

Helpdesk Research Report

International aid to Lebanon

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Question

Map international donor aid to Lebanon since the 2006 crisis (development and humanitarian aid). Where possible, identify funding committed in response to the Syrian crisis.

Contents

1. Overview
2. Implications of partial data availability
3. Evolution of donor aid since the civil war
4. Official aid since 2006: main donors and sectors
5. Official humanitarian aid in relation to the Syrian crisis
6. References
7. Appendix: Key international organisations in Lebanon

1. Overview

Solid data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) makes **mapping the official part of international donor aid** to Lebanon possible. At the same time, as emphasised by one expert, **official data is only part of the story**: before and since 2006, a major part of aid flows to Lebanese actors (governmental and other) has been unrecorded, for example from Saudi Arabia and from Iran. Another difficulty is that official aid data from the past two years is not yet consolidated, though preliminary indications are available from both OECD and OCHA. With regard to aid committed in response to the Syrian crisis since 2011, data is available from OCHA. This data is easy to disaggregate by donor, but not by sector. Lastly, based on a rapid review, both the data and literature that address aid to Lebanon at macro levels seem **largely gender-blind**.

Lebanon has received large volumes of international aid **since the 1970s**, in both the development and humanitarian fields. Due to alternating phases of large-scale violence and lesser confrontations, the emphasis in aid has regularly gone **back and forth between, or at times combined, types of aid:** humanitarian assistance (emergency and recovery), reconstruction, or more traditional development.

Since the civil war (1975-1990), **core players in international aid have mostly remained the same**. Major **bilateral** donors have been Western states (especially the USA and some European countries), Western-allied Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and Iran. International organisations from the **UN system**, from the humanitarian, refugee and development fields, have been consistently strong aid contributors. Likewise, non-governmental organisations (**NGOs**) from all three fields, along with actors from the Red Cross Red Crescent system, have long been active in Lebanon, as contributors or channels for aid. Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010, p. 39) also emphasise that **Lebanese actors themselves** have generally played a major role in humanitarian, reconstruction and development aid, as implementers and donors. An appendix to this report provides a selection of key organisations active in official aid to Lebanon (multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as NGOs and similar organisations).

On **recent aid to Lebanon**, the OECD (2013) offers an overview with the following visual¹:

Figure 1. Recipient aid at a glance (2013) – Aid to Lebanon, 2009-2011


Lebanon

Receipts	2009	2010	2011
Net ODA (USD million)	580	448	432
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	72%	67%	65%
Net ODA / GNI	1.7%	1.2%	1.1%
Net Private flows (USD million)	115	449	- 171

For reference	2009	2010	2011
Population (million)	4.2	4.2	4.3
GNI per capita (Atlas USD)	7 870	8 750	9 110

Top Ten Donors of gross ODA (2010-11 average)		(USD m)
1	United States	85
2	UNRWA	74
3	France	69
4	EU Institutions	54
5	Kuwait (KFAED)	37
6	Arab Fund (AFESD)	37
7	Germany	29
8	Spain	24
9	Italy	23
10	Turkey	17

Bilateral ODA by Sector (2010-11)



Sources: OECD - DAC, World Bank; www.oecd.org/dac/stats

Source: OECD (2013)

¹ Several acronyms are used in this report. CPA stands for Country Programmable Aid; GNI for Gross National Income; ODA for Official Development Assistance; OOF for Other Official Flow.

The rest of this report presents a summary of analyses and data on international aid to Lebanon. Section 2 lays out the implication of partial data availability. Section 3 presents the evolution of aid since the civil war, through a brief narrative analysis and data on the post-2006 period. Section 4 identifies the main donors and sectors since 2006, with a special note on humanitarian aid. Section 5 presents aid committed to Lebanon in relation to the Syrian crisis since 2011.

2. Implications of partial data availability

Data and analysis on aid to Lebanon are separate. A few descriptive sources map international aid to Lebanon since 2006, based on data provided by donors. These sources are separate from analytical references.

The **main sources of official data** on international aid to Lebanon since 2006, compiled based on donor information, are:

- **OECD DAC Statistics.** Coverage on development and humanitarian aid from international organisations and bilateral donors is available from 2006 to 2011. Data is available on total amounts as well as by donor and sector. Data for 2012 and 2013 is not available yet, as shown by an online search and confirmed by an expert comment.
- **World Bank Data.** General coverage on aid (total amounts and by donor) is available from 2006 to 2011. Data on aid is very general and similar to OECD data, with the added possibility of relating aid flows to other indicators such as gross national income.
- **UN OCHA.** OCHA provides data humanitarian aid from 2006 to the present, including the most recent and current information about aid from international organisations, bilateral donors, and others such as NGOs.

Complementary sources, such as AidData 2.0² or the Registry of the International Aid Transparency Initiative³, are still works in progress and are less comprehensive – though they provide detailed data as self-reported by individual donors.

One expert pointed to a **fundamental problem with the data** about aid to Lebanon: while assistance from DAC countries is documented, donations from key countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar is not. Yet, according to the expert, Gulf and Arab states have been the largest donors. Such **contributions are not recorded**. According to the expert, this does not in itself suggest corruption, but illustrates ‘the accounting challenge’. The expert provided two examples. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia lodged reconstruction aid in the personal bank account of the Lebanese Prime Minister. On the other hand, Iran avoided the government altogether and gave its funding to Hezbollah (expert comment). Barakat and Zych (2011, pp. 138-139) confirm the lack of proper financial tracking in the case of the housing sector.

As a result, the expert argued that it is **unlikely anyone can map international donor aid to Lebanon with accuracy** (expert comment). Most information in this helpdesk report is based on data about ‘official aid’ and does not cover unrecorded aid; this significant limitation should be kept in mind.

² AidData 2.0 – Lebanon: www.aiddata.org/content/index/data-search#8b5b2fcfb13df26e6230dba7ad987ce3

³ International Aid Transparency Initiative – Registry – Lebanon: http://www.iatiregistry.org/dataset?q=&publishertype=&secondary_publisher=&groups=&publisher_organisation_type=&country=LB&filetype=

3. Evolution of donor aid since the civil war

Analysis of aid to Lebanon since the civil war

Cross-cutting issues

Many authors emphasise that any discussion of international aid to Lebanon must consider the **strength of local aid** as well, from the civil war to the current Syria-related crisis (Mac Ginty and Hamieh 2010, p. 39; Mac Ginty 2007, pp. 465-466; Naufal 2012, p. 7). Indeed, Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010, p. 39) note that Lebanese communities have been accustomed to being 'reconstructors of first resort' in the face of the state's limited capacities due to sectarian divisions, clientelism and chronic economic problems. Citizens have routinely turned to better organised and funded NGOs and donors, both national and international.

Another cross-cutting point is that, based on a rapid review, the macro-level discussions of international aid to Lebanon since the civil war appear to be **largely gender-blind** (whereas gender is discussed in analyses of aid implementation in Lebanon, especially at meso and micro levels). This also applies to sectoral aid. Abdo and Kerbage (2012), studying women's entrepreneurship development initiatives since the end of the civil war, point to '**micro-achievements and macro-gaps**'. They conclude that targeting by donors has been poor and ineffective; most interventions are supply-led, with a lack of co-operation between organisations that leads to duplication and over-supply in some areas (pp. 78-79).

From the civil war until 2006

With a history of war and military occupation, Lebanese institutions and society had 'substantial experience of post-war reconstruction and official development' (Mac Ginty and Hamieh 2010, p. 39). From the 1970s to the early 2000s, much of this assistance came from **Arab states and Iran** (p. 39).

Emergency relief in the 2006 war

Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010, pp. 39-40) note that during and right after the 2006 war, '**local communities were most instrumental** in the provision of emergency relief'. In particular, the Lebanese Red Cross, Jihad al-Bina (the reconstruction wing of Hizbollah), as well as the ICRC and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, made significant contributions. Financial data on aid during this period remains 'patchy'. The two main international donors were the **USA and Saudi Arabia**. Non-DAC countries contributed to about a quarter of the response. However, over 95% of their allocations went to activities that the UN had not put forward as a priority, whereas DAC donors contributed 83.5% of the UN appeal.

After the 2006 war: reconstruction and development⁴

Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010, p. 39) explain that **external actors became more prominent during reconstruction**. Main actors included UN agencies, international NGOs, local NGOs and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as major Western donors including the US, the UK and ECHO, and non-DAC donors (p. 39). Non-Western actors dominated aid, with states such as Iran, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia playing the key part (Hamieh & Mac Ginty 2010, S107). At the same time, leading states (mostly Western), along with international organisations and financial institutions, provided major financial and

⁴ For consideration of humanitarian aid in response to the Syrian crisis from 2011 onwards, see section 5.

political backing to government-sponsored reconstruction, and multilateral organisations provided military and political security to allow this reconstruction to proceed (Mac Ginty 2007, p. 466).

Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010, pp. 39-40, 45) note that aid reflected the **national and regional politics involved** in humanitarianism and development. **Ideological, religious, political and economic interests** has influenced all actors' motivations and actions. This applies to DAC and non-DAC donors alike, and to all Lebanese political and militant actors. Among the latter, some are championed by leading Western states, the EU and Saudi Arabia, others backed by Syria and Iran (pp. 39-40, 45).

Lebanon is thus the site of a **development and reconstruction proxy war**, where 'regional interests largely explain the timing, publicity, sectoral prioritisation and methods of aid disbursement' donors choose (Mac Ginty and Hamieh 2010, p. 40). The USA and Saudi Arabia in particular have used reconstruction to support their Lebanese allies. Iran used its resources to support non-governmental actors, at times 'anti- or alternative-governmental' (p. 40). Mac Ginty (2007, pp. 471-477) concludes that diverging aid practices reflected different positioning vis-à-vis a 'liberal peace' approach – defined as western, pro-market, centred on conservative stability and security. He notes donors' differing approaches with regard to peacebuilding and reconstruction, a liberal economy, and local participation.

Interestingly, politics was also a factor in internal and external **stakeholders' perceptions** of aid flows and effectiveness (Mac Ginty and Hamieh 2010, p. 39). For example, non-DAC interventions were often perceived as more significant and useful due to donors' strategies, even while some non-DAC donors did not uphold generally recognised 'best practice' in humanitarianism and development (p. 39). Overall, monitoring and evaluation 'was less important among non-DAC donors than among their DAC counterparts' (p. 46). Nonetheless, all donors had different levels of professionalism (p. 47).

Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010, pp. 42-46) argue that **two key factors shaped donor behaviour**. First, the governmental strategy to address housing through compensation rather than public building allowed non-state actors to play significant roles. Second, reconstruction assistance mainly took the form of compensation (for housing) or projects (mainly the reconstruction of infrastructure and public facilities). Each attracted different donors and demanded different partners, processes and coordination.

Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010, pp. 42-46) indicate that the various donors provided **different responses**, in terms of: types of assistance (e.g. conditional or unconditional grants); timeframes (e.g. early recovery, long-term development); channels of disbursement; geographical and sectoral distribution. Many Western states and Western-backed institutions, especially the European Union, favoured governance programming, whereas many Arab and Gulf State donors, notably Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, preferred physical reconstruction projects (Hamieh & Mac Ginty 2010, S103-S104). The latter often emphasised large-scale, high-visibility infrastructure projects, e.g. bridges, housing and roads (Hamieh & Mac Ginty 2010, S104; for details on the housing sector, see Barakat & Zyck 2011).

General **coordination** was attempted but with limited success, due to the multiplicity of humanitarian and reconstruction actors and to political factors (Mac Ginty & Hamieh 2010, p. 45). While the UN cluster system managed to coordinate many UN agencies and international NGOs, it was ineffective in coordinating with non-DAC donors and with Lebanese and non-DAC NGOs (p. 45).

Data on official aid to Lebanon since 2006


Official aid from 2006 till 2011

The following charts represent aid between 2006 and 2011. Overall, total ODA over the period generally amounted to **around US\$ 500-700 million per year**, with a peak in 2008 at nearly US\$ 1 billion.

Each year between 2006 and 2011, **DAC countries contributed over half of the aid** – and often well more than half of it. **Multilateral donors seem to have contributed fairly consistent amounts** over the period, representing roughly a quarter of the total (with variations in absolute amounts and relative weight compared to other donor types). Non-DAC countries made notable contributions from 2009 on, but these remained very small compared to both other donor categories.

The final chart shows that Lebanon received **two types of flows from donors: ODA and OOF** (official transactions with countries on the OECD list of aid recipients which do not meet the conditions of Official Development Assistance, because they are not primarily aimed at development or because their grant element is under 25%). While ODA makes up the vast majority of aid throughout the period, OOF flows were significant in 2006 and 2007 (the rest of this report focuses on ODA).

Figure 2. Aid to Lebanon, 2006-2011, in USD million (current USD 2011)



Source:
author's own,
based on data
from OECD DAC
Statistics

Official aid since 2011

No verified systematic data is available on development aid since 2011. Instead, projected estimates can be found. For instance, OECD surveyed what country programmable aid donors planned to give Lebanon for **2012-2015** (OECD 2012), as shown in the table and figure below.


Such figures indicate relative continuity in total amounts. However, **humanitarian aid** that donors have committed in response to the Syrian crisis for the past two years is likely to represent a major change, since it has reached amounts similar to or higher than total aid prior in 2011 (see section 5).

Table 1. Country programmable aid to Lebanon, planned 2012-2015

CPA actual	CPA planned					CPA / GNI		CPA per capita	
	2011 USD million					%		2011 USD	
2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2011	2015	2011	2015	
335	379	379	382	385	0.8	0.8	84.6	92.3	

Source: author's own, based on OECD 2012, p. 27.

Figure 3. Country programmable aid, 2011 actual & 2012-2015 planned (in 2011 USD million)



4. Official aid since 2006: main donors and sectors


Main donors

In 2011, the top donor was **EU institutions** (US\$ 118 million), followed by the USA (US\$ 87 million), UNRWA (US\$ 77 million) and France (US\$ 71 million). Others in the top 10 were the Arab Fund and several bilateral donors – Kuwait, Germany, Spain, Italy and Japan (all around US\$ 15-40 million).


An examination of who the top donors were each year between 2006 and 2011 reveals a striking continuity: **EU institutions, the USA, UNRWA and France are consistently among the top 5**. Minor changes include variations in relative amounts contributed by each donor, and a few changes in who the top 5 are (e.g. Italy disappears from the list after 2009, when the Arab Fund enters it).

Among the four main donors identified, **trends between 2006 and 2011 are very different**. UNRWA slowly and steadily increases its contributions. All other donors make very variable contributions over time; the general trend is a spike around 2008 followed by a decrease.

Figure 4. Information on top donors of aid to Lebanon, 2006-2011



Evolution of aid from four major donors of the 2006-2011 period



Source: author's own, based on OECD DAC Statistics

Sectors⁵

Major sectors

By far the **main sector funded in 2011** was **'social infrastructure and services'** (US\$ 316 million). Other sectors that received significant funding were **'economic infrastructure and services'** (US\$ 95 million), humanitarian aid (US\$ 63 million), production sectors (US\$ 57 million) and multisector or cross-cutting interventions (US\$ 30 million).

Between 2006 and 2011, **'social infrastructure and services'** tended to receive constant high funding, with a spike in 2008. On the other hand, humanitarian aid, at a very high level in 2006, dropped continuous over the period. Funding more typical of development aid (**'economic infrastructure and services'** and **'production sectors'**) tended to slowly, sometimes irregularly, pick up.

⁵ The categories below are taken from OECD DAC Statistics.

Figure 5. ODA disbursements by major sectors, totals, all donors, 2011 (USD million)





Figure 6. ODA disbursements by major sectors, totals, all donors, 2006-2011 (constant 2011 USD, million)



Source for both previous figures: author's own, based on data from OECD DAC Statistics

Main sub-sectors

A finer disaggregation of data shows the most funded sub-sectors in 2011 to be **education** (US\$ 121 million) and **'government and civil society'** (US\$ 95 million). A second group of well-funded sectors, which received around US\$ 60-70 million each, are **transport and storage, water supply and sanitation, and humanitarian aid** (counted as a sub-sector as well as a sector). Remaining well-funded sub-sectors, which received US\$ 15-40 million each, were: industry, mining and construction; health; 'other multisector'; banking and financial services'; and agriculture, forestry and fishing.

Between 2006 and 2011, notable trends included the stark decline in humanitarian funding, the continuous high level of funding for education and the high but very irregular funding for 'government and civil society'. There is a trend towards rising funding for water supply and sanitation and for transport and storage. Lastly, health seems to receive constant, though lower, funding.

Figure 7. Top 10 sub-sectors in 2011, totals (ODA disbursements, USD million)






Figure 8. Funding for top 10 sub-sectors, totals, 2006-2011 (ODA disbursements, constant 2011 USD, million)



Source for the two figures above: author's own, based on data from OECD DAC Statistics

Humanitarian aid

Figure 9. Humanitarian aid by sub-sector, totals, 2006-2011 (ODA disbursements, constant 2011 USD, million)



Source: author's own, based on data from OECD DAC Statistics

For the period since 2011, OCHA has recorded the following funding (commitments and contributions):

Figure 10. Humanitarian aid, all donor types, totals, 2011-2013 (USD million)





Figure 11. Top donors of humanitarian aid, all donor types, 2011-2013 (USD million)

Top 5 donors of humanitarian aid, 2011-2013 (by decreasing order of funding amounts each year)

- 2011: Saudi Arabia, Norway, European Commission, Switzerland, Italy
- 2012: USA, European Commission, various (details not yet provided), Norway, Germany
- 2013: USA, Kuwait, various (details not yet provided), European Commission, Germany

Top 10 donors of humanitarian aid in 2013 (USD millions)



Source for two figures above: author's own, based on OCHA FTS, Lebanon emergencies for 2013, table R24c

5. Official humanitarian aid in relation to the Syrian crisis

Existing data makes it **difficult to identify** which part of the humanitarian aid given to Lebanon is related to the Syrian crisis. In particular, OECD and OCHA data sets show that, over the past two years, humanitarian aid has been committed in response to crises affecting Palestinian and Iraqi refugees already established in Lebanon, and in response to the crisis in Syria that has affected Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians (some of whom lived in Lebanon before, others recently moved there from Syria)⁶. Data is rarely disaggregated in a way that allows for a rapid overview of the respective aid flows.

The **lack of very recent consolidated data** compounds the problem. For example, a search through detailed OECD statistics on humanitarian ODA committed to Lebanon in 2011 (the most recent available data) does not find any aid flow related to the Syrian crisis⁷.

OCHA reports that, **as of 1 August 2013, donors have contributed over US\$ 427 million** in humanitarian pledges, commitments and contributions for the year 2013 in relation to the impact of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon – out of a total of over US\$ 437 million in humanitarian funding to Lebanon⁸. This means that, since the beginning of **2013, close to 98% of humanitarian aid** recorded by OCHA to Lebanon has been related to the Syrian crisis. Figures for 2012 were over US\$ 122 million for the Syrian crisis out of a total of US\$ 153 million in humanitarian aid to Lebanon (nearly 80%)⁹. However, International Crisis Group (2013, p. iii) notes that donors have yet to provide Lebanon, UN agencies and their partners the **\$1 billion necessary** to address the refugee crisis until December 2013.

Figure 12. Top 10 funding contributions to Lebanon for the Syrian crisis in 2013, as of 01/08/13

Donor	Channel	Description	Funding (USD)
USA	UNHCR	Protection, Camp Management, Shelter and Settlements, WASH, Education, Relief Commodities	70 000 000
Kuwait	UNHCR	Humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis	47 526 882
Various donors (no details yet)	Danish Refugee Council	Revised Syria Regional Response Plan	37 612 890
USA	UNHCR	Protection, Camp Management, Shelter and Settlements, WASH, Education, Relief Commodities	15 600 000
ECHO (EU)	UNHCR	Humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees	14 205 181
Kuwait	UNICEF	Humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis	11 105 100
Kuwait	World Food Programme	Humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis	10 769 320
Various Donors (no details yet)	Première Urgence - Aide	Revised Syria Regional Response Plan	9 175 000

⁶ See for example: OCHA – Financial Tracking Service – Lebanon: <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=lbn&yr=2013>. Lebanon emergencies for 2013, table reference R10c.

⁷ The search was conducted in the following data set: <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/microdata.html?q=1:1+2:95+3:286+4:1+5:3+6:2011+7:2+8:85+9:85&ds=CRS1&f=json>

⁸ Source: see note 6.

⁹ OCHA – Financial Tracking Service – Lebanon: <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=lbn&yr=2012>. Lebanon emergencies for 2012, table reference R10c.

	Médicale Internationale		
ECHO (EU)	Danish Refugee Council	Emergency assistance to conflict and displacement affected population in Syria and neighbouring countries – Shelter	9 080 893
ECHO (EU)	UNHCR	Support to displaced Syrians in neighbouring countries	7 381 229

Source: author's own, based on OCHA FTS, Lebanon emergencies for 2013, table R10c

A rapid survey of major contributions (US\$ 1 million and more) in humanitarian aid made to Lebanon in 2013 in relation to the Syrian crisis reveals the following¹⁰:

- **Major identified donors are:**
 - Bilateral donors: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the USA.
 - Multilateral donors: the Central Emergency Response Fund, the European Commission and ECHO, the World Food Programme.
 - Others: the Consortium of Relief Organizations.
- **The major identified channels are UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA and WFP, as well as organisations from the Red Cross Red Crescent system.** Overall, identified channels include:
 - Bilateral venues (direct aid to the Lebanese government).
 - Red Cross Red Crescent: ICRC, Netherlands Red Cross, UAE Red Crescent.
 - Multilateral organisations: UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, WHO.
 - NGOs: Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre (CLMC), Danish Refugee Council, Handicap International, International Orthodox Christian Charities, International Rescue Committee, MEDAIR, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam GB, Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale, Relief International, Save the Children, Solidarités-France, War Child Holland.

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¹⁰ Source: see note 6. This is in line with what Naufal (2012, pp. 7-11) documents.

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Key websites

- OCHA – Financial Tracking Service – Lebanon:
<http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=lb>
- OECD – Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – Statistics: <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>
- World Bank – World DataBank – Lebanon:
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/table/source/2?country=LBN&series=&period=>

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About this report

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7. Appendix: Key international organisations in Lebanon

Based on the findings mentioned in the body of the report, the following organisations were identified as key international donor organisations in Lebanon. Nearly all have offices in Lebanon.

Multilateral organisations

Arab Fund (AFESD)

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.arabfund.org/Default.aspx?pageId=357&Cr=LEBANON>

Contact (in Kuwait):

<http://www.arabfund.org/Default.aspx?pageId=39&mid=26>

European Commission & ECHO

Activities in Lebanon:

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm

Contact:

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/about_us/contacts/index_en.htm

UN System in Lebanon

Activities in Lebanon (with links to all UN organisations present in Lebanon):

<http://www.un.org.lb/Default.aspx?pageid=656>

Contact:

United Nations Country Team: <http://www.un.org.lb/Subpage.aspx?pageid=16>

Resident Coordinator Office (RCO): <http://www.un.org.lb/Subpage.aspx?pageid=55>

UNHCR

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486676>

Contact:

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486676#LEBBE>

UNICEF

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/lebanon.html>

Contact:

www.unicef.org/infobycountry/lebanon_contact.html

UNRWA

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=65>

Contact (headquarters in Amman):

<http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=43>

WFP

Activities in Lebanon:

<https://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-responds-syrian-refugee-crisis>

Contact (office in Syria): <https://www.wfp.org/countries/syria/contacts>

Bilateral donors

France - AFD:

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.afd.fr/home/pays-d-intervention-afd/mediterranee-et-moyen-orient/pays-Mediterranee/liban>

Contact:

<http://www.afd.fr/home/pays/mediterranee-et-moyen-orient/geo/liban/contact-liban>

Kuwait (KFAED)

Activities in Lebanon:

http://www.kuwait-fund.org/index.php?option=com_kfaedprojects&radioSearchBy=Country&listRegions=4&listCountries=100&radioSectors=All&listSectors=2&radioStatus=All&radioType=All&submit=Search

Contact (office in Kuwait):

http://www.kuwait-fund.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=72

USAID:

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/middle-east/lebanon>

Contact:

<http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/middle-east/lebanon>

NGOs and similar organisations

Danish Refugee Council

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://drc.dk/relief-work/where-we-work/middle-east/lebanon/>

Contact:

<http://drc.dk/relief-work/where-we-work/middle-east/lebanon/>

ICRC

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/middle-east/lebanon/index.jsp>

Contact:

<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/middle-east-and-north-africa-contact.htm>

Lebanese Red Cross

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.redcross.org.lb/index.aspx?pageid=907>

Contact:

<http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/where-we-work/middle-east-and-north-africa/lebanese-red-cross/>

Norwegian Refugee Council

Activities in Lebanon:

<http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9167173>

Contact:

<http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9167173>