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UGANDA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY:

A SYNTHESIS OF MAJOR THOUGHT

REPORT PREPARED FOR DFID UGANDA

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FINAL DRAFT

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ACRONYMS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CSO	Civil Society organisation
DP	Democratic Party
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DFID	Department for International Development
GoU	Government of Uganda
GoR	Government of Rwanda
GoS	Government of Sudan
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JLOS	Justice, Law and Order Sector
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MISR	Makerere Institute for Social Research
NALU	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NEC	National Executive Committee
NC	National Conference
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PAF	Poverty Action Fund
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
UPPAP	Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
UPC	Uganda People's Congress

BOXES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. DFID is in the process of introducing a new approach to providing development assistance. This approach recognizes that there are context-specific foundational factors that affect the capacity for reform as well as medium-term opportunities and constraints to change. It also acknowledges that there are contingent factors that influence state capacity and policy direction--including geopolitics, external obligations and the nature of donor assistance.

3. The agenda has six related objectives:

- a. To deepen understanding of the 'country's structures, institutions, and comparative historical trajectory';
- b. To provide a sound analysis of existing incentives and capabilities for change in the medium term;
- c. To candidly assess how external agents and donors (and aid modalities) influence change;
- d. To define how expected changes are likely to affect the poor;
- e. To clarify what this 'deeper understanding' signifies for subsequent DFID action;
- f. To evaluate how current incentives within DFID are likely to influence how staff respond to the new recommendations. (Booth, 2003a)

4. Prior to programme inception, DFID commissioned a number of guidance documents, which have been influential in defining priorities and providing a practicable analytical framework. Moore's guide to assessing political systems (Types of Political Systems: A Practical Framework for DFID Staff. See [Framework of Political Systems](#)) recommends three levels of analysis for mapping political systems. The first examines 'foundational' issues, particularly territoriality; geo-strategic position; resource dependence; social structure; and constitutionality. Moore argues:

- (a) governments that do not have territorial authority are likely to be preoccupied with defence and, possibly, with enriching themselves; government capacity to make and implement decisions will depend on population size; where the country is positioned and issues of regional security; the extent and manner of external intervention;
- (b) taxation revenue is likely to build accountability to citizens, while 'unearned incomes' such as aid or oil revenues might lead to incoherent policymaking (as donors vie for policy control) and militarised politics (as governments try to monopolize oil revenues);
- (c) the social structure (including the size of the proletariat or middle class, ethnic composition, the role of the public bureaucracy) will help to define politics and governance. Broadly, a large proletariat and sizeable professional middle class are likely to support democratic values and policy-based political parties; the public bureaucracy can drive policy in its own interests; though ethnic-based politics need not be problematic, it can also generate conflict;
- (d) the political system is defined by levels of constitutionality; that is, whether or not effective constitutional rules exist, and whether governments respect and observe them.

The Oxford Policy Management (OPM) framework (used in its report on Drivers of Pro-poor Change in Nigeria) adds to Moore's 'foundational' features. It highlights some of the structural factors (natural resource endowments; geographic and climatic factors; demographic patterns and changes; ethnic composition; the skills base; technologies; levels of economic development; structures of production, distribution and exchange; distribution of income and wealth) that are consequential for development. OPM emphasizes the importance of understanding the inter-relations between such structural features, institutions and agents.

Moore's second level of analysis examines institutionalisation, such as of the government apparatus, policymaking and political parties; the degree and quality of political competition and the institutional distribution of power. His reasoning is that poor and disadvantaged peoples have the best prospects where

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they are organised and where there is a 'a set of stable and predictable political institutions that permit competition for power through civic processes'. The third level investigates government capacity and accountability.

5. DFID Uganda has commissioned this synthesis report to provide a background for subsequent, detailed and thematic, change analyses. The principal purpose of this report is to *summarise* major work on the history, politics and institutional development in Uganda; social development, including the role of religion and ethnicity; conflict and insecurity; external forces in Uganda's development. The report provides material for analysing the foundational features described and includes some investigation of institutionalisation of the government apparatus. The report does **not**: (a) aim to provide an exhaustive account; it concentrates on principal features and, consistent with the Terms of Reference, focuses on opportunities and risks to future development; (b) provide the country analysis described in point (3b-f) above; (c) provide the rigorous political systems analysis anticipated in either the Moore or OPM frameworks; this will be conducted in the second phase of the work.

6. The report uses major published material and documents supplied by DFID Uganda. It does not include material from other donor agencies and, with fairly limited information, has not been able to provide a comprehensive comparative study of how donors are operating on the ground. (Much research is required here.) Similarly, the report uses very limited interviews and would have benefited from a much broader sample of respondents, particularly across government and donor agencies.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

7. This first section describes the geographic, demographic and economic differences between the north and south pre-colonial Uganda and the ways in which institutions (for example, rules governing production) were subsequently created to exacerbate regional inequalities. The section also examines the development of social classes and the role of religion and ethnicity in political development. It emphasizes the colonial governments/agents role in the underdevelopment of local industry, stifling the growth of the middle class, introducing and sustaining unfavourable terms of trade, and promoting racial, religious and ethnic tensions.

8. In the pre-colonial period, Uganda comprised a number of prominent kingdoms and scattered communities. It was a highly diverse territory, with a variety of social structures and practices. There were distinct differences between the North and the South: the South was more developed and had fairly well established centralised authorities. There were also important distinctions across southern Kingdoms. Ankole became a class-based society, in which the Bahima ruling class controlled the use of violence and owned the cattle. Bunyoro-Kitare, which was the most powerful kingdom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had fairly rigid social divisions between its pastoral aristocrats and agricultural serfs. Buganda was, reputedly, a more fluid society, in which peasants could be recruited to higher positions

9. By the nineteenth century, Buganda had expanded considerably, largely at the expense of Bunyoro. These clans upheld traditional religious beliefs, involving the worship of deities and spirits. In 1862, the first Europeans to arrive in Buganda introduced Christianity. The first Anglican missionaries arrived in 1876. The Roman Catholic missionaries arrived in 1879. Religious tensions developed between both groups and between Christianity, Islam, and the traditional Kiganda religions.

10. Uganda was made a protectorate in 1894 and the Uganda Agreement was concluded with Britain in 1900. The principal parties to the Agreement were the Baganda oligarchy (who were intent on retaining their traditional power and desired long-term British military support to guarantee their security) and the representative of the British Crown (who needed to secure the best arrangement feasible for Britain's economic profit). Under the final terms, the British allocated 10,034 square miles of land to the 'great chiefs' and the Royal Household, and retained all uncultivated, waste and forest lands for the British Crown. The

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Uganda Agreement both legitimised the social changes that had already taken place in Buganda and triggered new tensions and conflicts within Buganda and between the Baganda and other ethnic groups.

11. British policy of direct and indirect rule produced a racialized state and civil society and a tribalised rural population via decentralized despotism. Baganda chiefs were instrumental in 'mediating British rule', which intensified ethnic conflict. Centralized administration (via direct rule) excluded native institutions and practices and demanded conformity with European directives.

12. British economic policy resulted in the underdevelopment of local industry and stifling of the private sector. It led to racial tensions between Indians and Africans. Protectorate policy also exacerbated regional inequalities; production and wealth were effectively concentrated in the South while the North was used as a reservoir for labour and, later, soldiers.

13. The lack of a common Ugandan language helped to perpetuate inter-group and inter-regional conflicts.

14. However, despite the social and economic dislocation built up under colonialism, Uganda had favourable economic prospects at Independence, which governments could have used for the country's profit. Instead (arguably following the negative course of the country's social history), up to 1986, successive governments promoted ethnic and religious divisions and conflicts. Ugandans have vivid and terrible memories of the widespread dislocation and destruction under Milton Obote and Idi Amin. Analysts suggest that the social conditions that produced the violence in Uganda include social inequality (generated by unequal trading relationships and local regional, ethnic, religious and gender disparities); the existence of sub-states, ethnic and religious factionalism; poor conflict resolution mechanisms; absence of an indigenous property-owning class; the post-Independence decrease in national production; parochial, weak and poorly educated leaders; and the language problem.

15. Museveni's National Resistance Movement assumed power in 1986. The government's immediate (post-coup) political moves helped to build legitimacy beyond the South and Southwest and, importantly, to raise expectations of broad public participation, government accountability and improved welfare. Consistent with the democracy, security and unity objectives outlined in its Ten-Point Programme, the NRM expanded Resistance Councils (RCs) to the entire country. RCs operated on the principle that decision-making power, authority and policy-making responsibilities should also be located at the local levels and that citizens should be able to reach and influence their representatives and hold them to account for the quality of services. The Movement was to comprise all citizens in a distinct no-party democracy. Museveni reasoned that parties were likely to appeal to people on the basis of ethnicity and religion. Therefore, parties would only be instituted when social classes were sufficiently developed.

16. The NRM (subsequently the Movement in 1996) was committed to poverty reduction and political stability; it attracted tremendous support from donors and the economy grew at an average growth rate of 6% in the 1990s. Additionally, the Movement has managed to secure relative peace and stability in most parts of Uganda.

17. However, questions are now being raised about the quality of development in Uganda. Among the more frequently cited issues are the long-standing (North-South) regional inequalities; insecurity in Northern Uganda, the Southwest and the Great Lakes region; increasing tensions within the Movement and the political challenge to Museveni from within the heartland constituencies; the recent downturn in the economy and the evidence of growing inequalities; youth disaffection and the potential political risks; legacies of ethnic, religious and other social divisions, and the implications for political change; patronage, corruption and their costs to development; the character of the formal institutions and implications for stability.

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INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

18. The historical review demonstrated the disrepair of institutions, particularly post-Independence, and the challenges facing the Movement in 1986. These included establishing the rule of law, building a civilian army, and instituting mechanisms for ensuring respect for and defense of human rights. The Movement had its own 'socialist' vision of democracy, which involved broad representation of previously marginalized groups, such as women, PWDS and the youth. Further, it was intent on building an inclusive system that would preclude political and religious dissent. This no-party version of democracy has resulted in costs and benefits for institutional development.

19. The 1995 Constitution provides for a unicameral Parliament comprised of 'members directly elected to represent constituencies; one woman representative for every district; such numbers of representatives of the army, youth, workers, persons with disabilities and other groups as Parliament may determine. The Constitution differentiates between the Movement political system, the multiparty political system and any other democratic and representative political system. The Movement is defined as a broad based, inclusive and non-partisan political system, in which anyone can present himself for election, and in which decisions are based on merit rather than political affiliation. Political parties under the no-party political system are prohibited from appealing for membership on the basis of gender, 'ethnicity, religion or any other sectional division'. The 1997 Movement Act and the 2002 Political Organisation Act imposes restraints on political organisation and expression. Political parties cannot campaign or field candidates while the Movement system operates

20. The Constitution also provides for an independent judiciary and a civilian army. Various horizontal accountability mechanisms, including the Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Inspectorate of Government, have been established.

21. Multipartyists resent the restraints on political organisation and expression and, as they perceive it, the unfair advantages that the Movement grants itself, under the Movement Act. By claiming that it is not a party, the Movement is not subject to the stipulations of the Political Parties and Organisations Act. It receives funding through parliamentary appropriation and is treated as a part of government though it has its own distinct political interests. The President is dominant within the Movement and has substantial support, particularly among the Movement caucus, within Parliament. Yet, Parliament has a reputation of being a lively institution and various caucuses are sufficiently confident to challenge the President. Nevertheless, Parliament would benefit from capacity development and greater independence would improve its effectiveness. Vertical accountability mechanisms (elections) are still tainted by patronage, intimidation and corruption. Horizontal accountabilities are operational but have limited effect. Civil society organisations have been developing but are limited by restraints on their activities and by the tendency (by both government) and donors to select/co-opt the more organised, visible, urban and seemingly competent organisations. Academics note that both government and development agencies have been advancing one particular notion of civil society, which is often inconsistent with social realities. The Judiciary is trying to rebuild its reputation; it has been seen as corrupt, inaccessible to the poor and hesitant to make anti-government decisions. It now has plans to improve access and check corruption and its recent decisions have improved its image as an independent institution. Analysts question the role of the military, which has been accused of indiscipline and human rights abuses. Additionally, there are concerns about the military's political role.

22. Therefore, following Moore's guidelines, institutions are developing but they cannot be described as regularised and predictable. Some of the core institutions are still relatively fragile and susceptible and even the more successful could profit from capacity building and greater acknowledgement of their role and value.

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POLITICAL CHANGE: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

23. Following a Constitutional Court ruling in March 2003, parties are now free to campaign for candidates, open offices and hold public meetings, provided they meet required qualifications and register. A transition to multipartyism seems likely and commentators are debating the likely benefits and risks. Analysts note that the direction and character of change depend on (a) whether or not the President contests the 2006 elections; (b) whether or not a referendum is held and the outcomes; (c) the degree of freedom that is allowed the parties; and (d) the electoral laws and constitutional safeguards implemented. However, they are also careful to point out that notwithstanding these factors, the youth, disillusioned groups in the north and various pockets of resistance in the southwest are likely to have some bearing on political change.

24. Therefore, despite substantial improvements since 1986, Uganda remains a fragile political system. Though the government has achieved relative peace and stability, particularly in the South, its geographic position and past role in conflicts leaves it prone to regional threats. Insecurity continues in the North of the country and has spread to the Southwest. Uganda does not have firm control over its territory and does not monopolize the use of violence.

25. Procedural democracy is not enough. There are a number of long-term factors that affect the capacity for active political participation. These include rural and urban divisions; gender inequality; lack of property rights; insecurity and conflict. It is important that procedural matters do not mask the importance of more substantive reforms.

POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

26. Given the context, how effective are Uganda's poverty policies? Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) is well recognised as being 'broad based and locally owned'. Analysts observe that it has had an instrumental role in building national consensus around poverty eradication. Further, it has also managed to combine the policy and programmatic goals of the President/Movement, Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) technocrats and bilateral and multilateral agencies.

27. This President-technocrat-donor partnership worked well, and resulted in substantial poverty reduction gains. The President has been credited with providing strong leadership, while MFPED--which has been compared to a 'developmental' elite--has, with donor assistance, built a successful and predictable budget framework. Donor agencies have been instrumental in the design and implementation of the PEAP and now provide over 52% of budget funding.

28. One celebrated feature of the PEAP process is that it is fairly open, encouraging CSO involvement and representing local level voices, through participatory poverty assessments. Government and donors consider participation to be crucial for promoting broad ownership.

29. However, with the recent down turn in the economy, groups have been debating the sustainability of the model, particularly whether the core economic policies are compatible with long-term poverty reduction and curbing inequality. Various analysts are now challenging the claim of broad ownership and demonstrating the ways in which the selective representation that is characteristic of the political system is also replicated in the administration of the PEAP.

30. There is a view that 'ownership' may not be necessary for policy effectiveness; policy commitment may be sufficient. However, perceptions that policy is 'owned' by select groups can reduce commitment in others, as reported interviews with Parliament, CSOs and elites suggest.

31. At the local level, officials have, traditionally, had limited discretion, which fiscal decentralisation promises to change. However, legacies of patronage, ethnic and religious divisions compromise outcomes.

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These reinforce the view that the PEAP's reach and effectiveness depend on the broader context, as described in the preceding sections.

32. Donors have a part in shaping this broader context; however, some analysts suggest that they have not always played a consistent or constructive role. The main critiques are that donors, in their bid to present Uganda as an exemplar of macroeconomic stability, have ignored/not paid sufficient attention to human rights abuses and governance failures; therefore, donors have, inadvertently, compromised political development. Furthermore, donors have engaged with government in ways that prevent broad inclusion. For purposes of expediency, they have selected and supported 'priority' agencies, such as MFPED, and created parallel organisations that mirror what should be occurring in the traditional civil service. This approach has hampered wider institutional development.

33. The study suggests that much more research is required in order to understand donor relationships with governments, inter-donor politics and the risks and incentives that different agencies provide.

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OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This DFID-commissioned report on Uganda's political economy is designed to provide a background for more detailed analyses of processes of political and social change in Uganda, and their implications for the country's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Consistent with this broader agenda, the main purposes of the paper are to present key arguments on the ways in which Uganda's historical development has influenced existing institutions, political structures and processes, society and culture, and to emphasize opportunities and potential risks to future development.

The author conducted an extensive literature search and synthesized a selection of pertinent published and unpublished material; including documents supplied by DFID Uganda. It does not include material from other donor agencies and, with fairly limited information, has not been able to provide a comprehensive comparative study of how donors are operating on the ground. Additionally, she conducted selected interviews with UK-based experts on Uganda. The study would have benefited from more extensive interviews, particularly among government officials and within the donor community. However, these could not be completed within the short time allotted for the work.

Laure-Helene Piron (ODI), David Booth (ODI) and staff from DFID Uganda contributed documents and provided helpful comments on the drafts. The report does not feature this author's personal opinions or the views of any person who commented on the text.

Section 1 of the paper synthesizes material on the history of Uganda from the pre-colonial period to 1986. It emphasizes the economic, religious, ethnic and political dimensions of the pre and postcolonial experience. Section 2 focuses on institutional development, particularly of the democratic and legal framework. Section 3 synthesizes current thoughts on the prospects for political reform, and includes subsections on procedural and substantive change. Section 4 summarizes some of the main arguments on politics and the development framework, and highlights perceptions of the role of donors. Section 5 concludes.

SECTION 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - UGANDA

Pre-Colonial Societies; The Introduction of Foreign Religions; British Protectorate Policies and The 1900 Agreement; Indirect Rule and the Privileged Place of the Baganda Oligarchy; Direct Rule; The (Under)development of Local Industry; The (Under)development of the North; The Language Problem; Dislocation and Destruction: Independence – 1986; NRM and the Challenges of Reform

1.1 PRE-COLONIAL SOCIETIES

Before the British renamed and reconfigured the territory, what is now Uganda was then an array of kingdoms (Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro) and communities located in the Lango, Acholi, Madi, West Nile, Bukedi, Bugisi, Busoga, Teso, Karamoja, Sebei and Kigezi regions. It was a heterogeneous area, with a variety of customary practices, social and political structures.

Across the northern region, population was scarce and the environment unduly harsh; people engaged either in herding or shifting agriculture. Pastoral groups, such as the Karamojong, had little opportunity to settle in social units and family relations took precedence over the clan¹. Among agriculturalists, such as the Acholi, people were able to form larger social units but these were temporary, as even these groups had to move every few years. For both, the little surplus available from their labours was used within the

¹ The clan is a group of people who share the same ancestor, either through birth or kinship.

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households, where there was minimal division of labour between men, women, old and young. Clans focused on religious practice, and the main social distinction that existed was between 'elders and non-elders'. Elders were elected to serve on community councils but were not entitled to special tributes or other privileges. They were responsible for selecting clan leaders who, in turn, chaired the councils. Clan leaders were responsible to the council, and could not make war or peace without consensus. Similarly, elders had joint responsibility for resolving disputes.²

Inter-clan violence was common and deadly; clans fought over cattle, land, women and goods. It was difficult to maintain peace in these regions. These non-stratified social systems existed in much of North and Eastern Uganda (among the Lango, Madi, Lugbara, Karamajong, Acholi, Iteso, Sebei, Alur, Kakwa, Jonamu, Japadhola, Gwere, Samia, Bagishu Badama, Banyuli, Bagwere) and in some parts of the South (among the Bakiga, Bakongo and Bamba)³ (However, these communal norms had begun to change even before Uganda was made a protectorate in 1894. In all, except the most remote communities, increased contacts with other groups resulted in more centralised forms of governance, which were considered necessary for preparation and defence in war.)

In the greater part of the South, where there were better environmental conditions and higher levels of development, feudal kingdoms developed (among the Baganda, Banyankore, Batoro, Banyoro and Basoga), in which peasants were required to pay tributes to the lords. The surplus was largely paid in kind and used for consumption, though there was 'non-competitive' trade within regions and across states. Mamdani notes that particularly in the South, 'women were a means of production, to be owned, exchanged, and distributed. The most advanced forms of accumulation were cattle and women, in that order'.⁴ Labour was not merely divided by sex and age; there were different tasks for peasant men, women and slaves. Further, there were skilled artisans and carpenters who provided services to the lords, and regional specializations (such as copper-works in Toro and canoe building in Busoga) had begun to develop.

There were important distinctions across southern Kingdoms. Ankole became a class-based society, in which the Bahima ruling class controlled the use of violence and owned the cattle. Bunyoro-Kitare, which was the most powerful kingdom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had fairly rigid social divisions between its pastoral aristocrats and agricultural serfs. Buganda was, reputedly, a more fluid society, in which peasants could be recruited to higher positions. Eventually, these distinctions contributed to Bunyoro's demise and Buganda's ascendancy, for while the Kingdom of Buganda was able to build its administration by recruiting the 'ordinary' people, Bunyoro relied increasingly on a group of elite pastoralists.⁵ Nevertheless, compared with Ankole and Bunyoro, the Buganda monarchy had more control over the use of force. In Ankole and Bunyoro, territorial leaders had the power to contest the kings' actions. The Kabakas (kings/heads of all clans heads) of Buganda had substantial authority, and eventually used it to assert their right to kill offending subjects.

By the nineteenth century, kingdoms regularly used raids to expand their territory and influence. Fixed group associations did not have the personal significance they subsequently gained. Ethnic association became substantially more politicised and tribalised during and after British rule. However, there were numerous conflicts: Buganda-Bunyoro tensions and wars preceded the British and so did those between more and less powerful regions, such as Buganda and the eastern territories of Bukedi, Busoga and Bugisi. Intra-ethnic conflicts were also quite common; many were the result of religious differences among the Catholics, Protestants and Muslims.

² Kanyeihamba (2002), *The Political Development of Uganda*; Kasozi, A.B.K., *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda*, p. 18.

³ Kasozi, p. 17.

⁴ Mahmood Mamdani (1976) *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*, p. 25

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 28-29.

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1.1.1 THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN RELIGIONS

According to historical reports, Buganda originated sometime in the fifteenth century, following the migration of Nilotic Luo-speakers (from what is now South East Sudan) into the lacustrine region (Reid 2002). There, they settled the Czewi states, joining the Bantu-speakers who had started to occupy the area from around 500 B.C.⁶ Up to the seventeenth century, Buganda remained a small kingdom, comprising only a few clans; Bunyoro, the more powerful kingdom to the north, frequently attacked it. By the nineteenth century, Buganda had expanded considerably and comprised about 50 clans. These clans upheld traditional religious beliefs, involving the worship of deities and spirits. The first Arab merchants arrived in the 1840s and introduced Islam. Later, in 1862, the first Europeans to arrive in Buganda---John Speke and James Grant---told Kabaka Mutesa of Christianity.

Religious tensions increased after the first Anglican missionaries arrived in 1876. David Livingstone, who inspired the missionary movement in Africa, was genuinely persuaded that slavery would not end unless Christianity and commerce were introduced and developed. Though he had questionable motives, Henry Stanley acted on that initiative and made his own appeal for 'the practical Christian tutor, who can teach people how to become Christians, cure their diseases, construct dwellings, understand and exemplify agriculture, and turn his hand to anything, like a sailor... In return, Stanley assured that 'Mtesa would give [the missionary] anything he desired.'⁷ London's (Anglican) Church Missionary Society quickly responded and, by 1876, eight missionaries were sent to Buganda. In 1879, the French (Roman Catholic) White Fathers also arrived and set about redeeming African souls and countering Anglican heresy. As Pulford describes it, though both groups of missionaries had the same evangelical objectives, intense rivalries developed because they had fundamentally different interpretations of the scripture.

'Even the physical locations of the missions in the capital underlined the competition, the Catholics on Rubaga hill and the Protestants facing them across a valley from another hill, Namirembe. The sin of Christian disunity had already reached Buganda'.⁸

Protestant-Catholic discord was only one dimension of the religious conflicts; rivalries also developed between Christianity, Islam and traditional Kiganda religions.

Under Mutesa's leadership, all religious groups had some license to evangelise. Conditions changed dramatically after Mutesa's death. Mwanga, who succeeded him as King of Buganda in 1884, attempted to expunge all foreign religions, which entailed persecuting the Christians. Therefore, just prior to the colonial period, religious violence probably caused more devastation in Buganda than the Kingdom had ever experienced⁹. This persecution had major unintended effects: the murdered Christians were celebrated as martyrs and Protestants and Catholics formed political parties, in opposition to the Muslim and traditional groups. However, in 1888, when Mwanga plotted with the traditionalists to eradicate all foreign religions, the Roman Catholic, Anglican Protestant and Muslim political parties collaborated and overthrew him. Subsequently, the Muslims expelled the Christian groups from government and Buganda was turned into an Islamic state. Excluded from power, the Catholic and Protestant factions agreed that if/when they returned to government, they would divide power and resources equally between them; Muslims and local religious groups would be denied. Later, when Muslims were removed from power, Catholics and Protestants controlled state resources, as they had hitherto agreed.

Though many missionaries retained their religious ideals, the *ba Fransa* (Catholic) and *ba Ingleza* (Protestant) parties grew to have strong political links and to defend the position of the metropolitan powers

⁶ The Columbia Encyclopaedia 2001. <http://www.bartleby.com/65/ug/Uganda.html>

⁷ Pulford, C. (1999) *Eating Uganda*, p. 27.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 44.

⁹ Kasozi (1999), pp. 27-28

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they represented. At that time, even the Baganda were speculating about which colonial power would eventually control the state. The Christian collaboration did not last. In 1892, Catholics and Protestants fought to control Buganda. The Protestant victory (bolstered with Lugard's¹⁰ supplies of guns and ammunition) relegated Roman Catholics to a secondary position and marginalized the Muslims. Anglican Protestantism became the prominent religion and the basis for favoured access to resources.

1.2 BRITISH PROTECTORATE POLICIES AND THE 1900 AGREEMENT

Captain Lugard's mandate in Uganda was to extend the commercial enterprises of the Imperial British East Africa Company. He executed his role effectively, obtaining treaties and facilitating British control, without much of the local population even being aware of developments. Protectorate status differed somewhat from colonisation. It relied more on treaties with the indigenous population and less on using British finances to support the economy. Therefore, Sir Harry Johnston, who was appointed Special Commissioner for the Uganda Protectorate in 1899, was instructed to ensure that 'trade [was] established on a smooth basis; administration [was] placed on a permanent and satisfactory footing; control over taxation [was] exercised without arousing native suspicions; no effort [was] spared to preserve external appearances by which the collection of revenue and its expenditure took place within the formal structure of traditional authority; governance and development of Uganda [were] carried out with as little reliance as possible on metropolitan finances.'¹¹ The Uganda Agreement of 1900 was the key to achieving these objectives.

The principal parties to the Agreement were the Baganda oligarchy (who wanted to retain their traditional power and desired long-term British military support to guarantee their security) and Johnston, the representative of the British Crown (who needed to secure the best arrangement feasible for Britain's economic profit). Under the final terms, the British allocated 10,034 square miles of land to the 'great chiefs' and the Royal Household, and retained all uncultivated, waste and forest lands for the British Crown. An additional eight thousand square miles of land were divided among notables and lesser chiefs (Mamdani, 1996). Peasants now became tenants of the new Baganda mailo (mile-owning) landlords, the majority of whom were Protestants. Native Councils would continue to exist and chiefs were required to collect taxes. Johnston maintained that 'enough taxes should be collected to enable the government of the Protectorate to be run on a basis of complete self-sufficiency'.¹²

1.2.1 Indirect Rule and the Privileged Place of the Baganda Oligarchy

Sathyamurthy (1986) argues that the Uganda Agreement both legitimised the social changes that had already taken place in Buganda (among religious groups and among clan heads, peasants and the oligarchy) and triggered new tensions and conflicts within Buganda and between the Baganda and other ethnic groups. Among the Baganda, economic inequalities increased as the new landowners managed and exploited the peasantry. Unequal relationships between Buganda and other regions, particularly Bunyoro, also increased as the Baganda oligarchy now had administrative power. The British actively stratified the kingdoms: Though Ankole and Toro did not enjoy Buganda's special standing, they were also given Agreement status; however, Bunyoro was treated as 'enemy territory'.

Baganda chiefs were instrumental in 'mediating British rule' or, as Mamdani describes, in instituting 'decentralised despotism'. Native administrations followed ethnic boundaries, except in areas where it was not feasible to form a district (such as West Nile, Bugisu, Bukedi, Toro and Kigezi).¹³ Rather than utilizing indigenous leaders, the British deployed the Baganda and its Kiganda (centralised and hierarchical) model of administration in much of Uganda. At the local level, appointed chiefs held judicial, legislative, executive and administrative power. Under the guise of native laws, they forced labour, crops, sales and contributions.

¹⁰ Captain Frederick Lugard was a representative for the British East Africa Company. He arrived in Buganda in 1890.

¹¹ Sathyamurthy (1986), p. 140

¹² Ibid. p. 158

¹³ Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1989) *The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflict*, p. 31

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The Baganda had another role: to spread the Christian (protestant) gospel to all and sundry. Revolts against Baganda rule became common throughout Uganda. The Banyoro were particularly resentful, and not without cause: Baganda armies had helped the British to conquer the Banyoro (who were, reputedly, fiercely resistant to colonial incursions) and the Basoga. As a reward to Buganda, sizeable portions of Bunyoro land---the Lost Counties---were transferred to Buganda, and the residents made tenants of the Kabaka and his chiefs.

There were revolts against other imposed native authorities as well. The Rwenzuru Movement, which started in 1962, demanded separate districts for the Bamba and the Bankonjo, and complete secession from Toro. The Movement resented Batoro subjugation and proceeded to institute a separate Kingdom in the Rwenzori Mountains areas. Though its leader subsequently returned the Kingdom to the Ugandan government in 1983, tensions and sub-nationalist sentiments remain.¹⁴

1.2.2 DIRECT RULE

Centralized administration (via direct rule) excluded native institutions and practices and demanded conformity with European directives. Kanyeihamba (2002) describes what this meant for legal administration. Up until 1920, all executive and legislative powers were invested in the British Commissioner. Subsequently, in 1920, a new Consolidating Order in Council was promulgated, and this provided for executive and legislative councils. However, up until 1926 when one Indian was appointed as an unofficial member, all the councillors were Europeans. The 1926 provision was meant to appease the Indian community and to coordinate the interests of the European and Indian commercial groups, though it was important that Indian involvement was, as far as was possible, restricted. (Indians were brought to Uganda as indentured labourers from the nineteenth century. After the period of indentureship ended, many remained and engaged in commerce.¹⁵) Africans, despite their dissatisfaction with being excluded from government, were considered 'too backward to contribute much to the development of the country'.¹⁶ Africans were not included until 1945, under the firm stipulation that representatives were to be 'men of substance and authority, of ripe experience and possessed of a developed sense of responsibility that may be expected of those holding high office in the Native Governments and Administrations'. Further, 'only Buganda and the Western and Eastern provinces were to be represented'. Northern involvement was denied since, as the governor claimed, 'their tribal and administrative organisations have not yet in all districts advanced to the stage requiring the creation of centralised native executives'.¹⁷

(These attitudes eventually pervaded the churches. Pulford (1999) describes how churches began to charge fees based on race and how missionary schools taught the geography and history of the metropolitan countries. Museveni's (1997) biography notes the ways in which religion fostered social distinctions: 'Christianisation' involved an element of modernisation and this demanded changes...which penetrated to the deepest aspects our traditional culture. It even affected our eating habits because keeping to traditional ways was considered 'pagan and ungodly'.¹⁸)

1.2.3 The (Under)development of Local Industry

The centralized and decentralized administrative/political systems facilitated British economic policy. Uganda was to develop primary products, such as cotton, coffee, sugar, rubber and tea in order to meet the needs of the mother country. Conversely, it was to import manufactured products from Britain. Production and wealth were effectively concentrated in the South, particularly among the elite. The introduction of export crops was done at the expense of local industry, as new taxation policies were developed to ensure

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 31-33.

¹⁵ However, Asians had made contact prior to that, through trade networks via Zanzibar.

¹⁶ Kanyeihamba (2002), *The Political Development of Uganda*, p. 16

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 23

¹⁸ Museveni. Y. K. (1997), *Sowing the Mustard Seed*, p. 7

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that small-scale entrepreneurs were appropriately discouraged. Additionally, small independent traders were either forcibly excluded from the market and/or coerced (largely through intermediaries such as Baganda chiefs) to produce for the metropole (Kasozi 1999; Mamdani 1996) Kasozi notes that the British systematically undermined African industry, while encouraging European and Asian immigration and participation. Between 1949 and 1959, the number of European immigrants increased from 3,448 to 10,866. Over that same period, the number of Asian (Indo-Pakistani) immigrants increased from 35,215 to 71, 933.¹⁹ While the Baganda were preoccupied with land ownership and administration, Asians became involved in commerce: retail and wholesale trade, cotton ginning, coffee and sugar processing. The British encouraged this, though for their profit. By the late 1940s, the banks were British or Indian-based. Kasozi notes that banks rarely lent to Africans, though they accumulated African savings. Africans were largely excluded from wholesale trade as, according to colonial policy, licenses could only be issued to traders who owned permanent buildings of stone or concrete. In 1959, 'Africans handled less than 10% of national trade'.²⁰ This colonial policy provoked intense resentment; Africans felt alienated and for a long time regarded Asians as foreigners and exploiters. Idi Amin tried to capitalize on African discontent, at a huge cost to the economy. (See [1.3 Dislocation and Destruction: Independence – 1986](#))

1.2.4 The (Under)development of the North

The North was used as a reservoir for labour and later, soldiers. When, in 1925, the new Director of Agriculture started to encourage cotton production in the North, he was summarily advised that 'the policy of government is at present to refrain from actively stimulating the production of cotton or other economic crops in outlying districts on which it is dependent for a supply of labour for carrying out of essential services in the central producing districts'.²¹ This economic zoning of the country perpetuated the neglect and underdevelopment in the North and fomented regional tensions. It also ingrained feelings of superiority in the South and inferiority (at least in terms of production). However, the North had the means to retaliate, as it monopolized the use of force.

The Acholi succeeded the Nubians (Ugandans of Sudanese descent), who up until the Sudanese mutiny (1897) were regarded as the 'best material for soldiery in Africa'.²² Lwanga-Lunyiigo argues that the British ascribed to a 'martial tribes' thesis that prioritised the Nilotic and Sudanese people of Northern Uganda. These groups were considered the most satisfactory fit for the theory that soldiers should be of a different race, geographically distant and even hostile to the main groups. The Acholi were recruited to the Kings Africa Rifles, with the mandate to 'take action against any local group(s) in the Protectorate which engaged in active opposition to the Administration'.²³ Lwanga-Lunyiigo is clear that 'colonialism built up the army as an instrument of coercion as a pacifying army, not as a people's force to ensure defence against external aggression'. Furthermore, much of Uganda, including the Northerners, came to believe that only groups from the North had the right to bear arms. He emphasizes that this was a 'myth' that both Milton Obote and Idi Amin (See Section 1.3 below) exploited, and the source of 'the most bitter legacies of colonialism'.

1.2.5 The Language Problem

The lack of a common Ugandan language helped to perpetuate inter-group and inter-regional conflicts (Kasozi 1999). According to recent estimates, 70% of Ugandans speak one of the Bantu languages. Bantu ethnic groups are concentrated in the South and include the Ganda, Soga, Ankole, Nyoro, and Toro. Western Nilotic speakers (Acholi, Lango and Alur) live in the North; Eastern Nilotic speakers (Karamojong, Teso, and Turkana) live in the Northeast and Sudanic speakers (the Lugbara) in the northwest. (See [Map of Uganda](#)) Though the British government had introduced Kiswahili into the primary school curriculum, it

¹⁹ Kasozi, p. 32.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 33

²¹ Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1989) p. 35

²² Ibid. p. 28

²³ Ibid.

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subsequently declared that all vernaculars, including Kiswahili, were subordinate to English. Meanwhile, the Christian hierarchy discouraged Kiswahili, regarding it as the language of Islam; the Baganda discounted it as the language of 'prostitutes and thieves' and subsequently, as it was used among the army, it became known as 'the language of violence'. Therefore, English became the official language for administration. Kasozi (1999) notes that as is not common among the peasants, English is another 'stratifying agent', dividing society into 'the privileged who speak it and the deprived who do not'.²⁴

1.3 DISLOCATION AND DESTRUCTION: INDEPENDENCE – 1986

Despite the colonial precedent, few would have predicted Uganda's considerable post-Independence decline; instead, there was an expectation that economic growth would continue, with a leading role for the Baganda elite. However, whereas ethnicity had been used as the mode of indirect colonial rule, it now became the medium of protest.²⁵ Further, religion, ethnicity and politics were mixed in very unhealthy ways. People, particularly those from the North who were widely resentful of the Baganda's prestige and privilege, supported Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC), which comprised a distinctly non-Baganda but Protestant majority. Obote was soon to discover that without Baganda support he would be unable to win a governing majority. Accordingly, he formed an alliance with Buganda's Kabaka Yekka (King before All) party in order to exclude the Democratic Party, which was predominantly Catholic. At Independence in 1962, Obote was elected Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II, President. Under the terms of the agreement, Buganda would have authority over the other kingdoms, as well as representation in the National Assembly. The alliance disintegrated shortly thereafter and culminated with the Kabaka's forceful expulsion from Uganda. Obote now declared himself President and set about destroying all 'kingdoms and feudalism'; dictating a new constitution and establishing a one-party state; and assuming control of commercial enterprises. In response to real and perceived threats to his position, Obote used the largely Northern-sourced (and British and Israeli trained) military to crush the opposition. Therefore, in less than a decade after Independence, people had lost faith in the promises of procedural and substantive democracy. As Brett describes it, 'bullets rather than ballots dominated politics'.²⁶

When Idi Amin—Obote's former ally and Army Chief of Staff—capitalized on tensions within the army and deposed Obote in *absentia*, there was popular approval both at home and abroad. This was another 'new dawn'. During his first year of rule, Amin seemed intent on building legitimacy and support, including between the Baganda and religious groups. However, by 1972, when he recognised that his overtures had had little effect, Amin launched a frenetic economic and political programme, which involved expelling 70,000 Asians and capturing their assets (immediately removing needed business skills and access to credit); appointing Muslims to key positions in the army, thereby alienating the majority Christian country; attacking the Langi and Acholi and isolating the north; dismantling the Kingdom of Buganda into separate districts; and dissolving the Cabinet. Amin succeeded in building enemies in all parts and, in a final attempt to secure his regime, succumbed to what Low describes as a 'reckless and bestial' slaughter of whole communities, prominent individuals (including the Chief Justice of Uganda and the Vice-Chancellor of Makerere) and members of his Cabinet. Amin's assault on the Church demonstrated his paranoia. He considered himself threatened by small independent and Pentecostal churches, as they were supposed to have international connections that could work against him. The Catholic and Anglican churches had substantial support among the majority of Ugandans and could, therefore, be easily mobilised. There are reports that even Muslims were persecuted. Archbishop Luwun was apparently assassinated because he was from Obote's Lwo ethnic group, and though he was not involved in politics, the Archbishop had been forced, on occasion, to make submissions on behalf of the Langi and Acholi (Ward 1995). Amin's reach extended beyond Uganda. Maintaining that Uganda had rights to parts of Tanzania, Sudan, and Kenya, he started his assault on Tanzania in 1978. Ugandan soldiers occupied parts of Tanzania for over two months,

²⁴ Kasozi (1999), pp. 6-11.

²⁵ Mamdani, *Citizens and Subjects*.

²⁶ Brett, E.A. 'Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: the Role of the Military in Politics' p. 129.

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persecuted citizens and killed livestock. Tanzania retaliated by invading Uganda and taking Kampala. Amin was ousted; his era of terror ended in 1979.

Lule, the non-royal Muganda who succeeded Amin, was rather unconvincing as a leader and was soon overthrown by Binaisa, also a Muganda. However, Binaisa lacked popular support and alienated many within the army when he sacked Museveni, then the Minister of Defence, and the Army Chief of Staff. Army officials replaced Binaisa with Paulo Muwanga, a former member of the Uganda National Congress. In 1980, Milton Obote succeeded Muwanga in a purportedly fraudulent election. Religion, ethnicity and politics were crucial in this election. Ward (1995) notes that constituency boundaries were drawn so as to split the predominantly Catholic (DP) areas. In Buganda, DP was the party of choice, even among Protestants. The Baganda were fearful that Obote would attempt to reduce the Kingdom's autonomy and that the Anglicans would support him. In the north and east, where there was deep resentment of the Baganda, people (especially the Lwo and Ateso) voted for the UPC.

Under Obote's second term, ethnic flavoured politics continued and was again characterised by Northern appointments to the army and a repressive military campaign against non-UPC supporters (also played out in the churches). Obote's attempt at political monopoly provoked widespread resistance in the South and West Nile, with armed opposition from the People's Resistance Army (PRA), under Yoweri Museveni's guidance. Museveni was born in Southwest Uganda, among the Banyankore Bahima. He studied political science in Tanzania---where he was greatly influenced by socialist ideologies---and trained in counter-insurgency in Mozambique. His People's Resistance Army (PRA) largely comprised Banyankole, Baganda and Bayarwanda soldiers. In 1981, the PRA joined with Yusuf Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters, and formed the National Resistance Movement. The NRM comprised the National Resistance Council and the National Resistance Army; the latter had responsibility for 'organizing and winning the war effort, politicising the army, educating the public and defending the population' (Kasozi, 1999). The NRA spread quickly through Ankole, Buganda and Toro, and solidified peasant support with its socialist ideologies and practical strategies for building citizenship. Meanwhile, Obote increased his efforts to eradicate the NRA and launched "Operation Bonanza" in 1982. This failed, and Obote's soldiers resorted to a brutal slaughter of villagers, which many claim, was even more extreme than Amin's; it is estimated that over 100000 Ugandans were killed in the Luwero Triangle. In 1985, Barjilio Okello deposed Obote, who had, by then, lost much support even within his government. The Military Council, which was formed to administer the country, installed General Tito Okello Lutwa as president, and Barjilio Okello as chief of staff. Negotiations between the Okello regime and the NRM started but quickly stalled, amidst charges that the Military Council had reneged on agreements and had flagrantly abused human rights. In January 1986, the NRA toppled the Okello regime and the NRM became Uganda's eighth government.

1.4 NRM AND THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM

Kasozi (1999) analyses the social conditions that produced the violence in Uganda, and categorizes them as social inequality (generated by unequal trading relationships and local regional, ethnic, religious and gender disparities); the existence of sub-states, ethnic and religious factionalism; poor conflict resolution mechanisms; absence of an indigenous property-owning class; the post-Independence decrease in national production; parochial, weak and poorly educated leaders; and the language problem.²⁷ He notes the following:

1. 'On the eve of independence, colonial Uganda was...a resource-rich country [that] had long been paying the costs of its administration and by 1916 was no longer a burden to the taxpayer';
2. 'After independence, unlike Kenya, Uganda attracted no substantial foreign investment or aid, and unlike other dependent ex-colonies Uganda's subsistence sector was not only self-supporting but very strong';
3. 'Life expectancy was for a long time as impressive as that of some industrialized countries; the literacy rate was high, road and communications systems were good and medical services reasonable';

²⁷ Kasozi (1999), pp. 6-11.

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4. [By 1985] over one million Ugandans were killed; overall life expectancy [was reduced] from over fifty to forty years; infant mortality increased from 91.9/1000 in 1973 to 100/1000 in 1984; maternal mortality increased; the ratio of doctors per population decreased from 1/10000 to 1/25000; 'ignorance, disease and poverty became the norm of many Ugandans of all social classes'.²⁸

In 1988, Low cautiously predicted that the NRM had a 'better chance of success than any of its predecessors'.²⁹ First, the NRM had managed to build a fairly credible coalition, comprised of representatives from former political parties, Bantu southerners and Baganda supporters. Second, the South now had an army, which in principle was not permitted to abuse or kill any member of the public; this boosted the NRM's image. Third, a Southern-based government, with its core support around it, would have less urgent security concerns; previous northern political leaders were always on guard against 'close enemies'.³⁰ Museveni's immediate (post-coup) political moves helped him to build some legitimacy beyond his 'heartland' area in the South and Southwest and, importantly, to raise expectations of broad public participation, government accountability and improved welfare. Consistent with the democracy, security and unity objectives outlined in its Ten-Point Programme, the NRM expanded Resistance Councils (RCs) to the entire country. RCs, which had previously been established in the areas under guerrilla control, operated on the principle that decision-making power, authority and policy-making responsibilities should also be located at the local levels and that citizens should be able to reach and influence their representatives and hold them to account for the quality of services. The Local Council (LC) system that replaced it, operated on the same principles. Uganda was to be a distinct no-party democracy. Apart from promoting inclusion at these levels, Museveni's strategy for conflict prevention entailed incorporation of hitherto moderate and virulent critics within government. Dicklitch notes that this elite cooptation effectively fragmented the opposition into moderate and radical camps. While the moderate group resigned itself to cooperate and participate in government, the radical elements continued to firmly insist on multiparty democracy.³¹

Supported by a hopeful donor community, Museveni committed himself to economic growth, political stability and legitimacy. Uganda's economy responded with an average growth rate of 6% in the 1990s. Donors pronounced that Uganda was, indeed, 'a pioneer of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa',³² while even the more strident critics acknowledged that the Movement deserved to be credited for improving and sustaining peace and security in most parts of the country, allowing a fairly free press, and encouraging participation through democratically elected local government. However, in recent years, donors have become more cautious in their evaluation of Uganda and less restrained commentators are beginning to expose actual and potential risks to development. Among the more frequently cited issues are the long-standing (North-South) regional inequalities; insecurity in Northern Uganda, the Southwest and the Great Lakes region; increasing tensions within the Movement and the political challenge to Museveni from within the heartland constituencies; the recent downturn in the economy and the evidence of growing inequalities; youth disaffection and the potential political risks; legacies of ethnic, religious and other social divisions, and the implications for political change; patronage, corruption and their costs to development; the character of the formal institutions and implications for stability. Sections 2 – 5 address these.

1.5 SUMMARY

This section reviewed important features in Uganda's historical development. It depicts the regional, religious and ethnic divisions that preceded the colonial period and summarizes some of the ways in which the British administration capitalized on pre-existing tensions and provoked new divisions. British

²⁸ Ibid, pp. 3-5

²⁹ Low, 'The Dislocated Polity' p. 51

³⁰ Ibid. Low, p. 52.

³¹ S. Dicklitch, (2002) *A Basic Human Rights Approach to Democracy in Uganda*, p. 208.

³² Reinikka and Collier eds., *Uganda's Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms and Government*, xiii.

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protectorate policies entailed both direct and indirect forms of rule. Direct rule excluded native institutions; indirect rule used and/or constructed native institutions to enforce local control. British economic policies resulted in growth and in development of the infrastructure but also stifled local industry; promoted unequal trade relations; and encouraged ethnic, race, regional and class divisions between the Baganda and the rest of the population; North and South; Europeans, Asians and Africans; a small wealthy landed and commercial elite and a majority poor. Despite these, Uganda, at Independence, had favourable prospects for development; analysts did not anticipate the drastic social and economic decline that occurred under Obote and Amin. Since 1986, the Movement has made substantial development gains. However, there are questions about the stability of these achievements, and concerns that development goals may be at risk.

SECTION 2

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Constitutional Provisions; The 1997 Movement Act and the 2002 Political Parties and Organisations Act; Relations Between the Executive and Legislature; Vertical Accountability Mechanisms: Elections; ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL FINANCE; Horizontal Accountability Mechanisms; Civil Society; Justice, Law and Order; The Military

One of the critical questions in current discussions on Uganda is whether the existing formal institutions are adequate for political stability and for ensuring respect for and guarantee of rights for all citizens, despite the leader or group that is in power (Dicklitch 2002). Commentators note that the NRM had to make the transition from a bush army, with informal methods of operation, to building and refining formal rules for government and administration. Therefore, the existing institutions are new and susceptible to informal norms, differing ideological persuasions and personal rule.

This section discusses the status of democratic and legal institutions. The first subsection provides a synopsis of key constitutional provisions. The remaining subsections synthesize views on the role of the Movement; relations between the Executive and Legislature; the status of Justice, Law and Order; the accountability of the Military; the effectiveness of vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, including civil society.

2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Executive Under the terms of Uganda's 1995 Constitution, the President is Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces. The President is required to uphold the Constitution, and should hold office for a maximum of two five year terms.

The Legislature Consistent with the Movement system of 'no party democracy', the Constitution provides for a unicameral Parliament comprised of 'members directly elected to represent constituencies; one woman representative for every district; such numbers of representatives of the army, youth, workers, persons with disabilities and other groups as Parliament may determine; and the Vice-President and Ministers, who, if not already elected members of Parliament, shall be ex-official members of Parliament without the right to vote on any issue requiring a vote in Parliament.³³ Parliament is to pass laws for the 'good governance' of Uganda; ensure government accountability in expenditure and policy management; debate topical issues; and monitor government appointments. Parliament works through committees: 12 standing and 10 sessional. Standing Committees include Public Accounts, Budget and Local Government Accounts. All committees have monitoring responsibilities.

The Judiciary The Judiciary, which is to be independent, has the important role of ensuring speedy justice for all irrespective of their social and economic status.

³³ Uganda 1995 Constitution, Chapter 6, Article 78 (1)

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The Political System As stipulated in the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution, the NRM was instituted in government until the first elections were held under the Movement system in 1996. The Constitution differentiates between the Movement political system, the multiparty political system and any other democratic and representative political system. The Movement is defined as a broad based, inclusive and non-partisan political system, in which anyone can present himself for election, and in which decisions are based on merit rather than political affiliation. The 1997 Movement Act specifies the Movement's structure, functions and provisions for financing. The National Executive Committee, Secretariat, and District through Village Committees are answerable to the National Conference, which convenes biannually. The Chair of the Movement is the Head of the Movement, Chairperson of the National Conference and of the National Executive. He presides over the election of the Vice-Chair and nominates candidates for the National Political Commissar³⁴.

Political Parties Political parties under the no-party political system are prohibited from appealing for membership on the basis of gender, 'ethnicity, religion or any other sectional division'. Originally, under Article 269 of the Constitution, political parties were restricted from opening and operating branch offices, holding conferences and rallies, sponsoring candidates and campaigning on behalf of candidates and 'carrying on any activities that may interfere with the Movement political system for the time being in force'. The 2002 Political Organisations Act requires that parties register with the Electoral Commission, which will ensure that all parties meet a number of legal requirements. Parties must disclose their assets and sources of funding, and should report on campaign spending. Nevertheless, political organizations cannot sponsor or campaign for any candidate while the Movement system exists. In March 2003, the Constitutional Court ruled that Sections 18 and 19 of the Political Parties and Organisations Act contravenes the Constitution. Therefore, parties are now free to campaign for candidates, open offices and hold public meetings. However, parties are still constrained by Article 72 (2) of the Constitution, which requires that 'an organisation shall not operate as a Political Party or Organisation unless it conforms to the principles laid down in the Constitution and is registered'. Currently, only the NRM is registered; the UPC and DP have refused to register, stating that they have been political parties for a long time. The Reform Agenda Party states that it is being prevented from collecting the signatures required for registration.

Voting and the Electoral Commission Chapter 5 of the Constitution specifies that all citizens over 18 years have the right to vote and that the government will 'take all the necessary steps' to ensure that all qualified persons exercise this right. The Electoral Commission--which should comprise persons of 'high moral character, proven integrity, considerable experience and demonstrated competence in the conduct of public affairs'--is responsible for ensuring that elections are regular, free and fair. Specific duties include organising and supervising elections, demarcating constituencies, compiling and maintaining the voters' register, formulating and implementing civic education programmes. The Constitution stipulates that the Electoral Commission must remain independent and free 'from the direction or control of any person or authority'³⁵

Human Rights Uganda has signed all the major international human rights conventions and instruments. Chapter 4 of the Constitution underscores that all individuals have fundamental rights and freedoms, including economic and social rights, which should be protected by all organs of the State. The 'National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy' is meant to provide some guidance on how to promote and protect rights. The Uganda Human Rights Commission is authorised to investigate human rights complaints, enhance respect for human rights through public education, advise Parliament of effective strategies for promoting human rights, monitor Government compliance with international treaties and obligations. The Commission should remain independent and has the power to order redress where rights are violated.

³⁴ Thomas and Barkan, p. 6.

³⁵ Ibid. Chapter 5, Article 62.

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2.2 THE 1997 MOVEMENT ACT AND THE 2002 POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS ACT

Multipartyists resent the restraints on political organisation and expression and, as they perceive it, the unfair advantages that the Movement grants itself, under the Movement Act. By claiming that it is not a party, the Movement is not subject to the stipulations of the Political Parties and Organisations Act. It receives funding through parliamentary appropriation and is treated as a part of government though it has its own distinct political interests. Opposing groups argue that despite its 'no-party' pretext, the Movement uses a structure and operates in ways not unlike a number of one-party states. The Movement claims to include all Ugandans but effectively excludes groups and individuals who do not share its position. President Museveni has remained the unopposed leader of the Movement, with firm control of the agenda. Multipartyists frequently contend that the President frequently insists on regulations without allowing general debate, advances his own candidates in contravention of official nominating procedures, supplies his own position papers, and discourages internal challenges

Dicklitch argues that particularly since 1995, the Movement has been concentrating on consolidating power, even within Parliament. In June 2001, the government instructed that all incoming members of Parliament undergo intensive politicisation. Similarly, in 1999, it required that civil servants in select ministries register their political affiliation.³⁶ Following the Constitutional Court ruling of March 2003 (See [Political Parties](#) above), Opposition groups have been pressing for the abolition of the Movement Act. In an Open Letter to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (August 4, 2003), the Democratic Party (DP) decried the Movement's attempts to amend, and thereby extend the life of the Movement, rather than abolish the Act. The DP argued that the Movement Amendment Bill allows the Movement to continue to illegally access public funds and 'is directed at perpetuating political discrimination'.³⁷

2.3 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE

Despite the claim that all Ugandans are part of the Movement no-party system, there are clear distinctions within Parliament between those who do and do not support the Movement. Non-supporters are informally seen as 'Opposition' (we use this term in the text). As Chair of the Movement, President Museveni has substantial support within Parliament, particularly within the Movement Caucus. Baker (2001) notes that, as a consequence, bills can be rushed through without the required debate. Despite this, there are sufficient independent 'Opposition' MPs and critical Movement supporters. Parliament is reputedly a vocal and assertive institution, though many regard the 1996 Parliament as more independent and active. Since 1996, there have been a number of parliamentary resignations and allegations that executive efforts to either co-opt or censure criticism have undermined vigorous debate. However, since 2001, Parliament has been able to increase its power over budget review, though it has had little control over the recent increases in defence spending. It has also effectively investigated some instances of official corruption. Further, Parliament has challenged the government's role in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Northern Uganda (Baker 2001).

As noted, the NRM had insisted on broad parliamentary representation and has included women, youth, PWDs and the army. This was an innovative strategy, which increased the visibility of these interest groups. However, analysts suggest that this increased 'presence' has not produced the expected gains. For example, despite the recognised achievements of the women's movement in Uganda (and executive actions to promote equality),³⁸ Tamale (1999) suggests that the government has obstructed women's efforts to act as an interest group. Furthermore, ingrained sexism and patriarchy undermine effective women's representation in Parliament. Goetz and Hassim (2003) conclude that participation does not necessarily result in effective policy influence. (Also see discussion in [Tradition, Gender Inequality and Democracy](#))

³⁶ Dicklitch 2002, p. 211.

³⁷ Jude Mbabaali, Democratic Party, Open Letter to Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, August 4, 2003. <http://www.dpuganda.org/openletter.html>

³⁸ Tripp, A.M. 'The Politics of Autonomy and Cooptation in Africa: the case of the Ugandan Women's Movement',

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There are a number of vocal caucus groups in Parliament, including the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO), the Young Parliamentarians Association, and the Acholi, Teso and Lango Parliamentary groups. These challenge the government on important areas of policy. MPs from these northern groups were involved in a recent parliamentary boycott, which was staged in protest of what they described as government inaction in the North.³⁹

Under Museveni's leadership, new institutions for accountability have been created to secure both executive and legislative accountability. In principle, Members of Parliament are required to observe a 'Leadership Code of Conduct', which stipulates declaration of assets and income and prohibits conduct which is: 'likely to compromise the honesty, impartiality and integrity of specified officers; or likely to lead to corruption in public affairs; or is detrimental to the public good or welfare or good governance'.⁴⁰ The Inspectorate of Government---or any other authority that Parliament designates---is responsible for enforcing the Leadership Code. Where breaches occur, persons may be dismissed from office for a specified time and prohibited from holding any other public office. Piron and Afako (2004) observe that the Act may have limited effect, as some government officials have begun to challenge it the courts and to insist on the right to privacy.

2.4 VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS: ELECTIONS

The Movement has been accused of using underhand strategies to exclude 'the Opposition'. In 1996, for instance, President Museveni, Paul Ssemogerere (Democratic Party) and Muhammad Mayanja Kibridge were nominated for President. President Museveni won, though with complaints from his challengers that contrary to regulations, he had begun to campaign before the designated period and had unfair access to the media. Barya et al. note that though it was clear that Ssemogerere did not pose a real challenge to Museveni's leadership, he was still harassed and prevented from campaigning freely in Western Uganda⁴¹. The NRM used various scare tactics to bully the electorate. For example, people were told that Ssemogerere had links with Milton Obote and that Obote would return and resume the slaughter if Ssemogerere were to win the presidency.⁴²

In the 2001 elections, the Electoral Commission confirmed reports of voter intimidation, harassment, and undue military presence, particularly the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU). Dr. Kizza Besigye, the President's main opponent, subsequently went into exile, claiming continual harassment. Other Besigye agents were subject to arbitrary arrests and beatings. In addition, there were widespread reports of double voting, ballot stuffing and missing election material. The Electoral Commission itself was accused of fraud, as voter cards were found on its premises and three officials were arrested for tampering with the voting register. The Movement again depicted elements within the 'the Opposition' as criminals, this time with links to terrorist plots in Kampala and Kasese⁴³. Dicklich (2002) suggests that with such propaganda, voters prefer to choose the 'safe' option.

Analysts warn that political repression and intimidation are fuelling radical elements among 'the Opposition' and increases the likelihood that groups will seek unconstitutional avenues to gain power. Repression has had other consequences: it has prevented organisation and coherence across opposition parties so that many have been unable to develop internal democratic structures and processes and credible agendas. Both the DP and the UPC have radical elements; segments within the UPC are still connected to Obote.⁴⁴

³⁹ BBC News, Uganda MPS walk out Over Conflict, Thursday 20 November 2003

⁴⁰ Uganda Constitution, Chapter 14, Article 233 (2)

⁴¹ Barya et. al., p. 43

⁴² Dicklitch, p. 210. Source: The Monitor March 6, 1996 and The New York Times May 10, 1996

⁴³ Baker and May, Uganda Governance Assessment, Draft, April 3, 2001.

⁴⁴ Dicklitch 2002, p. 214.

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Besigye claims to be unconnected to rebel groups but he does not rule out that he may resort to war. *The Economist* reports that in one radio-talk show (August 2002), he instructed his followers to 'train and wait for his call to arms'.⁴⁵

2.4.1 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL FINANCE

Elections do not merely reflect the old traits of domination and intimidation, they are very expensive affairs, which waste valuable resources and encourage corruption. Without effective access to television and print in the rural areas, campaigners must make personal appearances, with all the attending costs. Further, people expect politicians to contribute to public and private projects. Campaign spending is used to win favours among the electorate. Candidates have become severely indebted as they use personal finances, sell or remortgage homes, and borrow to meet campaign expenses. There are concerns that local businesses support particular candidates, which may have serious implications for post-election accountability.

2.5 HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

The Movement has instituted horizontal accountability mechanisms, which have had some success; however, there are recognised constraints. For example, the Inspectorate of Government (IG) was established in 1987 and charged with promoting and fostering strict adherence to the rule of law and principles of natural justice; eliminating and fostering the elimination of corruption, abuse of authority and of public office; and promoting fair, efficient and good governance in public offices.⁴⁶ The IG deals with complaints from civil servants; however, it does not attend to criminal or human rights accusations, as these are the responsibility of the Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the Human Rights Commission, respectively. Though the IG has highlighted flagrant high-level abuses, it has limited capacity, including personnel, transport and equipment, and relies on government and donors for funding. Further, the IG is unable to enforce compliance (Flanary and Watt, 1999). Despite IG activities, in 2001, Transparency International ranked Uganda as the third most corrupt country, and the 1998 National Integrity survey ranks the Police among the more corrupt institutions. In response, the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity has been established and is located within the Office of the President. (The Government, with donor assistance, has also developed a National Anti-Corruption Strategy) The DEI has responsibility for overseeing the promotion of ethics and integrity across government institutions; enhancing awareness of the dangers of corruption; and coordinating local, national and international anti-corruption efforts. Piron and Akafo (2004) note that the department needs to be strengthened and to participate more actively in tackling corruption. Currently, the Directorate concentrates on educational activities. The Uganda Human Rights Commission has quasi-judicial powers and is responsible for human rights education and monitoring violations. It has been candid about a number of issues, including police corruption; abuses by security organs, including the use of 'safe houses'; Uganda's involvement in the DRC; and Operation Wembley (Barya et al, 2003; Piron 2003; Afako 2003). However, analysts are concerned that the UHRC has limited effect; GoU still relies on extra-legal measures and agencies, which contravene UHRC recommendations (Afako 2003).

2.6 CIVIL SOCIETY

Analysts note that while colonial governments placed racial, class and legal limits on 'civil society', postcolonial administrations, particularly of Obote and Amin, monopolized state institutions and actively muzzled opposition. Since 1986, the NRM government has allowed relative press freedom and a variety of CSOs have emerged, including NGOs and CBOs. Freedom of expression and speech, including of the press and other media, is enshrined in Article 29 (1) (a) of the 1995 Constitution. Civil society organisations are now categorised into membership-based and occupation groups (such as trade unions and professional associations); groups that support development and service delivery; advocacy groups; cultural and religious organisations; networks and the media. With the exception of the Uganda Law Society,

⁴⁵ *Economist*, 'War and Rumors of War', Vol. 365, Issue 8295, 10/19/2002

⁴⁶ Uganda Constitution, Chapter 13, Article 225

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membership-based groups concentrate on issues that affect their members and do not participate in matters of democratisation and governance. Development groups focus on providing services to communities and tend to avoid conflictual relationships with government. Importantly, foreign-based NGOs are normally hierarchical, focused on achieving results and accounting to funders. Therefore, there is little space for empowerment and horizontal decision-making. Local NGOs, located mainly in the urban areas, have low levels of financial support and capacity. Community-based organizations include cooperatives, savings and credit groups and burial associations; they do not focus on national issues. Advocacy groups include human and women's rights organizations, groups that represent disadvantaged peoples, and those that advance specific issues, such as debt reduction. These lobby the state, though investigators note that there are restraints on expressing certain views. Cultural and religious organisations provide social services to communities. However, some are also closely allied to political parties and influence social policy. Most cultural groups promote traditional practices and have local political influence. Networks of NGOs have been established to build capacity and lobbying power. Dicklitch notes that these NGOs tend to complement government activities rather than confront officials. Government attempts to control civil society groups by requiring that NGOs are registered, and that they commit to non-sectarian and non-political programmes. Baker and May (2001) discovered that the Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Centre (UHEDOC) had its registration terminated because it hosted a seminar on corruption. Similarly, the Uganda National NGO Forum was refused registration for a number of years, purportedly for its political stance.

Compared with the periods prior to 1986, the media has some autonomy, which it uses to publicize corruption and challenge government actions. However, the government has attempted to regulate the media through the 1995 Press and Journalist Statute. This Statute allows the Media Council to suspend journalists and publications.⁴⁷ Additionally, there are many reports of harassment and imprisonment of journalists who are critical of the state. In December 2000, for example, four journalists employed with the New Vision were banned temporarily because of negative commentary on the Government. They were allowed to resume their duties only on condition that future columns 'are vetted for political correctness'.⁴⁸ Barya et al (2003) report that journalists fear victimization and, as a consequence, practise self-censorship.

Therefore, analysts conclude that while civil society has blossomed since 1986, there are serious resource and political constraints that prevent it from effectively championing democratisation and accountability. Further, 'political' civil society organisations are located in the urban areas, and do not necessarily represent rural interests. This reinforces Mamdani's contention that the pace and prospects for democratic change differ in rural and urban areas.

However, there is much debate on whether 'civil society'---as it is currently understood---is applicable and sensitive to the Ugandan context.⁴⁹ Karlstrom disagrees with the exclusive focus on voluntary associations'. He maintains that civil society analyses should 'identify those forces and institutions that *do* have some potential for producing productive engagement between state and society and, ultimately, the sort of stable, legitimate, and democratic state forms that have proven so difficult to achieve in postcolonial Africa'.⁵⁰ These may include *kinship groups* such as clans (normally excluded because they are considered to be private rather than public institutions), which, particularly in Buganda, have long made political and economic claims on the state; *ethnic identities and solidarities* (excluded because they are thought to 'promote parochial rather than cross-cutting solidarities') which, though they can be divisive, also have a constructive role; and *Local Government* (excluded because it is created by the state) which, though in principle a state institution, is not dominated by the state; there is capacity for local self-rule, citizen association and constructive state-society relations. Thornton (1999) (See [Democratizing the Rural?](#)) also

⁴⁷ Baker and May, April 2001.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Karlstrom, M. 'Civil Society and its Presuppositions: Lessons from Uganda, p. 115

⁵⁰ Karlstrom, p. 106.

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suggests that current interpretations of political action are too narrow and tend to discount the ways in which less visible organisations contest values and norms.

2.7 JUSTICE, LAW AND ORDER

The Judiciary has been depicted as largely independent but hesitant to rule against the government (Baker 2001). However, recent Constitutional Court rulings have supported Opposition petitions and posed serious challenges to the Movement. As noted, the March 2003 ruling (above) allows for political competition, though the Attorney General has been careful to note that this ruling stands 'until the Supreme Court reverses the decision of the Constitutional Court'.⁵¹ In January 2004, the Supreme Court also ruled in favour of the DP, and nullified the Constitutional Amendment Act (13) 2000. This Act was presented and passed the same day (in contravention of the 14 day rule specified in the Constitution), in order to bypass a previous Constitutional Court ruling, which nullified the 1999 Referendum Act. Further, the amendment was passed without using a headcount, which made it difficult to assess whether the required two-third majority was present.⁵² (The 1999 Referendum Act was the basis for the 2000 Referendum, which approved the Movement system.) Following this ruling, the DP has called for the President's resignation. Observers note that it is significant that these disputes are being resolved in the courts and that the judiciary is increasingly being seen as confident and impartial.

The Justice, Law and Order sector is normally regarded as inaccessible to the poor. Its Sector PEAP Revision Strategy Paper (SRP) acknowledges that there are technical and financial barriers to accessing both criminal and commercial justice, particularly in the rural areas, and that this is especially disadvantageous to women. Further, current legislation includes explicit gender-biased or discriminatory gender-neutral laws that deny equal rights to women and men. The SRP outlines policies for improving the quality of justice. These include improving physical access; increasing access to justice for vulnerable groups; attacking domestic violence; and improving access to commercial justice. Additionally, the *Chain-Linked Initiative* and the *Case Backlog Project* were designed to improve communication and coordination between the Police, Prisons, Judiciary and DPP in order to ensure speedy access to justice. Nevertheless, there are substantial obstacles to criminal and commercial justice reform, including the proliferation of small arms trafficking in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Region.

2.8 THE MILITARY

Under the 1995 constitution, the NRA was renamed the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) and allowed special representation in Parliament. It is required, under the terms of the Constitution, to remain 'non-partisan, patriotic, disciplined, productive and subordinate to civilian authority'. With external assistance, GoU began a process of demobilization in 1993. Ex-soldiers were reintegrated into their homelands, as the government committed to building a small, modern and professional army. However, after 1996, there was a reversal in the demobilization policy and increased allocations to defence spending. Defence spending was capped in 1999, though few believe that this has contained actual allocations. The army has been implicated in human rights violations (See [Conflict, Insecurity and Rights](#)) and is often accused of gross indiscipline. Commentators are generally concerned about the President's influence over the security forces. He has appointed his son and brother to key positions, despite accusations of nepotism, particularly within his Personal Protection Unit. He has also been accused of controlling military appointments in order to contain opposition. There are differing opinions on whether it is unreasonable for the President to ensure loyalty among top military positions in the army, given Uganda's history and the old

⁵¹ Ayume, f. J. Presentation on widening the political space in Uganda; challenges and prospects, May 24, 2003 <http://www.fhri.or.ug/ayume.htm>

⁵² Abdallah, H. DP defeats govt in Supreme Court- Jan 30, 2004, *The Monitor* <http://www.government.go.ug/news/index.php?myId=812>

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and emerging domestic and regional conflicts. However, there is agreement that the budding 'militarization of political space' does not bode well for democracy.

2.9 SUMMARY

The historical review demonstrated the disrepair of institutions, particularly post-Independence, and the vast challenges facing the Movement in 1986. These include establishing the rule of law, building a civilian army, implementing mechanisms for ensuring respect for and defense of human rights. The Movement had its own 'socialist' vision of democracy, which involved broad representation of previously marginalized groups, such as women, PWDs and the youth. Further, it was intent on building an inclusive system, which would preclude political and religious dissent. This no-party version of democracy has resulted in costs and benefits for institutional development.

Up until recently, Parliament has been operating in a context of restrictions on formal opposition. The President is dominant within the Movement and has substantial support, particularly among the Movement caucus, within Parliament. Yet, Parliament has a reputation of being a lively institution and various caucuses are sufficiently confident to challenge the President. Nevertheless, Parliament would benefit from capacity development and greater independence would improve its effectiveness. Vertical accountability mechanisms (elections) are still tainted by patronage, intimidation and corruption. Horizontal accountability mechanisms are operational but have limited effect. Civil society organisations have been developing but are limited by restraints on their activities and by the tendency (by both government and donors) to select/co-opt the more organised, visible, urban and seemingly competent organisations. The Judiciary is trying to rebuild its reputation: it has been seen as corrupt, inaccessible to the poor and hesitant to make anti-government decisions. It now plans to improve access to justice and to check corruption. Further, its recent decisions have improved its image as an independent institution. Questions continue to be raised about the role of the military, which is still accused of indiscipline and human rights abuses. Additionally, various segments seem to have a political role.

SECTION 3

POLITICAL CHANGE: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Procedural Change; The President's Next Moves, Party Negotiations and Electoral Laws; The Referendum and Possible Outcomes; The Youth, Political Involvement and Risk; Longstanding Obstacles to Political Development; Democratizing the Rural?; Buganda and Obusinga; Tradition, Gender Inequality and Democracy; Inequality, Property Rights and Political Development; Conflict, Insecurity and Rights

This section synthesizes current debates on political change in Uganda. This is a momentous period and analysts are not decided on the costs and benefits of multipartyism. In public circles, there is more discussion and speculations about procedural than substantive democratic change. However, the literature highlights the ways in which historical legacies continue to undermine citizenship and active political participation. The first subsection summarizes current views on procedural change; the second draws on the historical analysis and outlines some of the longer-term challenges to political development.

3.1 PROCEDURAL CHANGE

Multipartyism

In March 2003, the Movement's National Executive Committee (NEC) and the National Conference (NC) proposed two major constitutional amendments: to lift the ban on political parties and to remove presidential term limits. The first provision would end almost two decades of compelled membership of an all-encompassing Movement and is widely welcomed by the Opposition. The second is, in some circles, regarded as an attempt to extend President Museveni's term in office, despite his promise not to contest the 2006 elections.⁵³ Though the Afro-barometer survey reports that 80% of the electorate support a two-term

⁵³ The Monitor, April 3, 2003

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constitutional limit to the presidency, Museveni is to request approval for a third term in office and it is expected that this will be granted. A second option is being debated, which is to propose a parliamentary system through referendum. If granted, this would allow Museveni to avoid the presidential term limit and assume the office of prime minister.⁵⁴

The President has stated that he supports the shift to multipartyism, despite objections from some 'historicals' within his party. A Movement Think Tank is seeking to retain restrictions on political parties and various elements within the Movement are intent on seeking a referendum prior to changing the political system; they emphasize that this is consistent with the terms of the Constitution. However, there is discord, even among leaders of the Movement, on whether a referendum is necessary to change the political system to a multiparty arrangement. The major opposition parties have promised not to participate in a referendum. The opposition parties have a number of objections: (a) the NRM is already registered as a political party (now named the National Resistance Movement Organisation; NRM-O); (b) parties have already begun talks on transition; (c) the Electoral Commission cannot finance the referendum, which is projected to cost Ush29 billion/\$14 million.⁵⁵

Commentators note that the direction and character of change depend on (a) whether or not the President contests the 2006 elections; (b) whether or not a referendum is held and the outcomes; (c) the degree of freedom that is allowed the parties; and (d) the electoral laws and constitutional safeguards implemented. However, they are also careful to point out that notwithstanding these factors, the youth, disillusioned groups in the north and various pockets of resistance in the southwest are likely to have a bearing on the nature of change. We summarize the main arguments.

3.1.1 The President's Next Moves, Party Negotiations and Electoral Laws

The President's political intentions are still unclear and there are many opinions on his next actions and the attending political scenarios. First, the President could remain as head of the Movement and contest the next election. There is some agreement that President Museveni may win the election, though analysts predict a 'substantial attrition' in Museveni's support base by 2006, particularly among young people and in urbanised areas (Armon 2003). Additionally, a party coalition could pose a substantial challenge. Currently, the seven main political parties are negotiating a coalition. Known as the Group of Seven (G7), the parties comprise Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), Justice Forum (JEEMA), Democratic Party (DP), Reform Agenda (RA), The Free Movement (TFM), Conservative Party (CP) and National Democrats Forum (NDF). There are speculations that the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO) might also form a party and join the G7; this would improve the prospects of the coalition, as PAFO is well regarded. (However, this has not been a smooth process. The DP has been accused of delaying the coalition, and might be dropped. This would rob the group of a fairly strong support base.) Additionally, though the President has strong support in the Western region, there are suggestions that his base there is dwindling. Analysts also point to the potential political risks arising from 'unmet and competing demands for the restoration of cultural kingdoms (such as the Bakonzo of the Rwenzori area); land disputes; opposition to the Movement within 'heartland constituencies'; and increasing political divisions within the Movement.

Second, the President may decide not to contest the next election but to support a 'suitable successor'. Some commentators suggest that the President would prefer to lead the change process. They interpret his support for multipartyism as a well-calculated strategy that is designed to give him longer-term control over the choice of candidates and to either pre-empt the opposition and/or build a 'desirable' opposition (Wilson and Healey 2003). An appointed successor may or may not diffuse elements that are opposed to Museveni. Such an appointment might raise new tensions; parties are already debating how they might respond if

⁵⁴ Wilson and Healey (March 2003), p. 4.

⁵⁵ The *East African*, Monday, February 9, 2004. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200402110013.html>

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Museveni chooses a Muganda to succeed him.⁵⁶ Further, if elections are held under the umbrella of the Movement, those opposed to the system, particularly the more militant factions within the traditional and emerging parties, can stage an armed uprising. Multipartyism is likely to bring its own risks, and many fear that the 2006 elections may continue the poor precedent set in 2001 (See [Vertical Accountability Mechanisms: Elections](#)).

External agencies are pressing the Movement to open political space but they recognise that Museveni has a pivotal role in the process, both before and after 2006. The nature and direction of change depends on the outcomes of negotiations with the contending parties, the electoral laws that are crafted to manage the system and whether or not parties are persuaded to respect these laws (Wilson and Healey 2003). Following the March 2003 Constitutional Court ruling, the government held preparatory talks with 11 selected political parties. According to reports, 53 unregistered parties have since formed an alliance in order to protest the method of selecting the 11 parties and their own exclusion from the talks, and also to register their intent to seek redress in the courts.⁵⁷ Commentators warn that these are the sorts of divisions that require careful political management. Given such tendencies, some are arguing for timely change (Armon 2003).

3.1.2 The Referendum and Possible Outcomes

Multipartyists are aware that a referendum might not work in their interest. Ottemoeller's (1996) study of perceptions of democracy among Ugandans note that the majority values free speech and regular elections above organised political expression. Bratton et al (2000) support this. Their survey revealed that Ugandans define democracy in terms of civil liberties such as freedom of speech (20%); peace and unity (14%); government by the people between elections (13%); voting rights at election time (8%); open and accountable decision-making: good governance (4%). Only 2% defined democracy in terms of multiparty choice. As far as many persons were concerned, the Movement offers sufficient choices; political parties are likely to bring mayhem and even death.⁵⁸ Multiparty advocates argue that the Movement's 'politicisation' campaigns have sustained these fears.

Should the Movement win a referendum, the people could decide not to retain the presidential system and 'opt for parliamentary government'. This, as noted, may change the stakes: Museveni would be able to contest the election without constitutional restraints. However, the referendum could uncover growing and longstanding opposition to the Movement system in the north, among the youth (discussed below) and, as noted, in heartland areas. Northern attitudes to democracy and to the Movement system attest to the NRM's failure to resolve longstanding conflicts and reach that segment of the population with tangible social and economic gains. Table 2 of the Afrobarometer study (See [Table 2: Support for Democracy by Region and Partisan Affiliation](#)) indicates that though there is strong support for democracy throughout the country, the proportion of respondents who favour democracy is lowest in the North. Table 3 ([Table 3: Extent of Democracy by Region and Partisan Affiliation](#)) shows that compared with other regions, more respondents from the North think that Uganda is a democracy with major problems or is not a democracy. The authors suggest that the results do not necessarily indicate that non-democratic sentiments are more prevalent in the North. Instead, Northern and Opposition responses seem to be rooted in their lack of support for the Movement system and feelings of exclusion from political goods (See Table 4. [Table 4: Provision of Political Goods by Region and Partisan Affiliation](#)) and lack of tangible social benefits. Table 5 ([Table 5: Patience with Elected Government by Region and Partisan Affiliation](#)) describes the consequences. As the report notes, patience with the government has declined considerably since 2000, with the North and Opposition demonstrating the highest levels of intolerance and willingness to 'try another form' of government.

⁵⁶ Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda, Parties Walk Thorny Road to Unity Ahead of 2006, *The Monitor*, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200402230004.html>

⁵⁷ Xinhua Net www.chinaview.cn 2004-01-23

⁵⁸ Bratton et al, pp. 19-22.

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Yet, outcomes will likely depend on whether or not the Opposition chooses to participate. In 2000, the traditional political parties and a section of the Conservative Party decided to boycott the Referendum, arguing that 'the right to belong to a political party was God-given'. However, newer parties---such as the Action Party---campaigned. There was disagreement on whether the boycott was the prudent strategy; that is, whether it denied the electorate the opportunity to weigh the full range of possible choices and, inadvertently, portrayed the Opposition as fractious and ineffectual. A similar scenario is possible in the 2005 Referendum. Already, DP representative Jude Mbabali has warned that 'if the referendum is to decide whether the Movement system is retained or the country should go multiparty, the party would boycott it as it did the one held in 2000. "We shall use the time set for the referendum to take our presidential candidate on a countrywide tour."⁵⁹

3.1.3 The Youth, Political Involvement and Risk

Museveni has managed to retain core support among women and older people; he also has a good base in the rural areas. However, some speculate that he is likely to face new challenges from the youth. Unemployment levels are high among the youth and educated. The economy cannot cater for the vast numbers of UPE graduates and many are discouraged. The JLOS SPRP notes that crime rates are increasing among the youth, particularly in urban areas. Boys and girls, even younger than seven years, are involved in economic and serious crimes. There has been a 'steep increase in economic crime for all age groups of juveniles from 1998 to 2000'. The report records a 95% increase of predominantly older youth charged with capital crimes. Commentators warn that urban youth, who are most aware of the growing inequalities, are prone to manipulation and can be easily persuaded to join violent protests. Youth have few legitimate channels to express and defend their political views. Similarly, Dolan⁶⁰ is concerned about youth who have been scarred by violence in the North and encourages attention to the psychosocial needs and economic and social conditions of *all* children within the area. The report notes that 'there is a backlash against youth' as adults try to re-enforce traditional hierarchical relations; this prevents many youth initiatives. Notably, the DFID Uganda Conflict Analysis of Acholi-land notes that LRA leader, Joseph Kony, is supported by growing numbers of 'long term young rebels who are virtually devoid of stakes within the Acholi community still less national life'. It is reasonable to conclude that Northern---and, increasingly, children in the Southwest---are at risk and can pose political risks.

Though many agree that multipartyism may be the most effective medium for including the youth in political affairs, they also acknowledge that stalwarts within the Movement may try to delay this; that broad sections of the electorate may object; and that regional conflicts, perceived and real, can stymie the process.

3.2 LONGSTANDING OBSTACLES TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

This section synthesizes debates on some of the long-term factors that influence political change in Uganda. It focuses on the rural-urban divisions; cultural claims; tradition and gender inequality; property rights; insecurity and conflict.

3.2.1 Democratizing the Rural?

Lieres (1999) points out that 'current debate on democratisation in Africa is largely confined to issues of institutional change, focusing in particular on the structural prerequisites for multipartyism. The question of democratic participation and active citizenship is often left out of the debate'. Mamdani's thesis suggests that these concerns are especially relevant for rural development in Uganda. He argues that 'citizens' and 'subjects' were created through a colonial policy of direct and indirect rule. Colonialism produced a

⁵⁹ The *East African*, Monday, February 9, 2004.

<http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/current/Regional/Regional0902200437.html>

⁶⁰ C. Dolan, Which Children Count? The Politics of Children's Rights in Northern Uganda
<http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/children.shtml>

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'bifurcated state', in which rights, civil society and citizenship were restricted to select groups under urban 'direct' rule; they were not extended to those subsisting under customary rural authorities. Nationalist post-colonial governments were committed to reversing this racial exclusion from civil society, and have been fairly successful at 'democratising the urban areas'. Up to 1986, he contends, there were no serious attempts to democratise---which would necessarily involve detribalising---the rural.

However, while Mamdani agrees that the NRM's introduction of Resistance Councils and Committees effectively dismantled indirect customary rule and replaced it with 'village self-governance', he also contends that these Resistance and, later, Local Councils have paid little attention to social differentiation; instead, they have 'stabilised peasant communities on the basis of leadership by its more prosperous members'. Golooba-Mutebi's⁶¹ study of local level participation in Rakai notes the ways in which the powerful dominate proceedings, sometimes in a blatantly dis-empowering manner. Excerpts from speeches from the parish and sub county chiefs in one area record both officials accusing the villagers of laziness, irresponsibility and disrespect for those in authority. The sub county chief also warned 'of dire consequences' for those who reneged on their taxes. These examples do not merely point to the excesses of power; they are also the outgrowth of a culture of deference to the leader/big-man, which makes such excesses possible.⁶² The Afrobarometer report---which does not distinguish between rural and urban areas---suggests that 'Ugandans may be caught between an authoritarian and paternalistic past and what is supposed to be a more participatory and accountable democracy... They want a government that is more accountable to them but they have not let go of a sense of dependency on government'. The survey finds that while Ugandans are interested in public affairs and believe that they have the right to question their leaders, 59% of respondents think that 'people are like children and the government should take care of them like a parent'.⁶³

It is worth emphasizing some noteworthy objections to Mamdani's thesis, as these also have important implications for understanding citizenship and civil society. Thornton (1999) contends that Mamdani utilizes a familiar but narrow interpretation of 'political society', that is, as 'both the power of the state and the resistance to that power'. Civil society then becomes that agent that opposes or mediates state actions in the people's interest. However, the broader and more exact understanding is that 'any contest over values and ideals is inherently political'. This broader conception of political society at once defies suggestions that civil society is 'non-political'. It also resists attempts to limit its scope to the more 'enlightened and visible' urban areas. This distinction is important, for it suggests that popular notions of civil society may mask the political activities and incentives for action that reside in rural communities. The crucial challenge for policy is to understand how urban and rural societies (and the myriad groups within them) understand and experience citizenship.⁶⁴ Further, to what extent are ethnic, religious or cultural allegiances a reflection of domination or a preference for certain values and ideals? Mamdani portrays 'tribal' allegiances as a 'degeneration or atavistic regression to the past'.⁶⁵ However, Thornton challenges this value judgement, particularly where 'allegiance to the chief is voluntary and contingent'.

The important political question is how to combine people's respect for and right to culture with effective defense of equal rights, opportunities and justice. The Afrobarometer survey notes that the proportion of persons who oppose traditional rule has declined from 79% in 2000 to 48% in 2002. It suggests that ethnic

⁶¹ Golooba-Mutebi, F. 'Reassessing Participation in Uganda' Paper prepared for presentation at the Development Studies Institute's 10th Anniversary Conference on 'New Institutional Theory, Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction'. September 7-8

⁶² Moncrieffe, J. et al, State Responsiveness to Poverty: The Politics of Pro-Poor Policymaking and Implementation in Uganda, pp. 40-41.

⁶³ Afrobarometer survey, pp.16-17

⁶⁴ For a useful case study, see, Hickey, S. 'Politicising participatory development: Citizenship and exclusion in North West Cameroon', Paper prepared for DSA Annual Conference: Different Poverties, Different Policies, September 10-12, 2001.

⁶⁵ Thornton, p. 3.

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mobilization during the elections may have been partly responsible for this outcome. Second, traditional kingdoms have improved their profile, precisely at a time when the Movement is, increasingly, being accused of corruption. Therefore, particularly in the West, traditional leaders are becoming credible 'political' alternatives.

3.2.2 BUGANDA AND OBUSINGA

Arguably, Mamdani's thesis does not successfully explain the persistence of the Buganda Kingdom, and the high profile, educated and civilised 'subjects' within it. All Ugandan governments have had to deal with the Baganda and have discovered that political stability and legitimacy in the Central region require sensitive and strategic political management. The issues are not simple. President Museveni, who is well aware that he needs Baganda support both to win elections and within the party, has brokered an arrangement in which the Kingdom is, in principle, restricted to a cultural role in return for his re-instituting the Kabaka and returning some of his lands. The President also works with the Kabaka and the Katikkiro (prime minister of Buganda) on advancing some development programmes. Both the President and the Kingdom count the progress on immunization in Buganda as one of the successes of collaboration. However, this arrangement also rests on a false distinction of the political and non-political. The Kingdom defends certain values and ideas---some quite distinct from state positions---which constitutes political action and it continues to lobby for a more political role. Much depends on the political pacts that are arranged following the current constitutional reviews. It is unlikely that President Museveni would deliberately alienate the Baganda. However, it is difficult to predict the outcomes, and the situation may well become more complex if a non-sympathiser were to succeed him.

To groups such as the Bakonzo/Bamba (the Banyarwenzuru), the government has not adopted a consistent approach to all requests for cultural recognition. They feel that they have been persistently marginalized and denied their human, political and cultural rights. Kabanankye⁶⁶ notes that the majority of the Banyarwenzuru, and particularly the youth, support the Rwenzuru Movement and its demands for the institutionalisation of the Obusinga bwa Rwenzuru. People believe that official recognition of the Obusinga will promote social progress and improve the self-esteem of the Banyarwenzuru. They claim that is sound precedence for their claims for in 1982 when Omusinga Mumbere agreed to hand over his army and administration to the Central Government, he was recognised as cultural leader and given a post in the District Council. Mumbere denies that he has been associated with the ADF, though he admits to having joined the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), which he subsequently left in 1994 in order to pursue constitutional solutions.

There are fears that these unmet cultural requests will continue to provoke conflict within the area, and particularly among the youth. However, Kabanankye states that some Banyarwenzuru refuse to be associated with violent activities and strongly object to Mumbere's past role in NALU. Since Independence, successive governments have tried various tactics to balance their own political aims and the competing claims within the region. President Museveni is in a difficult position since he has restored and recognised select groups, and is perceived by those denied, as having done so unfairly.

3.2.3 TRADITION, GENDER INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY

Gender discrimination and inequality are rooted in some cultural norms and are fervently upheld, particularly in rural areas. This is one of the areas in which there is a strong and enduring conflict between culture and official policy, with serious consequences for citizenship and political development. Culture pervades government structures. Though PPA 1 corroborates current claims that LC1 officials are held in high regard, PPA2 reports that women were more critical than men. As far as many women were concerned, LC1 officials are biased against them, disregard their opinions and ignore women representatives. Additionally,

⁶⁶K. Kabanankye, Bakonzo's political and socio-cultural dynamics.

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there are allegations of corruption: In Wakiso, women report that men often pay LC1 officials to have complaints against them dismissed.⁶⁷ Khadiagala (2001) states that one of the principal failures of popular democracy in Uganda is that though the NRM promised that local councils would provide 'culturally appropriate forms of justice', which would benefit poor rural and uneducated women, local elites have used their positions to reinforce social control. Further, the gap between theory and practice arises out of misconceptions about the character of local spaces, particularly the notion of community.' Gender discrimination persists despite structural reforms and claims of the right to custom perpetuate inequalities and abuse. Recent analyses of the links between gender and poverty demonstrate the ways in which these pervasive inequalities 'impose large efficiency costs on Uganda's economy' (Klasen 2003); result in higher levels of poverty and illness in Women Headed Households (Lawson 2003); undermine important PEAP initiatives (Booth et al. 2003) and prevents equal and fair access to justice (JLOS SPRP; Wengi and Kyasimire, 1995). Bratton et al (2000) note that women lag behind men (by about 10 percentage points) in electoral, informal and community participation and voter registration. Poor and low-income women are least likely to register to vote and those who hold traditional views tend to avoid community meetings. The researchers found that 'women were twice as likely to say that they do not know what democracy means'. Women in rural areas and the less educated were even more unaware. However, there were significant disparities in awareness between boys and girls, despite educational status. These legacies of inequality are not restricted to rural regions.

3.2.4 INEQUALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

One of the more significant considerations is that insecurity of land tenure continues to undermine equality, economic development and political participation. As noted, colonial administrators operated a dual land tenure system, in which they granted land rights to the Baganda under freehold/*Mailo* arrangements, reserved substantial plots for the Crown, and denied security of tenure to the small-scale cultivators who occupied the land. The rest of the country retained customary systems. The 1969 Public Lands Act recognised customary tenure but Idi Amin subsequently weakened the position of these users when he declared that all land was owned by the state. At Independence, the Buganda Kingdom regained its lands (via the Buganda Land Board), but Milton Obote subsequently vested all lands to the state, under the Uganda Land Commission. Since 1994, the reinstated Kingdom has been agitating for some resolution to the land problem. Hunt (forthcoming) notes that in order to address these issues, the Land Act attempts to formalise traditional rights and facilitate an easy transition to freehold status. By allowing private ownership, it also aims to improve security, enable access to credit and boost commercial agriculture. Importantly, it provides security of tenure for those residing on *Mailo* land and compensates *Mailo* landowners for loss of rights. There are also special provisions for women and children. Section 28 of the Act allows customary norms to prevail where land is held communally, with the exception that women, children and persons with disabilities should not be denied access to the land. Section 40 promotes joint decisions on land transactions, where spouses or children reside together and, therefore, have a claim on the land. However, Parliament is yet to pass the amendment that provides for joint ownership. There are substantial objections to this amendment both at the centre and local levels. PPA2 reports that 'men justify the unequal distribution of resources by asserting the importance of maintaining the status quo'. Their research also revealed that women share these perceptions believing, as one man in Masindi commented, that 'if women are allowed to own property, they will be on top of men'.⁶⁸

Insecurity of tenure and of access to land is also common among 'pastoralists, urban slum dwellers, tenants, hunter-gatherer groups, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)'. Further, there are significant regional and intra-regional inequalities in average land holdings. Bosworth (2000) notes that there are 'significant regional differences in average land holdings and significant inequality within regions'. Intra-

⁶⁷ MFPED (2002) Uganda Participatory Assessment Process, Second Participatory Poverty Assessment Report: Deepening the Understanding of Poverty, Kampala: MFPED.

⁶⁸ UPPAP, PPA2: Deepening the Understanding of Poverty, p. 34

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regional inequality, which is rooted in historical social and political power relations, entrenches a stratified society of 'landless or near landless wage-earners, who are among the poorest; a land short category whose access is limited to or heavily dependent on tenancy relations of one form or another; [and] large landowners'. This inequality and related poverty have led to land disputes throughout the country; existing dispute resolution mechanisms are not effective. Additionally, outstanding political issues continue to plague the land reform process, including Baganda land claims and Banyoro insistence on the redistribution of land rights in Kibale district. Both require negotiation in order to appease opposing interests. Commentators fear that allowances to the Baganda might result in loss of rights to the non-Baganda who now live in the area; Baganda, with influence in government oppose further provisions for the Banyoro. Hickey (2003) makes the interesting point that land disputes, which are often ethnically based, are supporting the development of local 'politics of belonging'---that is, a political culture that distinguishes between 'insiders/outside, indigenes/settlers'---and which flout the principle that the rights to participation belong to all citizens. He cites the case of Mbale, where traditionally land ownership is loosely related to clan membership and length of residence in an area, and notes that in the 2002 local elections, the dominant clan/land owners resumed power, so that the poor remains excluded both in terms of ownership and governance.⁶⁹

3.2.5 CONFLICT, INSECURITY AND RIGHTS

Dicklitch (2002) argues that though the NRM does not have the egregious rights records of the previous Obote and Amin regimes, human, social and political rights are still being violated, and this puts democratic development at risk. The government is accused of both rights abuses and failure to protect human rights, particularly in the North, where Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has, since late 1987, attacked villages, abducted thousands of children,⁷⁰ destroyed property and killed.⁷¹ Human Rights Watch (March 2003) has also documented UPDF (Uganda People's Defence Force) recruitment of child soldiers, for protection of villages and for combat against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Current estimates place the economic costs of this extended war at approximately US\$1.3 billion.⁷²

The conflict had its roots in the colonial division of North and South Uganda (See [The \(Under\)development of the North](#)) in which the South was developed to become the hub of government and economic activity, while the North continued to concentrate on pastoralism and on supplying soldiers for the army. In the 1970s, Amin brutally punished the Acholi for their activities under Obote 1. Acholi soldiers returned under Obote II and soon resumed attacks against civilians in the South and Southwest. Museveni's NRA was able to force the Acholi back to the North but splinter groups developed, including Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). Lakwena's claims of special powers galvanized substantial support. Her mission was to 'fight against Government, purge the Acholi of wrongdoing and create a new system based on adherence to the "ten commandments"⁷³. Lakwena was eventually defeated---though uncomfortably close to the capital---and escaped into Kenya. The HSM disintegrated, leaving a peaceful subgroup and a more militant arm: the LRA. The LRA, under Kony's leadership, believes that it has inherited Lakwena's mission and spiritual powers. Importantly, the LRA is not a popular resistance ethnic movement; instead, it has been described as a 'religious cult that has succeeded on a mixture of spiritualism and brutality'.⁷⁴ Though the LRA is

⁶⁹ Hickey (2003), p. 36

⁷⁰ According to the latest (January 2004) Human Rights Watch Report, 10000 children have been abducted since mid-2002. See Human Rights Watch (January 2004) Abduction of Children in Africa: Briefing to the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. <http://hrw.org/english/dos/2004/01/29/africa7118.htm>

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch (January 2004) claim that 'abducted children are forced to fight against the UPDP, raid villages for food, slaughter civilians. Girls as young as 12 are given to rebel commanders as "wives". Children who refuse to follow orders or try to escape are killed, typically by other children who are forced to beat or hack the victim or be killed themselves.'

⁷² CSO PEAP Revision Steering Committee (2003), p. 97.

⁷³ DFID Uganda (June 2003), Conflict Analysis and Strategy for Acholi-land, p. 11

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 7.

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comprised of Acholi, they are also the main victims of the insurgency. However, other ethnic groups in Apac, Adjumani and Lira have also been affected by the conflict.

In the early 1990s, the Government of Sudan (GoS)--allegedly in retribution for the GoU's support for the Sudanese Liberation Army--formed an alliance with the LRA. However, since September 2001, GoS has sought to break links with the LRA, which the United States has declared a terrorist organisation. GoS, concerned about its international standing and its prospects for aid, now seem committed to forming good relations with GoU. GoS has allowed the GoU to pursue the LRA inside Sudan (via Operation Iron Fist). Though there are claims that elements within Sudan still offer the LRA a physical base, the GoS claims to have no official association with the group. The majority of the LRA have returned to Uganda. One unintended consequence of Operation Iron Fist is that the LRA heightened its attacks in the North and also began to permeate the South, which had been previously unaffected.

Though the UPDF has not been able to defeat the LRA, and has been accused of human rights abuses in their attempts to do so, GoU seems to prefer a military solution. The DFID conflict analysis report notes that 'strong executive views about how the conflict should be managed' have contributed to tensions between the Acholi and the GoU. The Acholi feel marginalized and abandoned by government; they are equally suspicious of UPDF officers who they claim are not inclined to end the conflict given the personal allowances they gain while it continues. Various Acholi representatives (religious leaders, parliamentarians, externally-based groups) have been pressing for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, analysts observe that there are no coherent national conflict resolution strategies and that the LRA has a record of instability and unreliability.

There are other notable pockets of insecurity. In Karamoja, poverty, insecurity and the proliferation of arms are the outgrowth of colonial and post-colonial policies that devalued pastoralism. While the colonial administrations actively restricted access to rangelands, ignored customary institutions and isolated the region, post-colonial governments have focused on 'resettlement' and providing minimal infrastructure (Walker 2002). Karamoja remains among the poorest and most underdeveloped regions and pastoralists have been forced to compete for resources. Cattle raiding has intensified since the 1970s and, without effective conflict resolution mechanisms, violent conflict is now institutionalised.

Regional threats, perceived and real, pose additional constraints. The Government believed that Zaire/ the Democratic Republic of Congo had previously supported the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels in the West. Consequently, in 1997, Uganda, in collaboration with Rwanda, overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko and installed Laurent Kabila. There are reports that Uganda also supported troops to overthrow Kabila in 1998. The (2001) UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC reports that the Ugandan Army was involved in looting diamonds in the DRC. Human Rights Watch reports note that the UPDF also provoked ethnic conflict between the Lendu and Hema.⁷⁵ In 1999, conflicts erupted between Ugandan and Rwanda troops in the Congo, which erupted again in May 2000.

Hickey (2003) makes the interesting point that though the NRM has managed to secure relative peace and stability in much of Uganda, it has not been able to 'de-militarise political space'; instead, it has perpetuated 'a model of guerrilla warfare and political revolution'. Consequently, political debates are couched in threats of insurgency; marginalized groups warn of violence unless their demands are met; some of the key officials are ex-military officers who maintain a combative stance to politics. These, Hickey argues, limit the prospects for reaching political solutions; they do not augur well for democracy.

⁷⁵ See Human Rights Watch, D.R. Congo: Uganda Must Protect Civilians in Ituri, New York, April 7, 2003. <http://hrw.org/press/2003/04/ongo040703.htm>

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3.3 SUMMARY

The Movement system was an innovative and skilful political response in a context of deep social divisions, conflict, distrust, and government failure. The NRM set a goal of nation building, which included people from the grassroots to the centre. It attempted to divert attention from singular allegiances. Seventeen years on, the majority of Ugandans are now more concerned about building national identity and unity than defending ethnic distinctions. However, many contend that the Movement is, increasingly, functioning like a party, and is incapable of accommodating and representing diverse interests and opinions. A transition to multipartyism may present both risks and opportunities and it is difficult to predict the course of change. Procedural democracy is not enough. Substantive social, political and economic reforms are required to address long-standing inequalities and discrimination, rural and urban divisions, conflict and insecurity.

SECTION 4 POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

Background to the PEAP; The President/Movement's Role; The Domestic Technical Group; Donor Agencies; The Early Results' Recent Developments; Ownership and Policy Effectiveness; Where 'Ownership' Promotes Exclusion; Ownership and Contestation of Policy Options; Politics and Local Level Administration; The PEAP in Broader Context; Critical Perceptions of Donor Roles in Governance, Human Rights and Democracy

4.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PEAP

Most assessments agree that Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), subsequently its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), owes much of its success to broad agreement---though more on policy focus rather than selected strategies---and strong political leadership. The PEAP, which is commonly viewed as 'locally owned', originated in 1995 with the GoU's recognition that economic growth was not benefiting the majority of the poor. The World Summit on Poverty in Copenhagen (1995) strengthened this view, and the President and Ministers who attended subsequently reinforced the need to take poverty seriously. A poverty analysis was commissioned in 1996, which revealed that 66% of Ugandans were not meeting basic needs. Officials claim that this 'shook up the government', which then set up a task force to design a poverty action plan. Preparatory consultations for the Plan were broad-based, including representatives from different line ministries, local government, academic institutions and civil society organizations. By 1997, Uganda had begun to implement its poverty action plan. The World Bank was then developing its country assistance strategy, though under the mandate that country strategies should include input from local communities. Accordingly, Uganda's first participatory poverty assessment (PPA1) was launched in 1998 and the results published in 1999. PPA1 stressed the need for greater access to water, security, information and good governance, and the PEAP was redesigned to incorporate these. With agreement and technical assistance from the World Bank, the PEAP was subsequently revised in 2000 and submitted as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The 2000 PEAP/PRSP established four major objectives:

- **Creating a framework for economic growth and transformation:** Pillar 1 emphasizes rapid and sustainable economic growth and structural transformation (focusing on economic openness, and on modernising agriculture, manufacturing and services);
- **Good governance and security:** Pillar 2 addresses transparency of public actions, respect for human rights, zero tolerance for corruption, security and accountability);
- **Increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes** (through employment promotion and improved access to services and information);
- **Enhanced quality of life for the poor** (emphasizing health, education, housing, service delivery and information)⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2001-2003), Volume 1, pp. 4-5.

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Piron (2003) notes that the PEAP has had an instrumental role in building national consensus around poverty eradication. Furthermore, it also managed to combine the policy and programmatic goals of the President/Movement, MFPED technocrats and bilateral and multilateral agencies.⁷⁷

4.1.1 The President/Movement's Role

Poverty reduction and empowerment have always been central to the President's socialist ideals and Ten-Point programme. Traditionally, Museveni favoured state-led modernisation but reluctantly accepted that structural adjustment—with its emphasis on macroeconomic stability and privatisation—was a pragmatic route to economic management; further, he could not obtain funding without it. Though there is a view that President Museveni was forced to capitulate to the donor agencies, evidence indicates that there were mutual compromises. Uganda's active/central poverty reduction—as opposed to trickle-down—focus bears Museveni's imprint and reflects the influence of some of the more vocal officials and NGOs (Christiansen and Hovland, 2003). Ideologically, the President still favours some state intervention, which MFPED and the IFI's try to moderate (Piron 2003).

The President is intent on giving close and personal attention to poverty policy, which is one of the Movement's primary 'political projects' (Piron 2003). His dominant role in government means that he is able to use political space to push policy reforms. Observers note that presidential involvement is less controversial where all parties agree on the course of action or where sound political leadership is required, such as on HIV/AIDS. However, the President has also used his 'political role' to respond to popular demands and introduced 'necessary policy' without prior discussion with the domestic and international technocrats. In such circumstances, political involvement can become more contentious⁷⁸. For example, during the 1996 election, the President responded to public demands for abolishing user fees in education and promised free primary education to four children from each family. This resulted in a massive increase in primary school enrolments (from 3 million in 1997 to 7.6 million in 2003 and with girl's enrolment increasing by 50%⁷⁹) However, the policy contravened IFI recommendations. Earlier, IFIs had introduced user fees in order to provide additional resources for improving service delivery and quality. Both IFIs and domestic technical staff were/are concerned about the affordability of Universal Primary Education (UPE). In 2001, the President abolished cost sharing in health, which also improved access. Again, the technocrats would have preferred a more timely strategy. Therefore, despite broad agreement on the PEAP, the political and technical 'projects' do, at times, diverge. (However, there is evidence that donors have begun to accept that abolishing user fees has drastically improved access to services.)

4.1.2 The Domestic Technical Group

The domestic technical group (predominantly within MFPED) has, with donor collaboration, managed to build a successful and predictable budget framework that incorporates (a) a Medium Term Expenditure strategy, which both guarantees increased pro-poor expenditure over three-year periods and assesses the quality of pro-poor interventions; and (b) a Poverty Action Fund, which protects poverty expenditure against budget cuts, channels resources from debt relief to key poverty reduction areas, and ensures that these resources are spent as defined. The emphasis has been on primary healthcare, primary education and water and sanitation (Piron 2003). Additionally, MFPED directs a fairly open budget process, which publicizes poverty documents and involves CSOs, government representatives and donors in sector working groups. CSOs, particularly the Uganda Debt Network, have also been involved in poverty monitoring, particularly of the Poverty Action Fund (PAF). The Uganda National NGO Forum collaborates with global NGOs in analyses of PRSPs and, more recently, of SAPRI. It has used this broader knowledge

⁷⁷ Piron (2003), p. 18

⁷⁸ Interview with technocrat MFPED, January 2002. ODI/MISR State Responsiveness to Poverty Project.

⁷⁹ The Ministry of Education and Sports, Sector PEAP Revision Paper, November 2003

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and experience in its contribution to the current (2003) PEAP revision process.⁸⁰ Sector strategic and spending plans are important to the budget process. Sectors must clarify how their budget plans will meet PEAP objectives, and risk budget cuts if they fail to do so. There is disagreement on the nature of the relationship between the President and MFPED. Anti-Movement groups tend to portray MFPED as a pawn of the President. However, MFPED has some degree of independence: it protects poverty allocations against defence spending; it publishes frank poverty assessments reports, which sometimes pose indirect challenges to government policies; and it negotiates for certain policy options, with GoU's acceptance of structural adjustment among its successes (Piron 2003). One MFPED official describes the nature of the relationship:

"The President has defined a 15-point agenda, which is executed through the ministries. Therefore, the President establishes the broad macro priorities and the technocrats have the mandate to establish priorities within this framework. The technocrats and the President do not agree all the time. There are times when the President declares that he has wanted to take some action but is obstructed by the technocrats; therefore, he will implement the policies in his own way".⁸¹

4.1.3 Donor Agencies

Donor agencies have been instrumental in the design and implementation of the PEAP. They now provide over 52% of budget funding, which is directed at addressing PEAP priorities. Uganda was the first country to receive general budget support under the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC). Other donors, such as DFID, Ireland Aid and the EU also provide general support and funding for specific PAF expenditures or sector programmes. The Sector-wide approach to aid is being extended across government and is considered crucial for effective planning and resource allocation (Foster and Mijumbi, 2002). Donors also provide substantial technical support within the sector working groups and ministries; this has forced them coordinate their positions on various policy and technical issues and amend their procurement and financial systems (Piron 2003). The PEAP (Volume 3) outlines the terms of the partnership.

Box 1: Partnership Principles between Donors and GoU

Government will: continue to increase its focus on poverty eradication; continue with increased tax effort; assume full leadership in donor coordination; decline any offers of stand alone donor projects; strengthen monitoring and accountability; continue to improve transparency and combat corruption; continue to strengthen district capacity; develop comprehensive, costed and prioritised sector wide programmes, eventually covering the whole budget; further develop participation and co-ordination of all stakeholders (including parliamentarians); strengthen capacity to coordinate across government

Donors will: jointly undertake all analytical work, appraisals, reviews; jointly set output/outcome indicators; develop uniform disbursement rules; develop uniform and stronger accountability rules; ensure all support is fully integrated into sector wide programmes and is fully consistent with each sector programme's priorities; continue to increase the level of untied sector budget support; increase the level of delegation to country offices; abolish topping up of individual project staff salaries; end individual, parallel country programmes and stand alone projects; progressively reduce tying of procurement

Source: PFAP Volume 3, Annex 1, 2001

4.1.4 The Early Results

There is sound evidence that the political-technical-donor partnership produced substantial pro-poor gains. The (national) poverty headcount index fell from 56% in 1992 to 49% in 1995 and 35% in 1999. In the rural areas, it fell from 60% (1992) to 54% (1995) and then to 39% in 1999 (Appleton 2001). Studies of

⁸⁰ CSO PEAP Revision Steering Committee/Liaison Committee (October 2003) In Search of Consensus on a New Development Path: A Synthesis of Civil Society Views into the 2003 PEAP Revision Process.

⁸¹ Ibid.

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'Uganda's Recovery'⁸² since 1986 note that the government has provided a suitable context for growth: there is 'reasonable internal peace' instead of the widespread violence that existed. Second, the government has been able to check predatory taxation, particularly on exports. Liberalization of the foreign exchange rate and of coffee marketing is considered important for growth. Third, the government managed to secure fiscal discipline, which increased the predictability of the currency. These dramatic improvements benefited households, allowing them to gradually move from subsistence-based to market activities. Between 1992 and 1996, growth in cash crop production accounted for 48% of the reduction in poverty, compared with 14% for food crops. However, between 1996 and 2000, food crop production accounted for 43% of the reduction in poverty, compared with 27% for cash crops. (Appleton 2001; Morrissey and Verschoor 2003) Throughout the 1990s, the government's economic strategy had also begun to profit firms, though these were yet to recover from the Asian depression in 1972 and the 'shrinking enterprise sector, dissaving and decumulation of assets' that occurred between 1971 and 1985 (Reinikka and Svensson, 2001). There was evidence that a more efficient tax policy was required, particularly for trade, and that corruption was having an adverse effect on growth. Nevertheless, Collier and Reinikka (2001) were assured that the government would be able to tackle these obstacles.

Improved security, health care, electricity and infrastructure were also important for improved incomes. Compared with much of the South, the Northern region remained more susceptible to the decline in cotton prices and agricultural opportunities, insecurity, low levels of education, welfare and infrastructure development (Deninger and Okidi, 2002). Reports also indicate that debt relief benefited poverty policy. Morrissey and Verschoor note that; 'the ratio of debt interest payments to exports fell from 35% in 1997/8 to 10% in 2000/1'; over the same period, the ratio of debt payments to tax revenue has also fallen from 22% to 11%.

4.1.5 Recent Developments

However, MFPED recently acknowledged that poverty levels have increased from 35% in 2000 to approximately 38% in 2003, and that inequality has deepened. Consequently, the 2004 PEAP seeks to understand the underlying causes and to prioritise human development. This revelation has increased debate on (a) the sustainability and effectiveness of Uganda's poverty reduction model and (b) how this political-technocratic-donor partnership has affected political development, economic growth and social welfare in Uganda. The remainder of this section summarizes four strands of these debates. First, it synthesizes some of the critical views on 'ownership' of the PEAP and the implications for sustainability. Second, it summarizes reports on the effectiveness of the PEAP at the local level. Third, it outlines concerns about the sustainability of the PEAP, given the broader context. Fourth, it notes some of the more critical perceptions on how donors influence this broader context.

4.2 OWNERSHIP AND POLICY EFFECTIVENESS

There is a popular perception that broad policy ownership is crucial for successful and sustained policy implementation and, as noted, Uganda's PEAP is highly regarded as 'locally owned'. The PEAP has opened political space, for example, by facilitating the views of the poor through UPPAP and including CSOs in policy making. Nevertheless, current assessments of the PEAP qualify the claim of wide ownership. Piron notes that in the PEAP/PRSP 2000 process, parliamentarians had very limited involvement and were unfamiliar with the main tenets of the Plan. Many parliamentarians did not respond to invitations to PEAP consultation exercises: some argued that the PEAP is a donor influenced document that is largely 'owned' by the President while others suggested that with such broad consultation, Parliament has no special incentive to get involved. While some critics claim that Parliament has little interest in poverty, other commentators note that parliamentarians are marginalized, for though they are now represented in most sector working groups (SWGs), they are still not represented in some of the key policy groups. Hickey observes that there is also inequality of 'ownership' across the Ministries, with MFPED at the centre and key

⁸² Reinikka, R. and P. Collier, Uganda's Recovery: The Role of Farms Firms and Government.

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PAF ministries such as Health, gaining prominence. MGLSD and ministries that do not benefit from PAF seem to have much less 'ownership' of the agenda. Hickey also indicates that elites feel excluded from the process. Many dispute the published poverty records and regard the poverty agenda as 'externally imposed...inherently profligate and corrupt' and 'a means for personal enrichment by both national and international consultants'.⁸³ He notes that the problem for policy is that without the right messages, elites who could have supported the agenda may undermine it.

Various CSOs protest that government domination of the policy process restricts their participation and ownership. In 2000, the Government invited a Civil Society Task Force (comprised of national and international NGOs and research institutions) to contribute to the PEAP revision process. Piron observes that trade unions, religious groups, political parties and the media were excluded from consultation, perhaps for political reasons. Additionally, Nyamugasira and Rowden⁸⁴ report that while the selected CSOs were able to contribute to designing the PEAP, they were excluded from policy formulation; instead, this was restricted to MFPED and donor officials. CSOs do not support some of the policies that, purportedly, follow from the PEAP 2000 consultations. They are especially averse to the World Bank financed Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) and the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which they regard as inconsistent with the stated poverty reduction goals. In the current (2003) round of revisions, CSOs are optimistic that their contributions will be carefully considered. First, they claim to be better equipped to contribute to the PEAP. Second, they believe that government now recognizes the limitations of its economic policies, which provides a better platform for debate.

These qualifications raise important questions about the relationship between participation and ownership: How much participation is necessary for policy ownership and how do donors and governments undermine it? Morrissey and Verschoor (2003) present a different dimension to the debate: they suggest that policy ownership is not necessary for effective implementation; commitment is a sufficient condition. They note, for example, that while GoU can be said to 'own' the poverty focus (the policy option originated with the government), it does not own but, instead, has committed (established a preference for a proposed strategy) to economic liberalization; the economic strategy was strongly donor influenced. This commitment, in turn, has been sufficient for the PEAP's success. Morrissey and Verschoor characterize the policy environment in Uganda as one in which GoU has a preference for pro-poor policies that are donor influenced but not donor driven. Uganda has strong political capacity though weak administrative capabilities, which means that donors have an important role in providing technical assistance and advice.

4.2.1 Where 'Ownership' Promotes Exclusion

As noted, reports from Parliament, civil society groups, and the elite suggest that the perception that policy is 'owned' by the Donor-GoU-MFPED alliance is undermining wider 'commitment' among key stakeholders. Donors and MFPED recognise that greater parliamentary involvement is important for increasing the PEAP's political base (Piron 2003). Therefore, donors have committed funds to improve parliamentary capacity. Piron notes that this may itself undermine the PEAP: 'clientelistic motivations might weaken pro-poor allocation, prioritisation processes might become more complex and it might become harder for MFPED to control the budget.'⁸⁵

Selective CSO engagement also promotes exclusions, particularly among traditional authorities (which have been confined to a cultural role), trade unions, rural groups, religious groups. As described in Section 3 (See [Civil Society](#)), a number of academics are, increasingly, critical of the approach to building civil society. They are concerned that the process of crafting an active and acceptable core of civil society organisations has served political purposes (it co-opts the more organised and eloquent urban groups and 'legitimises'

⁸³ Hickey, 2003, p. 43.

⁸⁴ Nyamugasira and Rowden, (April 2002) 'New Strategies, Old Loan Conditions',

⁸⁵ Piron et al. 2003, p. 30

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their involvement while restricting their power) but is also distinctly apolitical: it assumes a false distinction between state and civil society; it restricts its focus to voluntary, seemingly democratic organisations; it creates a financially dependent group of organisations that may become alienated from the constituencies they should represent; and it does not contend with some of the 'more uncomfortable' arenas of power and protest. Therefore, governments and development agencies have been advancing one particular notion of civil society, which often maps very poorly onto the social realities of the societies that are the object of development'. Further, 'it is a part of a package of related ideas that have the effect of depoliticising development'⁸⁶.

4.2.2 Ownership and Contestation of Policy Options

There is a view that the 'partnership' precludes serious consideration of alternate policy options, and that there is, seemingly, total commitment to a neo-liberal economic strategy. One recent CSO report emphasizes that 'most public investment programmes target men and women with endowments and exclude up to 20-30% of the population; the programmes do not operate on a rights-based approach'.⁸⁷ The CSOs are especially sceptical of the emphasis on privatisation, arguing that the assumptions underlying the interventions have not been justified: Uganda's private sector is too small to contribute meaningfully to growth.⁸⁸ Hickey observes that there is a high level of chronic poverty, particularly within the rural areas, among the landless, PWDs, the elderly and people 'who experience multiple asset depletion'. Further, while growth in the 1990s seem to have met its pro-poor goals, in more recent periods, it has benefited the richest 10 percent, and market oriented policies have produced very limited gains for the chronically poor. The 2003 Gender Review⁸⁹ questions the benefits of liberalization, emphasizing that growth policies have different consequences for men and women: (1) Men and women have unequal access to liberalised markets and do not gain equally from them; (2) Movements from subsistence to market oriented production have different consequences for men and women; and (3) Current private sector led initiatives are oriented to big business and do not accommodate small-scale agricultural and non-agricultural initiatives. Furthermore, significant gender inequalities in access to assets (particularly land), inputs and control could 'impose large efficiency costs [on] Uganda's economy (Klasen 2003)'. Therefore, there is fundamental disagreement on whether the PEAP's core economic policies support long-term poverty reduction, particularly for the most vulnerable groups. Hickey is concerned that pivotal programmes such as the PMA do not have 'a clearly defined link with the poorest in Uganda' and contends that this has much to do with its 'location within a broader development strategy that emphasises a particular form of modernisation', in which the 'poor are cast as agents of their own recovery, knowledgeable about their circumstances and able to author their development through participation in local government and labour intensive growth'. Social protection measures are meant to compensate for the shortfall, and the PEAP has identified this as a crosscutting issue but social protection does not have high priority in the hierarchy of poverty reduction strategies. There are few apparent policy alternatives, largely for political and ideological reasons.

However, observers report that there is a new, potentially consequential, dimension to the ownership and commitment debate. There are reports that the traditional 'political-technocrat-donor partnership' appears to be unravelling. Among the contentious issues is whether or not the budget should be increased in order to achieve the PEAP objectives. Hickey divides proponents and opponents into two camps, which cut across ministries and the donor community. He suggests that while sections of MFPED; select ministries; donors such as DFID, UN and WHO; and some key NGOs seek to increase the budget in order to meet the PEAP's

⁸⁶ Harris J. Civil society: universal concept or donor fad? ODI Seminar Series on [Putting politics back into development: are we getting there?](http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/destin2002/civsoc.html) (<http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/destin2002/civsoc.html>)

⁸⁷ CSO PEAP Revision pp. 10-11.

⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 10

⁸⁹ Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 'Engendering Uganda's Poverty Eradication Initiatives: A Desk Review on Gender and Poverty', May 2003.

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(particularly Pillar IV) objectives; economic advisors within MFPED, the IMF, World Bank and select private sector groups seek to prioritise macroeconomic stability and containing the debt burden.

Group A: The Finance Ministry Tendency	Group B: The Civil Society Tendency
MFPED: Macroeconomic, Budget, Overseas Economics Advisors IMF, World Bank, Bank of Uganda, Uganda Manufacturing Association	MFPED: PMAU Ministry of Health Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development DFID, UN, WHO NGOS: eg. DENIVA, FOWODE, UDN

Source: Hickey (2003), p. 25.

These developments have important implications for policy direction and stability. Hickey notes that thus far, the 'finance ministry' group has been more influential, which demonstrates the real locus and 'ownership' of the PEAP.

4.3 POLICY OWNERSHIP AND COMMITMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL⁹⁰

The 1997 Local Government Act provides for political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation; it is central to the PEAP agenda. In principle, decentralised government should bring services closer to the people; the people should have a role in deciding how these services are provided; citizens should also have easier access to the means and mechanisms for holding their service providers to account. The current local government framework builds on the resistance council (RC) system of the late 1980s. (See [NRM and the Challenges of Reform](#), paragraph 2) Consequently, it stipulates that 'democratic participation and control of decision making' would be facilitated under a tiered political and administrative system running from the village (LC1) to the parish (LC2), the sub county (LC3), county (LC4) and the district (LC5). The Act also provides that administrative staff, headed by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and the sub-county chief (SCC), would be appointed to all levels. At each level, the administrative officer reports to the political appointee. The District Council is "the highest political authority within the area of jurisdiction of a Local Government". It comprises an elected district Chairperson, one councillor elected to represent an electoral area of a district, two youth councillors (one of whom should be female, two councillors with disabilities (one of whom should be female), and with women councillors forming one third of the Council.⁹¹

In principle, all levels of local government should participate in the planning and budget process. Views from the village level should feed into the sub county and then district plans. Therefore, the resulting district development plans (DDP) should be a true reflection of local needs.⁹² Though local levels are responsible for delivering many government services, most of the funding for these services comes from central government in the form of sector conditional grants, under the Poverty Action Fund (PAF). In addition, local governments receive block/unconditional grants from the government; these are used to pay administration costs, including salaries. (Notably, the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) is unique in its approach. It funds small-scale investments through discretionary grants, though district and sub-county governments are required to meet specified administrative and implementation capacity criteria.⁹³) Therefore, the Centre contains local discretion and maintains what it considers 'necessary strong control', given the widespread problems with implementation capacity and accountability systems at the local levels.

4.3.1 Politics and Local Level Administration

Tensions exist between the central and local governments; some of these revolve around the question of how to balance strong central direction and broader accommodation. Tensions exist, too, between

⁹⁰ Note that this section is an excerpt from the ODI/MISR State Responsiveness study.

⁹¹ The Local Governments Act, 1997, pp. 14-15.

⁹² See Tim Williamson's "Targets and Results" for a more comprehensive review of the budget process.

⁹³ Ibid. p. 9.

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technocrats and politicians at the local levels. Technocrats and politicians tend to have different, sometimes widely diverging, views on how programmes should be implemented. This is especially pertinent in those cases where the politicians manipulate circumstances and their control over administrators to suit their own political ends. Thus, while the mechanisms for a functioning local government are well established, a “dual-mode” or ‘technocratic versus patronage’ system of local governance has emerged.⁹⁴ In the ‘technocratic mode’, as Francis and James⁹⁵ describe it, the centre---and specifically MFPED, controls the use of funds through conditional grants; the local population has limited say in defining how these funds are used and ‘decentralisation’ has little empowerment potential. In principle, there is more scope for empowerment where local populations have access to unconditional grants and locally generated revenues; however, these tend to be [mis] used by the politicians and, though mechanisms exist, local people do not have the authority to hold their elected officials to account: the ‘patronage- mode’.

The ‘patronage mode’ does not only incur costs in terms of misappropriated revenues; it reinforces patterns of dominance and may even be more incapacitating to local populations than were centre-local relations. Goetz and Jenkins⁹⁶ put it well:

Poorer people usually have as little influence in their local settings as they do in the national political arena, and sometimes substantially less. Local authorities often have at their disposal even more resources – symbolic and material – with which to resist efforts to address the needs of the poor, whether these are initiated locally or by national or international agencies.

PPA reports indicate that the poor, particularly women, feel disconnected from the policy process. They do not believe that local officials are sufficiently concerned about their interests or that elections---tainted as they are by bribery and corruption---are effective means for holding their representatives to account. Therefore, there are questions about the quality of participatory governance at the local level. The government uses other avenues to include the poor. The UPPAP’s participatory poverty assessments are an increasingly popular way of facilitating public voice; however these have their limitations. Though the process normally culminates with strong policy suggestions on behalf of the poor, it is a rapid, technical and periodic exercise that cannot provide the sustained feedback and accountability necessary for political development.

There are differing opinions on the appropriate response to these issues. GoU/donors have opted for fiscal decentralisation, with the hope that this will result in increased accountability and improved performance. One alternative view advises caution: It notes that local authorities ‘provide limited transparency and accountability’ and that monitoring may be required. It suggests, too, that initiatives such as the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) ‘may face implementation difficulties as they give too much discretion at the local level’⁹⁷

4.4 THE PEAP IN BROADER CONTEXT

Subsection 4.3 demonstrates that elitism, bias, social division and patronage (from the centre to the local level) help to shape development outcomes, despite the formal structures that are in place and account for some policy failures. Various policy analyses demonstrate the costly consequences of other legacies, including corruption. For example, Tangri and Mwenda (2001) argue that privatisation has been ‘the least successful of Uganda’s otherwise well-performing economic programme’. Vast donor support for

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Francis, P. And James, R., ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization Program’, in *World Development*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 325-337, 2003.

⁹⁶ Goetz, Anne Marie and Rob Jenkins, (1999) *Creating a Framework for Reducing Poverty: Institutional and Process Issues in National Poverty Policy*. See, also, Mick Moore and James Putzel, ‘Thinking Strategically About Politics and Poverty’, IDS Working Paper 101.

⁹⁷ Morrissey and Vershoor, pp. 15-16

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privatisation, liberalization and deregulation has been used to support patronage: 'reward loyalists, recruit new supporters and buy off opponents'. (Mwenda 2003) Parliament and the media have exposed these but anti-corruption agencies have failed to hold the offending politicians to account.⁹⁸ Similarly, targeted assistance has largely failed in Uganda; programmes such as *Entandikwa* are highly susceptible to patronage and seem to produce more costs than gains.

Box 2: Historical Legacies and Consequences for the PEAP: The 2003/4 Agriculture Sector Plan Review Paper (SPRP) acknowledges that the Plan for the Modernization (PMA) has a number of defects and may fail to reach and empower the poorest farmers. The PMA was designed to reduce political patronage and to promote gender equity. In principle, groups of farmers are supposed to form farmer's forums and define joint agricultural needs. Communities should decide on development priorities for the Non-Sectoral Conditional Grant. The SPRP notes that in practice, 'though women are represented in farmer groups, men still control decisions concerning the use of resources, particularly land'; wealthier community members tend to capture the NSCG; NAADS 'has not followed PEAP guidelines and concentrated on the poorest populations or the poorest community members, including women'.¹ Similarly, the ODI/MISR review of the PMA in Mukono and Kabale uncovered political manipulation and subversion of the programmes; exclusion of community interests; class alliances in farmers groups; and religious divisions that prevent collaboration.

The PEAP also depends on effective reform of the public service. Public service reforms started in the 1990s. In 1997, staff had been reduced from 320,000 to approximately 150,000 and wages were decompressed. However, there is a view that reforms have slowed since 1998 and that corruption has increased. Two explanations are normally advanced: (1) the Ministry of the Public Service does not have the leadership capacity that MFPED does and (2) the Administrative Reform Secretariat is separate from the Ministry and lacks the influence required.

The PEAP's success also depends on the broader political context, as described in Sections 2 and 3. Much hinges on the character and growth of the core institutions including the balance of power between the executive and Parliament, the role of civil society, changes within the army and judiciary. The political stability that is crucial for the PEAP depends on pre and post-election developments and there are no guarantees about how these will materialize. Corruption and patronage, which may increase as the election approaches, divert valuable resources, particularly from sectors that are not protected by the PAF. Legacies of ethnic and gender based land appropriation still undermine the PEAP's attempts to reach all the poor and promote equitable chances (See [Inequality, Property Rights and Political Development](#)). The PEAP has not been able to broach serious debate and secure government commitment on some crucial issues such as security and defence (Piron 2003). Sections 2 – 4 outlined the ways in government and other local constituencies are influencing this broader context. The following sub-section summarizes perceptions of donor roles.

4.5 CRITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF DONOR ROLES IN GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

The preceding subsections highlight the important roles that donors have been playing in Uganda's poverty reduction efforts; they show that financial support and technical assistance have been indispensable for growth. Donors have been able to extend their political influence not only because Uganda is heavily reliant on aid but also because they have been able to develop partnerships with a group of visionary and, in many respects, amenable technical experts. Domestic technical experts do not regard donors as 'drivers' of the policy process; rather, they are seen as partners who can fill some of the capacity gaps in ministries and sectors. Uganda's successes are being emulated and donors are keen to protect the international and

⁹⁸ Mwenda, 2001, p. 117

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domestic legitimacy they have gained. However, there are commentators who are more critical of donor motives, achievements and roles. As noted, a number of analysts believe that GoU's accountability to donors precludes alternate policy options, despite evidence that current economic strategies are not reaching the poorest or containing inequalities (Hickey 2003; Nyamugasira and Rowden 2002). Some contend that government's obligations to donors have undermined cross-group deliberation and consultation (Hauser 1999). Additionally, a number of critics suggest that donors have, through their actions and inaction, undermined institutional development, good governance, human rights and democracy and public accountability. We summarize these positions in turn.

4.5.1 Donors and Institutional (Under)development

Though both donors and local technocrats see advantages to donor involvement, some analysts portray the partnership with Uganda as a new, more invasive method of achieving conditionality (Harrison 2001). They note that at the root of this is a donor strategy that prioritises finance ministries (supporting the fundamental goal of macroeconomic stability) and that, in the bid for efficiency, avoids the 'less competent' departments. Harrison suggests that this expedient approach is characteristic of the new 'post-conditionality' politics. He argues that the nature of donor involvement in certain African states, such as Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Tanzania, has changed from the outright coercion that typified the 'conditionality mechanism' to a more 'supportive' and selective engagement. In these countries, public service and finance ministries (key to the macroeconomic and public sector reform programmes) are well financed and supported with ample overseas technical staff. By comparison, 'other weaker ministries have little technical assistance' and 'the perceived expertise within the Ministry of Finance gives it an image of power which is reinforced by the larger and better maintained premises and the high level of computerization of the ministry'. MFPEd's almost hegemonic status is also enforced through the budget process, for despite claims of consultation, 'it dominates policy-making in all areas'. 'All ministries [are] constantly aware of the power of the Ministry of Finance and its central concern: fiscal prudence'⁹⁹ Stratification raises inter-departmental tensions, particularly when ministries believe that policies designed under the guise of a multi-sectoral framework are actually intended to dissipate their own power and prospects for finance. Traditional civil service departments feel that they are sidelined in other ways, as donors and governments set up parallel structures and processes. Mwenda (2001) emphasizes that there are consequences for long-term institutional development: There are costs, too, to policy commitment and continuity. Additionally, by excluding the less amenable, the approach fosters a perception that donors are attempting to avoid serious contestation of the core principles they advocate. However, donors maintain that with limited resources, it is important to prioritise and to channel resources to areas and personnel that can 'jumpstart' the development process.

4.5.2 How Donors Undermine Human Rights, Democracy and Governance

Commentators acknowledge that donors face a difficult dilemma. Recognising that the government has managed to build unexpected stability and achieve notable economic gains, they have been pleased to reward and support this, in some part to boost the merit of their own economic policies. They note that IFIs are especially intent on 'showcasing' Uganda, not merely to advertise a particular poverty reduction model but to improve their own image, post-Structural Adjustment and SAPRIN. This *political* choice has entailed some 'trade-offs', with deliberate actions in some areas and a much more guarded approach in others. To many onlookers, Uganda's special position means that it has been able to secure its own patronage arrangements with the donors, unlike Kenya and other 'less agreeable' countries (Reno, 200; Harrison 2001; Hauser 1999).

Human rights and multiparty activists argue that donors have long ignored poor governance and the growing lack of a rights protective culture in Uganda. These commentators believe that donors should have adopted a sterner stance and a more consistent approach across countries (Dicklith 2002). Instead, donors have

⁹⁹ Harrison (2001), pp. 665-666

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applied double standards, imposing political conditions on countries such as Kenya and Malawi and ignoring the contraventions in Uganda (Hauser 1999). Reno (2002) regrets that creditors have continued to provide debt relief throughout Uganda's intervention in Congo and that they have not been able to credibly curtail the state's use of war to strengthen its position against strongmen or to discipline predatory gangs.

However, some commentators acknowledge that there has been a marked transition in donor approach to governance. They explain that in the 1980s, governance did not have the 'place' that it now has; the emphasis was on 'getting prices right'. Since then, IFIs have explained various policy failures in terms of poor governance. This means that there has been a change from fairly high to fairly low tolerance for 'poor governance'. Donors have now coordinated their approach to governance in Uganda. For example, in April 2003, the 'Development Partners on Governance and Anti-Corruption' reminded GoU that despite the country's laudable achievements, corruption is both 'pervasive and institutionalised' and robs approximately 7.5% of the annual budget. The partners made it clear that it is 'becoming increasingly difficult...to explain this to our taxpayers back home who currently provide just under half the GoU budget'.¹⁰⁰ Correspondingly, the Governance Matrix was designed to encourage and monitor government progress in areas such as human rights, democratisation, accountability, corruption and conflict.

Reports also show that donors are concerned about higher levels of military spending since the late 1990s and about weak financial management in the defence sector. Both the World Bank and DFID supported defence studies in 1997/8. While the World Bank studied Logistics and Accounting, DFID examined the efficiency of defence spending. These studies were largely technical, so that matters such as the UPDF's political role and the country's security needs were not addressed. Both the Bank and DFID acknowledged that very few of the recommendations were implemented. The IMF initiated a cap on defence spending in 1999, which resulted in closer GoU-donor engagement on defence issues. DFID has been leading a broader effort to promote security reform. This involves analysing sectoral needs---including identifying the priorities and costs for building an effective defence force---and developing a policy framework and long term strategy for defence transformation. Therefore, DFID is encouraging the defence sector to implement the sort of rigorous strategic analysis that the PEAP requires of other sectors; it has lobbied other donors to support this approach.

4.6 SUMMARY

Uganda's PEAP is well recognised as being broad based and locally owned. The GoU-Donor-Technical partnership worked well, and resulted in substantial poverty reduction gains. However, with the recent downturn in the economy, groups have been debating the sustainability of the poverty reduction model. Analysts have challenged the claim of broad ownership and demonstrated the ways in which the partial/selective representation that is characteristic of the political system is also replicated in the administration of the PEAP. 'Ownership' may not be necessary for policy effectiveness; policy commitment may be sufficient. However, perceptions that policy is 'owned' by select groups can reduce commitment in others, as reported interviews with Parliament, CSOs and elites suggest. At the local level, officials have traditionally had limited discretion, which fiscal decentralisation promises to change. However, legacies of patronage, ethnic and religious divisions compromise outcomes. These reinforce that the PEAP's reach and effectiveness depend on the broader context. Donors have a part in shaping this broader context; some analysts suggest that they have not always played a constructive role.

¹⁰⁰ Statement of Uganda's Development Partners on Governance and Anti-Corruption, p. 1.

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SECTION 5

CONCLUSION

Mick Moore's guide to assessing political systems (Types of Political Systems: A Practical Framework for DFID Staff. See [Framework of Political Systems](#)) recommends three levels of analysis for mapping political systems. The first examines 'foundational' issues, particularly territoriality; geo-strategic position; resource dependence; social structure; and constitutionality. Moore argues:

(e) governments that do not have territorial authority are likely to be preoccupied with defence and, possibly, with enriching themselves; government capacity to make and implement decisions will depend on population size; where the country is positioned and issues of regional security; the extent and manner of external intervention;

(f) taxation revenue is likely to build accountability to citizens, while 'unearned incomes' such as aid or oil revenues might lead to incoherent policymaking (as donors vie for policy control) and militarised politics (as governments try to monopolize oil revenues);

(g) the social structure (including the size of the proletariat or middle class, ethnic composition, the role of the public bureaucracy) will help to define politics and governance. Broadly, a large proletariat and sizeable professional middle class are likely to support democratic values and policy-based political parties; the public bureaucracy can drive policy in its own interests; though ethnic-based politics need not be problematic, it can also generate conflict;

(h) the political system is defined by levels of constitutionality; that is, whether or not effective constitutional rules exist, and whether governments respect and observe them.

The Oxford Policy Management (2003) framework adds to Moore's 'foundational' features. It highlights some of the structural factors (natural resource endowments; geographic and climatic factors; demographic patterns and changes; ethnic composition; the skills base; technologies; levels of economic development; structures of production, distribution and exchange; distribution of income and wealth) that are consequential for development. OPM emphasizes the importance of understanding the inter-relations between such structural features, institutions and agents.

Moore's second level of analysis examines institutionalisation, such as of the government apparatus, policymaking and political parties; the degree and quality of political competition and the institutional distribution of power. His reasoning is that poor and disadvantaged peoples have the best prospects where they are organised and where there is a 'a set of stable and predictable political institutions that permit competition for power through civic processes'. The third level investigates government capacity and accountability. This report provides material for analysing the foundational features described and includes some investigation of institutionalisation of the government apparatus. However, it does not provide the rigorous political systems analysis anticipated in either the Moore or OPM frameworks; this will be conducted in the second phase of the work.

The first section described the geographic, demographic and economic differences between the north and south pre-colonial Uganda and the ways in which institutions (for example, rules governing production) were subsequently created to exacerbate regional inequalities. The section also examined the development of social classes and the role of religion and ethnicity in political development. It emphasized the colonial governments/agents role in the underdevelopment of local industry, stifling the growth of the middle class, introducing and sustaining unfavourable terms of trade, and promoting racial, religious and ethnic tensions. However, despite the social and economic dislocation built up under colonialism, Uganda had favourable economic prospects at Independence, which governments could have used for the country's profit. Instead (arguably following the negative course of the country's social history), up to 1986, successive governments promoted ethnic and religious divisions and conflicts. Ugandans have vivid and terrible memories of the widespread dislocation and destruction under Milton Obote and Idi Amin. Analysts suggest that the social

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conditions that produced the violence in Uganda include social inequality (generated by unequal trading relationships and local regional, ethnic, religious and gender disparities); the existence of sub-states, ethnic and religious factionalism; poor conflict resolution mechanisms; absence of an indigenous property-owning class; the post-Independence decrease in national production; parochial, weak and poorly educated leaders; and the language problem.

Despite substantial improvements since 1986, Uganda remains a fragile political system. Though the government has achieved relative peace and stability, particularly in the South, its geographic position and past role in conflicts leaves it prone to regional threats. Insecurity continues in the North of the country and has spread to the Southwest. Uganda does not have firm control over its territory and does not monopolize the use of violence. Consequently, the government devotes substantial resources to defence. Donors have tried to curtail this expenditure but there are reports that defence spending is frequently higher than stated and concerns about the lack of accountability within the sector. Insecurity and inadequate territorial authority pose a significant risk to political stability and to the poverty reduction agenda.

Institutions are developing but they cannot be described as regularised and predictable. Though Parliament is relatively active, executive dominance curtails its effectiveness and civil society and the media are partially restrained. Both government and donors have relied on a selective approach to building civil society, which does not engage sufficiently with the political and social realities in the country. This means that significant, potentially influential, segments are excluded. Vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms exist and are functional. However, particularly since 2001, elections are not seen as free and fair processes. Institutions such as the Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Inspectorate of Government work well but have limited effectiveness. The Judiciary has been described as corrupt, inaccessible to the poor and, though independent, hesitant to make anti-government decisions. It has been trying to address these issues. The military has not matured to the non-partisan, patriotic, disciplined, productive force envisioned in the Constitution. Further, there is a perception that the military is too often used to solve disputes, which political negotiations may have resolved. Therefore, some of the core institutions are still relatively fragile and susceptible and even the more successful could profit from capacity building and greater acknowledgement of their role and value.

Prior to 1986, political competition had costly consequences and has since been curtailed. The prospect of multipartyism raises concerns about the ways in which the 'foundational' factors described are likely to affect the transition. They raise concerns, too, about how the youth and other marginalized groups will choose to press their case. Uganda does not have a good foundation in this area and much depends on the effectiveness and character of political negotiations and the safeguards that are put in place to guide political change. Ultimately, certain long-standing issues will help to define who gets to participate and how and it is important that procedural matters do not mask the importance of more substantive reforms.

Uganda is highly dependent on foreign aid. However, this has been well coordinated across donors to meet PEAP priorities. Uganda has not been a pawn to donor competition; the President and technocrats within MFPED are influential. However, there are signs that the partnership is unravelling and this may lead to a less coordinated strategy. Analysts question donor consistency and effectiveness in areas such as human rights, democracy and governance (Dicklitch 2002; Hauser 1999; Harrison 2001; Reno 2002). There are perceptions that donors have not been consistent or sufficiently rigorous in these areas. Much more research is required in order to understand donor relationships with governments, inter-donor politics and the risks and incentives that different agencies provide

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APPENDIX

A1. FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS,

Framework of Political Systems (Summary)			
LEVEL ONE	Territoriality	Govt has a monopoly of violence and coercion?	
		Justice and police services function widely?	
		Govt levies taxes widely?	
	Geo-strategic Position	Alternative 'governmental' authority?	
		Govt controls borders?	
		Population size	
	Resource dependence	Fear of provoking external power?	
		Direct internal influence of external forces?	
		Large government income from: Minerals?	
	Social structure	Multiple aid donors?	
		Proletariat?	
		Middle class?	
	Constitutionality	Influential public bureaucracy?	
Role of ethnicity in politics?			
Govt observes law/constitution?			
LEVEL TWO	Institutionalisation	Govt easily changes constitution?	
		Government apparatus	
		Policymaking	
	Political Competition	Political parties	
		Civil society organisations	
		Significance of political power;	
	Institutional distribution of Power	Civic-ness of political competition	
		Exclusiveness at elite level	
		Inclusiveness at mass level	
	LEVEL THREE	Government Capacity	Electoral currencies
			How far the executive shares power with the: Military?
			Legislature?
			Judiciary?
Other levels of government?			
Public enterprises?			
Private sector?			
Government Accountability	Mass media?		
	Civil society?		
	Un-civil society?		
		Religious organisations?	
		Personnel and organisation (civil and military)	
		Finance	
		Policymaking	
		Vertical	
		Horizontal	

Source: Moore, M. Types of Political Systems: A Practical Framework for DFID Staff, October 2001 p. 1

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A2. SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS

Selected Human Rights Provisions

1. (Article 21. 1) All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of the law;
2. (Article 21. 2) A person shall not be discriminated against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or social or economic standing, political opinion or disability.
3. (Article 22. 1) No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except in execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction and sentence have been confirmed by the highest appellate court.
4. (Article 23. 1) No person shall be deprived of personal liberty except in execution of the sentence or order of a court; for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious or contagious disease; in the case of a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years, for the purpose of the education or welfare of that person;
5. Article 24.) No person shall be subjected to any form of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
6. (Article 29. 1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media; freedom to assemble and to demonstrate together with others peacefully and unarmed and to petition; and freedom of association which shall include the freedom to form and join associations or unions, including trade unions and political and other civic organisations.
7. Article 30) All persons have the right to education
8. (Article 39) All persons have the right to a clean and healthy environment
9. (Article 40) All persons have economic rights (employment rights)
- 10 (Article 50) This provides for the enforcement of rights and freedoms by courts, including for redress and compensation when rights have been violated.

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A3. AFROBAROMETER SURVEY RESULTS

Table 1: Rejection of a One-Party State by Region and Partisan Affiliation

	Region				Affiliation		Total
	West	East	Central	North	Movement	Opposition	
Disapprove	40	58	51	73	33	80	53
Neither	4	2	9	4	4	2	5
Approve	55	38	39	21	62	17	40
Don't Know	1	2	1	2	1	1	2

Table 2: Support for Democracy by Region and Partisan Affiliation

	Region				Affiliation		Total
	West	East	Central	North	Movement	Opposition	
Dem. Best	85	74	76	59	80	72	74
Non - Dem. OK	8	16	9	15	9	17	12
Doesn't Matter	3	6	10	12	6	7	7
Don't Know	3	5	5	14	5	3	6

Table 3: Extent of Democracy by Region and Partisan Affiliation

	Region				Affiliation		Total
	West	East	Central	North	Movement	Opposition	
Full Democracy	12	15	10	4	16	3	11
Dem. With Minor Problems	56	40	44	29	56	25	43
Dem with Major Problems	23	33	33	38	20	46	31
Not a Democracy	4	5	7	12	2	22	7
Don't Know	5	8	6	18	7	4	8

Table 4: Provision of Political Goods by Region and Partisan Affiliation

	Region				Affiliation		Total
	West	East	Central	North	Movement	Opposition	
Freedom to say what you think	92	87	92	64	93	66	85
Freedom to vote as you choose	84	81	86	64	90	55	79
Freedom from unjust arrest	78	70	66	48	80	41	67
Freedom of Political Assoc.	65	63	72	41	76	40	62
Ability to influence Govt.	68	67	55	24	70	30	56
Equal Treatment Before the Law	62	65	45	24	62	21	51


Table 5: Patience with Elected Government by Region and Partisan Affiliation

	Region				Affiliation		Total
	West	East	Central	North	Movement	Opposition	
Time to deal with Problems	67	47	61	35	73	26	54
Try Another Form	30	52	36	59	27	71	42

Source: Logan et al, Uganda Round 2: Afrobarometer Survey Report (2003)

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A4. MAP OF UGANDA



Map of Uganda Source: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/uganda.gif>

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