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Query: What analysis exists on transition from UNMIH to MINUSTAH, including through the intermediate UN missions UNSMIH and UNTMIH?

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1. Overview

United Nations peace operations in Haiti date back to September 1993, when the Security Council set up the first UN peacekeeping operation in the country – the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Since then, Haiti has been somewhat of a "playground" for the evolution of UN peacekeeping (Leininger, 2006). Early missions (UNSMIH/UNTMIH) were characterised by narrow remits addressing essentially the creation and professionalization of a police force. MINUSTAH is the latest, but most long-lasting, in a series of six UN peace operations in Haiti. It has a much broader mandate than earlier missions.

Despite (or perhaps because of) its broader mandate, integrated approach and greater emphasis on human security and peacebuilding, the MINUSTAH mission struggled to establish stability and reduce human rights violations. Muggah and Krause (2007) have noted how "UNMIH - with its state-centric focus - achieved more during its short period of deployment than MINUSTAH achieved over a comparable period of time. However, it is important to recall that the gains of UNMIH evaporated shortly after the mission ended in 1996." (p.138)

This report examines the transition from UNMIH to MINUSTAH. It begins by providing a background to UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti, including the deployment of UNMIH and intermediate UN missions UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MIPONUH and MICAH (Section 2). Analysis of the evolution of UN missions is limited, and tends to be descriptive rather than drawing out any key findings or lessons learned about the transitions from one mission to another.
Likewise, while MINUSTAH and its early deployment has been the subject of analysis, the actual transition between the US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) in early 2004 and the formal takeover by MINUSTAH a few months later has not been examined in any depth. Section 3 looks at the deployment of MINUSTAH in 2004 and how the mission was managed in the 2004-2007 period. It focuses primarily on identifying areas of concern and lessons learned from the Haiti experience, including the following key issues:

- Slow pace of deployment;
- Relatively new peacekeeping countries with a lack of experience;
- Language difficulties and lack of cultural training;
- Dilemma of providing operational support to the Haitian National Police (PNH), while retaining local support;
- Differences of opinion in the Security Council and mission itself, leading to an ambivalent mandate and uncertainties about MINUSTAH’s security functions;
- Problems operationalizing the ‘integrated’ mission;
- Imbalance between the long-term calendar of operations vs. the short-term (6-month) troop mandates;
- Failure to adapt and respond quickly enough to Haiti’s rapidly changing political economy; and
- On-going concerns about MINUSTAH’s credibility as protectors of human rights vis-à-vis cases of excessive military force, violence, sexual misconduct and abuse by peacekeepers.

### 2. Background – UN Peacekeeping in Haiti

The UN first got involved in Haiti at the request of the provisional Government. It established the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) helping to prepare and observe the 1990 elections. Although the elections were ‘highly successful’, a coup followed in 1991 and President Aristide went into exile. In February 1993, a joint United Nations / OAS mission – the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) – was deployed in response to the deteriorating security situation and on the request of Mr Aristide. MICIVIH’s task was to monitor the human rights situation and to investigate violations. In September 1993, the Security Council set up the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country – the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). UNMIH was mandated to assist in the professionalization of the army and the creation of a separate police force. However, its mandate was undermined by non-cooperation of the Haitian military authorities and the absence of parallel efforts to reform the rest of the criminal justice system and Haiti’s larger political framework (Durch and England, 2010).

UNMIH was followed by a series of successive UN missions: the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). As shown in the table below, the United Nations missions preceding MINUSTAH were relatively limited in scope, addressing essentially the creation and professionalization of a police force. They were also subject to limited time horizons (Faubert, 2006).
Between November 1997 and March 2004, there were no blue-helmeted military personnel in Haiti. The UN and its agencies attempted to play the role of ‘neutral referee’ staying on the sidelines, and “efforts to assist in the transformation of Haiti’s political economy were sporadic and uncoordinated” (Cockayne, 2009, p.80). Dürch has noted how the “UN’s Haiti operations in the 1990s ended with a sense of futility” (2011, p.52).

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<th>United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Haiti</th>
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<td>Mission</td>
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<td>UNSMHIH (United Nations Support Mission in Haiti)</td>
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Source: Adapted from Faubert (2006)

In response to a deteriorating security situation and armed conflict in several Haitian, in March 2004 the UN Security Council authorized a three-month US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to be followed by the United Nations stabilization force, MINUSTAH. MIF and MINUSTAH held a joint planning conference (3-7 May 2004), which resulted in a draft transition document. Although MINUSTAH formally assumed operational responsibilities on 25 June 2004, many of the MIF forces remained in theatre and came under the operational control of MINUSTAH¹.

In contrast to previous UN missions in Haiti, the mandate given to MINUSTAH in 2004 was much broader, addressing a wide range of transition issues including support to the political

process, the protection of civilians, and promoting human rights (see table above). The Mission was authorized to include up to 6,700 military personnel, 1,622 police, some 550 international civilian personnel, 150 United Nations volunteers and about 1,000 local civilian staff. In recent years, the Security Council have adjusted MINUSTAH's mandate, its concept of operations and the authorized strength to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground and to the evolving requirements as dictated by the political, security and socio-economic situation prevailing in the country.

The 2010 earthquake was a tragic event for Haiti. The Hotel Christopher, the headquarters of MINUSTAH collapsed, and nearby United Nations offices and other facilities were severely affected. A total of 101 United Nations military, police and civilian staff lost their lives, including the Special Representative, his principal Deputy, the Acting Police Commissioner, the Director of Political Affairs, and the Head of the Elections Unit, representing “by far the greatest [loss] for any single event in UN peacekeeping’s 62-year history” (MINUSTAH, 2012). Many more were injured, and others have been unable to return to work.

Although the overall security situation remains fragile in Haiti, there has been a peaceful transition of power from one democratically elected leader to another from the opposition – the first time this has happened in Haitian history. MINUSTAH’s mandate was extended in October 2011 and, following the removal of post-earthquake ‘surge’ capabilities, the Mission currently consists of up to 7,340 troops of all ranks and a police component of up to 3,241.

3. Transition to MINUSTAH – Analysis

As mentioned in the overview, examinations of the transition between UN missions tend to be descriptive rather than analytical. After a series of UN missions in the 1990s, there was a brief period from 2001-2004 when the United Nations had no peacekeeping presence in Haiti. Due to this gap between missions and the brief three-month timeframe of the US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF), it is perhaps not surprising that there is so little analysis of the transition to MINUSTAH. This section pulls out some of the key findings about MINUSTAH’s deployment and how it was managed in the 2004-2007 transition period. It focuses primarily on identifying areas of concern and lessons learned from the Haiti experience.

Slow pace of deployment of MINUSTAH
MINUSTAH’s pace of deployment was slow, and it was not until November 2004 that the mission was able to deploy throughout the country. By mid-August 2004, less than half of the authorised troops and a quarter of the police were on the ground. The protracted deployment was exploited by the former Haitian military, who occupied abandoned police stations in mid-late 2004 and contributed to outbreaks of violence and criminality (CIC, 2006).

MINUSTAH also took time to get the required number of people to build the necessary capacity to fully conduct and implement police, justice and prison reform, due to problems getting people with the required skill-sets and ability to speak French. For example, in December 2006, UNPOL only had 44 per cent of its required staff, and only 50 per cent of the key posts in the justice section were operating. (Mobekk, 2009).
Composition – language difficulties, inexperienced troops and lack of cultural training
MINUSTAH is led and mainly composed of Latin American states. Brazil took command of the operation in 2004, supplying 1,200 troops as well as the force commander. Substantial contingents from Argentina, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Jordan, and Nepal followed, as well as smaller contingents from Peru, Spain, Morocco, the Philippines, Ecuador and Guatemala. Police units were also supplied by Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Senegal, with further police officers coming from over thirty countries (CIC, 2006). Given the relative inexperience of some of these peacekeeping countries, including the Brazilian command whose lack of expertise and depth of decision-making reduced their initial credibility, a lesson learned is the need to combine UN troops from countries with a range of peacekeeping experience (UNAC, 2006).

Language barriers have also affected MINUSTAH’s reputation and the way the mission was perceived by local people. Few members of the peacekeeping forces could express themselves in French and in English. As of mid-2006, little more than a third of UNPOL deployed with MINUSTAH spoke French, despite being frequently engaged in direct encounters with armed gangs (Durch and England, 2010). Even fewer peacekeepers could speak Creole (the language spoken by the majority of Haitians). Only three translators were available for a force of 500 police. The United Nations Association of Canada (2006) recommended that MINUSTAH develop mixed patrols, combining foreign troops with those of Haitian origin, in order to build trust: “Canada, which has many reserve soldiers of Haitian origin in its ranks, chose in their last deployments to create mixed patrols. These have produced many positive results, as local people recognize themselves in the uniforms that people like them are wearing, and thus quickly start to feel trust” (p.84). Cultural training would also have helped peacekeepers to understand Haitian culture and develop trust between MINUSTAH forces and the local population.

Dilemma of providing operational support to the Haitian National Police (PNH), while retaining credibility and local support
MINUSTAH’s mission in Haiti could best be described as ‘collaborative state-building’ with all mandated activities undertaken in support of the transitional / elected government (Durch, 2011). Although MINUSTAH was tasked with supporting the Transitional Government under Resolutions 1542 and 1608, in practical terms this meant working with the Haitian National Police (PNH) – a small, politicised and corrupt law enforcement agency, accused of human rights violation and criminal violence (CIC, 2006). There was no army, as Haiti disbanded its military in 1995 after years of military interference in politics, including numerous military coups.

The Center of International Cooperation (2006) has highlighted how MINUSTAH’s ‘central dilemma’ was how to provide operational support, while trying to turn the PNH into a professional rights-respecting law enforcement agency. While important for rebuilding the state’s security institutions in the long-term, joint operations compromised MINUSTAH’s credibility and legitimacy, particularly in the urban slums where PNH were seen as a source of insecurity (Cockayne, 2009). A 2005 Harvard Law School report found that MINUSTAH “effectively provided cover for the police to wage a campaign of terror in Port-au-Prince’s slums” (p.1).
Differences of opinion in the Security Council and mission itself led to an ambivalent mandate and uncertainties about MINUSTAH’s security functions. Troop-contributing countries interpreted MINUSTAH’s mandate differently, particularly with regard to the protection of civilians and the utilization of authority (Faubert, 2006). Although Resolutions 1542 and 1608 are detailed, they straddle the line between assigning MINUSTAH a purely assistance role and authorizing a more proactive, interventionist approach (CIC, 2006). Early on in the mission, there were sharp differences of opinion as to how robustly MINUSTAH should act and several countries refused to allow their troops to take part in offensive missions. A 2005 Harvard Law School report concluded that “MINUSTAH’s failures are largely the result of the timid interpretation of its mandates by its officials. Even now, staffed in full, the peacekeeping force continues to interpret its mandate complacently and with a narrowness unfit for the situation on the ground” (p.1).

Within the Security Council itself, complex dynamics during the transition period contributed to ambivalence over MINUSTAH’s mandate. In February 2006, the Security Council Report noted that: France and the US had both lost interest in resolving the situation in Haiti; Brazil (the lead country) was no longer a member of the Council; China was disinclined to support MINUSTAH’s mandate due to disagreements with Haiti’s growing ties with Taiwan; and Argentina was reluctant to accept an interventionist type of UN involvement.

By mid-2005, MINUSTAH began to use a more proactive, robust\(^2\), approach in some of Port-au-Prince’s slum areas. Although the security situation eventually improved and peacekeepers were effective in disbanding some of the criminal gangs, the way in which operations were conducted gave rise to questions about the legitimacy of the mission and led to a crisis of trust between MINUSTAH and the Haitian people. Many of the military operations were led by troops with little training in urban modes of action or how best to avoid collateral damage (Tardy, 2011). For example, in July 2005, MINUSTAH troops used automatic weapons (22,000 rounds of ammunition within seven hours)\(^3\) in the densely populated Port-au-Prince slum of Cite-Soleil in July 2005.

Problems operationalizing the ‘integrated’ mission
MINUSTAH uses an integrated approach, with five key integrated areas of activity: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); justice; electoral support; national dialogue; and child protection. On the management side, a ‘major innovation’ was the creation of an integrated management structure between UNDP and MINUSTAH, with the Resident Representative of UNDP appointed as Deputy SRSH to allow continuity (as he had already been in country for two years) (Faubert, 2006).

However, early efforts at integration were hampered by institutional mistrust and negative stereotyping between the agencies. While it was reported that UNDP felt they had better local knowledge and referred to the mission as “the big kids on the block” who were “bullies”, the mission thought UNDP were in a “different universe” (Mobekk, 2008). This unwillingness to integrate is partly based on differences in perception between the “short-term objectives of the mission verses the long-term developmental goals of the UNDP and the perceived

\(^2\) See Tardy (2011) for broad/narrow definitions and critique of ‘robust peacekeeping’
\(^3\) http://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearman/cite_soleil/Port_au_Prince_001919_26July2005.pdf
intrusive approach of the mission verses the perceived “soft” approach to the government of the UNDP” (Mobekk, 2008, p.148).

Analysis of the DDR section (the most fully integrated section of the mission) by Muggah (2007) concluded that the ‘integrated’ DDR mission was in fact ‘disintegrating’. Effective integration was hampered by weaknesses in political leadership within and outside the UN, the absence of clear direction from headquarters, competing understandings of DDR among managers and practitioners and confusion over financing mechanisms. Although integrated in vision, the operational work of DDR UNDP and DDR MINUSTAH separated into at least two separate programmes in 2006, with UNDP concentrating on community violence prevention and DPKO on DDR.

Coordination between key actors has increased during 2007, particularly within the UN family and on certain issues, such as security sector reform (Mobekk, 2008). However, donor coordination is still lacking despite the creation of formal coordination mechanisms: “Improving coordination has been identified by the UN Secretary General, MINUSTAH and many donors as a key priority, particularly as new stakeholders expand their roles” (CIGI, 2010, p.4).

Short-term missions vs. long-term planning
Although MINUSTAH has been operating for almost eight years now and there is a stated commitment to the long-term reconstruction of Haiti (UN Secretary General, 2006), ‘long-term’ planning has been hampered by the reality of the period of time allotted to the troops in the field - six-month mandates. In addition, each renewal is only for one year at a time. This dysfunctionality weakened MINUSTAH’s mandate, with observers noting that “long-term is not synonymous with an accumulation of short-term missions” (UNAC, 2006).

Failure to adapt and respond quickly enough to Haiti’s rapidly changing political economy
From the outset, MINUSTAH faced an increasingly complex and rapidly deteriorating security situation – a volatile mix of politically motivated violence and criminality. Cockayne (2009) argues that MINUSTAH was initially ill-equipped for the task of resolving the on-going violence and instability, due to their traditional military response. MINUSTAH was criticised for failing to anticipate and respond to non-traditional threats to stability from the complex (often criminalised) political economy, for example targeting DDR programmes at rebel armed groups, rather than local gangs and organised criminal violence.

Although it took some time to understand the nature of the threat and develop an effective strategy, MINUSTAH eventually succeeded in 2006-7 by ‘taking on’ the gangs in ‘intelligence-led’ military-police-civil operations. The Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) – an integrated unit of military officers, police and international civilians – gathered information on the activities of the urban gangs through a network of paid informants and covert surveillance. This intelligence helped MINUSTAH take the initiative, control the ‘battlespace’ and clear the slums of Port-au-Prince of gangs (Dorn, 2009).

Human security: protectors or instigators?
According to Security Council Resolution 1542, MINUSTAH’s role is to ensure a secure and stable environment, restore and maintain the rule of law, public safety and public order in
Haiti, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. However, there have been regular protests against MINUSTAH’s use of excessive military force particularly in urban slum areas and to suppress demonstrations. The failure to provide adequate security to residents of internal displacement camps, including women and communities faced with violence forced evictions has also lost the mission considerable local support and credibility.\(^4\)

The mission has been continually plagued by public allegations of human rights abuses and sexual assault by members of the peacekeeping mission. Henry and Highgate (2009) have observed how peacekeeping enclaves in Haiti are gendered sites, as are the interactions that play out therein. Although MINUSTAH now has one of the largest gender units of any UN mission, it remains questionable the extent to which gendered power imbalances have been addressed (Beetham, 2011). For example, despite over 100 Sri Lankan MINUSTAH troops being sent home in 2007 due to allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse of underage girls, there is still no evidence that Sri Lankan troops were ever prosecuted. Even very recently, a Security Council Report (March 2012) questioned MINUSTAH’s ability to demonstrate its legitimacy and effectiveness in the midst of recent allegations of sexual misconduct by police personnel from the mission.

5. Additional information

The following edited books also provide analysis from some of the world’s leading experts on the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti:


In this book, Paul Higate and Marsha Henry develop critical perspectives on UN and NATO peacekeeping, arguing that these forms of international intervention are framed by the exercise of power. Their analysis of peacekeeping, based on fieldwork conducted in Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo, suggests that peacekeeping reconfigures former conflict zones in ways that shape perceptions of security. This reconfiguration of space is enacted by peacekeeping personnel who “perform” security through their daily professional and personal practices, sometimes with unanticipated effects. “Insecure Spaces” interdisciplinary analysis sheds great light on the contradictory mix of security and insecurity that peace operations create.

Summary and book available from: [http://zedbooks.co.uk/paperback/insecure-spaces](http://zedbooks.co.uk/paperback/insecure-spaces)


In ‘Fixing Haiti’, some of the world’s leading experts on Haiti examine the challenges faced in Haiti, the tasks undertaken by the UN, and the new role of hemispheric players such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, as well as that of Canada, France and the United States. The volume is a product of a 2008 CIGI conference, "Haiti’s governance challenges and the international community," which examined the internationally supported stabilization and


Bibliography


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Key websites:
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Experts consulted
- Morgan Hughes, Center on International Cooperation (CIC), New York
- Prof. Keith Krause, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
- Dr Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, International Development Department, Birmingham University
- Prof Alex Bellamy, Griffith University
- Dr Marsha Henry, Gender Institute, LSE
- Anja Kaspersen, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Prof. Paul Williams, International Affairs / Security Policy Studies Program, George Washington University

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