Understanding pro-poor political change: the policy process

Contract No. CNTR 02 4039

Part II: Cambodia and Vietnam

Inception report
This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2

**Politics and development studies**
- Political Traditions 2
- Political regimes 4
- Political Institutions 6

**The policy process**
7

**Relating the political system to the policy process**
10

3. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 11

**Focus of analysis: political system – sector - policy issue - policy decision**
11
- **Level 1:** The political system and the nature of state-society relations 11
- **Level 2:** The institutions and policy processes of the three case-study sectors. 11
- **Level 3:** Policy issues from within the three sectors 13
- **Level 4:** Policy decisions 13

**Focus on the policy issue level**
13

**Defining the subject matter: what is pro-poor policy?**
15

**Research questions**
18
- Who makes policy? 18
- How do policy-makers perceive the poor? 18
- How is policy made in the countries and sectors in question? 19

**Approach to sub-national levels of the political / policy system: analytical and logistical considerations**
20

4. OUTPUTS 22

**In-country workshop towards end of fieldwork**
22

**Layout and structure of the country reports**
23
- Sectoral cf thematic presentation of findings 23
- Policy system cf poor as lens for the presentation of findings 24

5. BIBLIOGRAPHY 26

**General**
26

**Cambodia**
28

**Vietnam**
31
This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.
1. Introduction

This report develops the ideas presented in the ODI proposal document presented in August 2001. It has benefited from correspondence with DFID Governance advisors in London, Bangkok, Hanoi and Phnom Penh. In it we are trying to respond to two broad sets of comments: from London, that we need more – or more explicit - theoretical underpinning to the research programme, and from the country offices that we should look forward as much as back, and that the analysis should yield practical guidance as well as academic insights.

The report aims to do three things. Firstly, it provides a more explicit theoretical framework for the study (Section 2). Secondly, it translates these theoretical concerns into an approach and methodology (Section 3). Finally, it pulls out the key implications of this methodological section for planning the fieldwork phase, identifying points for discussion and planning by the ODI team and by DFID (Section 4).

As an aside, we should note that we have made a small change to the title of the research project. It would seem that what we are looking at is not simply the policy-making process, but also the process by which policy is implemented. The literature on the policy process (see below) emphasises that attention to implementation is crucial for understanding policy outcomes. Developing policies which favour the poor made is the first hurdle, but getting them implemented in the face of low state capacity or vested interests is equally problematic. A number of factors - too few or inadequately trained government staff, resource constraints, a lack of accountability and / or incentives facing the “street-level” bureaucrats responsible for service delivery - can all result in outcomes which at best fall short of the expectations of policy-makers, or at worst include unintended perverse outcomes. Equally, policies which do not have explicitly pro-poor intentions may result in doing so.
2. Theoretical framework

The subject matter of this research lies at the juncture of two fields which are often treated as largely distinct. This section briefly sketches the key concepts that we will draw from these diverse traditions, while the next section lays out how we will apply them in the conduct of our research.

Politics and development studies

The first broad field is that of political studies, political science and political history, with its focus on the nature of state-society relationships (from Marx and Weber onwards), power, and regime type. The connection between political studies and development studies, and the degree to which development policy and practice has taken politics seriously, has waxed and waned over the decades. Much of the interest in developing world politics has been focused on “whole system” transitions, such as the process of democratisation (e.g. Huntington 1991, Carothers 2002), or of state collapse (through rebellion, revolution, or coup d'état). Some of the work in this field involves examining panels of countries to see if there appears to be consistent relationships between regime type and macro-level development outcomes (with the general conclusion that there is no clear connection between democracy and progress in poverty reduction: see Moore et al 1999).1

Other approaches to the politics of developing science have looked in more detail at the nature of the state and its embeddedness in society in developing world contexts. Some of this is highly specific to the country in question, approaching contemporary politics through a focus on political culture and discourse which owes as much to anthropology as it does to political science.2 Out of this literature, however, there emerges a set of useful concepts with a high degree of generalisability. For simplicity, we will draw on the work of Bratton and de Walle, who distinguish three levels of political or institutional analysis in the context of development studies.

Political traditions

The first level of analysis is concerned with political traditions, those long-standing cultural legacies that suffuse political and social institutions. Examples would include Weber’s linkage of the Protestant work ethic to the rise of capitalism in northern Europe, or its contemporary Asian equivalent, the acceptance of family-centred aspiration and acceptance of benevolent authoritarianism that is ascribed to Confucian east Asia.3 Other examples of underlying traditions shaping political institutions and regimes would include the differing endowments of social capital used by Putnam to describe different economic and political trajectories in north and south Italy; or the concept of the “politics of the belly”, the evocative term used by Bayart to describe the zero-sum game patronage model of political competition

---

1 See also Hassan 1996, who argues that in south-east Asia political stability cannot be clearly related to the presence or absence of democracy.
2 See for example Kaviraj 1991 on Indian politics.
3 See Rigg for a summary of the Confucian and “Asian values” discourse, and of its critics.
prevalent in much of sub-Saharan Africa, driven by the self-fulfilling perception that the only way to secure individual security is at the expense of collective progress.

In the context of this research, there is good case to be made that Cambodia and Vietnam have substantially different political traditions. At a very general level, the traditional template of authority that continues to underpin much of Cambodian politics is one that is to a large degree shared with Thailand and Laos, whereas that of Vietnam is influenced more by the Confucian values and institutions of China.

Examining the role of political traditions does however need to be addressed carefully. It is necessary to make the distinction between i) acknowledging that there are observable historical continuities in political concepts and values, and that these vary between different countries, and ii) accepting a relativist argument that differences in political systems are not – or should not be – subject to purposive transformation. The major intellectual weakness of the strongly relativist position is that it implies that it is possible to identify “cultures” that are bounded, unchanging and independent of each other; and that as such it ignores the role of human agency and the exercise of power that is involved in construction and reproduction of culture. As such, it can become an excuse for denying competence to comment and rejecting any suggestions.

The question of a Cambodian or Vietnamese “tradition” thus needs to be regarded as complex for a number of reasons. There has been extensive “invention of tradition” under both the French colonial regime and the (often very different) regimes that have ruled since independence. In both Cambodia and Vietnam, political traditions have been moulded over the decades through the influence of modern – and, in culturally relativist terms, largely “Western” - ideologies of nationalism, socialism and human rights; and - particularly in Cambodia – by the extent of destruction, including the destruction of religious and educational infrastructure, during war and revolution. More recently, both countries have been subject to intervention by donors, non-governmental organisations and others seeking to reform political traditions. All these factors suggest the need to adopt a balanced perspective which addresses the mixture of continuity and change in fundamental political values (see Box).

---

4 This difference between the Indian-influenced political culture of Cambodia and the Chinese-influenced political culture of Vietnam was used by Newman (1979) to explain the different trajectories of the (ideologically comparable, socialist) revolutionary regimes that came to power in both countries in 1975. While some part of the difference between the policies of the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist Parties can undoubtedly be explained in these terms, Newman’s analysis takes the cultural mode of explanation to a position that we argue below is unhelpfully relativist. For a critical examination of the validity of describing Vietnamese culture as Confucian, see Templar 1999.

5 See Osborne on Sihanouk’s use of political tradition in Cambodia in the 1950s and 1960s.
Box 1 Political traditions in Cambodia

Cambodian political concepts have evolved in response to a range of influences since independence. Despite this, there are several strands of apparently customary behaviour which can be discerned and which have been mobilized to political effect in recent years:

- **Patron-clientism**, defined as a special case of dyadic ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal service, to the patron (Scott 1972). This is particularly prevalent within the state, but a version of it has been advanced as the basis of individual sponsorship of development projects to benefit the poor, and the allocation of gifts to party members at election times.

- **Conceptualisation of power in terms of hierarchy**, particularly seen in the division of society into ‘big’ people, who wield personal influence in a variety of spheres of life, and ‘little’ people who wield little personal influence (Chandler 1979 p 302). Of particular importance politically is the view that power inheres in ‘big’ people rather than in official positions, and that advancement for ‘little’ people is likely to emerge through attachment to ‘big’ people, rather than primarily through individual effort or excellence.

- **Reluctance to dissent openly as an individual.** Whether this is a deep-seated cultural attitude or a strategic response to the realities of power in Cambodia over recent decades and centuries, this has been suggested as an important characteristic of political behaviour by anthropologists in Cambodia (Chandler 1994 p. 314), although the emergence of individuals willing to campaign for opposition parties across Cambodia over the last decade calls into question the nature of this reluctance, and the conditions under which it operates.

It should be noted, however, the alternative views of political culture drawn from a different conception of Cambodian tradition have been mobilised as part of the democracy promotion process in recent years. In particular, human rights and peace organisations have drawn upon Buddhist doctrines, such as the Ten Duties of Kings, and upon historical exemplars such as King Jayavarman VII, to promote a view of leadership as appropriately characterised by values of service, benevolence, mercy and tolerance.

Political regimes

Political regimes can be defined as the sets of procedures that determine the distribution of power. Various attempts have been made to define criteria with which to categorise different types of regime. Linz thus distinguishes different types of authoritarian regimes, based upon the degree of inclusiveness, popular mobilisation and the political values they express. Dahl takes a similar approach, locating political regimes along two axes: the first according to the degree of political competition (from monopolistic to pluralistic) and the second by the degree of political participation (roughly speaking, the proportion of the population entitled to participate in politics on a more or less equal level).

Dahl’s approach is useful in understanding the broad contours of power relations within any given political system and the nature of its embeddedness in society.
However, there are limits to which the interesting variations in the nature of either competition or participation can be captured on a scale, that is, as a quantity. Thus the obvious distinction between Cambodia and Vietnam in terms of political competition is that between a pluralistic (multiparty democratic) system in the former and a monopolistic (one party) system in the latter. Yet this characterisation provides only a partial description of the nature of political competition in these two countries. A fuller description of the nature of political competition would have to reflect on the basis of that competition with ideological issues (or at least issues of collective national interest) more pronounced in Vietnamese debates than in their Cambodian equivalent.

Similarly, the nature of the participation or inclusion of the population in the politics of these two countries cannot completely be captured on a scale that is independent of value judgements about what type of participation matters. If the implicit metric of participation is periodic elections, both countries are nominally equal (both hold regular national elections to a National Assembly on the basis of universal adult franchise) - albeit that in Vietnam all candidates must be either Party members or Party-approved. Yet there are more opportunities for participation “between elections” in Vietnam, and these are generally more formal, and generally less malign in their effects on the collective developmental outcomes of the political system. One of the most critical questions in terms of the developmental perspective on politics is why democratic government (most notably in India) has failed to deliver better pro-poor outcomes in countries in which the poor are by any reasonable definition a significant proportion of the electorate. Describing the proportion of the population that can participate in politics is thus a necessary but not sufficient perspective on the inclusiveness of a given political regime.

In describing regime type – especially for the purpose of policy analysis - it thus seems helpful to complement a focus on participation and competition with attention to accountability and representation. Examining accountability and representation provides some observable phenomena to research:

- What kinds of organisations represent the poor? (Members of Parliament, NGOs, mass organisations)

- How do those organisations identify the interests of the poor? (consultation? ascription?)

- How do they promote the interests of the poor? (Debate in parliament, lobbying, participation as actors or consultants in the policy making process?)

- What mechanisms of accountability are available to the poor? (an independent and assertive press? quality of election campaigning? other fora?)

- What repertoire of contention or forms of resistance are available to or used by the poor? How do the poor resist and how effective is it?

---

6 For recent work on the importance of accountability in generating development outcomes, see Fox 1997; Jenkins and Goetz 1999a, 1999b.

7 Tilly 1986; Scott 1985.
Political institutions

The term “institution” is awkward, as it is used in at least two different ways. In academic terminology (e.g. in the New Institutional Economics literature), there is a commonly accepted distinction between institutions as the “rules of the game” and organisations as the “players”\(^8\). In daily usage, however, the term institution is often used interchangeably with organisation, so that a Ministry of Health or Cabinet Office are also described as political institutions. Bratton and de Walle explicitly accept that the term can be used in both senses:

- political institutions can be highly abstract notions, such as constitutional principles, or they can be expressed concretely in actual organisations, such as trade unions, political parties, or the military. They include key aspects of formal politics, like the judiciary, but also informal customs such as patronage, clientalism, seniority principles, or lobbying\(^9\).

Huntington links institutions and organisations in an interesting manner, defining institutions as “expected patterns of behaviour”, which helps to establish the distinction between organisations that are institutionalised (i.e. predictable in their procedures) and those that are not. O’Donnell argues that consolidated democracy is institutionalised democracy – i.e. political actors work on the assumption that democratic processes will continue to be the major means of managing conflict in society. He also draws a distinction between formal institutions (elections, parliaments, courts) and informal institutions (patron-client networks, influence of elders)\(^10\). This helps to frame an analysis of the policy process, to the extent that regularised political frameworks are more accessible than discretionary and unpredictable ones.

Institutions and their organisational expressions help to provide a concrete focus for the examination of policy choices, in both the short and long term. By setting the rules of the game – and determining which actors are allowed to play – institutions both perpetuate and transform regime characteristics (see Box 2).

---

\(^8\) North 1995 p. 23.

\(^9\) Bratton and de Walle 1997 p. 40.

\(^10\) O’Donnell 1996.
Box 2 Doi moi and the legitimacy of political institutions in Vietnam

Prior to 1975 the ideology of nationalism was used by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to legitimise its struggle for unification. With reunification, the legitimacy of the regime therefore came to rely upon perceptions of its performance in terms of national development. Poor economic performance, which undermined the Communist Party’s claims to moral and intellectual superiority, resulted in a crisis of legitimacy as the (Alagappa, 1995:324). Socio-economic and cultural differences also made the northern model of legitimation impractical in the south; while reform in other socialist countries further undermined its credibility, with the collapse of Eastern Europe followed by calls from many leaders for mass participation in the political process to avoid revolution (Vasavakul, 1995:278, 287). In an attempt to recapture legitimacy, the CPV made doi moi and its associated policies of economic renovation central to state policy and sought to revitalise the Communist Party apparatus and other political institutions such as the National Assembly and the mass organisations.

The adoption of doi moi signalled the CPV’s reliance upon a political process which drew in a broader range of institutions in an attempt to restore the legitimacy of one party rule. This policy arguably enjoyed a reasonable degree of success. However, since 1997 Vietnam has suffered from public disturbances, such as those in Thai Binh and the Central Highlands, and from a fall in foreign investment and economic growth. Both these factors have once again threatened the ‘performance legitimacy’ of one party rule (Thayer, 1998). The continuing fundamental tension between the open economic system and the closed political system remains a dilemma for the Communist Party.

The policy process

The second broad field of relevance to this research project is the more applied field of policy studies. This field typically i) examines how governments come to identify and define a policy issue; ii) identifies the influences upon policy formulation; and iii) analyses the process of implementation, and the factors (capacity, resources, incentives) which can result in policy outcomes which fall short of or contradict the intentions of policy-makers.

There are a range of different conceptual models which purport to describe the policy process. The policy process can be defined broadly as the process by which an issue is identified as something amenable to policy response, and is then subjected to various stages of analysis on the way to a decision, implemented, and the outcomes monitored and evaluated and the findings used to inform subsequent iterations of policy-making.

The starting point for the policy process literature is the rational or linear model of policy-making, which assumes that the process moves through the stages of agenda, analysis, decision and implementation identified above in a logical and technocratic manner. In this model, the process begins with the recognition and definition of the problem or issue that is to be addressed; proceeds through an identification of the possible courses of action which might be taken; an appraisal of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each option; selection of the optimal strategy; implementation; and ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluation of the results.
In practice, of course, this is a highly idealised model of the process by which policy is made and implemented. The initial definition of the problem and identification of options are shaped by a variety of forces which operate at both a conscious and unconscious level. These include prevailing popular discourses regarding a given social issue, perhaps articulated through the media; particular narratives which are embedded within communities of experts and which serve to frame reality and render complex situations understandable; the preferences of powerful stakeholders; and so on. Not all options are considered, and of those considered not all receive equal treatment on the basis of their technical merits. Finally, a variety of factors shape the way in which policy outcomes are measured and interpreted.

The first major critique of the rationalist-linear model focussed upon how policy issues are constructed. This incrementalist school emphasises the incentives towards evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, arguing that policy-makers tend to consider only a limited range of policy alternatives, most of which are only minor modifications of the current policy position. Far from systematically considering the full range of outcomes of each alternative, only a few crucial consequences are weighed – and of these, political rather than technical merit often prevails. Representative of this model, Lindlom (1980) argued that policy-makers recognise the strong constraints on radical change and thus tend to favour “disjointed incrementalism” or “muddling through”. Strategy thus typically changes in a gradual, step-wise manner, rather than through dramatic innovation11. In a variation, the “mixed-scanning” model (Walt 1994) suggests that policy makers engage in a broad but shallow initial review of the options, rapidly eliminating most of these in order to derive a shortlist which is then subject to more systematic appraisal of advantages and disadvantages.

If it is accepted that policy is not made and implemented according to strict technocratic criteria, there are a variety of explanations for how policies are in fact produced. Rational choice models posit policy choice as the outcome of public officials responding (in order to secure election or rents) to groups in society who organise in order to lobby in defence of their interests. In this struggle, each side is assumed to be well informed and to act rationally.

The rational choice (or neo-classical) approach is criticised for being overly theoretical and atomistic. Elite-centred models pay more attention to the manner in which policy-making is embedded in differences in power. Policy is depicted in elite-centred approaches as the outcome of struggles between factions within relatively small political and bureaucratic elites; the motivations may be self-interest (the control of state resources for the distribution of patronage) or altruistic, suggesting that the values and perceptions of social elites should be a major concern of policy analysts. In the southeast Asian context, there have been several attempts to assess the role of elites on development policy and outcomes on a cross-country basis (e.g. Alatas 1993; Crone 1993).

Institutionalist perspectives analyse policy choices and implementation outcomes in terms of the nature of political institutions. Institutionalist approaches vary in the degree to which they perceive the state to be an actor in its own terms, pursuing interests which are at least semi-autonomous of society; or see the state more as an

---

arena for competition between competing social and economic groups. Those who focus primarily on the capacity and internal workings of the state examine policy choices and implementation outcomes in terms of the degree to which states are permeated by political patronage systems and informal rather than formal decision-making structures, and the way in which relationships between parliaments and executives affect their ability to produce credible and speedy policy decisions. Those who focus more on the interface between the machinery of government and organised civil society emphasise the ways in which political institutions shape patterns of access to decision-making authority, giving some groups greater influence in policy-making. Finally, there is a third broad grouping of institutionalist analysts who examine the way in which the policy formulation and implementation and interpretation of outcomes are influenced by policy networks which link individuals with similar beliefs or sets of expertise.

There is much complementarity and overlap between institutionalist modes of analysis and interest-based approaches, which focus on the role of political and social interests in shaping policy choices and implementation outcomes. One group of scholars has suggested that policy choices and implementation outcomes reflect the collective interests of state officials — that is, they suggest that the state is an actor in its own right with interests of its own. Another group has focused on the way in which state action is constrained by social-structural factors, or the distribution of social and economic power between various fractions of the capitalist, peasant and proletariat classes – with some of these classes having much greater power than others, and thus much greater influence upon policy. Policy change can then be explained in terms of shifts in the balance of power between class forces, brought about by long-term structural change and by crises (economic, military or natural). A third group has focused on the role of organisations and institutions - political parties, producer associations, regional organisations and other lobby groups – and explains policy influence as a function of group’s capacity to articulate and organise a cohesive identity, pursue collective action, and form effective coalitions with others.

For our purposes, one of the key conclusions from the empirical and theoretical literature is that the idealised distinction between formulation and implementation is in reality often blurred. Lipsky reported on how public sector policies in America get transformed during implementation, due to the fact that “front-line bureaucrats” (welfare officers, teachers, police) responsible for service delivery have the scope – formal or informal - to exercise discretion during implementation, so shaping what service is provided, to whom, and in what form. Neo-rationalists such as Mintzberg argue that strategy formulation and implementation go hand in hand, and that under normal circumstances only a small proportion of an organisation’s intended strategy is implemented (or “realised”) because it is necessary to adjust and revise it in the light of experience. In this view, policy development is more about “crafting” than “planning”. While those making policy decisions may ultimately need to act “as if” there was an effective separation between formulation and implementation, they should (and probably do) take into account the reality of interests, opportunities and constraints which will determine how policy is translated into outcomes during the process of implementation.
Relating the political system to the policy process

While there is clear overlap, research on the policy process has tended to be treated as a relatively autonomous sub-discipline within political science. The literature on the policy process has also been dominated by research on Northern governments, despite the fact that it provides a set of conceptual tools (e.g. incrementalism, street-level bureaucracy) which are valuable in understanding how public policy works in the developing world. While some authors have addressed how specific aspects of the political system affect service delivery and development outcomes (e.g. the work of Jenkins and Goetz on accountability), only a few have (e.g. Grindle or Tendler) have really addressed the links between political systems, policy-making processes and outcomes in a broad and systematic manner.

Our conceptual framework draws pragmatically upon political science, policy studies and the contemporary anthropological and sociological literature on the countries in question. Given the time and resources available for this research, we believe it is best to begin with one or more concrete policy issues in each of the three sectors that are the subject of this research, and use the findings of the research to identify aspects of the sector in question and the political system – its culture, regime characteristics and institutions – in which it is embedded.

One of the challenges of this research will thus be to examine which aspects of the policy process – the process by which specific strategic government decisions are made, implemented and interpreted – can be most clearly related to the successively deeper levels of political substrate. There is a presumption that political institutions change more rapidly than regime types; and regime types, in turn, change faster than the underlying political traditions (assumptions regarding the basis of authority and legitimacy) in which regimes are embedded. For an external actor such as DFID, there is a need to know what concrete problems with the policy process are amenable to resolution in the short- to medium-term, through reformulating and strengthening institutions, and which are so deeply rooted in fundamental political culture that they are only likely to respond slowly to long-run historical changes (such as increasing urbanisation, literacy, and the emergence of new economic and social groupings) and so must be worked around rather than addressed directly (Unsworth 2001).
3. Approach and methodology

The overall aim of the research is to improve understanding of the political systems and mechanisms of pro-poor political change in Vietnam and Cambodia. This will involve addressing the following questions.

Focus of analysis: political system – sector - policy issue - policy decision

In terms of the theoretical concepts sketched in section 2 above, the subject matter of the research lies at four nested levels. We propose to address all four levels to some degree, and work actively to draw out the linkages between the four different levels. However, we also feel that it is imperative to prioritise between them, especially in terms of the focus of fieldwork, given the time and human resources available.

Level 1: The political system and the nature of state-society relations

This level of analysis will provide the background to the research on the linkages between policy-making and poverty reduction. This analysis will be based almost entirely upon a structured summary of existing sources rather than primary research. Analysis at this level will cover:

- the underlying political traditions or culture, the way in which different aspects of this political culture support or militate against pro-poor policy making;
- the nature of the political regime (as defined by – among other features – the degree and nature of political competition and inclusion, the degree to which authority and power are concentrated socially and geographically);
- the specific institutions (constitution, elections) and organisational forms (parties, executive, legislature, judiciary) that constitute the political system;
- detailed trajectory of changes in pro-poor policy since 1990 and reference to historical (pre-1990) trends. This will include trajectories of institutional change, economic liberalisation, international involvement and other reforms which have had influence on political reforms.

Level 2: The institutions and policy processes of the three case-study sectors.

The ToR require that the research reviews three broadly sectoral policy areas – namely forestry, land administration, and provision and financing of (primary) health care - in order to identify which groups in society have benefited from government policy.

We propose that this review of sectoral issues is pursued largely through the examination of a small number of specific policy issues in each of the sectors
involved (see below). However, it will also be necessary to provide in each case a brief background description of the structure of political authority and the locus of decision-making in each of the sectors in question. In terms of research, this description will be written through a combination of:

- a review of secondary materials (Government sector policies and plans, donor and NGO sector reviews, project evaluations, findings from PPAs and surveys on service delivery experiences of the poor, etc.); and

- findings with regard to sector-level institutions and processes that emerge from the policy decision studies (see below).

Box 2 provides some illustrative examples of the kind of questions that would be addressed at this level of analysis.

---

**Box 3 Examples of issues for sector analysis**

1. **Land administration policy**

Who/what organisations are responsible for formulating land policy? Is responsibility divided amongst different ministries or agencies at the central level? Who is responsible for implementation? To what extent does implementation reflect policy? When it doesn’t, why not – what forms of resistance are used, by whom, and why? To what extent is policy-making and implementation regarding land allocation determined at the Provincial rather than central levels? What have been the main external factors driving attention to land policy (i.e. what kinds of crises or pressures put land policy on the agenda?)

2. **Primary health care policy**

To what extent is primary health care defined institutionally as a distinct sub-sector, as opposed to defined implicitly as the aggregation of various vertical programmes (e.g. TB control, nutrition, etc.)? What are the main public health problems facing the poor? What are the main constraints upon their access to affordable quality health care – is it remoteness, lack of knowledge, cost, or the attitudes of health staff? How is primary health care financed? What is the balance between central financing; financing from revenues generated at the Provincial or sub-Provincial levels; and finances generated through cost recovery (user fees) at the point of delivery?

3. **Forest resource management**

Who is responsible for formulating and implementing forest policy - at the central level, and at the Provincial and sub-Provincial levels? To what extent is policy-making and implementation regarding land allocation determined at the Provincial rather than central levels? What have been the main external factors driving attention to land policy (e.g. demonstrations against land appropriations, donor and NGO criticism, environmental crises arising from deforestation)? To what extent does the state have a direct financial stake in forest resource management? What form does this stake take: granting concessions (domestic and foreign), state-owned enterprises, etc.?

The outcome of these policy reviews should be identification of what institutions, issues or interests in the sector in question constitute the main opportunities or obstacles to pro-poor policy making. This will suggest ways in which DFID can...
track whether developments in the sector are moving in a direction which improves or erodes the likelihood of prop-poor outcomes.

Level 3: Policy issues from within the three sectors

Certain policy issues emerge as consistent concerns within each of the three sectors. Findings from these particular policy issues can be taken as illustrative of both system-wide and / or sector-specific features of politics and policy-making. A policy issue will in most cases be broader than a particular policy decision (i.e. the process leading to a given law or decree being issued and then implemented: see below). While such a policy decision may form the core subject matter of a policy issue, a focus on a given policy issue might equally take a longer time frame encompassing a series of specific laws, decrees, resolutions or regulations. Where such an approach is feasible, it has the advantage of allowing insights into the evolution of a policy issue, and of its treatment of the interests of the poor, through several iterations. It thus raises the possibility of tracing the influence of “background” contextual factors – institutional evolution, regime change, the growing influence of external e.g. donor actors – on a particular set of interests and institutions within a given sector.

Level 4: Policy decisions

Finally, there are specific policy decisions. In conceptual terms, the policy process with regard to a given policy decision (that is, a law, decree, resolution, or regulation) is assumed to follow the sequence outlined in section 2 above under description of the linear model of policy making: that is, a social or economic phenomena is identified as a problem or issue amenable to policy response, and so gets onto the policy agenda; it is then analysed, and policy response options considered and evaluated; a decision is made; and the policy is then implemented.

Focus on the policy issue level

We believe that given the objectives and resources available for this research we are best focusing upon the third of the four analytical levels identified above, that is, upon one or if time allows perhaps two specific policy issues within each of the three sectors. The focus is thus at a level above that of a particular policy decision, but below a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of sectoral policy-making: it will draw upon the former to illustrate aspects of the latter. Comparison of insights from policy issue studies in the three sectors will also help to identify aspects of the policy system which have a high degree of generalisability, and can be assumed to relate to underlying political institutions and traditions – and, as such, less likely to change in the short to medium term.

Focusing at this level also has the advantage of ensuring greater consistency with the IDS studies of Indonesia and India - and thus facilitates the process of writing the final synthesis report.

Box 4 provides a preliminary list of illustrative policy issues in each sector in each country.
This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 4 Preliminary suggestions for focus policy issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forestry</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benefit-sharing policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Devolution and decentralisation of forest management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land administration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The evolution of land allocation policy since 1988; differential implementation and outcomes in rural, urban and peri-urban areas, and in lowland and highland agroecological and ethno-sociological systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policies regarding the use of land for commercial agriculture or aquaculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The policy of issuing Vietnam Health Insurance (VHI) cards to the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The system of central transfers to compensate for different levels of p.c. Provincial and sub-Provincial health financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forestry</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The regulation of commercial concessions, and how livelihood needs of the poor are protected in this process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land administration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The development of policies for land titling and its effects on access to common property resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policies for appeal against illegal appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary health</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The formulation of cost recovery policies, evidence of their effects on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Explaining the success of some vertical disease control programmes (e.g. polio control) compared to slow policy response to other disease control issues (e.g. HIV/AIDS – now achieving some results, but after a poor start)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are proposed for consideration by the country teams, in consultation with DFID staff, in the weeks leading up to the start of fieldwork. Selection should be finalised in meetings in-country in the first week of fieldwork. It may be useful to identify at this stage some basic criteria for selection:

- The policy issue in question must be substantial enough to incorporate a number of different levels of decision-making, and be well-documented;

- It should be both well established as a policy issue – so that it is possible to track it’s evolution to date over a good number of years – but also current, so that it has relevance for understanding the present policy-making system and identifying likely trends in the future development of the policy system;

- At the same time it should not be so controversial that people are very guarded in talking about it;
This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.

- Policy issue case studies should wherever possible encompass a range of different settings and groups amongst the poor (e.g. both rural and urban settings, and – especially in Vietnam - different ethnic groups, even if only at the level of lowland / majority Kinh and highland / ethnic minority). If it is not possible to encompass each axis of difference in each policy issue study, the collection of policy issue studies should together cover all the major important axes of difference);

- Policy issue case studies should as far as possible reflect DFID’s specific interests: if not in terms of sector or geographical focus of fieldwork (selection of locations for exploration of Province or sub-Province roles), then in terms of DFID’s thematic-structural governance interests (e.g. the functioning of new Commune-level structures in Cambodia).

- Finally, it must of course address a policy issue which is relevant to poverty. Identifying exactly what is meant by “pro-poor policy” is addressed in the following section.

**Defining the subject matter: what is pro-poor policy?**

This is an important question for all levels of analysis. However, it is especially important if – as we strongly recommend below – we focus our fieldwork upon a detailed examination of a small number of specific policy issues drawn from within each of the three case study sectors, and use these to obtain insights into how sector policy works.

The difficulties involved in defining a policy as pro-poor is that it could be deemed pro-poor in the eyes of some actors (e.g. a donor such as DFID), but not in the eyes of others (e.g. national policy-makers). Cutting across this distinction, a policy may be pro-poor in intention but result in outcomes which are not pro-poor; or, conversely, might have pro-poor outcomes even though this was not intended, or not the driving consideration, at the outset. With regard to this intention / outcome distinction, the issue is complicated further in that the data available on outcomes is often insufficient to provide a definitive identification of which policies have or have not had an impact on poverty – and how this impact might have been differentiated between different groups amongst the poor. We will of necessity have to make some judgements, based upon our reading of the balance of evidence, when choosing examples of policy “success” and “failure” with which to illuminate the links between the policy process and pro-poor outcomes.

This range of meanings of “pro-poor policy” are summarised – albeit in a somewhat idealised and simplistic manner - in the following matrix.
Table 1 Range of meanings of “pro-poor policy”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference or consensus in actors’ perception</th>
<th>Distinction between intention and outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy is:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-poor in intention and (on the basis of available evidence) outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Broad consensus: most actors agree that policy is pro-poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Lack of consensus: significant differences exist between policy actors (e.g. centre-local state, or government and donors) on whether policy is pro-poor</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We take the position that research that is ultimately oriented towards guiding DFID decision-making must take a donor definition of poverty and pro-poor as its first point of reference. It will nonetheless have to take account of how the policy in question was framed within national discourses about poverty: was it seen as pro-poor in intention by national policy-makers, and if so, was the link to poverty reduction seen in the same way as donors saw it? An obvious basic hypothesis would be that pro-poor outcomes are more likely to occur where the key national actors in the policy system (including both the sectoral ministry and the executive, and both central and Provincial levels) concur with the donor perception that the policy in question is desirable for poverty reduction (row 1)12.

We will also take the position that we are primarily interested in policies which are pro-poor in intention. Policies which fall in column 3 – that is, policies without an explicit poverty focus which nonetheless deliver significant pro-poor outcomes (because the poor are able to capture a significant portion of the benefits, either by taking up policy-generated opportunities that are available to all, or by successfully resisting and undermining policies whose intended outcomes were detrimental to the poor) – are interesting but, given the need to make choices within the resources available, of secondary concern for this research. Rather, we will concentrate upon purposive pro-poor policy.

When selecting policy themes to illustrate the sectoral case studies, we will attempt to choose a mix which ideally will include one in each of the following:

12 Though see Sanyal 1991 for an example of "antagonistic co-operation", in which donors, Government and national NGOs co-operated on a given development policy despite the fact that they held widely differing views on the objectives of the policy in question.
This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.

- Cell 1: where the perceptions of actors about the status of a policy as pro-poor largely coincide, and the policy is deemed successful on this criterion. In terms of operational outcomes, learning from these successes will hopefully suggest how in the future DFID might identify “low-hanging fruit”: that is, policy areas in which i) donor and Government perceptions of and interest in poverty reduction coincide and ii) Government capacity is of such a level that a small amount of targeted donor policy support has a good chance of resulting in pro-poor policy;

- Cell 2: actors agreed that a policy was desirable for poverty reduction, but for one or more reasons (low state capacity, embedded interests of state implementing bodies at sub-national levels, or resistance from social and economic groups - including sometimes groups amongst the poor) the policy failed to deliver pro-poor outcomes. Analysis from this case study would direct donor interventions towards improving state capacity rather than focusing upon political will. What this actually means in concrete terms in a given context may vary greatly: according to the “developmental state” school of thought, it might imply that there is a need for stronger state institutions, especially at the centre, which are largely autonomous from or not captured by particular social interest, and which are capable of exerting discipline upon lower levels of the bureaucracy to implement the policy formulated. More prosaically, it may imply a need for more effective systems of policy implementation, incorporating perhaps a simplification of decision-making, better communication of policies to local government, more flexibility in allowing sub-national government to adapt policy to geographical variations in circumstances, or an ability to build social consensus in support of policy implementation and engage the support of intended beneficiaries.

- Cell 5. In this case policy is pursued despite a fundamental ambivalence amongst senior policy actors (as occurs, for example, in aid-dependent countries when donors persuade a reluctant Government to take on a policy that the donors believe is pro-poor and necessary; or when a bureaucracy is unconvinced about politicians policy initiatives): but outcomes - intermediate or final - are disappointing. Operational lessons from case studies falling onto this category will focus upon how donors might engage in national discourses in order that they and national policy-makers may reach better, and closer, understanding before attempting to formulate policy. In terms of donor strategies, lessons from these case studies are likely to imply that a more long-term perspective is needed on the donor side, with much groundwork needed (in the form of efforts to reach agreement on understandings, concepts and values) before a specific policy can be formulated with reasonable odds of success.

These categories are very crude: perceptions and commitment will vary between Government actors and between levels of Government (and, for that matter, between donors and NGOs, between different donors, and between different parts of the same donor). The matrix does however capture some of the issues that need

13 See Colburn 1989 for an illustration (from Nicaragua) of how peasant resistance undermined the socialist states’ capacity to provide basic needs.

14 On the developmental state, see Leftwich; see also Norton 2002 for a review of this debate, its critics and the variant forms of the argument (e.g. on the “democratic developmental state”).
to be addressed explicitly in understanding what exactly is meant by pro-poor policy, and thus the subject matter of this research.

Research questions

With regard to each policy issue study – and the conclusions that are generalised form these about sector-specific and political system-wide features of the political system – we will approach research and report-writing through the following questions.

Who makes policy?

DFID undoubtedly has a good general sense of who are the key actors in policy-making, but this may need further specification. In both countries, external actors such as donors often find it hard to understand the workings of the policy process, albeit for slightly different reasons. Broadly speaking, in Cambodia the opacity of the policy process stems largely from the ways in which formal systems are subverted by the exercise of informal power through networks and patronage; whereas in Vietnam, while there is a clear element of this networking and patronage, this interacts with the fact that the formal rules are complex, with overlapping sources of formal authority, leaving many (including many within the system) unclear about how the process is actually supposed to work\textsuperscript{15}.

The research will seek to establish who exercises what kind of influence, at what stages, on the policy process. If it is helpful, each county team might spend some time early in the fieldwork phase brainstorming in order to derive a list of actors involved – formally and informally – in policy-making and implementation. If possible, the actors in this list could be mapped onto a rough flow chart which sketches the stages of the policy-making process or the directions of influence between the actors. Much of this will be specific to the sectors and policy issues that are the focus of the research, but the report will make an effort to identify and explore findings that appear to be generalisable across these and other sectors.

How do policy-makers perceive the poor?

The ways in which policies do or do not attempt to reflect the interests of the poor, or succeed in this effort, will depend crucially upon how policy-makers see the poor (e.g. as a moral obligation, as an embarrassing sign of national weakness, as a threat to social order, etc). Policy-makers’ perceptions are likely to vary with regard to different categories of the poor (e.g. by urban or rural categories or by ethnicity).

Understanding the perceptions of policy-makers with regard to the poor and the reasons for their poverty helps external actors such as DFID to understand why particular policies have evolved to date in the ways they have. It also helps DFID to be aware of what policies with regard to the poor are likely to be relatively easy to get on the agenda and which, because they rely upon a conceptualisation of the poor and

\textsuperscript{15} See McCarty 2002 on policy-making in Vietnam.
of poverty which is not deeply rooted in national political discourse, are going to be harder to raise and more likely to become distorted during policy formulation or implementation.

One specific question would be how far policy-makers accept the donor principle that the poor can contribute to policy-making through consultation / participation. In practice, it seems likely that many policy-makers continue to perceive the poor as ignorant and illiterate and thus having little to contribute to the policy process\textsuperscript{16}.

Analysis of policy discourse with regard to the poor will draw on:

- interviews conducted with Government officials at various levels (recognising that there will be a degree to which officials – especially at the centre – are likely to adapt what they say in the light of what they believe donors and those associated with them expect to hear);
- the content of discussions between Government and donors (in which international concepts are likely to overshadow national concepts);
- discussions within Government, as gleaned from official documents, insights from officials and foreign advisors posted in Ministries;
- debates in the National Assembly, as reported in both Cambodian- / Vietnamese- and English-language media; and possibly directly observed (and possibly recorded) in the case of Cambodia, should a suitable debate arise;
- NGO documents and interviews with NGO staff, both at the centre and in the Provinces;
- Political campaign debates (a richer source of material in Cambodia than in Vietnam);
- Media reporting, differentiating where necessary between populist and more elite / middle class-oriented titles, and in Cambodia noting the political alignment of the media outlet in question.

In Cambodia, it will be important to address whether these discourses, within Ministries and the National Assembly, vary in a consistent manner between the different political parties.

How is policy made in the countries and sectors in question?

For heuristic purposes, research into the nature of the policy process will follow the idealised sequence of the linear model: that is, it will address the institutions, interests and actors that shape each stage of the process from agenda-setting, through policy analysis and the identification of policy options, to the choice of policy response, and the various stages of implementation, feedback, and policy revision. Among the key questions are:

\textsuperscript{16} There was for example considerable scepticism expressed by some policy-makers in Vietnam with regard to the recent consultations with poor communities on PRSP (CPRGS) policy content. It was thought that the poor could describe their problems, but that they were not in a position to understand policy issues and thus had little of value to say about what pro-poor policies. This suggests limited buy-in to the donor advocacy of PPAs and related approaches to participatory policy-making.
What are the incentives, influences and interests to which policy makers respond in carrying out policies?

How do these shape the degree to which policies serve different groups of the poor in intent or outcomes?

What are the channels – formal and informal – by which different groups amongst the poor (urban-rural differences are likely to be pronounced here) manage to exercise influence at each stage in the policy process?

What is the role of agendas and patronage in policy making and resource distribution?

What are the channels and strategies open to different groups amongst the poor in seeking to shape or respond to Government policies? To what extent is the nature of the engagement of poor groups with the state shaped by established “repertoire of contention” (Tilly)? How responsive is the state to the needs of the poor and what is the influence (and the channels) of the poor on the formulation and implementation of policy?

What are the operational and practical implications of this for DFID?

Approach to sub-national levels of the political / policy system: analytical and logistical considerations

There are a variety of possible approaches to the incorporation of sub-national levels of the political and policy system in our fieldwork and in the subsequent presentation of findings and conclusions.

In the first option, we would select two or three Provinces, and one or two Districts within each, as case studies, and write them up as such, drawing out the differences between the centre and the sub-national levels, and between the different sub-national political locations. An alternative approach is to compile insights on sub-national policy processes using a looser and more opportunistic set of Province and sub-Province visits. Rather than present the material obtained from visits to Provinces as – for example - case studies of land, forest and health policy implementation in Kompong Speu Province, we integrate discussion of central and sub-national levels of policy making and implementation, referencing our findings to specific locations as and when appropriate.

This choice relates to the practical issue of the selection of Provinces and sub-Provincial sites for fieldwork. Approaches to this selection could involve:

making an effort to choose “representative” Provinces / Districts. At a fundamental level, this might include using rural and urban (or peri-urban) visits to examine the fundamentally different nature of the connections between poverty and policy (and political mobilisation and access) in these different environments. Trying to move beyond this, however, it is questionable whether it is realistic to attempt a “representative” range of geographical investigations with the time and staff available. This is especially true in Vietnam, which has
considerably more agro-ecological and ethnic diversity. In this context the best that might be hoped for is a selection of locations which draw in both Northern and Southern contexts, and / or upland and lowland environments.

- selecting purposively those Provinces in which DFID has a particular interest, and existing contacts (e.g. Ha Tinh for Vietnam)

- selecting opportunistically, on the basis of the researchers’ previous experience and contacts.

Under any of these three approaches, we could choose to select the same Provinces and Districts for each of the three sectors, or different Provinces and / or sub-Province levels for different sectoral issues or themes. Examination of forestry issues, for example, may well logically entail a different purposive sampling of Provinces than that called for in examination of health issues.

The team has not yet reached a decision on the role of sub-national fieldwork in the collection and presentation of the research. This will be discussed over the following weeks, and an approach fixed upon at latest in the first week of fieldwork. We welcome thoughts from DFID staff on these issues.
4. Outputs

**In-country workshop towards end of fieldwork**

We proposed in our note of 12th December that in Vietnam we hold a small workshop under the aegis of DIFD to present preliminary findings and conclusions. The participants in this workshop will be selected senior researchers from Ministry-affiliated national research institutes (e.g. Institute of Sociology, the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy, CIEM and LERES). This will provide a productive and manageable way to test and refine our thinking about what we have found, and to give us guidance on how to manage both the analytical and presentational aspects of writing up the final country report.

We feel that it could be useful to conduct a similar workshop in Cambodia, and would welcome thoughts on this, together with suggestions for invitees. The list should be kept to a small number of respected RGC officials with a role in policy-making, particularly in the three sectors under review17.

We need to agree the format and objectives of these workshops. What ODI proposed in Vietnam was a small meeting, probably no more than the ODI researchers plus the DFID Governance advisor and perhaps one or two other DFID, plus about eight-ten senior, open-minded people from policy side of Government. DFID London proposed inviting in a broader spectrum, including other donors. DFID Vietnam has also proposed linking the outputs of this research to a broader debate on governance, possibly conducted jointly with UNDP. We can see the attraction of such a meeting, but think it should be separate, and later. The meeting during the fieldwork should be sufficiently small and low key to enable everyone to engage in an open discussion of the report and the nature of national policy-making. A larger meeting involving other donors and a broader spread of Government partners, plus perhaps some representatives of NGOs, would be more suitable at a later date, perhaps when the first draft of the report is available for circulation and discussion.

---

17 If this workshop is to involve both researchers (Caroline and Tim) then it should be held around 20th February, before Tim leaves to meet with the Vietnam team in Hanoi. This will be a little early, as there will still be two weeks of Caroline’s research time still to spend. This may be about right, but leaves it up to Caroline alone to follow up on comments, including possibly comments on the sections that Tim was working on. The Vietnam country study will have to be led by Edwin and Loi, and may not involve Tim: especially if, as seems possible, the start of the Vietnam fieldwork will be set back one week.
This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.

**Layout and structure of the country reports**

The final format of the reports will obviously be shaped by the process, findings and conclusions of the research. However, it may be helpful at this stage to sketch the structure which it is anticipated the report will follow, as a point of discussion which will help DFID and ODI to agree on the objectives of the research.

**Sectoral cf thematic presentation of findings**

We would suggest that one option worthy of serious consideration is to adopt a thematic rather than a sectoral structure to each of the country reports. The sectors – and the illustrative policy issue studies within each - will remain central to the collection and analysis of information. However, this does not necessarily have to result in a report in which the findings and conclusions are presented in three separate sectoral chapters detailing the policy system and its strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis pro-poor policy in forestry, health and land respectively. It would also be possible to use the findings of the sectoral research to identify and illustrate recurrent themes – for example, the ambiguous nature of different aspects of decentralisation with regard to pro-poor voice and outcomes; the strengths and weaknesses of different channels available to the poor for establishing accountability and providing feedback on policy outcomes; or the potential and limitations on NGO / civil society channels in structuring input to policy. The report would be structured along thematic lines, illustrated throughout with material drawn from the sectoral studies, so that it would be possible to say – for example – how decentralisation does or might have different pro-poor outcomes in forestry compared to health.

The team has raised the possibility of structuring the report in this manner in conversation with DFID staff in London in meetings in December, and wishes to address to staff in Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand. The question seems particularly germane since DFID is not directly involved in all three sectors in Cambodia and Vietnam. Indeed, when it supports governance reforms, DFID in Cambodia and Vietnam (and with support form Bangkok) seems to do so more through thematic rather than sectoral initiatives (e.g. support to strengthening Commune governance in Cambodia, or interest in the Grassroots Democracy Decree in Vietnam).

While we believe there is a strong case for presenting the research findings and conclusions in a thematic rather than a sectoral structure, we consider that it is probably better not to select these themes in advance of the fieldwork. Ideally, they should emerge from our exploration of the case studies. However, it would be useful to engage in a preliminary discussion of what these eventual themes might be in meetings with DFID in the first week of fieldwork, and to revisit this discussion during writing up and presentation of initial findings in the small end-of-fieldwork workshops proposed above.
Policy system cf poor as lens for the presentation of findings

There is a danger that the way in which the research has been discussed to date (in the ToR, the ODI proposal, and subsequent documents) results in a somewhat top-down perspective which gives rise to a marginalised and fragmented perspective upon the poor as actors in the policy process. Political realism suggests that the poor are indeed - almost by definition – relatively marginal to policy-making, and that an analysis of the policy process that is to generate useful insights will of necessity concentrate primarily upon the structural features of the system, and the roles of the most influential actors in the policy process (various levels and fragments of the state, political parties, and influential – generally non-poor – social and economic groups).

However, there is also value in providing a more integrated perspective upon how the poor influence the policy process, even if only at the margin. It therefore seems worth including in each country report a final substantive chapter in which the findings laid out in the thematic (or sectoral) chapters are re-structured and represented from the perspective of the identity and agency of the poor, as a complement to a policy-system-focused analysis in the rest of the report.

This chapter will identify the most common forms of overt contention (e.g. strikes, demonstrations, symbolic attacks on government property) and covert resistance used by different groups amongst the poor in an attempt to influence the formulation or more commonly the implementation of policy. It will also note which of these appear to be effective and which ineffective (bearing in mind Charles Tilly’s observation that instruments of protest become institutionalised as a conventional “repertoire of convention”, rooted in political culture, which may be slow to change even when there is growing evidence that these forms are increasingly ineffective because of economic or political-institutional change). To the extent possible, it will address what the poor perceive to be appropriate and effective forms of participation and means of establishing accountability.

This formulation of the findings will be oriented towards providing DFID with guidance on how to work directly with the poor (e.g. by supporting different types of NGO or community organisation) so as to contribute to both short-term and long-term improvements in their capacity to engage in policy-making.
This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.
5. Bibliography

General


Barrington Moore, (1966) Social origins of dictatorship and democracy; lord and peasant in the making of the modern world.


This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.


McCourt, Tessa (2002?) The significance of understanding political capacity for reducing poverty. DFID: London: 3rd July.


This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.


**Cambodia**


Downie, Sue and Damien Kingsbury 2001 “Political development and the re-emergence of civil society in Cambodia.” pp. 43-64 in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol. 23 No. 1.


This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.


Vietnam


This is a public document. The views expressed here reflect those of the author(s) and not that of official DFID policy.


