GHANA:
A GOVERNANCE & POLITICAL ANALYSIS

A Report submitted to the
Department for International Development

By

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# Ghana – A Governance & Political Analysis

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGOA  Africa Growth and Opportunities Act
ASDR  African Security Research and Dialogue
BNI   Bureau of National Investigations
BoG   Bank of Ghana
CDD   Centre for Democracy & Development
CODAC Community Development and Advocacy Centre
CPP   Convention People’s Party
DPP   Democratic People’s Party
EGLE  Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EPCC  Economic Policy Coordinating Committee
ESAF  Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
FOSDA Foundation for Security and Development in Africa
GCB   Ghana Commercial Bank
G-CDD Ghana Centre for Democratic Development
GCPP  Ghana Consolidated Popular Party
GoG   Government of Ghana
GPRS  Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
HIPC  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ISODEC Integrated Social Development Centre
JSS   Junior Secondary School
MOF   Ministry of Finance
MP    Member of Parliament
NLC   National Liberation Council
NPP   New People’s Party
NRP   National Reform Party
PNC   People’s National Convention
PNDC  Provisional National Defence Council
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SSS   Senior Secondary School
TOR   Tema Oil Refinery
TUC   Trade Union Congress
UGM   United Ghana Movement
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ghana is the first country to gain political independence in Sub-Saharan Africa. With an estimated population of 19.3 million and a Human Development Index ranking of 129 in 2002, Ghana is significantly ahead of other West African countries, including the region’s oil rich giant, Nigeria.

While Ghana’s social and economic indicators place it at the higher end of Sub-saharan Africa’s generally poor ranking, socio-political tensions in the aftermath of the 2000 election continue to give worrying signals about the government’s ability to improve economic performance and at the same time deliver expected democratic dividends.

This report attempts to provide a realistic mid-term review of the Government of Ghana (GoG) and its priorities for the rest of its tenure, particularly in terms of the perceptions of key individuals and interest groups. It equally provides an assessment of the likelihood that these priorities will be achieved or more particularly, the perceptions of the same key individuals and interest groups of what will constitute indicators of success at the end of the government’s tenure in 2005.

The report is the product of an extensive process of informal consultation in Ghana. The Centre for Democracy & Development team of three responsible for the study placed emphasis on ensuring strong stakeholder involvement from a diverse range of Ghanaians. By moving away from adopting a desk research and literature review approach, field experiences provided us with a more nuanced understanding of the intricacies of politics and policymaking since the new administration assumed office. It also offered us a clearer understanding of the prospects and challenges facing the government in its quest to achieve socio-economic progress and political stability.

The greatest challenge that emerges from the study is that of deepening democracy in order to prevent conflict and ensure stability. This is what President Kufuor refers to as ‘securing the State’, but it is also a concern widely expressed in the course of the study. This is a challenge that is at once political and developmental. While there is recognition on the part of the Government of Ghana that securing the State is inextricably intertwined with achieving socio-economic development, there is no evidence of a clear-cut governance strategy for achieving the objective of a secure and developmental state.

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<th>Ghana</th>
<th>SSA</th>
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<td>Population (2000)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>606</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pop. Growth Rate (%pa)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per cap. US$ (2000)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1690*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (yrs)</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>48.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infant mortality (/000)</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>% below poverty line (2000)</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary education enrolment</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adult illiteracy:</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under 5 mortality (per 1000 births)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality (per 1000 births)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public expenditure (Fed/state/LGA) (%GDP)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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* Adjusted to purchase parity with the USA.

Source: Human Development Report 2002
The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy represents the most articulate vision of development through wealth creation and public-private partnership. Yet, if the product is to meet the hype surrounding GPRS, a lot more clarity is needed on how the Government plans to translate this vision into practical realities for an increasingly disenchanted public still waiting for the benefits of power alternation. What the study also brought into clear relief is a number of objective constraints faced by the current government in implementing its programmes. The most daunting of these challenges is that of capacity. This problem is felt all across government and we have described the extent of the problem in the body of the study.

With regard to the current government, there is no clarity as to where the locus of power resides. Having come into office after a long period in opposition, there is a certain lack of coherence as well as distrust of the civil service. Yet, there seems to be a higher level of coherence and synergy in the middle cadre of policy makers, especially the Economic Policy Coordinating Committee. While the government has taken its time to settle in, the notion of delaying presidential dividends to 2003 and closer to the next election seems widespread in governmental and non-governmental circles.

The judiciary and the parliament also face critical challenges. Generally, there is a lack of public trust in the judiciary, partly due to corruption, inadequate facilities, poor remuneration, delayed and or non-existent access to justice. Equally, the Parliament’s ability to ensure oversight over the executive branch remains hugely suspect.

As far as the organised opposition is concerned, the NDC still represents the most viable force. It is too early to speculate about its chances of winning the next election since a lot will depend on the selection of its party candidate and the degree of disenchantment with the NPP by 2004. The general feeling amongst the key constituencies is that the NPP will get the benefit of the doubt, unless it completely fritters away the goodwill it currently enjoys. As for the Nkrumahist parties, they are still in some disarray in spite of recent attempts to merge leading factions and there is very little prospect of things changing before the next election.

The above raises fundamental questions about the nature of assistance that will ultimately help the government bridge the growing chasm between the State and its citizens. While some respondents believe that norm-building initiatives are necessary in order to consolidate Ghana’s democracy, an overwhelming feeling is that international assistance should concentrate on developmental projects, governance and security sector reform. Also, there is a clear need for an integrated strategy to regional security issues since many of the problems that appear local, also have regional dimensions given Ghana’s contiguity to the West Africa’s zone of conflict.

On the basis of the above, it seems to us necessary that serious attention ought to be paid to understanding a range of issues, including institutional strengthening, role of traditional authorities, internal and regional security implications, HIV/AIDS epidemic and public-private partnership.
1.0. INTRODUCTION

In his first wide-ranging interview after his election victory in January 2001, Ghana’s President, John Agyekum Kufuor listed among his top priorities the need to ‘secure the state’ and revitalise Ghana’s sluggish economy and stabilise the nation’s faltering currency.¹

Almost two years into the Kufuor administration, the security of the state and its people and perceptions about the economy remain the most controversial debates in the media, amongst the opinion leaders interviewed in the course of this research and even in government quarters. In many cases, the two issues are seen as inextricably intertwined and there are those who believe that state underdevelopment and societal insecurity is primarily produced by poverty ‘which at its root is produced by power relations, the structural and systematic allocation of economic resources among different groups in society and their differential access to power and the political process’.²

What the above demonstrates is a widespread acceptance of the need to re-conceptualise ‘security’ in a more responsive direction with a move away from the traditional emphasis on national/state security to a focus on ‘human security’, with an expansion, concomitantly in the scope of the concept from its minimalist meaning (as in physical security) to include access to the means of life, the provision of essential goods, a clean and sustainable environment, as well as to human rights and democratic freedoms.

A key aspect of this, as exemplified by the Ghana TUC is the linkage drawn between security and development, on the one hand rooting insecurity in conditions of underdevelopment, and on the other, the recognition that security is an essential precondition and component of development – as well as a growing tendency to see defence and security as both a public policy and a governance issue (thus broadening the range of constituencies that can participate legitimately in this formally highly restricted arena).

Important as the linkage between security and development is, it is equally important to isolate issues relating to development and economic growth from ‘hard’ security issues in order to accurately reflect what the government is doing in these two key priority areas and what should be the focus of the administration’s efforts on these issues in the following years.

Consequently, while the report paints a broad picture of the path, players, process and pace of political and economic developments since the current administration came into office, we examine the linkages between politics and economy – on the one hand looking at Government’s attempt to revitalize the economy, in particular an analysis of its poverty reduction strategy and its

¹ Interview with Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, AllAfrica.com, January 2, 2001
² Views of the Trades Union Congress (Ghana) on Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, September 5, 2001
implications, and on the other focusing on democratic governance of the security sector and security sector reform, more broadly. A set of general conclusions and specific recommendations are then offered at the end of the report.
2.0. CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF GHANA

2.1. Political Outlook and Key personalities

In this section, we provide a broad overview of Ghanaian politics and the key personalities dominant in the political environment. The NPP government claims its ideological orientation from the Busia/Danquah political traditions. J. B. Danquah is one of Ghana’s founding fathers, and was instrumental in the independence struggle. Both Busia and Danquah see Ghana’s development path in terms of laissez faire capitalist free market type economies, and that constitutes their main ideological departure from Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP).

The key personalities in an NPP government are therefore bound to reflect these two tendencies. In the current NPP government, there are conflicting views on who has political clout, and is close to the President to effectively influence changes in policy. Popular perception among the government’s opponents and political analysts is that the current government is dominated by the Ashanti aristocracy, represented by the Asantehene since historically, the NPP has always been seen as an “Ashanti” party with links to the powerful Ashanti royal family and coca farmers. Others also point to a new Ashanti/Eastern region alliance or mafia i.e., “Eastern region mafia” representing the Danquah side of the Busia/Danquah political tradition.

2.1.1. Ashanti region: The Ashanti group comprises the President, his brother who is also the Minister of Defence, and Dr. Amoako Tuffour, chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority and the Asantehene. Outside government, the Asantehene features as a key influential personality in this government.

2.1.2. "Eastern region Mafia" Key personalities in the "Eastern region mafia" are Minister of Finance, Dr. Osafo Mmafo, Minster of Justice and Attorney General, Nana Akuffo Addo and Hackman Owusu Agyeman, Minister for Foreign Affairs. This group is likely to be associated with the Okyenhene (Kibi or Akyem ruling family) who will also be influential in this government.

In addition to these two powerful power blocs, there are individuals like J. H. Mensah (Brother in-Law of the President), are also seen as influential in the current government. J. H. Mensah commands a lot of respect, and has experience on his side, But as a source has pointed out, "JH is losing influence very fast because he dirtied his hands in a short time", i.e., used his position to help family members in a way that might compromise his rising influence. The government also gets support from powerful coalitions in industry, business, and rising young entrepreneurs in Ghana and the Diaspora.

The result of contending interests, forces and factions seem to suggest that there are no dominant figures in the government partly because on one hand,
the President thinks that most of the people are in cabinet posts because of him; and on the other hand, Some cabinet ministers think that the President is inexperienced. Generally, there is the feeling that the President does not seem to have a firm grip over the government, and his frequent travel abroad reinforces the impression that he is escaping the problems at home. It is roughly estimated that the President has travelled 40 times within 18 months. Apparently, the fact that he leaves Nana Akuffo Addo out of these trips seems to have caused a bit of tension between the President and himself. Perhaps, it should be pointed out that during the primaries of the NPP, Akufo Addo ran against Kuffuor for the flag-bearership of the party. The former is an Akan whereas the latter is an Ashanti and Nana Akuffo-Addo is seen as a rising star in the Party who still has his eyes set on the Presidency, perhaps after Kufuor’s second term. The fact that Kufuor’s nomination as the sole party candidate for the 2004 election underscores the broad agreement not to rock the boat.

2.2. The Northern factor

Popular perceptions in Ghana today hold the view that the North is clearly marginalised in the Kuffour government. Northerners occupy the following positions: Vice president, Minster of Interior (before he resigned), National Security Adviser - General Mohammed Hamidu. Apart from these positions, most Northerners occupy “Deputy Ministerial” portfolios. Young northern politicians are also in deputy ministerial potions. The NPP security apparatus is also dominated exclusively by Northerners, mostly from the Dagbon area, and linked to the “Abudu gate” in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute.

Although key Northerners occupy positions of influence in government, this does not appear to manifest in concrete development of the regions in the North nor does it invest them with adequate authority to act independently of the dominant Ashanti influence within the NPP. Historically, Northern politicians have always provided support to the two powerful political traditions, and have used the perception of numbers to bolster their influence. But the North has always fared better under the CPP rather than the NPP tradition. The Busia/Danquah tradition has always regarded the North as a CPP stronghold. On the other hand, most Northerners resent the NPP for their role in the 1966 overthrow of the Kwame Nkrumah government. There is to a large extent, mutual loathing between the Ashantis and Northerners. For instance, some Northern politicians describe the vice president’s role as “ceremonial.” He is seen as a token without any real power in the Executive. Most Northerners feel that they (Northerners in government) are being used to do “government’s dirty work” in the security and less glamorous areas (e.g. narcotics control and internal affairs). It is likely that the Ashanti influence in NPP will remain dominant and Northern influence is therefore likely to be minimal. Yet to demonstrate a national outlook and regional balance, it seems crucial for NPP to have Northerners in its ranks. Although some of these perceptions reside in the realm of conjecture, the fact that they cropped up repeatedly in our meetings with prominent politicians and civil society leaders underscores the sensitivity to identity politics in Ghana. No where
has this been better captured than the recent Dagbon crisis in Northern Ghana.

2.2.1. Chieftaincy and the Dagbon Crisis

One factor with potential dangers for Ghanaian national security is the issue of ‘Chieftaincy’ in the North. There are many chieftaincy and ethnic disputes in various parts of the country, but the most serious is the current Dagbon crisis in the northern region. While the current crisis can be traced to the 1920s as a dispute between two different ‘gates’ or lineages that have fought over the occupation of this skin, the trigger factor to the current crisis occurred on 27 March 2002 when the Ya Na, Yakubu Andani II and others were brutally killed by armed assassins believed to be sympathisers of or even hired by the Abudu gate.

Politically, the Nkrumahist tradition had identified with the Andani gate, while the Danquah/Busia tradition of which the NPP is a product identified with the Abudu gate. It is widely held that in 1999-2000, some NPP leaders were bent on deposing the Ya Na as a trade off for Abudu electoral support. While this is not based on solid evidence, the antecedents of NPP and the role of the government in enacting the 1971 Chieftaincy Law is partly at the root of current succession crisis and this makes the NPP government vulnerable to accusations of pro-Abudu faction.

This suspicion is largely reinforced by the presence in the government of alleged partisans to the Abudu gate both at the national security and northern region’s administrative positions. They include: Aliu Mahama (Vice President), Joshua Hamidu (National Security Adviser), Malik Alhassan Yakubu (Interior Minister) and Major Suleimana (National Security Council). Others include the Northern Region Minister and Yendi District Chief Executive. Moreover, there were situations in which the Abudu faction was given certain courtesies that are exclusively due to the Ya Na – courtesy calls from visiting state dignitaries.

What baffles keen observers is that while the government is believed to have had prior knowledge and the appropriate means to prevent the killings, nothing was done to stop the impending crisis. In fact, there were police and military garrisons about 300 - 500 metres respectively from the palace where the killing occurred but yet they failed to intervene in the crisis as required of them.

This crisis has serious implications for national security, given the ease with which small arms could be obtained and the presence of an army of young, unemployed and often unemployable youths ready to be used as pawns. The area is characterised by poverty, unemployment, and low educational standards. These factors can induce the youth to be easily recruited for armed violence. With reports that both factions are stockpiling weapons and training fighters, it looks like if the situation is not handled very well, the north could be

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3See Socialist Forum of Ghana “Perspective on the Dagbon Crisis”
engulfed by armed violence. There are beliefs that this could spread throughout Ghana due to certain factors. First, the Konkomba who fought the Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba in 1992 do have interest in the Dagbon affairs because the apparent Andani candidate for the skin has a Konkomba link from the mother side. Currently, he is said to be under protection of the Konkomba whose involvement in the crisis could spark an all out Northern crisis.4

There is also the possibility that the current anti-NPP feelings in relation to this crisis could translate into anti-Ashanti hostility. Already, there is talk of attacking Ashantis in any renewed fighting. If this happens, then one could see a bloody civil conflict in the country. Another point to note is that the military in Togo is alleged to have tortured and killed a Konkomba chief in Togo. Thus, rumours have it that the Konkomba in Togo are mobilising for conflict. With some Konkombas believing that the NPP is aligned with their Togolese enemies, perhaps the Dagbon crisis should be taken seriously like other national security issues.5

2.3. Judiciary

One of the litmus tests of an evolving democratic transition is the level of independence, efficiency and integrity of the judiciary and judicial system. The Ghanaian judiciary today is bereft with problems just as it has been since independence. As one retired Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice K.E. Amua Sekyi critically recounts, since independence the confidence of the masses of the people in the fairness of the judiciary has long since been eroded. He cites three major reasons for this: first, subservience of the judiciary to the executive; secondly, growing and widespread corruption among judicial officers and staff; and thirdly, delay in the trial of cases.6

Closely associated with these is the fact that appointments to the Bench are politically motivated and this makes judicial officers play ‘second fiddle’ to successive governments.

In addition, bribery and corruption have always marred the image of the judiciary. The situation was so serious that after the coup of 1966 and by 1986, the National Liberation Council (NLC) and the PNDC respectively carried out a cosmetic process of wholesale dismissal of judges in a futile attempt to clean up the image of the judiciary. As Sekyi argues, this did not help because the measure was never accompanied by a re-appraisal of the role of judges, and the creation of an enabling environment for fair and proper exercise of their functions including good salaries and assurance of

4 See Socialist Forum of Ghana “Perspective on the Dagbon Crisis” Already, at least five people were killed and no fewer than 336 people displaced as a result of communal clashes between the Konkomba and Nawuri ethnic groups at Kitare in Nkwanta District in the Eastern Volta of Ghana in the first week in November.

5 Ibid

‘comfortable age when retired’.\textsuperscript{7} While the Constitution of 1969 sought to remedy this problem by making the Chief Justice and judges of the Superior Courts the highest paid public offices in Ghana, the violent overthrow of governments changed these practices.\textsuperscript{8}

The current Attorney General of Ghana shares the above views by insisting that long period of authoritarian rule weakened the judiciary, and that the poor salaries and lack of resources have led to demoralization of the judiciary to the extent that most of the better elements have left the system. He also deplores the practice of corruption in the judiciary.\textsuperscript{9}

Corruption is such a problem in the judiciary that the present parliament was forced to set up a 21-member Parliamentary Committee to probe cases of alleged corruption within the judiciary in six regional capitals – Wa, Koforidua, Takoradi, Tamale, Sunyani and Sekondi.\textsuperscript{10}

The delays in trials are such that cases sometimes last as long as 20-30 years to go through courts. Often, judges have to deal with too many ‘part-heard cases’ on their hands to the extent that one time, a judge had 22 of such cases to deal with.\textsuperscript{11} Currently, Wa does not have a Chair of its tribunal because he was transferred to Accra and has not been replaced. The Bar Association is not happy about the fact that it is not consulted on the appointment of judicial officers, and the present Chief Justice, Wiredu has credibility problems with the Bar because of past allegations of corruption. Previously, Wiredu and Kufuor served in Victor Owusu’s Chambers.

To sum up, the judiciary is buffeted with a number of problems cardinal among which include the following:

- Lack of public confidence
- Poor infrastructure
- Poor salaries
- Corruption
- Delays in judicial process

2.4. Parliament

The Ghanaian parliament comprises 200 members. The ruling NPP has 101, NDC has 91, PNC 4, CPP has 1 and 3 independent members. Some MPs in the ruling party are Ministers and others sit on government commissions and bodies. This means that in most situations, they are out in the regions and so cannot afford to sit in parliament on a regular basis. This gives the NDC an

\textsuperscript{7} Justice K.E. Amua Sekyi, p. 11
\textsuperscript{8} Justice K.E. Amua Sekyi, p. 12
\textsuperscript{10} Business and Financial Times, August 26 – September 1, 2002 p. 2
\textsuperscript{11} Justice K.E. Amua Sekyi, p. 13
edge when it comes to voting. Further, they are more prepared and knowledgeable about parliamentary work than the NPP people.

Another problem that is seen as hampering the independence of Parliament from the Executive is the fact that some members of parliament are also members of the government. This is so because the Ghanaian government system is a hybrid of the US and Westminster models of democracy.

There is a feeling among opposition MPs that they and parliament are being marginalised. Clearly manifesting this is the fact that parliament was marginalised in the formulation of the GPRS. Inexperience, corruption, lack of resources, and the weak nature of opposition parties are some factors that could affect the credibility of Parliament. With members of parliament being bought off with favours from the ruling party, there seems to be a degree of self-censorship and there are limited parliamentary debates on policy issues.
3.0. STATE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN GHANA

Out of the nine political parties, which contested the last elections of December 2000, eight of them are believed to be in a state of flux. One of them, the United Ghana Movement (UGM) has publicly declared that it is taking leave of politics. Thus, even though it remains on the register of political parties in the country, it is considered extinct. Significantly, three of the political parties, namely the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) and Eagle Party (EP) are currently in an alliance referred to as the ‘progressive alliance’.

In the run up to the last Presidential election, the ruling NPP enjoyed the tactical support of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), the People National Convention (PNC), the National Reform Party (NRP), the Ghana Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) and the United Ghana Movement (UGM). However, it is clear that such support will not be forthcoming in the 2004 elections because the alignment of forces will change considerably. The single most important factor that brought all these parties together was their common opposition to Rawlings, and the further threat of the Rawlings and NDC remaining in power. In this light, the alignment of forces was based on political expediency and prevailing political environment. They ganged up to unseat Rawlings and the NDC. Now that the NDC is out of the way, every political party will want to hold its own grounds independently.

As is the case with elections in Africa, most parties emerge during elections and immediately disappear after the elections. In this sense, one cannot rule out the revitalisation of the smaller parties that are currently in flux nor can the birth of new parties be ruled out by the time of the elections of 2004.

3.1. The New Patriotic Party

First, the NPP. It is a well-known fact in Ghana today that President Kuffuor will contest the 2004 elections unopposed within his party because at the time of the close of nominations, only he had filed in his papers. He will therefore be declared their Presidential candidate when the party meets at its national delegates congress later in the year. The party has focused on the building of alliances for the 2004 elections but its overtures to the CPP and the PNC have been rejected. Historically, the CPP and PNC have the same ideological leanings, representing the Nkrumaist tradition in Ghanaian politics.

Their support for the NPP at the December 2000 elections, was merely a tactical one to unseat the NDC, which has helped in undermining the political position of the Nkrumaist tradition that both the CPP and PNC represent. The NPP and CPP traditions represent different ideological and ethnic lines, and have since the 1940s, been at political loggerheads. This explains why

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12Great Consolidated Popular Party (Daniel A. Lartey), National Democratic Congress (John E.A. Mills), Convention People’s Party (George P. Hagan), Peoples’ National Convention (Edward Mahama), United Ghana Movement (Werreko Brobby), National Reform Party (Goosie Tannoh) and the New Patriotic Party (J. A. Kufuor).
accepting the overtures of the NPP for an alliance has been rejected. An alliance between the NPP and the CPP is impossible to contemplate.

In preparation for the 2004 elections, the NPP has started a fundraising campaign to gather resources. There is the view that as the party in power, it should have no problems with acquiring resources. The results of the 2004 Presidential elections are therefore almost predictable. According to most people, the real test for the party will come in 2008 when Kuffuor’s term expires, and the opposition parties, particularly, the merged CPP and NRP would have managed to re-organise itself. However, there is the view that if the NPP can effectively deal with the question of who succeeds Kuffuor, then they would avoid a split that might be based along religious and ethnic lines.

On the religious line, the current Vice President is a Muslim from the North whereas the other potential contender, Nana Akufo Addo is a Christian from the South - Eastern Region. If the two individuals are to contest the NPP flag-bearership in the year 2008, the support pattern in the NPP could be split along the lines suggested above. Remember that this is an Ashanti party based on the Busia/Danquah tradition. As one observer put it, this is only a possibility. Significantly, the point should be made that by the year 2008, the two individuals referred to above may not be relevant. Thus, until 2008, it is premature to say what may exactly happen.

3.2. New Democratic Congress

The NDC remains a major challenger for power in the forthcoming elections unless the CPP gets its act together very soon. There are internal squabbles within the NDC around two leading personalities – Jerry Rawlings and Obed Asamoah. At their recent congress at which Obed Asamoah narrowly won by one vote to become Chair of the party, the tension between the two individuals was visible to the extent that Rawlings publicly accused Obed Asamoah of embezzling party funds. In specific relation to the forthcoming elections, Rawlings seems to be favouring J. Atta Mills because he thinks he can manipulate him from behind the scenes whereas Obed prefers Kwesi Botchwey, the former Finance and Economic Planning Minister under the NDC, as presidential candidate. Asamoah’s choice of Botchway is based on the belief that he can easily handle the Rawlings factor in the party. Both Botchway and Mills originate from Cape Coast. The other potential NDC candidate is the former Minister of Defence, Alhaji Iddrisu Mahama.

From reliable sources, Botchway seems to be suggesting that he is not interested in contesting the elections, but some people think this is a ploy to save himself from early public scrutiny. Further, it could be the case that he is trying to study the current political climate before indicating whether he would like to contest or not. Political pundits think that Professor Atta Mills, who had spent time in Canada teaching at a University, could eventually get the endorsement of the party at its forthcoming congress.

Significantly, the NDC is also trying to carve a new image for itself, at least ideologically. It has now said that its policy orientation has shifted from liberal
democracy to social democracy. A manifesto to this effect has been published. However, the NDC will no longer have unfettered resources to become as influential as it had been.

Can the NDC win the next elections? If they ever did, this will constitute a magical experience in current Ghanaian politics. The general mood in the country does not favour the immediate return of the NDC to power, at least not in 2004. It is generally accepted that the public will give the NPP a chance to prove itself as a party that is capable of delivering Ghana out of its present economic mess by improving the living standards of the vast majority of the people. Even with the PNC expressing willingness to merge with the NDC, it is evident that this could not give them enough political leverage to win overall power. NDC-PNC merger may be a plus in terms of winning seats in the Upper East region. It might also give them some seats in the North, an area that the NPP seems to have lost already because of the Dagbon crisis.

3.3. The Nkrumahist factor: CPP, PNC, NRP and GCPP

These four parties are generally referred to as parties of the Nkruamaist political tradition in Ghanaian politics. There are frantic efforts aimed at merging these parties in order to become a credible alternative to both the NDC and the NPP. So far, the PNC and GCPP have pulled out of the unity talks but the CPP and the NRP have gone ahead to announce an agreement to merge. Currently, both parties are working on details of transitional arrangements for the formal merger of the parties, which may successfully be agreed at their respective national congresses in December of this year. Perhaps it should also be pointed out that prior to pulling out of the merger talks, the PNC had agreed to what has been referred to as the Activists platform. This is the platform for the proposed new CPP.

While the contest for a presidential candidate of a united Nkrumahist tradition has not begun, few names have emerged. These include Dr. Edward Mahama (leader of the PNC), Dr. Kwabena Duffour (former Governor of the Bank of Ghana), Mr. Goosie Tannoh (Presidential candidate of NRP in the last elections), Prof. George Hagan (CPP candidate in the last elections) and Mr. George Aggudey (businessman). It is expected that a large part of the United Ghana Movement (UGM) could possibly merge with the CPP.

While a merger of these parties of Nkrumahist tradition can cause problems for the NPP, the internal rivalries among them will not help their cause. Some have even embarked upon media warfare to discredit certain figures in the CPP. There are a number of key issues around which the current debate within the CPP is centred. First, the issue of building structures in order to effectively intervene in politics as a serious force; electoral alliance - fielding candidates to win parliamentary seats and lend support to other parties in the presidential contest; and building a united, independent CPP with a socialist outlook to reflect a true Nkruamaist tradition.

Freddie Blay, the First Deputy Speaker of the House, and a CPP candidate, is calling for an alliance between the CPP and the NPP. In the case of Edward
Mahama, he is believed to hold the view that certain elements within the CPP have taken entrenched positions wanting to continue with the name, slogan and symbols of the party while Dan Lartey feels sidelined and thinks his party is the true Nkrumahist party.\textsuperscript{13}

According to some critical observers, in light of the above, any talk of unity among the above parties is premature.

3.4. EGLE and DPP

Both the EGLE and DPP are part of the CPP/ Nkrumaist tradition, and were formed by disaffected NDC members. Since the last elections of 2000, the two parties have not functioned. They have remained dormant and may become extinct with some of its senior members joining either the CPP or the NPP. Both parties are offshoots of the NDC and are linked to Kojo Tsikata, Ebow Tawiah, Kofi Tettegah - all former PNDC/NDC members.

3.5. Issue Areas

The main area of debate for the forthcoming elections will be the state of the economy and socio-economic policy. The CPP, PNC, NRP and GCPP hold the firm belief that there has been no paradigm shift in the country’s economic policy and orientation because the present government is essentially implementing the same Structural Adjustment Programme implemented by the Rawlings regime. The NPP government fervently believes that there is no other viable alternative. The NPP also argues that it is better placed to manage a liberal economy as the true party of wealth creation in Ghana. According to them, the TUC and civil society groups do not hold them hostage.

More specifically, the following issues will continue to be debated:

a) In the past four years, the issue of Ghana accepting the HIPC initiative has been debated in the country. Groups like the Socialist Forum, led by Mr. Kwesi Pratt, editor of the Weekly insight, have been critical of HIPC. The opponents of HIPC argue that it is not the solution to Ghana’s problems. The debate around HIPC therefore centres primarily on its significance for national development and poverty reduction. Some see it as a mere repackaging of SAP. Particularly, the issue of who benefits and the extent to which the HIPC funds reduces poverty in Ghana is important for the coming elections.

b) Second, like HIPC, the privatisation of state enterprises has not gone down well with a good number of people in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa. Privatisation is associated with SAP, which rather than cure African countries of their ills, have adversely worsened them. The attempt by the government to privatise water supply has come under

\textsuperscript{13}Lord Cephas M-Yevugah “What is happening to Nkrumah’s Flock?” Business and Financial Times, August 19 – 25 2002, p. 17
severe criticisms from opposition parties like the CPP, NRP, civil society groups and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). Civil society groups like the Media Foundation for West Africa, Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) and Socialist Forum are playing a lead role in the campaign against water privatisation.

c) Third, another area of concern is the provision of social services, particularly education and health. Both have experienced decline under the previous regime. Thus, how much the NPP government does in improving these services will be crucial in the forthcoming elections. The state of health and education in the country is appalling with many children unable to gain access to them. With the health system based on the ‘cash and carry’ system, only elements of the middle classes can easily access health care.

d) Fourth, closely linked with the above is the situation of unemployment in the country. Unemployment remains very high in Ghana today. The economy, and particularly, local industries and the private sector cannot absorb the increasing number of youth unemployed, particularly, graduates and so many graduates are forced to join the ranks of the army of unemployed. In this light, unemployment is an issue of concern. How the NPP government deal with this, will improve or worsen its credibility among the youth, and its standing nationally.

e) Fifth, the increase in utility tariffs is worrying for some sections of the society already over-burdened by increasing poverty. This will definitely make certain services relatively expensive including transport, food items and other basic things that the vast majority of the people use in the country.

f) Sixth, in the face of economic decline, the retrenchment of labour becomes the easy option out. Under the previous government, local industries collapsed. This is one of the economic deficits that the present Government has to address in order to avoid experiencing further retrenchment labour in a country already over-burdened by unemployment. The level of workers’ retrenchment under this government is definitely an issue of concern.

g) Seventh, under the NDC there was cry about the level of cronyism and the role of ethnic factors in the Government. There was the perception that Ewes were given certain privileges, particularly in strategic state bodies like the military and others. Already, in this Government, people are complaining about reverse to similar practices. Further, with the NPP trying to buy off opposition people, and giving posts to long time associates, this could lead to cronyism. Ethnicism and Cronyism are definitely not healthy for a democratic transition being experienced in Ghana at the moment.

h) Finally, currently, crime is on the increase in Ghana. For example, there is an unprecedented wave of armed robbery, which has been
facilitated by the proliferation of small arms in the country. The existence of the Bureau on Drugs and Narcotics within the Ministry of Interior means that the trafficking of these substances is a problem for Ghana like other West African countries. Clearly, these are a menace to the Ghanaian society and thus how the Government tackles them remains an issue.

Importantly, the Government has launched a series of programmes referred to as ‘Presidential Initiatives. If these initiatives produce successful results, they could help in addressing some of the problems referred to above. In what follows below, we highlight some of the initiatives put forward by the Government.

3.6. Presidential Initiatives

Presidential initiatives are aimed at reducing poverty through jobs creation for the unemployed and graduates. Some of the initiatives include the followings:

a) **Textile/Garment Initiative**, which is aimed at making use of the opportunities offered by the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) to export products to the US market. Since April 2002, Ghana has been granted visa to export directly to the US tax-free and quota free. According to plans, 100 medium size factories, 10 large size factories and 20 merchant exporters will be established within 4 years. These should generate $3.4 billion. Further, the thinking is that 100,000 jobs will be created during the 4-year period. To some, this is over ambitious and merely a ‘political talk’ because of time, inadequate infrastructure, human and other material resources. Closely tied in with this initiative is the Cassava Project aimed at producing industrial starch for export.

b) **ICT Initiative** is aimed at creating centres of excellence for training young people in IT. This initiative is being supported by the Indian Government, which will provide IT experts and knowledge.

c) **Distance Learning Initiative** is about improving the academic foundation from JSS to SSS. They use TV network to teach primary and secondary students. Closely linked with this initiative is establishment of an ‘Open College’. Currently, some JSS and SSS students cannot enter University. This group of students will be targets for the open learning centres across the country. The students will be provided with IT and entrepreneurial skills; teacher training is at the heart of this programme and there are possibilities of setting up small funds for self-employment.

The problem with the country’s school system is that it is admitting less and less students at every level. For example, while the primary school system produces 130,000 graduates annually, the JSS, which is the

14 Mark Anthony Kwarteng, ‘President’s Special Initiative on Textiles and Garments, Over Ambitious or Modest’ Business and Financial Times, August 26 – September 1, 2002, p. 13
next level they naturally progress to, can only absolve 80,000 students. This means that about 50,000 students cannot progress. Even out of this 80,000 students that progress to the JSS, only 50,000 can enter the SSS. This also means that about 30,000 cannot continue to the SSS. Regarding the tertiary (University and Polytechnic) level, it can only absolve 30,000 students per year. Thus of the 50,000 students who enter the SSS, 20,000 of them cannot progress to the tertiary level because of the lack of space. The Special Initiative is intended to address this problem.
4.0. KEY CONSTITUENCIES

4.1. Regional Balance

What are the key constituencies the NPP must satisfy in order to stay in power and win re-election? There is a general consensus among the people we talked to that there are two key constituencies – Ashanti and Eastern regions. The NPP has strengths in these regions and will therefore build on these to consolidate its hold on them for the forthcoming elections. The Ashanti and Eastern regions constitute core areas since they are high in population. There is the general view that the NPP support is guaranteed in these areas because the party is traditionally referred to as the ‘Ashanti’ party. For the NPP to consolidate its position in the South, they would also need to win considerable seats in the Brong Ahafo region. But this can also be problematic in view of long historical differences between the Brongs and the Ashantis. But if threatened, the Brongs and Ashantis will forget their differences.

The North is more problematic for the NPP. The Northern region is dismissed as relatively less important for votes because of its scarce population, and for historical reasons. Further, the current Dagbon crisis has exposed the partisan nature of the NPP involvement in the crisis. In the last election the NPP did not win a significant support in the region. The PNC also controls the Upper East region, while the Upper West is largely NDC. It is possible that with resources, the NPP can reverse the NDC/PNC domination of the North, but any revival in the Northern region is likely to benefit the CPP (even in its current disorganised form).

The Central, Western and Volta regions are currently dominated by the NDC, but have in the past been bastions of the CPP. The NDC is likely to retain some of these seats. With a CPP revival, it can regain the Western, Central and Volta regions. Without a CPP revival, the Western and Central regions will remain under NDC control to some extent. The Central region will be equally divided between the NDC and other opposition parties. Historically, the Fantes and Ashantis have been at loggerheads, this is likely to be reflected in the voting patterns that will emerge in 2004.

These factors notwithstanding, the urban rural divide has almost always dictated voting patterns in Ghana. President Kuffour's strident attempts to build roads and link the rural, cocoa producing areas with the rest of the country should be seen in this light. The NDC's stronghold of rural Ghana follows similar strategies used by the CPP in the early 1950s and 1960s.

From all indications, the various constituencies in Ghana could vote along ethnic and regional lines. The NPP's strategy is therefore to consolidate what they have gained so far. A source also pointed out that the government is about to embark on a redrawing exercise of key constituencies, based on population, thereby increasing the number of constituencies in the Ashanti,
Eastern and Brong Ahafo regions, which are heavily populated. This would in effect reduce the number of constituencies in the North.

What the various regions get out of this government in terms of development will dictate their voting patterns to a large extent. How the government addresses this depends on its performance and success with specific relation to the GPRS.

4.2. The Private sector

The private sector, mainly local business people support candidates and governments for opportunistic reasons and not on an ideological basis. The government's property owning ideology, reinforced by its declaration of today's Ghana as the "golden age of business", would endear it to middle businessmen. They would do anything to attract and keep foreign investors. Traditionally, the business class, entrepreneurs, market women, coca farmers and the commercial sector have always been Akan or Ashanti dominated, the NPP's natural constituency. The NPP is therefore cultivating its own business supporters, taking contracts away from NDC sympathisers to ensure that its own business constituency is largely catered for.

The professional classes, and some sections of civil society are keen to ensure that the current democratic process is not destabilised. There is also an understanding that the NDC must be kept out of power by all means. A coalition of the professional classes, and some civil society groups will support the NPP if it becomes clear that the NDC poses a particular threat to the ruling party, although the reasons for this are not uniform.

4.3. Traditional Authorities

Traditional authorities have always played a key and important influencing role in Ghanaian politics both under colonialism and after independence. Though they play a non-statutory role, they sometimes transcend that to play a statutory one on a limited scale. These authorities manage the affairs of their areas by maintaining law and order and providing advice to central government and other agencies on public affairs. Outside the modern court system, they maintain order and peace among their peoples and mobilise material and human resources for development activities. Further, they are considered as custodians of customary laws and as leaders of their communities, they are more acceptable than say an MP or a local civil authority. In areas where the authority of the central government (seen as Accra government) is less evident, chiefs and traditional authorities play vital roles in maintaining law and order, and securing development for their people.

Though Nkrumah virtually abolished the Native Authorities, the court systems have remained, even if unrecognised by central government. Successive military interventions revived their roles in Ghana to the extent that there is a National House of Chiefs. Over the years, they lost their customary sources of revenues and therefore are weak financially. This has made them vulnerable and often seen as being in the employ of governments and business. The fact
that they scramble for privileges from the governments, and sometimes publicly align with certain political parties, verify the above assumption. That said, it should be pointed out that some still get the usual voluntary customary dues as well as revenues from land and involvement in judicial processes.

Like previous Ghanaian governments, the NPP has indicated its willingness to work with traditional authorities. The current prominent role of the Asantehene, and their role in the Council of State support this view. Currently, there is some tension between chiefs and the District Assemblies because of the overlap of duties and the way in which this adversely undermines the influence of traditional authorities.

However, the NPP is seeking to use its cosy relationship with the Asantehene as an example of government-traditional authority relationship. The Asantehene wields an enormous amount of influence over President Kufuor, and has indicated that he will use this role only in an advisory capacity. The Asantehene's main interest is to strengthen the role of paramount chiefs and traditional authority, and promote them as "partners in development." promote cultural heritage by strengthening traditional institutions. However, other ethnic groups also see the blurred relationship between the Asantehene and President Kuffuor as confirmation that the NPP is an "Ashanti government". Other Chiefs in different regions are also crucial for social and political mobilisation and therefore constitute an important constituency for electoral votes. In the specific case of the north, a lot depends on how the NPP government addresses the Dagbon crisis, which is discussed above in detail.
5.0. SECURING THE STATE

5.1. Security-Sector Governance

What I mean by securing the State is ensuring that the security agencies of the state are firmly in place and are loyal to the new government and to the state as a whole, so there is no untoward upset in the state machinery.


Having been out of power for more than two decades and recalling the fate of the erstwhile government headed by President Hilla Limann, which was overthrown by Jerry Rawlings two years later, President Kufuor was not apologetic about his concern for the security of his government. The President took a number of steps on his assumption of office, which indicated that he wanted to maintain direct control of the security sector. First, he appointed his brother, Dr Kwame Addo Kufuor into the position of Defence Minister. (He now also acts as Interior Minister since the Dagbon crisis precipitated the resignation of the erstwhile Interior Minister, Alhaji Malik Alhassan.)

Second, he swiftly replaced the Chief of Defence Staff and Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force as well as the Inspector-General of Police and the Head of the Bureau of National Investigation. He appointed a retired Defence chief, General Mohammed Hamidu as National Security Adviser. General Hamidu spent most of the Rawlings era in the United Kingdom and, fortuitously his old Military Academy friend and coursemate, Olusegun Obasanjo, had become President in neighbouring Nigeria. Nigeria reportedly provides a complement of the current presidential security in Ghana because of the lack of confidence in the current arrangements. On a broader scale, President Kufuor also instituted a National Reconciliation Commission to investigate allegations of past human rights violations and the government has assiduously pursued cases of corruption against the last administration, with some members of the last government arraigned and convicted. To top all of these, President Kufuor decided to stay in his own home, presumably to ensure his personal safety and security.

While it is possible to capture all these presidential efforts within an institutional framework that approximates the thematic focus of the government strategy as: a) Subordination of the military to the civilian authority by placing civilians in key military decision-making organs and through the retirement of “ politicised” military officers; b) Addressing past human rights violations; and, c) Promoting the anti-corruption crusade, it is very difficult to talk about the institutionalisation of the reform process in place. Indeed, it would appear that the focus of thinking on defence and security management issues resides outside the administration, at the Universities and more critically in the various think-tanks like African Security Research & Dialogue (ASDR), Ghana Centre for Democratic Development and the Foundation for Security and Development (FOSDA) to mention a few.
One noticeable problem with this approach is that it seeks to achieve just civilian control of the military, rather than democratic control of the armed forces, which could be better achieved through an active and focused legislature and an empowered civil society. It is also very limited in its definition of security. As the quote above reveals, what securing the state means is ensuring the subordination of the military to the civilian authority, not necessarily the professionalisation of the armed forces which, in turn, ensures its autonomy from interference by politicians. More importantly, it also fails to seek a broader understanding of security that views security as development.

If the NPP government and President Kuffuor in particular had taken the view that civilian control is an institutionalised process that is inherently political, the departure point for guaranteeing democratic governance of the security sector is the protection of the Constitution. Framers of Ghana’s 1992 constitution successfully found a creative and thoughtful manner to address unconstitutional removal of legitimate government. In great detail, Section 3 (3) of the Constitution declares that ‘Any person who a) by himself or in concert with others by any violent or other unlawful means, suspends, overthrows or abrogates this constitution or any part of it, or attempts to do any such act;' or (b) “aids and abets in any manner any person referred to in paragraph (a) of this clause; commits the offence of high treason and shall upon conviction be sentenced to suffer death.”

Significantly, in order to prevent the usual situation where the army overthrows the government and suspends the constitution, the 1992 constitution vests the people of Ghana with the power to resist unconstitutional and illegal military takeovers. In sub-section 4, it enjoins that “All citizens of Ghana have the responsibilities and the duty at all times” to (a) “to defend this constitution, and in particular, to resist any person or group of persons seeking to commit any of the acts referred to in clause (3) of this article; and (b) to do all in their power to restore this constitution after it has been suspended, overthrown or abrogated as referred to in Clause 3 of this article.” It goes further to declare that any one who participates in resisting such attempts or acts of suspending and abrogating it commits ‘no offence.’ In fact, according to sub-section 6, any one who participates in resisting such attacks on the constitution and gets punished in whatever manner in the process shall, as soon as the situation was restored, be ‘absolved from the liabilities arising out of the punishment.” In fact, the Constitution in sub-section 7 declares that “The Supreme Court shall, on application by or on behalf of a person who has suffered any punishment or loss to which Clause 6 of this article relates, award him or her adequate compensation which shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund in respect of any suffering or loss incurred as a result of the punishment.

While it could still be reasonably argued that this comprehensive constitutional provision would not stop any trigger happy, gun-totting soldier from

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16 Ibid.
undertaking an illegal mission such as overthrowing a constitutional government, it demonstrates in a rather remarkable institutional manner the depth of feeling in the Ghanaian society about coup d'etats. The fact that this constitution was promulgated under the Rawling's military administration demonstrates an overriding commitment to constitutional rule or a depth of feeling in society which could not be overridden by the drafters of the Constitution. Indeed, it is the only constitution that offers specific incentives to any one who opposes the overthrow, abrogation or suspension of the Constitution.

In addition to the extensive coverage in the Constitution, the Rawlings government also put in place an Intelligence Act, again one of the few Intelligence documents that outline the role and mission of intelligence services on the continent.\(^\text{17}\) It seems to us therefore logical that an institutional assessment of security sector reform, which includes Police reform and Intelligence services. We have also attempted to examine national security issues from a much broader perspective than the military and thus the use of the concepts: ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ security sectors.

Of the traditional sector in Ghana, the military remains a major source of concern to government and civil society organisations in the current transition period. Military involvement in Ghanaian politics spans over two decades, giving it some edge over certain state institutions. Therefore, the military has been a major source of concern to the Kuffour administration since it assumed power. This is partly because of the need to avert a coup d'état, and also to re-organise its top ranks to reflect the changing nature of Ghanaian politics. The government also needs to demonstrate to the officer rank that is interested in building a professional army, and depoliticising and de-ethnicising the military at the same time since under the Rawlings regime, the military was not only politicised, it was also ethnicised.

5.2. The 64th Battalion

Under Rawlings, the 64\(^{\text{th}}\) Battalion, also known as "commandoes" became President Rawlings' elite brigade and 'personal army'. The 64th battalion enjoyed untrammelled privileges including good salaries, better weapons, political protection and training. According to military sources, some American military personnel that assessed the battalion after the elections concluded that they were over-trained. The privileges they enjoyed did not go well with members of the Ghana Armed forces who even despised the 64th Battalion and the Rawlings regime for such discriminatory practice.

In order to remove the last vestiges of Rawlings' influence from the military, the Kufuor government had to take some cautionary measures to deal with the battalion. They have been integrated into the military structure and dispersed to other units, while others have been sent to Sierra Leone for

peacekeeping operations. Politically, they have been neutralised as they no longer enjoy the protection of the NDC structures in Accra and beyond.

Within the military itself, the NPP has taken measures to remove NDC and Ewe officers from the command structure of the military, especially in areas where they could pose security problems. The government has sent 7 generals on leave. Appointments are now made on seniority of rank. Ethnic considerations seem to characterise security-related appointments; and the discharge and reintegration of over-aged soldiers (roughly 2000) into civil society continue to cause concern. For example, top-level officers of Ewe and Northern origins sympathetic to the NDC cabal have been replaced. Obviously, some of these officers are bitter and complain about “tribalism” of the Ashantis. There is an attempt to regionalise the composition of the army to the extent that recruitment has been decentralised and now takes place in the regions.

5.3. Bureau of National Investigations

The Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) is also being restructured to replace former NDC sympathisers with NPP supporters. For example, over 20 serving BNI officers, mainly Ewes and Northerners were sent on retirement by the NPP. The national security network is now dominated by the Dagbon elite and some former members of the Limann security network. These people also have scores to settle with President Rawlings.

5.4. The Rawlings factor

From the current state of affairs, it is obvious that the Rawlings' factor in Ghanaian politics is declining, but government functionaries display a level of paranoia hardly commensurate to the verbal tirades. He is likely to remain a controversial figure, and a constant source of embarrassment to the government and his own party. While former President Rawlings also does not have the capacity (militarily), or the popular support to mount an opposition to the government, it is possible to take advantage of the confluence of interests between a disillusioned public and a paranoid government.

The Rawlings factor is therefore exaggerated to some extent. The NDC would like to remain a mainstream political party, and would not like to be seen associating itself with Rawlings' pronouncements, even if they are hard put not to clash with him in the open. Secondly, the National Reconciliation Commission, and the investigations into human rights abuses in the 1980s might go some way in exposing the excesses of the period and thus tarnish Mr Rawlings' image and his reputation as details of gross abuses and violations, appear in the national press over the next few months. Issues surrounding the murder of the three High court Judges and retired army officers will probably also implicate the former President. In light of the above,

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it seems as though the former President’s influence in Ghanaian politics will diminish. His ability to mobilise any opposition to the current government will diminish in Ghanaian politics is also constrained as many political groups grapple for power through the ballot box. This is not to suggest that his influence within the NDC party structures will equally wane. What eventually happens will be dependent on who wins the contest between Professor Mills and Dr Botchway for the party’s presidential slot.

5.5. Non-Traditional Security Issues

Thus while most people are devoting much attention to the Rawlings factor, perhaps the point should be made that like other West African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, there is an increasing likelihood of social unrest. While there is no clear rallying point for such unrest, the factors that produced wars in these West African states are prevalent in Ghana today. Walking the streets of the capital, there is a widening gap between those who have and those who do not. The level of pauperisation is such that any opportunist could take advantage of it to destabilise the entire country. The vast majority of the people envy the big mansions, flashy cars and affluent life styles of the few who have. In fact, there are constant complaints by ordinary people including taxi drivers and students that the government’s policies favour the middle class. The high level of unemployment is not helping the situation.

Importantly, other factors that could threaten the national security of Ghana include small arms proliferation and the issues of Chieftaincy and land disputes. Therefore, in analysing the security sector in Ghana and perhaps elsewhere in Africa, it is important to also include these in the non-traditional sector of national security. West Africa is beset with the problem of small arms proliferation with 8 million small arms illegally circulating. In Ghana, about 40,000 arms are in illegal hands, and these are unlicensed. In view of this reality, any attempt to focus analysis of the security sector purely on the traditional sector is problematic. In Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, civilians lead armed insurgencies.

Some of these weapons are produced locally but they also come from other sources. In a detailed report produced by the Accra-based FOSDA, there are both external and internal sources of small arms. Regionally, the conflicts in Guinea, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone are possible sources; other sources include countries bordering Ghana including Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire and Togo. And there are three categories of people who are identified as carriers of weapons: farmers, traders and herders whose activities cut across borders; refugees and Ghanaian residents travelling from Cote D’Ivoire and Burkina Faso; and professional gun-runners who sell guns as a business exercise.19

Since 1966, guns were stolen from state stocks as a result of five military coups. It is interesting to note that some of the weapons are not only locally manufactured, but Ghanaians also sell guns to neighbouring West African

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19See FOSDA Report on Small Arms Proliferation in Ghana. Untitled and Unpublished, p. 7
countries. For example, the Western Marine Command of Nigeria’s Customs Service arrested six Ghanaians in a Canoe. Those arrested had 72,500 rounds of live ammunition and 99 sacks of shotguns from Ghana. This means that weapons are easily accessible in Ghana and thus a threat to national security.

In summary, the above issues illustrate that the threat to the Ghanaian democratic transition may not necessarily come from the military or any other section of the traditional security sector; it may as well come from the non-traditional sector or a combination of factors. This means that there is a need to look at the Ghanaian security sector from a more broader and comprehensive way by addressing the broader issues that could impinge upon it in an uncontrollable way.

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6.0. GENERAL STATE OF THE ECONOMY & GHANA’S POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY (GPRS)

6.1. The Economy

Generally, the economy is no better than where the NDC left it. Over the past two decades, market forces have dominated the economy and this trend has continued with the new government, which has even promised a ‘golden age of business’. The economy is reliant on the export of primary products and thus making it vulnerable to the general shocks of the global economy including price fluctuations. Further, since the 1990s, the economy has been characterised by high rates of inflation, high interest rates, depreciation of the cedi, dwindling foreign reserves, excessive public debt overhang and stagnant economic growth.\(^{21}\)

Over the past two years, this situation has not been reversed. Industries have collapsed, the level of poverty is not diminishing and more and more people are not gaining access to education and health care. In fact, the health system is based on what is referred to as ‘cash and carry’ system. The spending on health and education at 2.0% and 2.8% respectively of the GDP is lower than African averages.\(^{22}\) To many people, things like the ‘cash and carry’ system in health services only benefit the middle class who can afford to pay for such services. In a country where HIV/AIDS infection is estimated at 3 per cent of the entire population, this selective health system constitutes a national security threat that needs immediate and urgent attention.

Describing the current state of the economy in Ghana, the current Attorney General, Nana Akuffo Addo, had this to say: ‘we are poorer than we were at independence. Average per capita income, US$420 at independence, is now US$370 today, 44 years later. The average real wage is a quarter of what it was in 1970, thirty years ago. 40% of our population lives below the poverty line. Our economy is still neo-colonial in structure, dependent on the production and export of raw materials which account for over 80% of our foreign exchange earning, like they did 80 years ago in Governor Guggisberg’s time’.\(^{23}\)

The above statement fully captures the current state of the economy and whether this government can reverse such trend is premature to say. With the appalling state of social conditions including the appearance of rough sleepers in the streets of Accra and the increase in armed robbery, the government needs to address the issue of poverty reduction in a more serious and realistic way.

\(^{21}\)GPRS, p. iv  
\(^{22}\)GPRS, p. iv  
6.2. Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Strategy

PRSPs are intended as national statements of overall plans to reduce poverty, based on a process of broad consultations, developed in a three year frame of action-plan, albeit set in a longer time frame for sustainable development but monitored annually for compliance and targets.

The current GPRS emerged out of broad consultation and an assessment of the poverty level in the regions. It is preceded by two other national development strategies: Ghana Vision 2020 – The First Step (1996-2000) and the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: 2000-2002 (I-PRSP). The GPRS-I was worked out as a draft in fulfilment of HIPC conditions, but unfortunately, Ghana did not meet the conditions to qualify for HIPC. In this light, the current GPRS has taken off where the previous government ended.

At the time, the major challenges included: weak national ownership, unrealistic implementation strategies and inadequate financing. The current GPRS has been formulated with these challenges in mind in specific relation to addressing them and instituting a broad-based consensus among government, civil society, private sector and development partners.24

The main aims of the GPRS are to ‘ensure sustainable equitable growth, accelerated poverty reduction and the protection of the vulnerable and excluded within a decentralized, democratic environment’.25 Everyone we talked to agreed that the NPP Government is committed to the GPRS and the major priority is infrastructure development with Road construction as one of the top on the list of priorities. By opening up the rural areas through road construction, there is the thinking that it will provide an incentive and enable rural people have access to the market. Linked with this is assistance to the agricultural sector – especially the food crop growers. The help provided will be geared at improving productivity and thus, cocoa farmers have received help in the area of spraying their cocoa and a credit scheme has been set up. For rural dwellers, cooperative and income generation credits, and women are targets.

From the discussions held with the Technical Advisers in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional Integration, it is clear that the GPRS also focuses on social services including the need to address the inequality in education and health, and access to drinking water and training. While the will and commitment to implement the GPRS are apparent, there are obstacles to implementing the programme. Time, resources and capacity are lacking for the implementation of this three-year programme.

Titled ‘Agenda for Growth and Prosperity’, the two volume document explains the thematic priority areas, namely a) Macro-economic Stability b) Increased Production and Gainful Employment c) Human Resources Development and

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25 GPRS, p. 16
Provision of Basic Services d) Special programmes for the Vulnerable and the Excluded and e) Good Governance in Volume 1 and the costings and financing of the programmes and projects are contained in Volume II.

The total cost of the GPRS is estimated to be US$112.6 million allocated over the five thematic areas as follows: Thirteen per cent for programmes geared towards ensuring macro-economic stability (which really focuses on reducing and restructuring the domestic debt burden and flat allocation of HIPC first tranche to every district in the country), 36 per cent for enhancing production and gainful employment whilst 42 per cent is for enhancing human resources development and efficient and equitable provision of basic social services. Seven per cent of the total cost is for developing and implementing special programmes for the vulnerable and the excluded, and about 3% for pursuing and supporting activities and institutional reforms that enhance good governance.26

Due to what has been described as ‘resource and capacity constraints’, GoG has identified medium term priorities to be implemented over a three-year period – 2002 – 2004. These include: infrastructure development, which will focus on ‘road construction particularly feeder road networks into agricultural communities’, according to officials; modernization of agriculture and rural development with a focus on rice and cassava production under a presidential initiative; improvement of social services with particular emphasis to health and education; good governance and private sector development. The cost of this medium term priority programmes is estimated to be $2401 million to be financed mainly from GoG’s revenues including savings from the HIPC initiative.

6.2.1. Highlights of the GPRS Priorities

i. Wealth Creation and Privatisation

Under this Government, there seems to be an emphasis on private sector development as engine of growth. This means that there is no difference between what the NDC did and what is being done except that the NPP is bent on promoting what it calls ‘Property Owning Democracy’. To a large extent, the NPP’s privatisation process is a continuation from where the NDC left off. For example, the Airport Cargo Handling has been privatised; at the Port, some terminals have also been privatised; private participation in Telecommunication has been on the increase and there has seen a significant rise in the number of telephone users. There are now four new mobile telephone operators with the subscriber base growing from 31,000 in early 1999 to 55,000 by early 2000 but landline telephone subscriber base is still woefully inadequate at 4 lines per 1000. There is an attempt to introduce private participation in Railways as well as Water corporation. In all these, foreign companies will play a big role, as local businesses and investors cannot adequately compete.

26 GPRS, Volume II, p.1
One major headache facing the NPP government is the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR). In addition to political reasons, the government cannot easily privatise it because of its high indebtedness to domestic sources. For example, in 2001 the government took over part of TOR’s indebtedness to the banking system by converting 979 billion cedis into 3-5 years bonds. Currently, the Bank of Ghana remains exposed to the Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) to the sum of c0.9 trillion cedis on account of a margin deposit placed with GCB on behalf of TOR. As long as TOR is incapable of financing crude oil imports from its own resources, this situation will continue.27

Ghana Airways is another headache for the government as it also owes nearly $160 million to various trade creditors and lenders and has even defaulted on debt payments. Nationwide of South Africa is interested but there are doubts as to whether it has the expertise and equipment to provide the long-term recovery of the airline. The privatisation of Ghana Airways will remain a contentious issue since most Ghanaians are not happy with the privatisation of what is considered the only national asset and pride left.

Since most government owned enterprises have been privatised, Ghana Airways, remains a great source of pride, and has been since independence. Most Ghanaians would rather see it remain under state control or at least in Ghanaian hands. The government's attempts to privatise Ghana Airways through the back door, and hand it over the South African company has therefore generated a lot of debate about the NPP's disregard for Ghanaian assets. This is comparable the attempts by the NLC regime to private the state owned pharmaceutical company in 1966. Under public condemnation and opposition, the NLC had to back down. Even though the NPP is likely to proceed, for a long time to come, the privatisation of Ghana Airways will come to haunt this government.

The privatisation of water has been greeted with public outcry and the battle goes on. This will also become a contentious issue when problems related to health, hygiene, and inaccessibility of water to the poor becomes an issues. For the moment, groups like ISODEC remain the most vocal opponents of the water privatisation issues. However, others like the Community development and Advocacy Centre (CODAC) are also looking at the health and social implications of the privatisation on children and women in Ghana.

Some NGOs and civil society organisations have also pointed out that the government has plans to privatise land reserves, and government controlled land. There are no firm plans on this yet, but it is clear that land privatisation is likely to be limited to land not under customary or paramount chiefs' control.

According to some observers, local businesses will not benefit from the privatisation exercises because they lack the financial resources to do so. It is not clear as to how far the government’s Business Assistance Fund will go in helping local businesses develop.

6.2.2. Critique of the GPRS process

Although, GoG has laid out its priorities with some clarity on GPRS and, officials, especially the technical advisers display a high level of synergy and coordination; they also expressed their concerns about the challenges posed by poor capacity with regards to meeting the medium term objectives that have been clearly outlined. This is a serious issue to which we need to return with regards to this mid-term review of the government’s policy implementation. It is however important to review the GPRS in the context of ownership – in terms of consultation on poverty diagnosis and institutionalized mechanisms for accountability and government’s commitment to continued involvement of civil society.

With regards to consultation, the GPRS team explained that their definition of poverty came from thirty-six community studies in six of Ghana’s ten regions. After arriving at the thematic priorities, the team went back to the stakeholders to corroborate if the thematic priorities accurately reflected the input earlier made by them. While the extent of the consultation was not generally questioned, there has been criticism that the distribution of the GPRS benefits does not reflect the results of the poverty survey according to which certain regions like the north are the poorest. In response to this alleged lack of spatial distribution of funds and benefits, Advisers in the Ministries made it clear that the funds could not be distributed according to the results of the poverty survey for political reasons. If they went strictly by the results of the poverty survey, then regions like Central Accra would not get anything. This would have been politically damaging for the NPP.

While it is difficult to accurately measure the degree of input made by the ordinary people into the GPRS debate, one could actually say that their ability to influence the GPRS outcome appeared relatively minimal. The evidence from the Ghanaian media would appear to suggest that this was not even a priority issue for the people. Second, there was a common tendency to relate all debates about economic reform and poverty reduction to the HIPC controversy, a tendency which obfuscated a clear understanding of issues relating to GPRS from the media perspective. There was however another problem with media coverage of the administration. Having seen itself as playing a critical role in the exit of the NDC government, there is a sense in which the media has engaged in a level of self-censorship in relation to the administration. With the exception of the FM radio stations where free ranging debates about government performance were regular, it was difficult to get the sense of a countervailing independent thought on issues relating to GPRS in the media.

The same however cannot be said of organized labour, the business chamber of commerce, the non-governmental sector and women’s organizations. Yet, even in these sectors where efforts were made to raise issues and engage in debates on GPRS, the written positions of these constituencies often conflict with the little overt resistance displayed against the Government position in reality. It may well be that they were broadly in agreement with the views held...
in government, presumably because the views originally belonged to these stakeholders. Yet one issue that appeared to put things into perspective in the course of this study was water privatization. Whereas the TUC had officially endorsed water privatization, the local Union representing water corporation staff was vehemently opposed to it and sections of the social forces – such as Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) were also opposed. This of course raises the question about the relationship between the TUC leadership and the wider labour movement.

This phenomenon has also been played out in relation to GPRS. In TUC’s official views on the GPRS, the TUC criticized what it perceived as a ‘creation of appearance of broader consultations between government and civil society’, which is not the reality. Contrary to this, it identified two processes in tandem – the political relations and policies that are being established between the GoG and the Boardroom in Washington (read World Bank and IMF) and the appearance of broad consultations in civil society.\(^{28}\) Apart from the nature of the consultation, the TUC also raised concern about the funding uncertainty surrounding GPRS. It then wondered if the consultations were not just a case of showing ‘evidence’ to the Fund and the Bank rather than a genuine commitment to broad consultation with civil society.

Apart from process issues, TUC also criticized the ‘excessively monetarist and fiscal pre-occupation which prevents the policy framework from addressing the real roots of poverty and thereby developing policy instruments that tackle poverty on a systemic basis…we should not make a fetish of macro-economic stability, especially when such stabilization policies have not yielded any significant social and economic benefit to the masses that suffer most from these policies’. Following on from this general criticism, the TUC then highlighted a number of areas of particular interest to the Congress. These included: adoption and application of labour standards; promotion of equity through tackling the problem of low salaries and wages; tax policies that demonstrates commitment to poverty reduction; spatial distribution of new investments; opposition to the privatization of social security arrangements; involvement of the poor in the design and implementation of the GPRS with a specific focus on Food crop growers and women and capacity building for implementation.\(^{29}\)

Although the above critique was rendered in September 2001, by the time we met the representatives of the TUC in September 2002, the criticism was largely muted and the impression given was that organized labour broadly endorses the full GPRS document. Now, it may well be that the earlier concerns raised by the workers’ representatives have been fed into the final document and indeed some of them have been visibly incorporated – for example the focus of the Presidential Special Initiative on rice and cassava growers as well as women.

\(^{28}\) Views of the Trades Union Congress (Ghana) on GPRS, op-cit, p.2
\(^{29}\) p.9, ibid.
It may however also be a reflection of the warmth between organized labour and the government of the day. A recent study of the relationship between organized labour and previous governments, has however argued that the answer lies ‘partly in the fact that, …the Industrial Relations Act of 1958 and succeeding legislation had turned TUC into an arm of the State, dependent on the State and in turn dominating the national and local unions and rendering industrial actions practically impossible.’

Again, while the above may indeed be true, our own findings revealed a more pernicious problem. Although the TUC was in its public utterances opposed to the ‘nature of consultation’ and the eventual ‘outcome’ of the PRSP ‘broad consultation’, there was no blueprint articulating in any comprehensive manner the alternative vision to what was being criticized by organized labour except the 10-page critique referred to above. The TUC’s capacity to do this was severely limited. A visit to the Economic Research Department showed how limited the research capacity was to rudimentary data gathering, economic and policy analysis capacity. Indeed, one got the impression that the TUC Economic Research Department at the time of our visit had become a receptacle for international labour movement’s data gathering exercise, rather than focusing on issues that seemed of pressing importance to the Ghanaian workers. To this end, policy makers are of the view that Labour has not really lived up to expectation as an effective member of The Tripartite Committee.

Yet, if organized labour’s response to the GPRS has not demonstrated any coordinated strategy, the political parties have even proved more incoherent. The official opposition party – the National Democratic Congress - has proved less interested in the debate surrounding the GPRS. This is partly due to the fact that they are not in any way fundamentally opposed to the ideas and ideology that informed the making of the GPRS.

For example, in the party manifesto leading up to the 2000 election, NDC endorsed the idea of a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) as the main lending instrument in place of Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in its 2000 party manifesto. It based this endorsement on the ‘fairly successful’ poverty reduction programmes, which saw the percentage of Ghanaians classified as poor fell by 8.2% between 1992 and 1998.

For the period 2001 – 2005, NDC promised to ‘expand and deepen the implementation of an integrated approach to poverty alleviation’. It highlighted availability of social facilities, education, jobs and income generation ventures for the poor as priority items. Complementary programmes will also focus on agriculture and food security, small businesses, rural and urban development and social safety nets. Also, the manifesto specifically promised to freeze new releases into the ‘Poverty Alleviation Fund of the District Assemblies Common Fund and the money loaned out will be recovered through a revolving loan

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scheme operated to continue the Fund’s operations.\footnote{ibid} Perhaps this explains why NDC parliamentarians have been generally supportive of the government’s GPRS since the full paper is not markedly different from the original intentions of the NDC as contained in their manifesto.

Although the NPP and its earlier Busia-Danquah tradition has been pro-market and pro economic reform since its founding and thus has little difficulty convincing the IFIs of their commitment to an agenda for economic liberalisation, it is fair to say that the basis for current reform had been laid by the (P) NDC government which earned Ghana the sobriquet of ‘Africa’s adjustment miracle kid’ in Washington. The fact that the eventual product failed to meet the hype surrounding Ghana’s commitment to the reform agenda mattered little. The smaller minority parties have demonstrated even less focus on issues relating to GPRS, except in a platitudinous manner, save the erstwhile National Reform Party.\footnote{See section on political parties and the CPP Activists’ Platform in the Appendix.}

Civil society institutions are however quick off the mark in the debate. Non-governmental policy think tanks were able to collect and collate opinions, which provided independently verifiable information that could be used in countering the one-sided view on people’s attitude to Poverty and market reform.\footnote{See Afrobarometer Survey on Ghana at: \url{www.afrobarometer.org}} Of the many civil society organisations that have focussed on these issues, ISODEC stands out as the most consistent.

**6.2.3. Potential Constraints in GPRS Implementation**

Leaving aside the alleged ‘lack of broad consultation’, the NPP government’s demonstrable commitment to the GPRS and the overall reform agenda will still suffer from a number of institutional constraints. Many of these constraints will undermine the high level of coordination and synergy evident in the manner the technocrats in charge have managed the process if not speedily and comprehensively addressed. These include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:

a) **Institutional/Role clarification problems:** The present Government inherited several bureaucratic problems. Top among these is the perennial need for role clarification and institutional coordination between Economic Planning and Finance Ministries. Further, under the NDC government, there was no functional relationship between the Bank of Ghana (BOG) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). This was partly caused by the fact that there was a problem between the President and the Minister of Finance – and both were not on speaking terms. Since the inception of the current Government, efforts have been made to improve these relationships, which are crucial to the implementation of the GPRS and general management of the economy. This has been the case with advisers and other senior staff of these two ministries who meet on the regular basis to compare notes. Relations have also improved between the BOG and MOF to the extent that the latter gets regular (almost daily) reports on the state of finance from the BOG.
b) **Capacity constraints:** Perhaps the most critical of the capacity problem is that of capacity within the economic management team and the macro-economic team – the Economic Policy Coordinating Committee (EPCC). Unlike in the previous PNDC regime where the distinction between ‘politicians’ and ‘technocrats’ was often blurred in with the trio of Drs Joseph Abbey (the adjustment czar), Dr Kwesi Botchway, the Secretary of Finance and the Deputy Secretary for Finance, Amissah-Arthur Paa-Kwesi playing all sides, what is evident in the current government is that while the Senior economic management team, whilst technically competent, appear to leave the detailed work to the critical members of the macro-economic team – the Head of the GPRS group now based in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional Integration, the Special Assistant to the Finance Minister, the Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, are mostly technocrats. Although clearly politically savvy, what came through in discussions with the team was a high level of clarity about where things were headed. The confidence they display is infectious around government establishment and conveyed the impression that they had a relatively free hand to determine the shape of things as long as it fitted into the overall framework.

Another point to note is the small and homogenous nature of the team – they are mainly Ashanti – and clearly neo-liberal in outlook. Yet they also display a huge sense of economic nationalism, which might appear incompatible with the broader outlook of the party in government. For example, they emphasise the critical importance of having a document that is ‘Ghanaian’, not one imposed from outside. To this end, they narrated how they were able to win the argument on the need to offset domestic debts through PRSP funding as a mechanism for poverty reduction. The effort to also adopt road infrastructure as a key medium term priority was another issue that generated initial disagreement but which was also accepted by the IFIs.

Even if the competence of this team is not in doubt, their readiness to stay the course of the administration remains very much in doubt. For example, the Head of the GPRS team came on leave of absence from the Howard University and plans to return after two years in office. The Special Assistant to the Finance Minister is in the same boat. This has serious implications for the programme implementation. In addition to the problems of retaining this core team, of the 42 positions that are currently vacant within the GPRS context, only 12 have been filled.

Second, there is the lack of trained human resources, a factor compounded by tensions between serving civil servants and Ministers or NPP Advisers. For example, the level of competence and skilled capacity is also very low. In the office of the Auditor-General, a statutory body responsible for auditing the Central and Local Administrations, Public Corporations, and various sub-vented organisations in addition to the country’s Foreign Exchange in and outside Ghana, there are only four professional accountants. The office of the Comptroller and Accountant General’s Department has only two qualified
Moreover, there is lack of adequate equipment and often many of the people employed with IT skills may not necessarily have knowledge of accounting packages.

The NPP government has responded to the lack of skills base and capacity in the interim by filling key positions with Consultants, most of who have been hurriedly recruited from American Universities and Colleges or from the exile community. The government's use of Consultants also creates tension between them and serving civil servants who are poorly paid. The government argues that the civil service had been politicised under the NDC era. Basically, the NPP regarded most civil servants as pro-Rawlings. This was confirmed when some civil servants hid old files and opened new ones to cover up for cases of corruption or incompetence. Clearly, the NPP could not trust some of them.

c.) Problems with the Civil Service: Yet, what could have eased this capacity constraint is the utilisation of the civil servants a lot more. Yet, support for the work of the Macro-economic team from the top and middle levels of Government was weak and even where competence was not the problem, commitment to the party was seen as paramount. Since, quite a number of these senior civil servants had been in service throughout the (P)NDC days, the NPP found it very difficult to count on their loyalty.

Besides the issue of loyalty though, there were the usual civil service problems: service insecurity, poor pay, erosion of tenure and frequent changes in regime and policy direction, all of which produced a situation where the civil servants are neither trusted to serve the government of the day, or are unwilling or unable to place their expertise and knowledge at their disposal. The implication of this is clearly that the key members of the team are severely overstretched. Yet, attempts by government to recruit consultants and highly competent staff at a level higher than the civil service grade with adequate incentives to enable them to accept the offer, there has been to date powerful resistance from the civil service bureaucracy to allow these people come from outside the service. The economic reform team however insists that the situation with the civil service is improving and both teams are keen to ensure the success of the GPRS.

d.) Financing delays: In terms of financing, the government currently relies on funds from ‘on-going poverty-related projects, HIPC savings, GOG sources, donor support and non-traditional sources to finance the projects, programmes and activities under the GPRS’. In private, Government Advisers acknowledge worries about the delays in the release of donor funds/support upon which GPRS is dependent to a large extent. Out of the HIPC funds, about 20% goes to domestic debt repayment and the rest will go towards GPRS projects.

36 GPRS, p. vii
The implications of the above for GPRS implementation are not difficult to imagine. Indeed, The Economic Intelligence Unit had predicted as far back as July 2002 that ‘implementation of the GPRS is likely to encounter setbacks because of the poor capacity of the civil service’. It argues that ‘most, if not all of the privatizations planned for this year will not happen until 2003’, but the macro-economic team insist that everything that they are doing is on course. Indeed, it certainly appears to us as we talked to various government functionaries that there is an underlying strategy to start implementation of the noticeable reform projects a year to the election in the expectation that people will acknowledge this, and ignore the unmet needs of the past two years.

What this ignores, even if true is the unforeseen crisis that increasing inequality and depth of poverty can trigger if poverty reduction programmes are ignored, especially in the contest over resources among the districts. The Dagbon crisis in Northern Ghana (see above) probably underscores the importance of ‘securing the state’ in the wider sense of the security complex which has been discussed above.
7.0. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Ghana is still experiencing some shocks in its political economy in the country’s attempt to deal with its post-military, prolonged authoritarian past. While alternation of power is seen to have helped in the consolidation of the democratic process, there are fears that severe security problems triggered by lack of access to resources might create further security challenges. Commentators often cite the Dagbon crisis in Northern Ghana as the touchstone of this issue. Nevertheless, the present government appears to have a strong appreciation of the place of security and economic revitalisation in the country’s growth and developmental process. It also displays an understanding of the holistic approach that is required to deal with the multifaceted nature of the security challenges it faces, although its responses are often too personality-driven, rather than institutionally focused, placing democratic governance of the security issue as an issue in dire need of attention. That said, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy incorporates this holistic vision by setting out the priorities of the GoG in a clear and concise manner and also providing costings.

2. Government policies to redress poverty and other socio-economic concerns have just reached the implementation stages. Progress made so far is commendable, but challenges remain. Given the limited resources and the uncertainty of foreign injection of support and the scale and diversity of the challenges, GoG’s macro-economic strategies have received commendation from critical constituencies, although many are still worried about the feasibility of timely implementation given the severe capacity constraints that GoG is experiencing.

3. Clearly, the internal threats that Ghana has to confront are potentially dangerous. Many of them have to do with who lost power, who has gained power and who is wielding power. In dealing with them, Government has to adopt an institutional approach that does not paint its actions are patently partisan. There is no doubt that there are concerns about the investigations into past human rights violations as well as with the restructuring within the security sector and the anti-corruption investigations. Although these are steps that have proved popular with the people, care has to be taken to ensure that actions do not undermine the human rights and fundamental freedom of citizens. The danger of a heavy handed approach to internal security, given the paranoia that has attended recent statements by former President Rawlings, is that the Government risks destroying the very values it is trying to protect. Yet, there is always the risk of doing little, in which the GoG fails to provide even the minimum security requirements demanded by citizens. This certainly has featured in the response in the media to rising crime and insecurity.

4. Ghana is in an unstable region that poses a number of direct and indirect threats. The threat from the neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire given recent crisis is by far the most critical. For example, Ghana is one of the neighbours of Cote d’Ivoire; they share ethnic groups and there are a lot of Ghanaian
migrant labourers in the country. If the situation in Cote d’Ivoire worsens and becomes protracted as we have seen with the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Ghana could be flooded with refugees. In addition, Ghanaian migrant labourers, some of whom have lived in that country for more than three decades will be forced to return home with their families. This will impinge upon the economy of Ghana and possibly affect safety and security, disease and poverty. Currently, there are roughly 25,000 Liberian refugees in the Buduburam refugee Camp near Accra. Others have settled in different parts of the country unaccounted for. Already the Ghanaian economy cannot cater for these refugees and therefore the arrival of more refugees could cause social upheaval and lead to increasing xenophobia in a country overburdened by its own internal problems.

5. The problems with Togo, albeit resolved at the level of the two presidents, given their rapprochement, is by no means totally removed. Equally, threats to internal security from armed robbery and small arms proliferation emanating from the anarchic circumstances in the sub-region over the past decade indicate the longer-term impact of these external problems. Although Ghana is fully engaged in the efforts made at the sub-regional level to address regional instability and promote integration, there is a case to be made for a coherent and coordinated security policy response. Relations with the sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria is very crucial in this respect. Having a Ghanaian at the helm of affairs in ECOWAS – the sub-region’s main inter-governmental organisation should also have a bearing on Ghana’s continued commitment to regional integration.

5. Governance is at the core of all the concerns raised above. The success of GoG’s democratisation and decentralisation programmes, and policies to improve governance and civil-military relations are as important to the overall performance of the Government as are the socio-economic performance criteria. Issues of governance loom large in all discussions of Ghana’s future, and it ought to take a more serious form of constant dialogue and consensus building, legislative advocacy and action, independent awareness-raising through institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the National Commission for Civic Education etc. All indications point towards a commitment to good governance even if a coherent strategy is still lacking and the Ghanaian authorities have already offered the country for NEPAD’s Africa Peer Review Mechanism as it secures nomination to the Heads of State Implementation Committee of NEPAD.

6. Related to the effectiveness of a governance strategy is the question of capacity. High priority should be placed on redressing the policy expertise and human resource imbalance that is critically hampering the performance of government. Although there are competent, middle level technical advisers in government, they are sometimes too overwhelmed with administrative drudgery and thus unable to concentrate on crucial thinking on policy review and formulation.
7. All of the above underscore the important point that this is a process and that there is no teleological link between alternation of power and consolidation of democracy. Yet, deepening democracy is a core requirement for building an accountable and transparent State that is answerable to its citizens and guarantee their security and development.
8.0. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The shortage of skilled expertise, trained managers and civil servants capable of operating within government machineries needs to be speedily addressed. In the short term, this has been addressed by short-term employment of consultants, but this is too short term. Alternatively, GoG needs to address the incentives base for civil servants to a level commensurate to what obtains in the private sector. It equally needs to set up a rapid response, in-country educational and training facility for middle level, career civil servants.

2. A strategic review of the security services should be carried out as soon as possible, in order to define more precisely the missions and tasks of the security forces and allocate resources accordingly. Many whimsical initiatives have been taken to professionalise and ‘right-size’ the security forces but now is the time to conduct a holistic coherence check of all aspects of the security sector. The conclusions of such a review will play a major part in ensuring that the basis of the conclusions drawn is known to all while enhancing the prospects for broad ownership of the process and democratic, civilian control of the security sector. Equally, it would once and for all help address the perennial questions of force structure and levels; autonomy of the security sector, professionalism of the armed forces, and who does what and when.

3. The Police Force remains a crucial institution in Ghana, especially in the light of increasing national insecurity around robbery, murders, domestic violence, etc. High priority should be given to funding organisational changes within the Police Force under the authority of the Interior Ministry. Although we are aware that the Police is now receiving some attention via a UNDP sponsored, and ASDR run capacity development initiative, appropriate training and technical back up for the Police can hardly be over-emphasised. Only a rapid and sustainable growth of professional police who enjoy the confidence of both local communities and the international institutions can guarantee the internal stability of Ghana and stop the proliferation of so called private security outfits, in the near to the medium term. Civil society should be increasingly involved in the debate concerning development and security in Ghana, rather than being marginalised. This is both to engender local support and to gain legitimisation.

4. Even so, this is a regional, rather than an exclusively national problem. Given the proliferation of arms and narco-drug trafficking in the sub-region and the heavy presence of soldiers of fortune, Ghana is involved at the level of ECOWAS in the development of the West African Region’s Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (WARPCO), whose objectives is to provide region-wide intelligence on criminal networks operating across West Africa and elsewhere. The challenge is to institutionalise this initiative.
5. Following the commitment that the international donor community has shown to Ghana over the last two decades, continued but better targeted support is needed to enable Ghana deepen its democracy as a mechanism for preventing conflict and building peace. It is to these set of specific ideas that we turn for elaboration. International institutions should seek out and work with local grassroots organisations, women's groups, youth groups, etc to build a national coalition for governance and democracy issues nationally. This role should not be left to professional civil society groups with no links to the rural areas, and groups outside mainstream civil society groups.

6. The GoG and donor agencies need to pay particular attention to the prevailing poverty situation in the country because of the serious security risks it poses to the democratic transition. While the NPP government is currently focused on winning certain constituencies such as the Ashanti and Eastern regions for electoral purposes, its attitude towards the North is worrying. According to its poverty survey, this is the most deprived of the regions in Ghana but it is insignificant in terms of electoral votes, it looks like little attention is being paid to it.

7. The North (3 northern regions) have the highest poverty levels in Ghana, have the highest number of civil and political conflicts, and remain one of the greatest sources of political instability in Ghana today. Most people we spoke to agreed that for political stability and human security to be guaranteed, the North should be targeted for massive poverty eradication schemes concentrating on organisations, and groups working at the grassroots level. A greater study of the current impact and poverty levels in the North will help in this exercise. It would be important to examine the impact of the work by existing international and local groups like Action Aid, Oxfam, Network of Northern NGOs in order to determine new areas of engagement with these and other groups such as the Regional House of Chiefs and Community development organisations.
8.1. CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

As Ghana enters the implementation phase of its Poverty Reduction Strategy, it is important to monitor the process of implementation closely to ensure that the GPRS meets the identified targets. A few recommendations seem appropriate based on our own discussions with critical stakeholders on the kind of improvements that can make assistance work better for the country.

a) Cautious support in small amount - In several of our conversations, the point was repeatedly made that some groups and government agencies are over-subscribed by the donor community. Indeed, some donors and Ghanaians alike have cautioned as to the dangers of too much money to too few players, be they in government or civil society. In no case should donor funding – replace programming that government agencies should be providing as part of their statutory responsibilities. Donors should also seek new and more effective grassroots groups outside Accra and the centres of power.

b) Aligning and expanding menu of work: The International donor community must make a concerted effort to align its menu of work with Ghana’s priorities: Capacity building to meet the challenges of consolidation and growth; security sector reform; national reconciliation and building of a democratic culture to mention a few. There is widespread impression that donors come with their own agenda and are often not willing to realign their ideas with local interests.

c) Improving coordination: A concomitant issue is the extent of coordination among the donors themselves. It is of vital importance that the donors improve information sharing.

d) Attention to regional and spatial distribution: Donor programmes should always strive to look further than the Greater Accra region, and in venturing further a-field, should seek for regional and gender balance.

e) Altering the practice of aid: Donors in Ghana need to expand their notion of accountability to embrace not only their home constituencies and the Ghana Government, but also a broader Ghanaian public. We recommend that donors jointly pledge to raise their levels of transparency in their own work in country by:

i.) publishing their annual programme plans in local and national newspapers
ii.) holding annual press conferences to discuss performance and future plans
iii.) making expenditure accounts publicly available
iv.) making programme information available on request;
v.) identifying clear performance indicators;
vi.) broader use of Ghanaian expertise, when available, and more sensitive use of foreign consultants, when necessary.
Some institutions are already doing many of the things in the list, but they need to become acceptable practice among all players.
APPENDIX I

PERSONALITIES INTERVIEWED

Professor George Gyan-Baffour – National Development Planning Commission
Kyeretwi Opoku - National Reform Party
Kwesi Pratt - Weekly Insight/CPP
Prof. Kwame Karikari - Media Foundation for West Africa
Mr Adu Amankwah – TUC General Secretary
Dr. Nasser - Lecturer and Spokesman for Andani Gate
Mr Kojo Yankah, Consultant to the Asantehene
Professor Akilagpa Sawyer
Dr Amos Anyimadu – University of Ghana, Legon
Prof. Eboe Hutchful - ASDR
Mr Roger Oppong Koranteng - Ghana Institute for Public Administration
Mr Charles Abugre - ISODEC
Mr Linus Atarah - Third World Network
Dr Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, ASDR
Mr Iddrisu Siddiq – United Nations Development Programme
Ms Tracey Herbert – Democracy & Governance Programme, USAID

MPs

Hon Hawa Yakubu – (NPP)
Hon Darko-Mensah – (NPP) Chair, Committee on Defence and Interior
Hon J.E.Ackah – (NDC) Ranking Member, Committee on Defence and Interior
Hon Moses Asaga – (NDC) Ranking Member, Finance Committee

NGOs/CIVIL SOCIETY

African Security Dialogue & Research (ASDR)
Community Development and Advocacy Centre (CODAC)
Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA)
Ghana Centre for Democratic Development – G-CDD
Integrated Social Development Centre - ISODEC
Mata-N-Tudu – MtM
Socialist Forum
Third World Network (TWN)
Women Development Agency (WDA)

This is a partial list of the people interviewed by us in the course of the study. For understandable reasons, many of the people who gave us information did not want to be identified. Even where we have used such information obtained from undisclosed sources, we have ensured that we have other citable references.