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Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Ethiopia

Rapid Literature Review
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About this report

This report is based on 24 days of desk-based research and provides a short synthesis of the literature on fragility and migration in relation to Ethiopia. It was written by Becky Carter and Brigitte Rohwerder, GSDRC researchers at the Institute of Development Studies, UK. It was prepared for the European Commission's Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, © European Union 2016. The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not represent the opinions or views of the European Union, the GSDRC, or the partner agencies of the GSDRC.

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This paper is one of a series of fragility and migration assessments. Others in the series are:

- Avis, W. & Herbert, S. (forthcoming 2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Somalia*. (Rapid Literature Review). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- GSDRC. (2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Eritrea*. (Rapid Literature Review). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
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Executive summary

Key Facts

It is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the migration situation in Ethiopia today. Limitations with the migration data include the use of varying definitions for different categories of migrants, and the lack of documentation of irregular migration. Existing figures suggest the following:

Outward migration

- There are currently 88,149 Ethiopian refugees and 72,278 asylum seekers (UNHCR figures June 2015).
 - Kenya hosts 30,473 Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers; Sudan 18,335; Yemen, 13,787; Egypt, 6,278; South Africa, 5,538; South Sudan, 4,202; and Uganda 2,502 (UNHCR figures end of 2015). The US hosted 10,508 Ethiopian refugees at the end of 2012 (UNDESA and UNICEF figures).
 - There were **6,350 asylum applications by Ethiopians to European countries in 2015**, with the top five countries being Germany (2,170), Sweden (1,675), the UK (725), Norway (675), Switzerland (600) (Eurostat figures 2015).
- There were **460,000 legal migrants between September 2008 and August 2013**, 79 per cent of whom travelled to Saudi Arabia, 20 per cent to Kuwait and the rest to Dubai and other countries (MoLSA figures).
- However, it is estimated (based on 2012 figures) that **60-70 per cent of Ethiopians migrating are irregular migrants** – either trafficked or smuggled – generally to the Middle East, particularly the Gulf States (MoLSA figures).

Inward migration

- Ethiopia is the **largest refugee-hosting country in Africa**. As of December 2015, there are 733,644 refugees and asylum seekers in Ethiopia, of which 282,033 people are from South Sudan; 251,797 from Somalia; 155,207 from Eritrea; and 38,228 from Sudan (UNHCR figures).

Internal migration

- Internal migration in Ethiopia is thought to be **larger than external flows**, but the exact number of people who migrate internally is not known.
- There were **over 413,400 internally displaced people in Ethiopia** in July 2015 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre figures).

Other facts

- Officially **remittances are worth USD 3-3.5 billion (2014/2015) and are estimated at 7.4 per cent of GDP** (IMF and IDA figures 2015), although these official figures may underestimate the actual volume of remittances as a result of informal flows.
- In 2013 Ethiopia received **USD 3.8 billion in official development assistance** (World Bank figures 2015).

Migratory context and drivers:

- Until the early 1990s, **Ethiopia was one of the largest sources of refugees and migrants in Africa**; since then it has become the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa.
- Compared with many other countries in Africa, Ethiopia has a **relatively low international migration rate**. Analysis anticipates Ethiopia may experience rising outward migration rates in the next few decades as it develops and, as a result, continuing migratory pressures.
- **Most migration from Ethiopia is driven by lack of livelihood opportunities – especially for the young**; fluctuations in migration flows are more related to economies than immigration policies. High levels of demographic growth mean an estimated 2-3 million workers enter the job market each year. A key question is how the current developmental state model can support a private sector that will provide more productive employment and meet growing livelihood aspirations.
- **Oppressive political context and insecurity are cited as the second most important migration drivers**; Ethiopia receives very low ratings for political and civil rights from international human rights organisations. In recent months there has been a surge in unrest, with violent clashes in the Oromia Region and other parts of the country.
- **Specific groups face migratory pressures from political and economic exclusion and marginalisation**, including: political opposition members; Oromo people and other marginalised ethnic groups; Muslims; women and girls; refugees; pastoralist communities; and young people in large families.

Outward migration:

- The few legal options lead to **irregular migration – in particular to the Middle East**. Around 60 to 70 per cent of Ethiopians migrating there are irregular migrants.
- While the profile of migrants from Ethiopia varies by destination, in general **migrants are young and single, increasingly female, and many are Oromo and Amhara people**. The majority of legal Ethiopian migrants that go to the Middle East are young women.
- Many migrants are victims of fraud, forced labour, and physical, sexual, and psychological abuse by employers or traffickers.
- **Secondary outward migration** by refugees in Ethiopia (especially Eritreans) to Europe occurs as a result of their frustrations over their lack of opportunities in Ethiopia.

Inward migration:

- Ethiopia hosts **large numbers of refugees** – most of whom are women and children – from conflict-affected parts of South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. Most refugees are prevented from working, with the exception of some Eritreans who can undertake informal employment.
- There are also **returning migrants**, many of whom intend to migrate again as a result of their negative economic situation and difficulties in reintegrating upon return.

Internal migration:

- **Internal migration in Ethiopia is thought to be larger than external flows**. Rural-urban migration to improve livelihoods is a low but growing trend, in particular for young people, and can be a first step towards international migration.
- **Other internal displacement** has been driven by drought, war, political conflicts, resettlements, villagisation policies, and poverty.

Migrant journeys:

- There are three main irregular routes migrants and refugees take out of Ethiopia:
 - **Eastern irregular route:** desert and sea route from Afar, Dire Dawa, Jijiga, through Djibouti or Somalia, to Yemen and onwards. (The regular route involves flying from Ethiopia to the Middle East.)
 - **Southern irregular route:** overland route from Moyale to Kenya and on to South Africa.
 - **Northern/western irregular route:** overland route from Metema/Wollega province through Sudan and on towards Libya and Europe (by sea).
- Taking the irregular route means that **Ethiopian migrants and refugees are smuggled or trafficked** during their journey. **This is a risky process**, which has resulted in human rights abuses and the deaths of many Ethiopians.
- The **government response** has been to legislate against smugglers and traffickers (conflating the two) and to impose a temporary ban on migration to the Middle East between 2013 and 2015. However, there have been few prosecutions and people have taken other illegal routes instead. This may change with the introduction of new legislation.

Development impacts of migration:

- **Remittances**, from those abroad and in country, have had a positive effect on households and the country's development, although some migrants struggle to send them. Officially remittances are worth USD 3-3.5 billion (2014/2015) (the true figure is likely to be higher). Declining levels of international support for assistance to refugees in Ethiopia and the inability of the majority of refugees to engage in livelihood opportunities are contributing to **negative development impacts of refugees for Ethiopia**.
- **Foreign aid has been credited with contributing to Ethiopia's development**, although it has also been criticised for supporting programmes that are claimed to have contributed to displacement. The effectiveness of donor support in helping to meet development challenges will depend on the Ethiopian government improving governance, empowering local authorities, and becoming more accountable to its citizens.

Evidence:

- This rapid review has found a fairly large development practitioner and academic literature on the sources of fragility in Ethiopia. While migration statistics are unreliable, there is reasonably credible information about the routes and migrant profiles. This literature is more focused on those travelling to the Middle East, with a strong focus on young women in a number of reports. As much of the migration is irregular, this presents challenges for documentation.
- **Key evidence gaps** include:
 - Up to date information on migrant profiles, motivations and routes, taking into account the impact of the new global migration context (most survey data is from 2011–2013)
 - Migrant journeys along the north/west and south routes
 - Information on internal displacement
 - The impact of hosting a large refugee population
 - The role development aid has played in relation to migration pressures.

1. General background

1.1 Context to migration in Ethiopia today

An expert consulted for this report comments that:

‘Ethiopia’s modern history has been characterised by high levels of violence, including inter-state war, civil war, insurgency, violent protest and state repression. The environmental conditions in the wider Horn of Africa region, including Ethiopia, are highly variable, and among many populations adaptive strategies have included transhumance and migration – these are decades/centuries old patterns, although evolving’.

1.2 Economic status and development

Ethiopia is a **low-income country**: in 2014 its per capita GDP was USD 573.6.¹ However, its economy has experienced **strong and broad-based growth over the past decade**, averaging 10.8 per cent per year from 2003/04-2013/14 compared to the regional average of 4.8 per cent.² Services and agriculture are the driving sectors, with relatively modest manufacturing performance, and an increasingly important role played by public investment, according to the World Bank.³ See Appendix 1 for further economic data.

This growth has been part of a broader, successful development phase (World Bank 2015b: 4). In recent years Ethiopia’s **poverty reduction and expansion of basic services have been among the most impressive in Africa**, and Ethiopian households have experienced a decade of progress in wellbeing since 2000 (DFID 2014: 5; EU 2014: 4; World Bank 2015a). With the government dedicating a large proportion of the budget to pro-poor expenditures, and with substantial donor support, 2.5 million people have been lifted out of poverty since 2005 (UNDP 2015: 1). The share of the population below the poverty line fell from 38.7 per cent in 2004/05 to 26 per cent in 2012/13 (ibid.). Life expectancy has increased by about one year annually since 2000, and is now higher in Ethiopia than the averages in low-income countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2015b: 4). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for child mortality and water have been achieved, alongside positive results for universal primary education, gender parity in primary education, HIV/AIDS, and malaria.⁴ See Appendix 2 for further data on Ethiopia’s development progress.

1.3 Main dimensions of fragility and conflict

Nevertheless Ethiopia **remains one of the poorest countries of the world and faces enormous development challenges**. Twenty-five million Ethiopians live below the national poverty line and Ethiopia ranks 173rd out of 186 countries in the 2015 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2015: 1, 3).

Much of the rural population lives in constant **food insecurity**; the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimates that 32 per cent of the national population is undernourished for the period 2014-16.⁵ Ethiopia suffers from recurrent humanitarian crises, with roughly 8 million people suffering from chronic food insecurity (DFID 2014: 5). Causes include extreme poverty, seasonal shocks, degradation of natural resources and rapid population growth (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 6; DFID 2014: 5).

In recent history Ethiopia has experienced **catastrophic famines**, notably in 1973-74, 1983-84 and 1987-88; the famine of 1983-84 was the most severe, leaving over 1 million people dead (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 6).

¹ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/ET?display=graph>

² <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

³ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

⁴ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

⁵ <http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/>

Ethiopia has not experienced famine conditions in more than two decades, and during that time ‘its food security infrastructure – particularly the famine early warning system, and programmes to protect a baseline of livelihoods – have been significantly developed’ (expert comment). The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) helps manage the persistent caseload of vulnerable populations and decrease acute vulnerability (expert comment; Mosley 2012).

Currently Ethiopia is dealing with the **effects of the worst drought in decades**. A combination of El Niño-driven climatic shocks affecting successive harvests and high food price inflation has significantly increased food insecurity and malnutrition (Government of Ethiopia & Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team 2015: 6). More than 10 million people in Ethiopia, including an estimated 5.75 million children,⁶ are at risk of hunger, and USD 1.4 billion is needed in emergency assistance (Government of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Country Team 2015). A further 7.9 million people need support under the PSNP, bringing the total number in need of relief to more than 18 million (expert comment).⁷

Economic growth is also threatened by external shocks such as climate change and fluctuating commodity prices (DFID 2014: 5). There are currently **high rates of unemployment and underemployment** in both urban and rural areas. Meanwhile the current population of 96.96 million⁸ is projected to increase to around 190 million by 2050, accompanied by rapid urban growth (UNDESA 2015: 19; DFID 2014: 5). Inflation and currency pressure are also intensified by import-heavy state-led development initiatives, which exacerbate a structural balance of payments imbalance (expert comment). The state relies on official development assistance to finance the current deficit (expert comment).

Remaining challenges with basic social services include inconsistent availability of effective healthcare across the country; lagging maternal healthcare; ongoing problems with the quality of education; and slower progress with secondary school enrolment and gender parity (UNDP 2015: 1-2). Donors caution that Ethiopia’s MDG achievements have been from a very low base, and will be difficult to maintain as the needs of harder-to-reach populations are prioritised (DFID 2014: 5). The UNDP highlights the need **to focus on reaching the poorest of the poor** more effectively (UNDP 2015: 1).

Ethiopia faces a challenge in ensuring its rapid growth and development is **inclusive of all socio-economic groups and evenly distributed throughout the country**; in particular, the emerging regions remain relatively disadvantaged (UNDP 2015: 2). The World Bank finds that using aid effectively, to continue progress on the MDGs and address the causes of poverty, will require Ethiopia to improve governance, empower local authorities, and become more accountable to its citizens.⁹

Ethiopia has a long way to go toward establishing a **functioning democracy with effective rule of law** (DFID 2014: 5). It is Africa’s oldest independent country, and has never been colonised: during the last century successive Ethiopian regimes strove for political centralisation, often at the expense of specific ethnic groups (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 11). The current government, led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), came to power in 1991 after almost two decades of armed struggle against the repressive military Derg regime (World Bank 2012: 1). Political and economic conditions stabilised through a combination of state-led economic development and relatively decentralised regional government (DFID 2014: 5).

The EPRDF regime limits civil and political rights (ibid.), and has been accused of stifling dissent, suppressing opposition and committing human rights abuses.¹⁰ International human rights organisations give Ethiopia **very low ratings for political and civil rights** (see section 2.2 for further details). In 2015 there was a surge in unrest, with violent clashes in the Oromia Region and other parts of the country. According to an expert contributor to

⁶ <http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/2015-12/ethiopia-drought>

⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hurd-crisis-in-ethiopia-needs-global-response>

⁸ <http://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia>

⁹ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

¹⁰ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13349399>

this report, there is a risk of ‘destabilisation’, which could be compounded by ‘political unrest if economic growth is affected by a humanitarian crisis’.

Ethiopia’s **challenging location in the fragile region of the Horn of Africa** between war-torn Somalia, Eritrea, and the newly divided Sudan and South Sudan generates difficult cross-border conflicts, often involving cross-border communities (World Bank 2012: 2).

2. The economics and politics underlying migration

This section looks at the push factors for migration out of Ethiopia. Studies find that migrants cite a number of reasons for migration. Here three key drivers are explored: the economy, politics and conflict. The literature and expert comments suggest that the multiple migratory pressures described will continue, and may increase, in spite of the risks involved in migrating (Kanko & Teller 2013; Frouws 2015).

2.1 Employment opportunities in Ethiopia

Analysts find that **most migration within Africa – and from Ethiopia – is driven by employment opportunities** (Frouws 2015: 8; Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 4). Many Ethiopians, particularly the young, consider outmigration as the only way to achieve a better living standard (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 4; expert comment). A 2011 household survey of 1,282 households across 15 communities in Ethiopia found that 75 per cent of those leaving the country were doing so to find employment (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014).

Labour migration has been ‘one of the most prominent features of the relationship between **Ethiopia and the Middle East, and the Arabian Peninsula**’ (de Regt and Tafesse, 2015: 4). Frouws (2015: 8) finds that fluctuations in migration flows are more related to economies than to immigration policies. For example, he reports that Ethiopian migration to Saudi Arabia continued despite a major crackdown on irregular migration and mass deportations in 2013/2014 and still continues despite the war in Yemen. Bleak agricultural prospects in rural areas also drive **rural-urban migration** within Ethiopia (Atnafu et al. n.d.).

Ethiopia’s economic growth has resulted in increasing employment rates (IMF 2013), but many Ethiopians continue to struggle with **low wages, unemployment, underemployment, precarious self-employment and unprotected informal jobs**. In 2012 the monthly average real income was ETB 421.7 (or USD 23.4), well below the USD 1.25 a day poverty threshold¹¹ (Ferede & Kebede 2015: 54). In rural areas poverty prevails despite government efforts to develop the countryside economically (de Regt and Tafesse 2015: 4). While there is an increasing service sector and investment in manufacturing, agriculture will continue to be the main livelihood for the estimated 80 per cent of Ethiopians living in rural areas (Ferede & Kebede 2015).¹² The vast majority of agricultural work involves self-employment (own-account work) and non-paid employment (e.g. contributing family work) (Martins 2014: 32). There is a growing issue with rural underemployment as family members work on smaller and increasingly fragmented plots of land with lower productivity. Further, the smaller plot sizes are unsustainable for large families (Admassie et al. 2015: 4; Atnafu et al. n.d.). While self-employment in non-farm enterprises provides an additional income source for some of the poor, the size of the sector is relatively small and constrained by limited demand for goods and services in rural areas (World Bank 2015b: xxi).

In **urban areas**, employment rates increased between 2009 and 2012. Yet unemployment was 17 per cent in 2012 (more than double for women compared to men) and unprotected informal employment remains prevalent (IMF

¹¹ In 2012, the top four low-paying sectors – all paying below Ethiopia’s average wage – were hotels and restaurants; agriculture; wholesale and retail trade; and manufacturing (Ferede & Kebede 2015: 54).

¹² The last census in 2007 reported 84% of Ethiopians living in rural areas, since when there has been observable new urban growth (expert comment; Central Statistical Agency 2008: 19).

2013: 8). A particular concern is that, despite strong growth, the urban economy struggles to create sufficient productive employment opportunities for an increasingly educated urban youth (Martins 2014: 26). De Regt and Tafesse (2015: 4) report that educated people in urban areas have difficulties finding paid jobs in both the public and the private sector.

The Government of Ethiopia and its donors expect Ethiopia's **growth outlook to remain favourable**. The government is implementing policies that support macroeconomic stability and reforms aimed at improving competitiveness, albeit at a slow rate (IMF 2015: 1). Growing consumer markets and continued infrastructure investment will also drive future growth (EIU 2015). However, key constraints will continue to affect employment opportunities. UNDP (2015: 2) argues that a key question for the government is **how the developmental state model can promote a more dynamic and diversified domestic private sector**, serving local and export markets and offering more Ethiopians productive employment. There is also a need to identify labour-intensive sectors where private (foreign) investment could make a difference (expert comment).

High population growth is a key driver of migration. An estimated 1.4 million people entered Ethiopia's job market in 2005; that figure is now around 2-3 million a year,¹³ and looks set to continue to rise to 3.2 million per year by 2050 (UNDP 2015: 2). This is in addition to existing migratory pressure within the context of:

- growing youth unemployment;
- continued low agricultural productivity;
- the potential for weather-related shocks to generate large social costs and higher inflation (IMF 2015: 1);
- the lack of provision of conditions for private sector investment in the productive sectors of the economy, particularly in manufacturing and services (EIU 2015; UNDP 2015: 3; expert comment).

Given the country's development level, unemployment rate and its labour force entrants each year, migration is expected to increase until Ethiopia becomes an upper-middle-income country (expert comment).

Meanwhile **livelihood and employment aspirations are growing**, fuelled by remittances sent home by migrants, success stories from returnee migrants, and exposure to the rest of the world through film and TV, mobile phones and the internet, particularly social media (Kanko & Teller 2013; expert comment). Frouws (2014a: 21) reports that peer and family pressure may lead to a **'culture of migration'** amongst young people, where migration is associated with personal, social and material success and staying at home with failure.

2.2 Political issues

After economic reasons and the lack of livelihood opportunities, Ethiopians cite the **oppressive political context and insecurity** as the second most important migration drivers when asked their reasons for leaving their country (Frouws 2014b: 25-26).

Ethiopia receives **very low ratings for political and civil rights** from international human rights organisations. In 2016 Freedom House gave Ethiopia the lowest possible score on political rights due to the government's systematic constriction of political space during the 2015 parliamentary elections, while civil liberties received a rating of 6 out of 7 (7 being the worst).¹⁴ Freedom House (2015) reports that Ethiopia ranked 32nd out of 52 countries surveyed in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, below the continental average and among the lowest-ranked countries in East Africa.

Few mechanisms exist for airing grievances or expressing political discontent, with freedom of expression subject to serious restriction (AI 2015: 148). Using anti-terrorist legislation and periodic crackdowns by the security

¹³ Expert comment; <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/economic-development-the-good-news-from-ethiopia-and-what-might-make-it-even-better>

¹⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/ethiopia>

services, the government has attacked independent media publications, arrested peaceful protesters, journalists and members of opposition political parties, and used widespread arbitrary detention and torture to silence actual or suspected dissent (ibid.; EIU 2015). Freedom House (2015) reports widespread corruption, with EPRDF officials reportedly receiving preferential access to credit, land leases, and jobs. Ethiopia is considered 'highly corrupt', and is ranked as 103rd out of 168 countries and territories in Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index.¹⁵ The presence of the EPRDF at all levels of society – directly and, increasingly, electronically – inhibits free private discussion; many people are wary of speaking against the government (Freedom House 2015).

Freedom House also reports that other freedoms are threatened. According to the 2015 'Freedom in the World' report, while Ethiopia's constitution guarantees religious freedom, there has been increasing government harassment of the large Muslim community (Freedom House 2015). Other findings in the report include: frequent restriction of academic freedom, with the government prohibiting political activities on campuses; prohibition of same-sex sexual activity, punishable by up to 15 years' imprisonment; routine violation of women's rights, including patchy enforcement of the law against rape and domestic abuse, and illegal female genital mutilation and forced child marriage (ibid.).

There are **mixed views on prospects for change in leadership and governance**. Some analysts find that there are few prospects for change, given the total government victory in the May 2015 elections (EIU 2015), in which the EPRDF and allied parties won every parliamentary seat. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in the lead-up to the elections the government used authoritarian tactics to silence opposition parties, arresting leading opposition members and people organising rallies.¹⁶ Several opposition members and candidates were beaten to death in suspicious circumstances, according to HRW.¹⁷

The EIU (2015) finds it likely that the EPRDF will retain control in the 2020 elections. According to EIU's 2015 report, Hailemariam Desalegn – who has served as prime minister since the death of the long-standing incumbent, Meles Zenawi, in August 2012 and was re-elected EPRDF chairman in August 2015 – has not yet been able to replicate his predecessor's dominant position. Despite this, the EIU (2015) finds little suggestion of any imminent splits in the ruling coalition.

However, the recent upsurge in unrest and risks of destabilisation causes some experts to suggest **possible consequences for the unity of the EPRDF ruling coalition** (expert comment; Lefort 2016). Ademo (2015) finds that the battle for influence among competing groups exposes the country's enduring ethnic fault lines.

2.3 Internal conflict

An expert consulted for this report comments that:

'The last 50 or so years of Ethiopian history has been particularly convulsive, with two violent overthrows of the existing political order. The Ethiopian revolution of 1974-77 overthrew the imperial government and saw the Derg military regime installed. The 1970s-1991 insurgencies by the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements overthrew the Derg in 1991, redrawing the political landscape again and introducing the current federal system in 1995. Both of these revolutions created large-scale displacement, including the move into the diaspora by large groups, particularly those associated with the former order.'

The **Ogaden region** – comprising the plain between the Somalia-Ethiopia border and the Ethiopian Eastern Highlands, including the official state Somali region – has been an epicentre of instability in the Horn of Africa for

¹⁵ <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>

¹⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/23/dispatches-alarm-bells-ethiopias-100-election-victory>

¹⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/23/dispatches-alarm-bells-ethiopias-100-election-victory>

several decades.¹⁸ It was the arena for wars between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1960s and 1970s, and the proxy arena for the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁹ Today it is the site of complex interlocking tensions, with endemic communal and clan clashes at the local level often indistinguishable from regional and international insecurities affecting the area.²⁰

There are **armed opposition groups** in several parts of the country or in neighbouring countries, although in most cases with small numbers of fighters and low levels of activity (AI 2015: 148). Analysts foresee continued periodic outbreaks of protests and low-level violence between them and the government. In particular: the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnically based, violent and fragmented separatist group which has been waging an armed insurgency in the south east Ogaden region since 1994,²¹ and the Oromo Liberation Front in southern Oromia, designated a terrorist organisation by the government and banned since 2011 (EIU 2015; Prunier 2008: 13-14).²² These conflicts are not expected to threaten the government (EIU 2015), however secondary effects include restriction of access, with some parts of the Somali region severely restricted, and continuing reports of serious violations of human rights (AI 2015: 148).

The EPRDF's strategy of ethnic federalism is considered to have heightened and transformed historical territorial conflicts into contemporary inter-regional boundary conflicts (Zerihun Wondifraw et al. 2015: 13). In recent years there has been a heightened awareness of **ethnic identity**, political issues such as language rights, and border disputes between regions and ethnicities (ibid.). Analysts highlight that while historical and ongoing inter-clan or ethnic conflicts may have used ethnicity for mobilisation purposes, key drivers of these and other civil conflicts are **perceived or real disfranchisement, inequitable distributions of economic and political benefits, and competition for resources and livelihoods** (UNDP 2012: 8).

There are reports that since mid-November 2015, at least the northern half of **Oromia 'has been in a ferment of dissent'** involving intense and extensive demonstrations and loss of control of entire areas abandoned or deserted by security forces (Lefort 2016). Non-governmental sources report more than a hundred dead, and as of early 2016 there is only a partial return to normality (ibid.).

Ethiopia is highly regarded for its secularism, mutual respect and religious tolerance, but there have been **sporadic religious clashes** in recent years (Zerihun Wondifraw et al. 2015: 13).

2.4 Ethiopian involvement in the region

Ethiopian troops are part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Mosley (2014: 3) reports that this engagement is driven by national security objectives related to the Ethiopian Somali population and the perceived threat of militant Islamism spilling over from Somalia.

While the fragile truce between **Ethiopian and Eritrea** is holding, border tensions remain high²³ and the division of border communities has cut long-standing economic and familial linkages, increasing vulnerability for some populations (Mosley 2014: 3). This situation builds on deep interlinkages between Eritrea and Ethiopia. An expert consulted for this report comments that:

'Eritrea's large established diaspora was to a significant degree established as a result of the 1962-1991 liberation war (Eritrea, a former Italian colony, was federated with Ethiopia in 1952; the Ethiopian imperial government annexed Eritrea as a province in 1962, triggering the liberation movement). The Ethiopian government's counter-insurgency created a large base of refugees. The 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and independent Eritrea

¹⁸ <http://www.britannica.com/place/Ogaden>

¹⁹ <http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/horn-africa/history-ogaden-region>

²⁰ <http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/horn-africa/history-ogaden-region>

²¹ <http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/horn-africa/history-ogaden-region>

²² There are also a number of smaller rebel groups operating in Ethiopia – see Prunier (2008: 13-15) for further details.

²³ See historical overview by Fransen and Kuschminder (2009) and <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13349399>

triggered another wave. The more recent patterns of migration since the end of the war in 2000 build on that base.'

For more information on migration in the Eritrean context see GSDRC (2016).

2.5 Regional fragility

Ethiopia is at the centre of a **fragile region**, dogged by intrastate conflicts; interstate wars and political extremism and instability; and economic destitution, resource scarcities and environmental degradation (Khadiagala 2008: 1). Escalating communal violence, small arms proliferation and massive movements of people within and beyond the region are also issues (ibid.). At the same time recent analysis by Clapham (2015: 818) finds that relations between regional states are now more cooperative than at any previous period.

2.6 Excluded groups

Political marginalisation

There is evidence of the migratory pressure caused by the government's reportedly authoritarian approach to all political opposition (Frouws 2014a: 24). A Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) survey of Ethiopian migrants who intend to travel, have travelled to, or have returned from Yemen or Saudi Arabia found that political factors are most often considered as a driver for migration in Tigray (55 per cent), followed by Amhara (36 per cent), Oromia (29 per cent) and Dire Dawa (5 per cent) (ibid.). In his analysis of these results, Frouws (2014a: 24) notes that the reportedly authoritarian nature of the regime to opposition, even from within the dominant ethnic group, may make it possible for Tigrayans and Amharas to claim persecution or political marginalisation, and several opposition groups in the Tigray region are subject to government oppression (ibid.).

Oromo people

Tensions and conflict between the Oromo people and the Ethiopian government, over political rights and land resources, are commonly reported (expert comment; AI 2015; Freedom House 2015). The Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group, account for up an estimated 40 per cent of the population.²⁴ They have long been marginalised within Ethiopian culture,²⁵ and continue to suffer human rights violations from state efforts to suppress potential dissent in the region and limit their participation in the political process around the 2015 election (AI 2015: 151; Freedom House 2015).

In 2014, protests took place across the Oromia region against the government's proposal of a Master Plan to expand the capital Addis Ababa into Oromia territory. The forceful response by the security services resulted in the deaths of at least 30 people, including children, and thousands of arrests, with increased levels of arrest in the Oromia region continuing (AI 2015: 148-149, 151). This is seen by some analysts as the culmination of the underlying, long-standing conflict, with the centralisation of power contradicting authentic federalism, and 'exacerbated by the general perception of Tigrean hegemony and the marginalisation and dispossession of [Oromia]' (Lefort 2016; expert comment).

There are reports of **marginalisation of other ethnic groups**. A recent study on mixed migration in Libya mentioned tribal tensions as a migration driver, noting that persecution of Ethiopians of Somali descent and localised conflict in the Ogaden region were causing some displacement and population movement (Frouws 2014b: 25). HRW's report into the villagisation process in the Gambella region found that many of the able-bodied men were fleeing to UNHCR refugee camps in Kenya (HRW 2012: 27). A study in Uganda found Ethiopian asylum

²⁴ Expert comment; the 2007 census reported the Oromo people accounted for 34.5% of the population (Central Statistical Agency 2008: 16).

²⁵ Before 1991 the Oromo, were not permitted to display any manifestations of their language or culture, enter politics, or educate their children (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 7).

seekers – especially those from Oromia – were leaving Ethiopia as a result of political and ethnic marginalisation and fear of arrest and torture (Wakessa 2014: 15-16, 22, 28-36).

Muslims

Muslims, a substantial proportion of the population,²⁶ have tended to be marginalised (Abbink 2014: 348). In recent years there has been confrontation between the state and parts of the **Muslim community**, with the ‘Let our voice be heard’ Muslim protests against EPRDF interference in Muslim affairs between 2011 and 2014 (Abbink 2014: 346; Ademo 2015; expert comment). Freedom House (2015) reports that the government has increasingly harassed the Muslim community and that these protests ended in a number of deaths and more than 1,000 arrests. There are also reports that Muslim participation in political processes has been limited, and that they faced discrimination and harassment during the 2015 election period (Freedom House 2015). Surveys have found that the majority of those migrating from Ethiopia towards the Middle East have been Muslim, with Muslim women a key group in the labour migration to the Middle East (see section 3.5.3).

Women and girls

Women and girls face particular pressures in Ethiopia’s patriarchal culture. The World Bank reports that early marriage, divorce and sexual abuse are drivers of rural-urban migration for women and girls (citing data from 2006, World Bank 2010: 22). However, contrasting data from 2009 suggests that events linked to marriage have a low influence on migration flows to Addis Ababa (ibid.). The RMMR report on Ethiopian migrants to/from Yemen and Saudi Arabia found that women and girls feel an increased sense of responsibility to migrate to support their families, and women make up the large majority of regular migrants to the Middle East (Frouws 2014a: 24; see section 3.5.3). Trafficking is also an issue: ‘Ethiopia is a source and, to a lesser extent, destination and transit country for men, women, and children who are subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking’ (US Department of State 2014).

Refugees

Refugees in Ethiopia face challenging conditions. They are not allowed to access regular work permits, relying instead on informal sector activities with no legal status (EU n.d.: 2). A study of Eritrean refugees found that the lack of opportunities made onward migration seem the only feasible option for refugees to improve their lives, for those with familial resources, remittances or social networks; but the most vulnerable are left behind (Samuel Hall Consulting 2014: 54; expert comment). Since August 2010, the Ethiopian authorities have allowed Eritrean refugees to reside outside camps, provided they are self-sufficient or have other support in Ethiopia, as part of their ‘Out of Camps’ policy (UNHCR 2010: 85).²⁷ While this policy includes provisions for skills training and education for the refugees, it does not give Eritrean refugees the right to work (UNHCR 2011: 67; US Department of State 2015). Yet living out of the camps does provide them with some opportunities to find unofficial work in the informal sector, as most Ethiopians do (expert comment). Most other refugees, however, have very limited opportunities to work (Frouws 2015: 118), and vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied and separated children are at risk from human traffickers or smugglers (expert comment).

Pastoralist communities

Pastoralists feel economic exclusion and marginalisation acutely, especially given the increasing pressure of natural disasters such as droughts and flooding, compounded by climate change (UNDP 2012: 8). Pressure and competition over shared and shrinking resources will increase further, with drivers including population growth, increasing numbers of livestock produced for export, deforestation and environmental degradation, and lack of properly implemented land use systems (ibid.).

²⁶ The 2007 census reported Muslims accounted for 34% of the population (Central Statistical Agency 2008: 17).

²⁷ Approximately 3,000 Eritreans are part of this programme as of October 2015 (US Department of State 2015).

Young people in large families

A study on migration from a poor rural woreda (district) in northern Ethiopia to Bahir Dar and Addis Ababa found that the desire to live independently was a socio-economic driver of rural-urban migration for young people in large families (Atnafu et al. 2014 and n.d.). The respondents cited families' small agricultural plots as giving them little scope for independence and sustainable livelihoods (Atnafu et al. n.d.).

Most economically excluded

The people most economically excluded tend not to have the resources to migrate (expert comment; Frouws 2015: 58-59; World Bank 2015a: 105). Often migrants have experienced enough economic inclusion to broaden their aspirations, but not enough in many cases for these aspirations to be fully met (expert comment).

3. Outward migration

3.1 Context

Consecutive periods of conflict between the 1970s and early 1990s made Ethiopia **one of the largest sources of refugees and migrants in Africa**, from 55,000 in 1972 to over a million in 1992 (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 10-11). In addition, large numbers of Ethiopians have left to seek opportunities abroad (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 11).

3.2 The Ethiopian diaspora

Ethiopia's **diaspora is one of the largest of all African countries**. Exact figures are not known but one estimate is around two million, with large numbers reported in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Yemen), the US, Canada and Europe as well as in neighbouring Sudan and Kenya and in other African countries such South Africa and Botswana (Frouws 2015: 11, 132).²⁸

A 2007 report estimated that Ethiopians are the second largest Sub-Saharan African diaspora group in the US (after Nigerians) and the fifteenth largest in Europe (AFTCD-AFTQK 2007: 13, 16). Family reunification continues to drive outward migration of Ethiopians to the US (expert comment).

UNDESA and UNICEF (2014) found that in 2013 the top five countries for Ethiopians living abroad were the US (179,979 Ethiopian-born migrants); Israel (81,880); Sudan (62,431); Italy (31,547); and Saudi Arabia (28,048).²⁹ The OECD estimated that in 2013 around 362,000 Ethiopians were living in OECD countries.³⁰ It estimated that the seven OECD countries with the largest Ethiopian-born populations in recent years were the US (195,805); Israel (85,870); Italy (30,596); Canada (24,535); Sweden (15,494); the UK (12,000) and Australia (10,850).³¹ Looking at European countries only, the ten with the largest Ethiopian-born populations are as follows, according to the OECD:

²⁸ Other estimates by destination region or country are provided in Fransen and Kuschminder 2009: 21.

²⁹ UNDESA (2013: 3) explains that 'most of the statistics used to estimate the international migrant stock by country or area were obtained from population censuses. Additionally, population registers and nationally representative surveys provided information on the number and composition of international migrants. In estimating the international migrant stock, international migrants have been equated with the foreign-born whenever possible'. Moreover, in order to ensure that the estimates of the international migrant stock reflect properly the numbers of refugees, the figures on refugees reported by UNHCR and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) were added to the estimates of the international migrant stock for most developing countries, unless refugees and asylum seekers are routinely included in the country's population counts (p.4).

³⁰ OECD.Stat – see Appendix 3.

³¹ The figures are for 2013 except for Italy and Canada as no data was provided for these countries for 2013. The data for Italy is taken from 2012 and for Canada from 2011.

Table 1: Ethiopian-born populations of European countries in 2013 or most recent year of available data³²

Italy (data from 2012)	30,596
Sweden	15,494
United Kingdom	12,000
Germany	10,000
Netherlands	9,242
France (data from 2010)	8,738
Norway	7,237
Switzerland	5,856
Spain	3,931
Finland	1,822

Source: OECD.Stat <http://stats.oecd.org/>

In 2015 UNHCR estimated that there were 88,149 Ethiopian refugees and 72,278 asylum seekers.³³ Kenya hosts 30,473 Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers; Sudan 18,335; Yemen 13,787; Egypt 6,278; South Africa 5,538; South Sudan 4,202; and Uganda 2,502 (UNHCR 2016, 2015b-g). UNDESA and UNICEF (2014) reported that at the end of 2012 there were also 10,508 Ethiopian refugees in the US.

3.3 Current state of outward migration

Given potential migration rates,³⁴ the **current actual outward migration rate for Ethiopia is relatively low**, compared with many other countries in Africa (Frouws 2015: 132). Many people may declare intentions to leave but do not follow up, for varied reasons, and not always due to lack of opportunity (expert comment).

In 2014 UNDESA and UNICEF reported the **crude net migration rate to be -0.13 per 1,000 inhabitants for 2010-15**, with total net migration for the period at -60,000. In comparison, they noted that for 1985-90 crude net migration was 3.51 per 1,000 inhabitants, and total net migration was 780,000.

There is some evidence that **outward migration has increased in recent years**. Figures on legal migration from the Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) report around 460,000 migrants between September 2008 and August 2013, of which 83 per cent travelled between September 2011 and August 2013 (MoLSA n.d.). A 2011 household survey³⁵ found emigration had increased in recent years (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2-3).

³² See Appendix 3 for full data table for all OECD countries 2005-2013.

³³ <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483986.html#>

³⁴ OECD (2012: 339) found in 2008-10 that 33 per cent of the population would move permanently if they had the opportunity to do so, of which 12 per cent were planning to move permanently in the next 12 months. Based on 2007-2010 data, the Gallup World Poll found that Ethiopia was among the top nine countries with the highest negative potential net migration index values, with a rate of -46 per cent – showing that more people want to leave the country than move into it. (This rate is calculated by subtracting the estimated number of adults who would like to move out of the country permanently if the opportunity arose from the estimated number who would like to move into it as a proportion of the total adult population. The data is based on a total of 350,000 interviews conducted in 148 countries or areas throughout 2007- early 2010. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/142364/migration-triple-populations-wealthy-nations.aspx>)

³⁵ From February to April 2011 a total of 1,282 household surveys were collected in 15 different communities in Ethiopia (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014).

Analysts observe that, while rates are low, ‘intuitively it seems Ethiopians are leaving their country in large numbers, and absolute numbers are high, especially for some receiving countries’ (Frouws 2015: 58).

Most outward migration from Ethiopia is to the Middle East. The MoLSA data shows that 79 per cent of the legal migrants travelled to Saudi Arabia, 20 per cent to Kuwait and the rest to Dubai and other countries. The lack of legal migration options pushes migrants to take **irregular routes**, in particular to the Middle East (Frouws 2015: 8; Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2). The 2011 household survey by Kuschminder and Siegel (2014: 2) found that only 61 per cent migrate with legal documents, illustrating a relatively high level of irregular migration. The 200,000 regular labour migrants who travelled in 2012 are estimated to represent just 30-40 per cent of all Ethiopians migrating to the Gulf States and Middle East, implying that the remaining 60-70 per cent (between 300,000-350,000) are either trafficked or smuggled (MoLSA figures in Frouws 2014a: 4). The 2011 survey found that, ‘Of all current migrants, half migrate to the Middle East, with 20 per cent migrating in Africa and 22 per cent migrating to North America or Europe’ (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2).

There are no recent estimates but information suggests that **migrant numbers travelling to South Africa** increased after 2009 but have recently declined as a result of repeated anti-migrant violence in South Africa and tougher measures by African transit states to control the flow of illegal Ethiopian migrants (Frouws 2015: 21; Schröder 2015: 3).

There is some migration to Western countries too. The OECD reported that 20,500 Ethiopians entered OECD countries in 2013.³⁶ In recent years the top five OECD countries with the highest inflows of Ethiopians have been the US (13,097), Canada (1,400), Israel (1,355), Germany (1,337) and the UK (1,000).³⁷ In 2015 Eurostat reported a total of 6,350 asylum applications by Ethiopians to European countries.³⁸ In recent years the top eight European countries receiving asylum applications have been Germany (2,170); Sweden (1,675); the UK (725); Norway (675); Switzerland (600); France (205); the Netherlands (155); and Italy (95).³⁹ Older data from the OECD, that generally uses population registers or residence permits, finds that the top ten European countries receiving inflows of Ethiopians were as follows:

Table 2: Inflows of Ethiopians to European countries in 2013 or most recent year of available data⁴⁰

Germany	1,337
United Kingdom (data from 2011)	1,000
Italy (data from 2012)	837
Sweden	597
Norway	582
Netherlands	244
Switzerland	224
Belgium	148
Spain	146
France	136

Source: International Migration Database, OECD.Stat <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

³⁶ See Appendix 3 for full data table.

³⁷ Data from 2013 with 2010 data for the UK.

³⁸ See Appendix 3 for full Eurostat data.

³⁹ The figures are for 2015 except for France, for which the most recent data is from 2014. See Appendix 3 for the full data table.

⁴⁰ See Appendix 3 for full data table for all OECD countries 2005-2013.

A 2013 UNHCR study on mixed migration in Libya estimated that between 50-100 Ethiopian migrants/refugees **cross into Sudan** per day. This indicates that between 18,000 and 37,000 Ethiopians per year begin their journey on the western/northern route, although they may stay in Sudan and Libya rather than travelling on to Europe (Frouws 2014b: 26). Other studies have shown that Ethiopian migrants generally spend **1-3 years in neighbouring countries** (such as Kenya, Djibouti, or Somalia) before emigrating out of the continent, while Ethiopians in refugee camps in neighbouring countries may also receive resettlement in other countries further abroad (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 17).

3.4 Future outward migration

The United Nations projects little change in the crude net migration rate going forward, estimating a rate (per 1,000 population) of -0.11 from 2015-20 and -0.09 from 2025-30 (UNDESA & UNICEF 2014).

Ethiopia may experience rising outward migration rates in the next few decades as more Ethiopians are able to afford the current costs of migration if the economic and development situation continues to improve, and in line with development and migration trends (Frouws 2015: 58-59). Moreover rural-urban migration is relatively low compared to other African countries, but is increasing. This is often the first step towards international migration, as urban migrants usually experience welfare improvement, which may give them the means and aspirations to migrate (ibid.). For people from very poor areas this can sometimes be a multi-step process as they first move to smaller cities to earn enough to go to Addis Ababa, and then save money to leave Ethiopia (Atnafu et al. 2014: 20). If Ethiopia reaches the emigration rates of some lower-middle-income countries (between 5 and 10 per cent), between 4.7 and 9.4 million Ethiopians could be on the move within and beyond the region (Frouws 2015: 58-59).

Moreover, it is anticipated that the recent unrest and the government's authoritarian response may lead to a greater outflow of migrants from certain areas of Ethiopia (expert comment).

3.5 Migrant and refugee profiles

Information available on migrant profiles differs depending on the survey used. As the majority of migration from Ethiopia is irregular, precise information is elusive. There is much more information available on the profiles of those travelling along the Eastern route to the Middle East than elsewhere, especially in relation to female migrants. In addition, much more information is available about conditions in destination countries in the Middle East than elsewhere. Migrant profiles differ slightly depending on the destination.

3.5.1 Gender, age and education

A 2011 survey of 1,282 households in Ethiopia with a current or return migrant suggest that there is a '**strong feminization of migration** occurring in Ethiopia, as 60 per cent of current migrants are female' (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2; Kuschminder 2014: 1). MoLSA figures of legal labour migrants from 2012/2013 also show that 94 per cent were female (see Appendix 5). However, a 2013 survey, which took into account irregular migration to Yemen and onwards, found that 64 per cent of current migrants were male and only 36 per cent female (Frouws 2014a: 20). The high numbers of female migrants in official statistics may be a result of the greater opportunities they have for legal labour migration to the Middle East (Frouws 2014a: 7).

Migrants tend to be **young and single**, with different surveys finding most migrants were between 18 and 25, or had an average age of 30 (Frouws 2014a: 20; Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2). In general, migrants tended to be **more educated** than non-migrants (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 3), although lower levels of education were found in a survey looking at those travelling irregularly to the Middle East. This may be because migrants who travelled irregularly to Yemen are generally from less advantaged backgrounds (Frouws 2014a: 20).

3.5.2 Ethnic/tribal/regional profiles

Many of those migrating are Oromos. The 2013 survey found that in Yemen, 50 per cent of current migrants and 57 per cent of returnees were Oromo; while another study found that 87 per cent of migrants interviewed in Yemen were Oromos from Ethiopia (Frouws 2014a: 19; Colburn Consulting International 2014: 11). This is higher than estimates that they make up around 40 per cent of Ethiopia's population (expert comment).

The **next largest group are Amharas** (who make up 17 per cent current of Ethiopian migrants and 24 per cent of returnees) (Frouws 2014a: 19). It should be noted however, that 2014 International Organization for Migration (IOM) figures find that the largest group of returnees from Saudi Arabia are from Amhara (IOM 2014). In addition a relatively high percentage of current migrants in Yemen were from the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) (15 per cent); while a greater proportion of returnees were Tigre (17 per cent) than are current migrants in Yemen (4 per cent Tigre) (Frouws 2014a: 19). See Appendix 4.

The **main locations from which Ethiopians have migrated** have been identified as Jimma, Arsi, Bale, Eastern Hararghe of Oromia; Mekele and Raya Azebo of Tigray; Amhara-Oromia(Kemise) and Northern Wollo of Amhara Region; and Dire Dawa (Frouws 2015: 20). Another report identifies most migrants as coming from the Oromia area of south and southwest Ethiopia; the Tigray area of northern Ethiopia (bordering Eritrea); and the Somali National Regional State of eastern Ethiopia (bordering Somalia) (UNODC 2013: 13).

The majority of those migrating east towards the Middle East were found to be Muslim (87 per cent of current migrants in Yemen) (Frouws 2014a: 19). However, figures on potential migrants in this study report that 42 per cent of potential migrants are Christian, suggesting that there may be a higher percentage of Christian migrants travelling to other destinations (ibid.).

3.5.3 (Female) migrants to the Middle East

Women make up **the large majority of regular migrants to the Middle East** and are generally employed as domestic workers (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 5). Most Ethiopian women who migrated legally to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East in 2008-2009 were **unmarried Muslim women** who finished at least **some years of secondary education** (Fernandez 2010: 253). They often come from **poor rural areas** and intend to help their families back home (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 5). While there are some arguments that the poorest are unable to afford the costs of migration (Frouws 2015: 58), this may not necessarily be the case in Ethiopia for women migrating for domestic work, as they should not have to pay any significant up-front costs to a broker for migration via regular routes (Kuschminder 2014: 2). However in many cases brokers often charge extra fees, taking migration out of the reach of the poorest (Jones et al. 2014: viii). Christian women, women who are married or have children, and women with no/lower levels of education also migrate to the Middle East (Atnafu & Adamek 2015). Despite age restrictions, a study looking at girls and young women from poor rural areas migrating to the Middle East found that it was relatively easy for girls as young as 13 to obtain false identification (Jones et al. 2014: viii).

The **most common destinations** of Ethiopian women include Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the UAE, Bahrain, Djibouti, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen; while Djibouti, Egypt, and Somaliland are reported as the main transit routes of trafficked women (Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 2). A 2011 survey suggests women make their choice based on working conditions, payment and opportunities to find employment, financing their migration through informal loans from family and friends (Kuschminder et al. 2012: 40).

Saudi Arabia is a popular destination. This is as a result of:

- the relative ease of accessing a residence permit (*iqama*);
- the low minimum requirements for educational qualifications and skills, although some of these rules have changed for regular migrants following new legislation adopted at the end of December 2015 (expert comment);
- the availability of free-visa or visa on demand; and
- the role of traffickers and smugglers in artificially creating demand (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 8).

Around 60 to 70 per cent of Ethiopians migrating to the Middle East are **irregular migrants**, including both men and women, who are either trafficked or smuggled with the facilitation of illegal brokers (ibid.: 5). Irregular migrants to Saudi Arabia, tend to be **men** travelling via Djibouti and Yemen. They mainly find work as guards, daily labourers and on farms (ibid.). The *kafala* system of sponsorship results in women who run away from their sponsors ending up as irregular migrants (ibid.). The number of illegally **trafficked women** is reported to be rising (Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 2).

There are numerous reports that many migrants are **victims of fraud, forced labour, and physical, sexual, and psychological abuse by their employers or by traffickers** and a significant number develop psychological problems during their stay (Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 8; Frouws 2015: 20; Frouws 2014a: 6; Jones et al. 2014: viii; Kuschminder 2014: 2). Domestic workers lack legal protection in the Middle East against this workplace abuse (Kuschminder 2014: 3). The government is currently trying to negotiate bilateral agreements with countries of destination to improve the situation of Ethiopian migrants abroad but there has been little success so far (expert comment). Ethiopian migration to Saudi Arabia continued in 2015, despite a major crackdown on irregular migration and mass deportations in 2013/2014, and still continues despite the war in Yemen (Frouws 2015: 8).

Prior knowledge of what they may face in destination countries, whether accurate or deceptive, did **not change the decision of many migrants** surveyed, although some regretted it afterwards (de Regt & Tafesse 2015:8; Frouws 2014a: 5). The **most widely used and reliable sources** are friends and relatives in transit and destination countries and in Ethiopia (Frouws 2014a: 4). Many returnees and current migrants think that there is more information available about successful migrants at the community level than unsuccessful ones (ibid.: 33). Information about what to do if their rights are being abused and how to initiate return if they want to go home were flagged as important by another group of returnees (Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 10).

3.5.4 Migrants to the north/west

Some reports suggest **educated and trained migrants from urban areas** tend to migrate to Western countries, although there are also reports that many of those using the irregular route to Europe via Sudan are uneducated and young (Addis 2014: 159; Frouws 2014b: 27; Kuschminder et al. 2012: 37). A 2011 survey suggests that, compared to other migrants from Ethiopia, Ethiopian migrants to the north 'are most likely to have a passport and migrate for a variety of reasons including employment, family reunification, as UNHCR sponsored refugees and for education' (Kuschminder et al. 2012: 40). They are also the most likely to have a network in the country of migration, which influences their destination choice (ibid.). In addition they have been found to be absent from the household for the longest average duration and are the least likely to be employed in the country of migration (ibid.). They tend to come from households that are more comfortably off (ibid.). There are suggestions that this route is the most costly and thus many people work and save before being able to afford travel along the route (expert comment). For those from less well-off backgrounds, the cost of the journey may result in them having to spend time working in transit countries such as Sudan and Libya along the way (EC 2015: 32).

3.5.5 Migrants to the south

A 2011 survey suggested that **migrants to Southern African countries** are primarily from rural, agricultural or herding households, with low levels of education (Kuschminder et al. 2012: 40). They typically do not have a passport or formal entry documents and tend to migrate to countries that are easy to access and where they can find a job (ibid.). They are generally able to find employment and are most likely to migrate for the shortest period (ibid.).

3.5.6 Refugees and asylum seekers

In 2013, the UK government found that claims for asylum tended to come from: those associated with membership of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) or the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF); members of opposition political parties; persons of mixed Ethiopian / Eritrean origin; journalists and human rights activists; women; and those at risk of imprisonment (Home Office 2014).

HRW reports that the EPRDF's villagisation programme in the Gambella region led to many able-bodied men fleeing to UNHCR refugee camps in Kenya, leaving women, children, the sick, and the elderly behind in Ethiopia (HRW 2012: 27).⁴¹ See section 5.2 below for more information on the impact of government policies on forced migration, both out of and within Ethiopia.

In addition, there is **secondary outward migration by refugees** in Ethiopia (especially Eritreans) to Europe (Frouws 2015: 75).⁴² While there is reliable data on refugees entering the country, reliable data about their onward movement is lacking (expert comment). Those with access to familial resources and remittances or who have social connections and networks move onwards, and the most vulnerable are left behind (Samuel Hall Consulting 2014: 54).

3.5.7 Potential migrants⁴³

A 2013 survey of potential migrants found that most were **young** and a slight majority were female, although others suggest that males are more likely to migrate (Frouws 2014a: 20; expert comment). The 2013 survey found that most had **some education** and were **either unemployed or in the informal sector** (Frouws 2014a: 20). Most have **never been married** (ibid.). The preferred destination of 76 per cent of surveyed potential migrants was Saudi Arabia (ibid.: 41). Potential migrants are often **under strong pressure** from their families, peers and communities to migrate to provide for their families (Frouws 2014a: 4; Jones et al. 2014: vi). In rural areas **local brokers** have more influence in triggering migration decisions than in urban areas, although in general it was found that the role of brokers is not fundamental (Frouws 2014a: 26).

Almost all potential migrants surveyed (92 per cent) had a **high awareness of the risks** of seizure, detention and deportation. More than 80 per cent of those surveyed had heard about the possibility of extortion and robbery, exhaustion, dehydration, starvation and sleep deprivation, physical violence, kidnapping for ransom, degrading treatment, and verbal and sexual abuse (Frouws 2014a: 4). Despite feeling that the risks are increasing, 42 per cent **believed the benefits of migration were worth the risks** (ibid.: 5). On the other hand, many current Ethiopian migrants in Yemen and returnees believe that the benefits of irregular migration are **not worth the protection risks faced** (45 and 68 per cent respectively), although it should be noted that many arriving in Yemen are **repeat migrants** (ibid.: 5, 8). The survey found that two-thirds of potential migrants claimed they would change their mind about using irregular channels if they received thorough and reliable information about protection issues (ibid.: 6). **Men have fewer options** to use regular channels for migration so are more likely to choose the irregular route (ibid.: 7).

Can specific support packages be designed to meet migrants' needs in-country?

Most experts contacted for the report felt that support packages to meet the needs of potential migrants were **unlikely to make a difference**, especially as increasing development has been shown to result in increasing migration (expert comments). However, if support packages included employment opportunities for potential

⁴² Reports suggest that at least 1,800 refugees who have arrived in Europe lived in refugee camps in Ethiopia, although this is not comprehensive or exhaustive data (expert comment).

⁴³ This section draws on research carried out in late 2013 looking at the eastern route to Yemen. Potential migrants were considered to be Ethiopians still in Ethiopia and from areas and ethnic groups that comprise of people who are known to migrate to Yemen.

migrants on a sufficiently large scale and depth they might make a meaningful dent in the migratory flows (expert comment). This would require ‘high levels of investment in a) skills training for youth; b) labour intensive, light industries that guarantee employment; c) credit and technical support for small and medium enterprise development by youth, particularly in the allied agricultural and non-farm rural sectors; d) small-scale irrigation – which would increase the productivity of existing land, and reduce pressure to migrate’ (expert comment).

Secondary migration of refugees out of Ethiopia may be prevented by support packages that help to improve their living situation by addressing their lack of opportunity for gainful employment and the limited resources in refugee camps (expert comment).

4. Inward migration

4.1 Context

Ethiopia has been **hosting refugees since the 1990s**. In 2011, the country had only eight refugee camps with some 90,000 refugees; this increased to 23 camps by June 2014.⁴⁴ Ethiopia’s foreign-born population increased from 165,900 in 2000/01 to 303,800 in 2010/11 (Arslan et al. 2014: 60).

4.2 Current state of inward migration

Ethiopia overtook Kenya as the **largest refugee-hosting country in Africa** in August 2014 (IOM 2014: 9).⁴⁵ Its location makes it a source of, and a destination and transit country for migration and refugee flows – mostly within the region but also to the Gulf countries and Middle East, Europe and South Africa (EU n.d.: 2). Most of the refugees come from Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan,⁴⁶ mainly as a result of political and civil unrest and drought (ACAPS 2015: 2). In December 2015, there were reportedly 733,644 refugees and asylum seekers in Ethiopia, including 282,033 from South Sudan; 251,797 from Somalia; 155,207 from Eritrea;⁴⁷ and 38,228 from Sudan (UNHCR 2015a). The government generally maintains open borders for refugees seeking protection in Ethiopia (ibid.). Most asylum seekers from neighbouring countries and lately Yemen are granted automatic refugee status (ibid.). As of June 2015, UNHCR reported 2,871 asylum seekers living in Ethiopia.⁴⁸ See Appendix 6 for a map of refugee locations.

Another form of inward migration is **those returning to Ethiopia, sometimes after years abroad**. A 2011 survey found that the average time migrants spent abroad is 5.5 years and most of those returning come from the Middle East (58 per cent) (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2). Large-scale return occurred in 2014, when more than 163,000 Ethiopians were deported from Saudi Arabia (de Regt & Tafesse 2015).

4.3 Future inward migration

This rapid review has not found data on Ethiopia’s projected inward migration rates.

⁴⁴ <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2015/refugees-turn-ethiopia-safety-and-asylum>

⁴⁵ http://unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=483:ethiopia-overtakes-kenya-as-africas-biggest-refugee-hosting-country-&catid=35:news-a-media&Itemid=63

⁴⁶ <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2015/refugees-turn-ethiopia-safety-and-asylum>

⁴⁷ In addition, 81,078 Eritrean refugees previously registered as living in the camps are believed to have spontaneously settled in Ethiopia. UNHCR notes that this figure is to be verified. (UNHCR 2015a)

⁴⁸ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483986&submit=GO#>

4.4 Inward refugee and migrant profiles

4.4.1 Refugees

Women and girls make up almost half of all refugees in Ethiopia (49.6 per cent); and most refugees are children (57.4 per cent) (UNHCR 2015a: 1). Of those children, 39,273 (around 9 per cent) are unaccompanied minors or separated children. In particular, women and children make up the large majority of South Sudanese refugees (more than 90 per cent, according to ACAPS 2015: 2). UNHCR (2015a: 2) considers the large number of Eritrean unaccompanied and separated children in Shire to be of particular concern (Frouws 2014b: 18).

Most of the **South Sudanese refugees** originate from the Upper Nile and Jonglei states (ACAPS 2015: 1). Many have encountered killings, sexual violence, emotional abuse, abductions, and forced recruitment (ibid.: 2). Most of the refugees are living in the Gambella region, where host communities are already struggling to meet their own needs (ibid.: 4). Refugee camp capacity is overstretched and many refugees lack access to food (ibid.: 2).

Eritrean refugees⁴⁹ have sought asylum in Ethiopia since 2000. There are approximately 125,000 Eritreans living in camps in West Tigray and the Afar region as well as several thousand living legally in cities. However the accuracy of these figures is questioned due to high Eritrean refugee mobility and illegal migration/trafficking from the camps into cities and across national borders (Schröder 2015: 1; Frouws 2014b: 18).

Somali refugees⁵⁰ in the Dollo Ado and Jijiga camps, as well as in Addis Ababa, have arrived in Ethiopia at various points between 1990 and 2011.⁵¹

4.4.2 Returnees

Wanting to be closer to family or friends or being repatriated or deported were the **main reasons for return** (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2). In other cases women have returned from the Middle East because the degree of abuse they suffered from their employers 'reached beyond their capacity for tolerance' (Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 7). A survey in 2013 found that 70 per cent of returnees did not achieve any of their goals by migrating (Frouws 2014a: 7).

Most returnees from the large-scale deportation of Ethiopians from Saudi Arabia in 2014 were men (62 per cent) (de Regt & Tafesse 2015). Over 50,000 of these deported migrants came from Amhara, just over 30,000 from Oromia and just under 30,000 from Tigray (IOM 2014). This crackdown on undocumented migrants was 'accompanied by severe human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention, theft of migrants' belongings, rape, beatings, and killings', traumatising many of those who returned to Ethiopia (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 2, 10; Frouws 2015: 20; Frouws 2014a: 55). The Ethiopian government and society at large lacked the capacity to deal with the large number of returning people requiring financial assistance, housing, employment, and health (including mental health) services (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 10, 13).

Cycles of migration

While some studies find that returnees can reintegrate successfully (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2), many highlight the challenges returnees face and the likelihood they will migrate again.

Negative social attitudes and lack of saving from their time abroad have affected the reintegration of returnees surveyed in a more recent study (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 12-13; see also Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 1). In addition, their negative economic situation upon return (including as a result of difficulties investing) and the failure of their migration goals resulted in a considerable number of respondents thinking of migrating again, suggesting

⁴⁹ More information on Eritrean refugees can be found in GSDRC (2016).

⁵⁰ More information on Somali refugees can be found in Avis & Herbert (forthcoming 2016).

⁵¹ <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483986.html>

that lack of reintegration may lead to migration cycles (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 12-13; de Regt 2015: 3; Collyer 2015: 48; Jones et al. 2014: ix).

Women who worked in the Middle East find reintegration particularly difficult given the general assumption in Ethiopia that they will have been exploited and sexually abused, and are therefore not suitable marriage partners (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 12). As a result young female returnees interviewed suggested they preferred to migrate again (ibid.).

5. Internal migration

5.1 Context

In recent decades, forced and voluntary internal migration flows in Ethiopia have been driven by economic, climatic and political factors including drought, war, and the effects of poverty. For example, the war with Eritrea led to about 350,000 Ethiopians being displaced by 1999, and the EPRDF's establishment of ethnic federalism (enshrined in the 1994 Constitution) resulted in people moving to live within their ethnic territory (Atnafu et al. 2014: 5; Negash & Tronvoll 2000: 48; Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 6).

5.2 Current state of internal migration

Internal migration in Ethiopia is thought to be **larger than external flows**, although the exact number of people who migrate internally is not known (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 4; Frouws 2015: 136).

There are various **drivers of internal migration**. Short-term and seasonal migration is a form of livelihood diversification for rural people attempting to earn extra income (Rahmato et al. 2013: 22). Traditional rural-rural migration in Ethiopia, which occurs at marriage when the wife moves to live in the husband's community, is an increasing adaptation strategy to poor agricultural and living conditions (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 16). Rural-urban migration is low but increasing, up from 10.4 per cent in 1980 to 19 per cent in 2014,⁵² as people seek new opportunities in the city to escape rural poverty (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 15; Frouws 2015: 59; Rahmato et al. 2013: 227). Trafficking of women and children in Ethiopia from rural to urban communities is thought to be increasing, but there are no exact numbers (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009: 17).

In addition, many people in Ethiopia are **internally displaced**. As of July 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that there were over 413,400 internally displaced people due to inter-communal and cross-border violence, most of them living in protracted displacement situations.⁵³ For 2016 the IOM projects that 821,400 people will be displaced; 286,400 from drought, 425,000 from flooding and 110,000 from communal conflict (Government of Ethiopia & Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team 2015: 7).

Internal migration and displacement, and outward refugee flows, have been **linked to the resettlement and villagisation policies** of successive regimes. These policies were used by the Derg government in response to the 1985 famine. The EPRDF has also undertaken successive resettlement programmes. As part of the National Food Security Strategy in 2003, for example, they aimed to resettle 2.2 million people in the Tigray, Oromia, Amhara and SNNPR regions from the chronically food-insecure highlands to the fertile agricultural lowlands (IDMC 2007: 11). More recently the government aimed to resettle 1.5 million people in four regions – Gambella, Afar, Somali, and Benishangul-Gumuz – by 2013 (HRW 2012).

⁵² <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

⁵³ <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/ethiopia/figures-analysis>

This rapid review has not found a comprehensive overview of the EPRDF's recent, current and/or planned resettlement programmes, making it hard to assess how much internal displacement is, or will be, driven by the government's policies. International human rights organisations have repeatedly expressed concerns about forced resettlement and the lack of adequate compensation (for example, HRW 2012; Freedom House 2015).

In recent years reports in the press and by human rights organisations have focused on the impact of government development schemes in the Gambella region and in the Omo Valley. Freedom House (2015) finds that up to 70,000 people have been forced to move from the western Gambella region, with some fleeing as far as Kenya (HRW 2012: 27). There have been similar evictions in Lower Omo Valley, where government-run sugar plantations put thousands of pastoralists at risk by diverting their water supplies (ibid.). Thousands of people have also been displaced as a result of the government leasing large tracts of land to foreign governments and investors for agricultural development (ibid.). HRW (2015: 227) reports that dam construction, sugar plantations and commercial agriculture in the Lower Omo is affecting the livelihoods of 200,000 indigenous people. The Donor Advisory Group (DAG) published a report (2014) on resettlement in the South Omo Zone due to a state-owned 175,000 ha. sugar plantation development to be irrigated by the Gibe III dam. This will develop land occupied by 20,000 people undertaking largely traditional agro-pastoralist livelihoods. While no evidence of forced migration was found, the DAG reported that the Ethiopian government was not offering communities any alternative but to settle permanently elsewhere, and did not obtain the full prior consent of the tribes as recommended under international law.⁵⁴

5.3 Internal migrant/IDP profiles

5.3.1 Demographic profile

Those migrating within Ethiopia tend to be **more educated individuals** from households that are more agriculturally productive, and thus **wealthier**, than their neighbours (World Bank 2015a: 106). Another study found that internal rural-urban migration is often a **strategy of young people**, especially those seeking white-collar jobs their education has prepared them for (Atnafu et al. 2014: 10). In other cases internal migrants are those from the poorest families (including female-headed households) who drop out of school to look for work in the city (ibid.: 10-11).

5.3.2 Migrant girls

One study found that brokers would approach girls newly arriving in Addis Ababa from rural areas and small towns and recruit them into **sexual exploitation** under the guise of offering help (Temin et al. 2013: 40, 58). Other girls entered sex work as a result of abuse and exploitation in domestic work (de Regt 2015: 2). Sex work is reported to have 'advantages over domestic work with regard to payment, freedom of movement, access to social networks, building up human capital and other resources', although it is hard to get out of (ibid.).

Some young female migrants were able to support themselves and their families, but many others found themselves drawn into debt (Temin et al. 2013: 59). Another study found that in urban Ethiopia, 'migrant girls aged 15 to 19 were nearly twice as likely to be living with HIV as their native urban peers' (ibid.: 71). Many migrant girls regretted their migration, yet did not want to return home permanently (de Regt 2015: 3).

⁵⁴ Summarised in <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/03/eu-diplomats-reveal-devastating-impact-of-ethiopia-dam-project-on-remote-tribes>

5.3.3 Conditions for migrants

Most internal migrants end up working in construction or domestic work (Atnafu et al. 2014: 12). A recent study looked at adolescent girls migrating from rural areas of Ethiopia to cities to work as domestic or sex workers (de Regt 2015: 2). Many were subject to heavy workloads, low salaries (or no salary at all) and various forms of abuse (de Regt 2015: 2; Temin et al. 2013:58, 60; Atnafu et al. 2014: 13). The dangers of construction work include accidents arising from unsafe working conditions, as well as extremely hard working conditions, poor living conditions, long hours, and low pay (ibid.). Another study in urban Ethiopia found that migrant girls working in domestic labour often lacked identity cards, which prevented them from accessing free/subsidised healthcare (Temin et al. 2013: 36). This can also make it harder to find employment as identity cards may be required when applying for a job (Atnafu et al. 2014: 13). Churches are one of the institutions most frequently used as a support system (ibid.: 14).

Despite the hardships, internal migrants often consider themselves better off in the city as a result of 'better income levels, economic independence from families at the place of origin, a measure, however small, of agency, and better and improved quality of services in the cities' (ibid.: 15). However, the costs of living in urban areas make it difficult for migrants to save and send remittances home to their families and to continue their education (ibid.: 13, 15).

5.3.4 Internally displaced persons

It is estimated that over 221,801 internally displaced persons are currently men and 191,611 are women.⁵⁵ Out of these, slightly over 62 per cent were between 0 and 19 years old and 3 per cent were 60 years and older. Most of them are **living in protracted displacement situations**. There is little mention of this population within the general Ethiopian migration literature.

6. The migrant journey

Outward migrant journeys

There are three main routes migrants and refugees take out of Ethiopia:

- *Eastern irregular route*: desert and sea route from Afar, Dire Dawa, Jijiga, through Djibouti or Somalia, to Yemen and onwards. (The regular route involves flying from Ethiopia to the Middle East.)
- *Southern irregular route*: overland route from Moyale through Kenya and on towards South Africa.
- *Northern/western irregular route*: overland route from Metema/ Wollega province through Sudan and on towards Libya and Europe (by sea).

There is much more information available about the eastern route for Ethiopians than the northern/western and southern routes, although the experiences of Ethiopians travelling along the northern/western route is likely to be similar to others travelling along this route, about which more information may be available. See Appendix 7 for a map of the main mixed migration flows.

⁵⁵ <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/ethiopia/figures-analysis>

6.1 Eastern route

It is assumed that **most Ethiopians who leave the country travel east towards and through Yemen and onwards to Saudi Arabia** (Frouws 2014b: 26). They use three main ways to go to Saudi Arabia: i) via work contracts arranged by a Private Employment Agency (PEAs); ii) being smuggled⁵⁶ over land (desert) and sea; and iii) by obtaining a visa to go on hajj (only available to people over 28) (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 8).

6.1.1 Regular migration

The **advantages of regular migration** through PEAs are felt to be: a short comfortable journey by plane; the reassurance of being documented; and the possibility of protection from the Ethiopian Embassy and the PEA (although in general they were described as not being very helpful) (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 9; Jones et al. 2014: ix). PEAs make large profits from labour migration and charge female migrant workers going to the Gulf States between USD 200 and 800 for their services (Frouws 2015: 53). It is estimated that 'out of the 400 legally registered PEAs only 20 were fully bona fide; all others were **involved in irregular migration activities** or even de facto engaged in trafficking their clients' (ibid.).

6.1.2 Irregular migration

The majority of migrants going east take an irregular route. Returnees interviewed in Addis Ababa suggested that the **advantages of irregular channels** are: cheaper cost;⁵⁷ opportunities for higher wages; lower levels of abuse because employers will also be held accountable for employing undocumented migrants and are therefore more careful with their treatment; the availability of local brokers who facilitate the journey; and the lack of health checks (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 8; Frouws 2014a: 6-7). The **perceived cost of migration** is a significant factor pushing migrants into choosing irregular rather than regular routes, despite this not necessarily being the case.⁵⁸ **Brokers and smugglers** propagate the impression that irregular migration is cheaper, while 'fleecing them for sums of money large enough to lead to distress sale of assets by their families and unhealthy debt ratios' (Frouws 2014a: 7; Jones et al. 2014: viii). Another study finds that migrants who have certain social networks in their destination areas in the Middle East are more likely to migrate illegally (Addis 2014:136). However, others report that those who take the irregular route or are trafficked often face human rights abuses (Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 4; Frouws 2014a: 6).

Those working as undocumented migrants who had entered **Saudi Arabia via the hajj** felt this was advantageous: they could change employers as their passports were not held. However, they risk immediate deportation, which gives them less power to negotiate with their employers (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 9).

6.1.3 Journey to and through Yemen

The main route to Saudi Arabia goes through Yemen (via Djibouti or Somalia), where many migrants also stay (through choice or because of the difficulty of the onward journey). As many as 641,000 refugees and migrants (approximately 75 per cent of whom were Ethiopians) crossed the sea to Yemen between 2006 and mid-2015 (Frouws 2015: 20). **Despite the conflict** in Yemen, Ethiopians have continued to arrive there (almost 37,000 since the beginning of 2015), although reliable figures are hard to obtain as a result of the suspension of monitoring exercises due to the conflict (ibid.: 19). Reportedly many are unaware of the scale of the conflict, or had been

⁵⁶ The migrant smuggling businesses in the Horn of Africa and Yemen is estimated to be worth tens of millions of dollars annually (Frouws 2015: 53; UNODC 2013: 18).

⁵⁷ Most returnees paid between USD 259-1034 to reach Saudi Arabia (Frouws 2014a: 43). Personal savings are the most commonly mentioned way of covering the costs of migration (Frouws 2014a: 7).

⁵⁸ Legal migration should not cost very much but brokers charge fees which bring up the prices (Jones et al. 2014: viii).

convinced to travel by smugglers who had told them the conflict had ended (Ibid.). Others felt that their dire economic situation at home was worth taking the risk of crossing Yemen to try and get a job in Saudi Arabia (ibid.). Some see conflict in Yemen as an opportunity to migrate because of the lack of a strong state structure to prevent them (expert comment). Ethiopians who hope to claim asylum in Yemen tend to be treated as illegal migrants and many are detained and deported (Frouws 2014a: 13).

Risks

The journey generally takes two months and many migrants make a stopover somewhere along the way to contact individuals to facilitate the remaining journey (ibid.: 40). For most it costs between USD 259-1034 (ibid.: 43). Most Ethiopians leave from the vicinity of the small coastal town of Obock or, in order to avoid patrols by Djiboutian authorities, from remote coastal locations (ibid.: 11; UNODC 2013: 15). Refugees and migrants face a range of risks and abuses during and after the journey, including: 'exposure to the elements, physical violence, sexual assault, abduction and torture, mental abuse and discrimination, economic deprivation, detention by the authorities, extortion, trafficking and enslavement, dehydration, starvation and loss of life' (Frouws 2015: 20; Frouws 2014a: 29; UNODC 2013: 15-17).

The **sea crossing is particularly dangerous**. Since 2008 an estimated 2000 people have died while crossing to Yemen, more recently as a result of overcrowding and bad weather (Frouws 2014a: 11). There are reports of Yemeni traffickers in and around the northern town of Haradh taking refugees and migrants captive and transporting them to isolated compounds. There they reportedly inflict severe pain and suffering to extort money from the migrants' relatives and friends in Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, with Yemeni authorities turning a blind eye or even taking an active role (Frouws 2015: 20). Often **female refugees and migrants** are separated from males and disappear, presumably trafficked (unconfirmed estimates reach the thousands) (ibid.; Frouws 2014a: 12). Many migrants make the dangerous onward journey to Saudi Arabia on foot and at risk of violent criminal gangs operating with impunity (Frouws 2014a: 12).

6.2 Southern route

Ethiopians also travel through the Great Lakes and Southern African regions to reach South Africa (Frouws 2015: 21). There is scant information about this route. They tend to leave from Moyale to go to Kenya, where some stay, legally or illegally (Addis 2014: 133; Malinowski 2015; Frouws 2014a: 38). Kenya also hosts 30,473 registered Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers, mainly in the refugee camps of Dadaab (11,399) and Kakuma (7,595), and in Nariobi (8,385) (UNHCR 2016). Recently African transit states have taken tougher measures to control the flow of illegal Ethiopian migrants along this route (Schröder 2015: 3). Costs are estimated to be an average of USD 4,218 (Frouws 2014b:28).

6.3 Northern/western route

Little is known about Ethiopians travelling west to Sudan and Libya and onwards to Europe (Frouws 2014b: 26; Collyer 2015: 12; EC 2015: 34). Those travelling along this route **include Eritreans who lived in refugee camps in Ethiopia**, who are amongst the most vulnerable groups in relation to migration to Sudan (Collyer 2015: 12, 36).⁵⁹ In addition there are **reports of unaccompanied minors** from rural areas in Ethiopia, who are supported by family and broader social networks to make the journey (ibid.: 39).

⁵⁹ For more on migration in the Eritrean context see GSDRC (2016).

6.3.1 Journey through Sudan and the risks involved⁶⁰

The **journey to Khartoum** from Addis Ababa is estimated to take 3-6 days and cost USD 500-800 (Frouws 2014b: 26). Ethiopians may use a one month visa to get to Sudan, and travel onwards to Libya and Europe using the services of **traffickers and smugglers** (ibid.: 26).

Routes to Sudan include via Metema, or through the Wollega province and then the towns of Gambela or Assossa to avoid being intercepted by officials (although conflict in South Sudan may have lessened the use of this route) (Frouws 2014b: 27; Collyer 2015: 12). In addition, the border crossing in the area of Humera, where Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea meet, is widely used by Ethiopians in the north of the country as well as Eritreans (Collyer 2015: 12). There are reports highlighting the risk of trafficking and women becoming involved in sex work in Metema (ibid.: 12, 25).

Some are also reported to travel north to Egypt to cross the Mediterranean at Alexandria, or to avoid parts of Sudan and Libya by going through the Egyptian desert into Libya (Frouws 2014b: 27). The Egypt/Sudan corridor is reported to be particularly problematic in relation to migrants and refugees experiencing extremely severe human rights violations (expert comment).

It is suggested that more Ethiopians have been migrating to Europe since 2014 (Schröder 2015: 3). The **overland route is dangerous** and some refugees and migrants do not survive it (Frouws 2015: 23; Addis 2014: 134). Rural migrants are more vulnerable during their journey as a result of their limited networks and opportunities to collect information about smugglers (EC 2015: 37).

The journey from Ethiopia to Sudan can be done without smugglers, although people still use them (European Commission 2015:45). Many people taking the irregular route from Metema to Khartoum risk exhaustion from long strenuous walks, then detention and deportation (Collyer 2015: 27). In some cases, the diaspora has been found to help facilitate contact with smugglers, based on their own experiences (EC 2015:55). Sub-Saharan Africans are charged less than Syrians for the sea crossing to Europe, but the journey is more dangerous (around USD 800 compared to USD 2500) (Frouws 2015: 23).

A focus group discussion in Libya suggests that Ethiopians arriving in Libya are reluctant to register with UNHCR as Ethiopians as they **fear Ethiopian government operatives** in Libya are going to deport them (Frouws 2014b: 28). One research participant expressed fears that 'Ethiopian security officials were targeting Oromos, especially those who had spoken out against the government' (ibid.: 67). Elsewhere there are reports that Ethiopian agents are active in many countries in forcibly returning people wanted by the government (AI 2015: 151).

6.4 Smuggling and trafficking in migrant journeys

A survey of potential migrants found that most people **intended to travel legally** where this option was available (e.g. to the Middle East through PEAs and to Western countries through scholarships or the American Green Card lottery), but were **willing to travel illegally** if this was not possible (Addis 2014: 131; Schröder 2015: 3). In addition the inefficiency of the legal system results in some migrants turning to illegal routes (Addis 2014: 131). For instance, the blockage in migration to the Middle East after the government temporarily banned legal labour migration in 2013 led to a surge in illegal migration, especially from southern Ethiopia to South Africa and via the Sudan to Libya and across the Mediterranean to Europe (Schröder 2015: 3).

Taking the irregular route means that **Ethiopian migrants and refugees are smuggled or trafficked during their journey**. Trafficking usually involves 'coercion' whereas smuggling takes place with the consent of the person (EC 2015: 20). The distinction between smuggling and trafficking is at times difficult to make as **migrants' status may change during the course of the journey** as a smuggled migrant may fall victim to exploitation by traffickers

⁶⁰ For more on migration on the Sudan context see Strachan (2016).

(Frouws 2014a: 11; Collyer 2015: 38). There are different types of traffickers along the route, beginning at the local/village level (Addis 2014: 135). The involvement of labour recruiters has been noted as an ‘important aspect in cases where the migrant was eventually defrauded or trafficked’ (EC 2015: 93). In recent years the facilitation of migrant journeys has been taken over by criminal networks who appear willing to ‘go to any length extort, exploit and torture their fellow humans for a profit’ (Colburn Consulting International 2014: 16). Problems in countries of destination are more serious for illegal migrants (Addis 2014: 136).

A study looking at people **smuggling networks** found that Addis Ababa was a **hub city** for Somalis for onward migration. Elsewhere ‘important hubs for arranging the smuggling into Sudan are Metema (mainly used by Ethiopians), Humera (used by Eritreans from refugee camps in northern Ethiopia) or Gonder’ (EC 2015: 31; Frouws 2014b: 28). **Trafficking** to Saudi Arabia has been identified through Bossasso; to Saudi Arabia and UAE, through Afar, Djibouti and Yemen; to Sudan through Metema; to Djibouti through Dire Dawa; to South Africa through Moyale; and to Lebanon through Bole International Airport (Addis 2014: 134).

6.4.1 Risks

Migrants often start on foot, then travel in containers or cars, and vessels to cross the sea, avoiding main roads and staying in ‘safe houses’ along the way to avoid detection (Addis 2014: 134; EC 2015: 38; Collyer 2015: 26-27). Illegal migration is risky at all stages of the journey, and has resulted in many human rights abuses and deaths among Ethiopians (Frouws 2014a: 6; Addis 2014: 159; EC 2015: 38). Smugglers often accompany people part of the way and then hand them on to other smugglers for subsequent parts of the journey (EC 2015: 38). Regulations have resulted in migrants choosing more and more dangerous routes (Addis 2014: 159). **Female migrants are especially at risk** of rape, unwanted pregnancy, and sexually transmitted infections (ibid.: 134; Frouws 2014a: 29).

7. State responses to irregular migration and the refugee population

7.1 Outward migration

Legislation on smuggling and trafficking

The government has emphasised **regulating migration** since the National Committee Against Human Trafficking was established in 2012 (Collyer 2015: 20). Any **support provided for irregular border crossing is considered smuggling or trafficking** (ibid.). The conflation of migrants being trafficked and migrants being smuggled has been noted in the case of Ethiopia and results in anti-smuggling operations and prosecution taking place under activities and legislation covering people trafficking, irregular exit and/or document fraud (EC 2015: 73). However, the government generally focuses more on punishing those who facilitate illegal border crossings than on the migrants who make those crossings (ibid.: 75). The number of convictions related to smuggling and trafficking is ‘very low considering the large number of people crossing Ethiopia’s borders irregularly’ (Collyer 2015: 21). **Little risk of prosecution** means brokers operate freely and many Ethiopians and Eritreans use them to facilitate their journeys (ibid.: 21). **New government legislation on smuggling and trafficking** should affect this, however, and UNODC’s Regional Office in Eastern Africa has trained up to 70 judges, prosecutors and police investigators on how to implement it.⁶¹ It is too soon to assess the new legislation’s effects.

⁶¹ <https://www.unodc.org/easternfrica/en/Stories/new-ethiopian-law-on-human-trafficking-and-migrant-smuggling.html>

Ban and regulation on labour migration

As a result of human rights violations against Ethiopian migrants, the Ethiopian government **banned labour migration** from Ethiopia to the Middle East between October 2013 and mid-2015 (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 5). Recently the ban was lifted and new legislation on labour migration introduced, with a number of conditions placed on PEAs and those migrating, including relating to required skills and training.⁶² The ban was flagged as 'directly impacting (reducing) the options available to potential migrants consequently increasing the likelihood that potential migrants would turn to migrant smuggling operations and would be vulnerable to exploitation or fraud' (EC 2015: 92; expert comment). For example, Ethiopian women had been increasingly going to neighbouring countries before heading to the Gulf, instead of flying directly from Addis Ababa (Frouws 2015: 106). There are also some concerns about the new legislation (expert comment).

(Lack of) support for returnees

The government provided **training to some returnees** to Ethiopia after the 2014 deportations from Saudi Arabia to help them reintegrate, however they did not provide adequate follow-up, and support was not provided to all (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 11; Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 11). Their reintegration was also frustrated by lack of access to credit services and trade licences, and issues with the provision of working sheds (de Regt & Tafesse 2015: 11; Atnafu & Adamek 2015: 11).

7.2 Refugee population

The government generally maintains **open borders for refugees** seeking protection in Ethiopia (UNHCR 2015a: 2). The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), which has been coordinating humanitarian assistance, has praised the Ethiopian government for its collaborative efforts with humanitarian actors (ACAPS 2015: 4).

Refugees and asylum seekers are generally expected to **reside in camps and have very limited opportunities to work**. Eritrean refugees can live in Addis Ababa and other locations provided they have the necessary means to support themselves, giving them the opportunity to work in the informal sector (UNHCR 2015a: 2; expert comment).

While conditions in the countries of origin remain un conducive for voluntary repatriation and there is little local integration in most cases, **resettlement remains the only viable durable solution** for refugees in Ethiopia (UNHCR 2015a: 4; Frouws 2014b: 82). Some refugees, who have been waiting 16-17 years for their resettlement, have given up and are leaving the camps in Northern Ethiopia to head towards Europe (Frouws 2014b: 82).

8. Development impacts of migration

Outmigration

The **outmigration of Ethiopians** has had both **positive and negative development impacts** (Frouws 2015: 29). The migration of educated Ethiopians has resulted in brain drain, although some emigrants have used the opportunity to educate themselves while abroad in skills and technology transfers that will benefit them and the country when they return home (Addis 2015: 160). A survey that included returning migrants found that 20 per cent had paid work and 30 per cent owned their own businesses (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 2). An expert suggests that migration is transforming rural Ethiopia, largely positively, as migrants' remittances, even when small, represent a significant opportunity to improve their own and/or their families' economic situations (expert comment).

⁶² <http://allafrica.com/stories/201601140895.html>

However, Ethiopians abroad often face **severe human rights abuses with negative consequences** and may return home dependent on their families (Addis 2014: 160; de Regt & Tafesse 2015; Kuschminder 2014: 4). Many women who travel to the Middle East return in a worse situation than when they left and many are unemployed or underemployed (Kuschminder 2014: 3). **Corruption**,⁶³ such as bribes for permits, licences and permissions, can reduce the benefits of migrant driven investments or block the reintegration of highly skilled returnees (Frouws 2015, p. 54).

A report by the RMMS suggests that **reducing the recruitment costs** paid by Ethiopians working in the Gulf States could save millions every year, and be 'used by migrants and their families in the region to save money, invest, to spend it on education and household needs or used for development purposes' (ibid.: 9). The lack of opportunities for legal labour migration also hampers the development potential of labour migration (ibid.: 107).

Internal migration

There are **mixed findings on whether internal migration has improved rural household welfare**. Some reports find that migrants experience improvements in welfare and sending households experience little loss in production (World Bank 2015a: 106; Frouws 2015: 59, 136). There are suggestions that easing the remittances process could enhance agricultural productivity (Frouws 2015: 136). However, other studies suggest that internal migration has resulted in few benefits to the households of origin and, in most cases, a lack of regular remittances, sometimes because migrants were saving to start a business (Atnafu et al. 2014: 16-17). Nevertheless, those migrating were often able to improve their immediate (rather than origin) household's situation (ibid.: 16).

Remittances

Remittances have **contributed to individual and country development** (Addis 2014: 160). Officially remittances are worth USD 3-3.5 billion (2014/2015) and are estimated at 7.4 per cent of GDP (IMF & IDA 2015: 4, 14). In 2013 remittances mainly came from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Sudan, and Italy (Frouws 2015: 85). Other reports suggest that official figures underestimate the actual volume of remittances as a result of informal flows (ibid.: 86). Remittances have been increasing each year and are projected to continue to increase to overtake aid to Ethiopia (IMF & IDA 2015: 14; expert comment).

Studies indicate that, generally, return migrants and households receiving remittances are economically better off. They have higher monthly expenditures, larger houses, fewer household income shocks, a greater ability to save and higher levels of subjective well-being (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 3-4; Andersson 2014). This is despite less than 20 per cent of remittances being used for productive investments such as education, housing or land, or a business investment (Kuschminder & Siegel 2014: 4). A survey of return migrants from the Middle East found that 66 per cent were using the remittance for subsistence livelihood (Addis 2014: 147). Remittances were also found to be very important in protecting against income shocks, offering family welfare, covering living expenses, and helping reduce poverty (ibid.). Returning migrants who have saved their earnings bring foreign currency and may invest in activities that reduce unemployment and bring in taxes (ibid.: 160).

However, remittances can also increase income inequality within migrant sending communities, which may lead to greater outmigration (ibid.: 148). Nevertheless, there are some suggestions that non-migrants benefit indirectly from remittances as a result of employment creation and income multipliers (ibid.). There is some suggestion that female migrants send more remittances to their families, although males may also send more as a result of income differentials (ibid.).

⁶³ Ethiopia has a score of 33 (0 being highly corrupt and 100 very clean) and ranks 103rd out of 168 countries and territories in the 2015 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>

Engaging the diaspora

The **involvement of the Ethiopian diaspora in investments is limited** and focused on agro-processing, mining and hotels, possibly as a result of the diaspora community being made up of low-skilled workers with few resources to invest (Mekonnen 2014). Their investment is thought to have created 126,175 permanent and temporary jobs (ibid.).

Since the mid-1990s there have been **increasing attempts to promote collaboration with the diaspora** (Frouws 2015: 11) including:

- providing information on investment possibilities, trade, and government affairs;
- facilitating temporary and permanent return and reintegration;
- granting diaspora Ethiopians nearly the same rights as Ethiopians holding Ethiopian citizenship;
- supporting initiatives to facilitate knowledge transfer from diaspora experts to institutions in Ethiopia;
- setting up regional offices tasked to support diaspora investors; and
- attracting remittances and launching corporate diaspora bonds (ibid.: 11, 133-134).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an official Diaspora Policy in 2013 to use the economic potential and skills of the Ethiopian diaspora in a more organised and consistent way (ibid.: 11, 134-135). However it is unclear whether these policies have had any impact (ibid.: 135). In addition, there are complaints from the diaspora community that bureaucratic red tape and infrastructure problems make it difficult to do business in Ethiopia (Mekonnen 2014).

Further, political factors may discourage the diaspora from engaging with Ethiopia. Those who fled Ethiopia, either during the military dictatorship or when the current government took power in 1991 and are now based in democratic, developed countries may not wish to be involved. They 'may have expectations of democratic voice and accountability inconsistent with the tolerance of the EPRDF system; moreover, diasporan expectations around investment security, rule of law and transparency probably dampens some potential investment, given the less-than-transparent mechanics of investment in Ethiopia' (expert comment).

8.1 Impact of refugees

The limited available information suggests that hosting refugees has had both positive and negative impacts on Ethiopia's development.

Ethiopia is confronted with the challenge of 'providing protection to an increasing number of refugees coming from its neighbouring countries. This **increase is straining its meagre resources** especially at this point in time when the country is facing large-scale drought' (expert comment). The shift in focus to the migration crisis in Europe and elsewhere has had a 'profound negative impact on the resources that the international community has been providing to the country to mitigate the impacts of hosting refugees' (expert comment).

Refugees bring with them diverse skills and knowledge (expert comment). However, with the exception of Eritreans who are eligible under the 'Out of Camp' Policy, many refugees in Ethiopia are **prevented from working and contributing** to the country's economic development (Frouws 2015: 118). A study of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia found that only 40 per cent of respondents had some income from casual labour (Samuel Hall Consulting 2014: 23). However, evidence from Uganda and elsewhere suggests that, given the right to work and freedom of movement, refugees could contribute to the national and local economies (Frouws 2015: 127). In Mai Tsebri, the neighbouring refugee camps were found to 'represent a market for the town, and some small businesses noted that the decrease of the camp population negatively impacted their businesses' (Samuel Hall Consulting 2014: 31). The **presence of refugees has also benefited host communities** directly and indirectly as a result of infrastructure development and services within and surrounding the refugee camps (expert comment).

However, in some instances, such as in Hartisheikh in the Somali region, **hosting refugees has resulted in serious environmental damage**, with anticipated costly long-term consequences for the host community (expert

comment).⁶⁴ Impact assessments reveal that activities such as collecting firewood and using water sources near refugee camps puts pressure on natural resources and aggravates environmental degradation. This, when combined with other factors like the high prevalence of poverty and unmanaged use of natural resources and fragile ecosystems, is likely to exacerbate the ongoing problems associated with climate change (expert comment).

8.2 Development assistance

Ethiopia is **one of the largest foreign aid recipients in Africa** (OECD 2015: 2). In 2013 Ethiopia received USD 3,826,250,000 in official development assistance (ODA),⁶⁵ an increase on previous years at an annual average growth rate of 17.5 per cent since 2000 (NPC & UN Ethiopia 2015: xvi). It has also received a significant volume of non-traditional development assistance from official non-traditional providers such as China, India and Turkey and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members such as South Korea, philanthropic organisations and vertical health funds, as well as climate financing (Prizzon & Rogerson 2013: v). This is credited to 'external recognition of [Ethiopia's] strategic importance, its recent rapid economic growth and its good MDG delivery track record': partners feel that 'aid money is generally well spent, investment opportunities abound and debt and fiscal sustainability are dynamically manageable' (ibid.: vi). ODA was 8.2 per cent of Ethiopia's GNI in 2013, compared with 18.5 per cent in 2004 (NPC & UN Ethiopia 2015: xvi). Despite this large amount of foreign aid, little literature was found on its impacts and relationship to fragility, migration and development in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia **made strong progress on meeting all the MDGs**, although it lagged behind on gender equality and maternal health (ibid.: xiii).⁶⁶ The government has prioritised key pro-poor sectors such as education, health, agriculture, water and rural roads, as well as industry, as drivers of sustained economic growth and job creation (ibid.: xvi). In 2012 and 2013 58 per cent of total ODA was allocated to basic social services and 22 per cent to economic infrastructure, including water and sanitation. Ten per cent was allocated to agriculture and industry, and a further 10 per cent took the form of cross-cutting, multi-sectoral assistance (ibid.: 65; 75). Foreign aid has been credited with contributing 'positively to economic growth in the long run, but its short run effect appeared insignificant' (Setargie 2015: 129). Growth is credited with helping to reduce poverty, although it is not evenly distributed throughout the country and has not been inclusive enough (UNDP 2015: 2-3).

Contributions from development partners to four large programmes have **played an important role in helping to achieve the MDGs**, and account for about one-quarter of ODA per year (NPC & UN Ethiopia 2015: 66). These programmes are the Promoting Basic Services Programme (formerly the Protection of Basic Services Programme); the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP); the General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP); and the Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programme.

However, **foreign aid has been severely criticised** for providing funding to the Promoting Basic Services Programme which has been linked to the controversial villagisation programmes (Lunn 2015: 1; HRW 2012: 4).⁶⁷

Ethiopia scores above the global average on aid effectiveness (NPC & UN Ethiopia 2015: 70). However, the World Bank suggests that the effectiveness of donor support in helping to meet development challenges will depend on Ethiopia improving governance, empowering local authorities, and becoming more accountable to its citizens.⁶⁸

The RMMS 2015 report suggests that, given the relationship between development and migration, **migration is likely to rise as a result of development cooperation and economic development**. Ethiopia has a long way to go before it reaches the levels of GDP per capita at which people tend to refrain from migrating (Frouws 2015: 6, 59).

⁶⁴ <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=96754>

⁶⁵ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DY.OA.AL.LD.CD>.

⁶⁶ <http://allafrica.com/stories/201510231636.html>

⁶⁷ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/ethiopian-refugee-who-took-on-the-british-government>.

⁶⁸ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>.

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Appendix 1: Economic and employment data

Table 3: Economic and employment data

	2000/01	2005/06	2012/13
Population	64.6	73.1	84.8
GDP (billions of ETB, 2010/11 constant prices)	198.3	277.0	556.5
GDP real growth rate	1.6	11.5	9.7
GDP per capita (ETB, 2010/11 constant prices)	3,071.5	3,789.6	6,562
Sectoral shares in GDP (%)			
Agriculture	56.4	52.3	42.8
Manufacturing	4.1	4.0	4.2
Other industry	5.2	6.2	8.2
Services	36.3	38.6	44.8
Sectoral contributions to total growth (%)			
Agriculture	70.1	46.9	32.2
Manufacturing	1.9	3.5	4.8
Other industry	4.3	4.9	19.8
Services	23.7	44.7	43.2
Demand indicators (% of GDP, current prices)			
Private consumption	86.9	81.6	75
Government consumption	10.1	13.5	7.3
Investment	9.2	28.6	33
Net external balance	-6.2	-23.8	-15.3
Export of goods and services	4.5	14.5	12.7
Import of goods and services	-10.7	-38.3	-28

Source: Computed based on data from MoFED

Ferede and Kebede (2015: 35)

Table 4: Exports 2014

The main exports in 2014 were: Petroleum oils (excl. crude); coffee; sesamum seeds; fresh cut flowers and buds; vegetables, fresh or chilled (World Integrated Trade Solution <http://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/ETH>).

In 2014 Ethiopia exported to (in descending order) Kuwait, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, China, Netherlands;

The top five countries importing to Ethiopia (in descending order) were China, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, India

World Integrated Trade Solution: <http://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/ETH>

Table 5: Average real income by major sectors (Birr per month)

	2010	2012
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing	355.2	275.7
Mining & Quarrying	494.6	600.0
Manufacturing	385.0	341.6
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply	641.3	471.0
Construction	550.2	452.9
Wholesale and Retail trade	387.8	293.5
Hotels and Restaurants	213.0	249.0
Transport, Storage and Communications	603.6	508.3
Financial Intermediation	809.9	681.6
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities	656.5	605.0
Average monthly payment	483.9	421.7

Source: CSA-Urban employment unemployment survey

Martins (2014: 55)

Table 6: Ethiopia - Labour Market Indicators in Urban Areas

	May 2009	May 2010	March 2011	March 2012
	(Percent)			
Labor force/population aged 10 and above				
Total	59.7	59.4	60.3	62.5
Male	67.2	65.7	67.9	69.7
Female	53.1	53.7	53.5	56.2
Employment/population aged 10 and above				
Total	47.5	48.2	49.4	51.5
Male	59.0	58.5	60.2	61.7
Female	37.3	39.0	40.0	42.6
Informal sector employment/employment at firms				
Total	36.5	34.1	36.5	31.7
Male	30.5	28.3	28.0	24.2
Female	45.6	42.5	48.4	42.2
Unemployment/labor force				
Total	20.4	18.9	18.0	17.5
Male	12.2	11.0	11.4	11.4
Female	29.6	27.4	25.3	24.2
<i>Memorandum items:</i>	(Number of persons)			
Urban population				14,011,269
Urban population aged 10 and above				11,110,653
Labor force				6,944,691
Employment	4,547,266		5,139,813	5,726,116
Employment at firms 1/				5,152,260

1/ Excluding subsistence farmers and domestic paid workers
Source: Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency.

IMF (2013: 8)

Appendix 2: Development data

Table 7: Ethiopia then and now: a decade of progress from 2000 to 2011

	2000	2011
Percentage of the population:		
Living below the national poverty line	44	30
Living on less than US\$1.25 PPP a day	56	31
Without education	70	50
With electricity	12	23
Piped water	17	34
Percentage of children under 5 years that are stunted	58	44
Percentage of rural women receiving an antenatal checkup	22	37
Life expectancy (years)	52	63
Total fertility rate	6	4

Sources: Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys, Household Income and Consumption Expenditure Surveys, World Development Indicators, Carranza and Gallegos (2011), Canning et al. 2014.

World Bank (2015a: xvi)

Table 8: Poverty, inequality, wellbeing and sector of employment 2000-2011

TABLE 2: Poverty, inequality, wellbeing and sector of employment, 2000-2011

	2000	2005	2011
National absolute poverty headcount (National Poverty Line)	44.2%	38.7%	29.6%
Urban	36.9%	35.1%	25.7%
Rural	45.4%	39.3%	30.4%
International extreme poverty headcount (US\$1.25 PPP Poverty Line)	55.6%	39.0%	30.7%
Population (thousands)	63,493	71,066	84,208
Number of people living beneath the national poverty line (thousands)	28,064	27,523	25,102
Poverty depth (National Poverty Line)	11.9%	8.3%	7.8%
Urban	10.1%	7.7%	6.9%
Rural	12.2%	8.5%	8.0%
Poverty severity (National Poverty Line)	4.5%	2.7%	3.1%
Urban	3.9%	2.6%	2.7%
Rural	4.6%	2.7%	3.2%
Gini coefficient	0.28	0.30	0.30
Urban	0.38	0.44	0.37
Rural	0.26	0.26	0.27
Nutritional outcomes among children under 5 years of age*			
Stunting	58%	51%	44%
Wasting	12%	12%	10%
Underweight	41%	33%	29%
Life expectancy (years)	52		63
Net attendance rate: Primary education (7-12 years of age)*	30.2%	42.3%	62.2%
Urban	73.6%	78.8%	84.9%
Rural	24.3%	38.8%	58.5%
Immunization Rates (BCG, DPT1-3, Polio, Measles)*			
At least one shot	83.5%	76.0%	85.5%
All vaccines	14.3%	20.4%	24.3%
Proportion of households reporting shocks			
Food price	n.a.	2.0%	19.0%
Drought	n.a.	10.0%	5.0%
Job loss	n.a.	1.0%	0.0%
% crop loss (from LEAP)	22.4%	23.5%	13.8%
Share of population living in urban areas	13.3%	14.2%	16.8%
Proportion of households with at least one member engaged in			
Agriculture	78.8%	79.7%	78.4%
Industry	3.4%	8.7%	8.0%
Service	23.0%	20.8%	23.1%

Notes: The data source is the HICE and WMS surveys unless otherwise stated. *Denotes that the statistic was calculated using the DHS. Some of the statistics are taken from MOFED 2013 using these datasets. Life expectancy data is from the World Development Indicators. International extreme poverty rates estimated using a line of US\$1.25 PPP per capita per day are taken from Povcalnet (June 2014).

World Bank (2015a: xxiii)

Appendix 3: OECD and European migration data

Table 9: Stock of Ethiopian-born population in OECD countries, 2005-2013

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
United States	108,404	122,575	131,904	140,368	151,879	173,600	163,407	191,123	195,805
Israel	72,771	76,107	79,427	80,759	77,384	78,930	81,900	84,600	85,870
Italy	29,850	30,596	..
Canada	..	19,715	24,535
Sweden	11,221	11,427	11,783	12,223	13,052	13,822	14,314	14,844	15,494
United Kingdom	..	13,000	..	14,000	17,000	12,000	20,000	17,238	12,000
Australia	6,120	6,400	7,000	7,460	8,220	8,990	9,660	10,450	10,850
France	7,755	8,253	8,875	8,738
Germany	8,000	10,000	9,000	10,000
Netherlands	7,979	8,036	8,135	8,335	8,604	8,706	8,954	9,115	9,242
Norway	3,369	3,600	3,979	4,543	5,170	5,714	6,177	6,695	7,237
Switzerland	4,357	4,745	5,233	5,856
Spain	1,075	1,316	1,693	2,215	2,800	3,237	3,562	3,798	3,931
Finland	908	1,001	1,110	1,322	1,434	1,506	1,631	1,729	1,822
Austria	767	879	976	1,035	1,089	1,120	1,103	1,133	1,157
Denmark	962	1,003	1,036	1,102	1,143
New Zealand	..	927	1,143
Czech Republic	155
Hungary	..	97	100	105	105	139	123	145	137
Luxembourg	109
Iceland	47	53	62	67	62	61	62	70	74
Slovak Republic	24	31
Slovenia	17	28	31
Mexico	15
Estonia	3	3	3
Belgium
Chile
Greece
Ireland
Japan
Korea
Poland
Portugal
Turkey
TOTAL	212,661	265,133	253,924	280,685	296,636	330,047	381,234	386,926	361,826

Data extracted on 11 Feb 2016 15:28 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

Source: International Migration Database, OECD.Stat

<http://stats.oecd.org/>

Table 10: Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Ethiopian – to OECD countries, 2005-2013

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
United States	10,573	16,157	12,786	12,917	15,462	14,266	13,793	14,544	13,097
Canada	1,370	1,647	1,424	1,473	1,212	1,750	2,035	1,740	1,400
Israel	3,571	3,595	3,589	1,582	239	1,655	2,666	2,432	1,355
Germany	589	582	618	719	789	931	1,051	1,124	1,337
United Kingdom	1,000
Italy	861	1,071	1,127	1,009	978	830	749	837	..
Sweden	252	454	491	518	795	958	654	662	597
Norway	372	271	420	425	631	479	508	540	582
Australia	615	477	520	476	751	825	731	801	437
Japan	..	118	105	155	145	190	191	246	262
Netherlands	235	250	280	266	274	281	237	248	244
Switzerland	322	260	237	224
Korea	24	41	25	34	25	52	86	170	171
Belgium	160	177	183	181	159	148
Spain	95	187	232	315	377	271	225	189	146
France	106	118	145	133	151	162	139	120	136
Finland	51	82	114	201	113	69	106	111	98
Denmark	43	46	54	82	102	60	80	90	80
Austria	127	136	120	98	103	80	63	78	63
New Zealand	67	13	70	70	42	73	48	73	49
Turkey	31
Poland	25	28	28	20	25
Czech Republic	12	16	10
Hungary	2	4	6	22	24	29	15	34	8
Iceland	4	6	11	10	4	8	5	8	7
Chile	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	4
Luxembourg	15	4	4	10	9	8	9	7	4
Slovenia	1	8	3	1	3	3
Mexico	1	2	2	0	2
Slovak Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	..	1
Estonia
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
TOTAL	18,973	25,261	22,142	20,678	22,438	23,547	24,878	24,489	20,490

Data extracted on 11 Feb 2016 15:46 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

Source: International Migration Database, OECD.Stat <http://stats.oecd.org/>

Table 11: Ethiopian asylum applicants to European countries

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	1,740	2,115	1,710	2,090	2,195	2,595	3,560	6,350
European Union (28 countries)	1,155	1,225	1,020	1,540	1,680	2,060	2,830	5,080
Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG)	235	275	320	450	505	750	1,215	2,170
Sweden	110	180	170	225	315	355	555	1,675
United Kingdom	:	120	110	130	160	175	265	725
Norway	355	705	505	295	185	290	375	675
Switzerland	230	185	180	250	330	245	345	600
France	45	110	100	95	130	130	205	:
Netherlands	65	100	85	95	90	85	125	155
Italy	330	45	30	225	100	300	105	95
Belgium	70	85	70	65	60	40	75	80
Finland	15	25	10	20	15	25	30	80
Denmark	5	5	15	5	15	20	95	60
Greece	120	170	50	65	180	105	60	:
Malta	95	35	10	115	40	15	30	:
Austria	20	10	15	15	15	20	30	:
Hungary	5	5	5	0	5	5	10	45
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	5
Bulgaria	0	5	5	0	0	5	0	0
Ireland	10	15	10	5	5	10	5	:
Spain	15	20	10	5	40	10	5	:
Luxembourg	0	5	5	10	5	5	5	:
Romania	0	5	0	5	0	0	5	:
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
Iceland	0	0	0	5	0	0	5	0
Cyprus	10	5	10	5	0	5	0	:
Portugal	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	:
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	:
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	:	:	:	:	:	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Eurostat. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database?p_p_id=NavTreeportletprod_WAR_NavTreeportletprod_INSTANCE_sFp6GUtlbBHg&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1
 Accessed 01.03.2016

Appendix 4: Migrant ethnic and religious profiles

Table 12: Ethnic and religious profiles for potential, current and returned migrants in the Eastern Route

	Current migrants	Returnees	Potential migrants
Ethnicity/region:	50 per cent Oromos ⁶⁹ 17 per cent Amharas 4 per cent Tigre 15 per cent from SNNPR 7 per cent Ogadeni 2 per cent Somali	57 per cent Oromos 24 per cent Amharas 17 per cent Tigre	No information provided
Religion:	87 per cent Muslim 11 per cent Christian	72 per cent Muslim 28 per cent Christian	58 per cent Muslim 42 per cent Christian

Source: Frouws, 2014a, p. 19. (Note: the survey focused on the eastern route out of Ethiopia into Muslim countries, which may explain the higher percentage of Muslims amongst current and returning refugees).

⁶⁹ An International Organization for Migration (IOM) study in Yemen also found that the majority of migrants interviewed were Oromo from Ethiopia (87 per cent) (Colburn Consulting International, 2014, p. 11)

Appendix 5: MoLSA labour migration data

Table 13: Labour migration by region

Region	2001 E.C (September 2008 - August 2009)		2002 E.C (September 2009 - August 2010)		2003 E.C (September 2010 - August 2011)		2004 E.C (September 2011 - August 2012)		2005 E.C (September 2012 - August 2013)		Total		Grand Total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Tigray	463	949	131	573	284	1,582	1,277	8,592	921	8,390	3,076	20,086	23,162
Afar	148	35	53	31	26	139	308	611	84	558	619	1,374	1,993
Amhara	979	3,551	261	1,952	542	10,769	3,462	62,836	2,715	55,877	7,959	134,985	142,944
Oromiya	644	3,600	225	2,757	422	20,430	2,420	64,431	1,790	67,219	5,501	148,437	153,938
SNNP	517	1,981	117	1,300	443	4,547	927	23,392	478	24,821	2,482	56,041	58,523
Addis Ababa	1,119	7,251	620	6,860	969	11,813	2,235	26,774	1,224	17,667	6,167	70,365	16,532
Gambella					2	12	2	50	4	28	8	90	98
Diredawa	2	8	4	34	9	162	61	764	24	388	100	1,356	1,456
Harrari	1	15	3	12	2	15	10	11	3	85	19	238	257
BenshangulGumz			1		2	45	18	338	23	362	44	745	789
Total	3,873	17,395	1,417	13,529	2,703	39,530	10,727	187,940	7,266	175,430	25,986	433,824	459,810


Source: MoLSA, n.d.

Table 14: Labour migration by destination

Country	2001 E.C (September 2008 - August 2009)		2002 E.C (September 2009 - August 2010)		2003 E.C (September 2010 - August 2011)		2004 E.C (September 2011 - August 2012)		2005 E.C (September 2012 - August 2013)		Total		Grand Total	% of total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F		
Saudi Arabia	3,749	9,399	1,082	2,396	2,030	13,446	10,341	158,959	7,217	154,660	24,329 (a)	338,860	363,189 (b)	79%
Kuwait	103	6,976	321	10,837	663	25,457	270	28,476	130	20,659	1,487	92,405	93,892	20%
Dubai	9	113	1	142	0	510	109	321			119	1,086	1,205	0%
Different countries	14	905	148	19	12	115	16	175	12	108	202	1,322	1,524	0%
Total	3,875	17,393	1,552	13,394	2,705	39,528	10,736	187,931	7,269 (c)	175,327 (d)	261,137 (e)	433,673	459,810 (f)	


Source: MoLSA, n.d. Footnote: Some errors were found in the original data in the totals calculations. Corrected figures are (a) 24,419; (b) 363,279; (c) 7,359; (d) 175,427; (e) 261,137; (f) 459,900.

Appendix 6: Refugees and asylum seekers in Ethiopia



Source: UNHCR (2015a, p. 5)

Appendix 7: Regional mixed migration map



Source: http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/rmms_dashboard_map/December_Map_2015.pdf