EVALUATION OF ODA/DFID SUPPORT TO THE POLICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SYNTHESIS STUDY

VOLUME I

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

1. This report synthesises the findings and lessons learnt from ODA/DFID support to the police in developing countries over the last 10 years. It reviews the evolution of policy on support to the police, evaluates the effectiveness of this support in promoting the development of efficient, effective, accountable and community-based police forces and assesses its impact on the achievement of wider criminal justice and good government goals.

2. The evaluation was undertaken primarily as a desk based study by three consultants, using ex-post evaluation studies of three major projects undertaken by DFID’s Evaluation Department, material collected on a number of other police projects, expenditure data provided by DFID and bibliographic research. The consultants visited S. Africa to collect documentary material, interview stakeholders and visit projects. Interviews with other key actors were also conducted.

3. The evaluation process was guided by three major questions:
   - When should DFID be involved in policing projects?
   - How are the police necessary to the achievement of DFID’s goals?
   - To what extent have projects been able to achieve effective policing?

4. The report concludes that support to build effective and democratic police can make a strong contribution to DFID’s wider policy goals of the achievement of order, security, human rights and access to justice. However, in achieving this, support to the police must not be seen in isolation and much greater commitment by partners to these goals will be necessary. In particular, effective policing requires the formation of partnerships with civil society, especially those groups who are most vulnerable to crime or the abuse of rights. This will involve a more inclusive and proactive approach to policing, equity and justice and a recognition that pro-poor policing may divert resources away from more traditional areas of police activity or the protection of wealthy or dominant groups.

FINDINGS

Policy and Policy Evolution

5. Lead responsibility for assistance to Commonwealth and foreign police forces was transferred from the FCO to ODA in 1992. Until then, most assistance was given on an ad hoc basis in response to one-off requests for technical training in operational skills or material aid. There were a small number of projects which either aimed at improvements in the overall standard of police management and/or sought to help

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1 For the sake of brevity, the report will uses DFID, rather than ODA/DFID, especially when referring to continuities in policy and practice covering the period before and after the change of name in May 1997.
rebuild police forces after protracted periods of internal conflict. Some of these projects justified support to the police in terms of its assumed contribution to creating a climate of order and security in which economic development could take place. (Section 2. 4-8).

6. Following the transfer support to the police was linked more explicitly to the achievement of good government goals. Themes such as effectiveness, openness, accountability were stressed, with a stronger emphasis on community policing and the need for attitude change amongst the police. (Section 2. 9-13) By 1996/7 commitments for police projects had grown substantially. (Section 2.14 and Annex C). Since the election of a new government, there have been two major developments in the evolution of policy. First, a growing awareness of the interdependence of the police both within the wider criminal justice system and with the nature of political society and the state. Second, a recognition that the poor and the vulnerable suffer disproportionately from crime and ineffective policing and that freedom from crime, personal safety, protection of rights and access to justice are essential aspects of a pro-poor development policy. (Section 2. 15-17).

7. From the review of the evolution of policy and management arrangements, the report extracts a number of key themes which are used to focus an evaluation of the extent to which projects have achieved immediate and longer term goals. (Section 2. 18-36) These are: responsibility for policy and project implementation (Section 2. 36 and 37 and Section 3), institutional development (Section 2. 19-22 and Section 4); policing and good government (Section 2. 24-30 and Section 5. 6-19), policing, equity and poverty (Section 2. 31-34 and Section 5. 20-32).

Responsibility for Policy and Project Implementation

8. In developing policy and strategic frameworks for support to the police and in project design and implementation there have been problems both of congruence between major stakeholders and of defining areas of management responsibility. (Section 2. 36 and Section 3)

9. There have been differences in perspectives and priorities between the FCO and DFID. Embassies and High Commissions have tended to focus on diplomatic and political issues, DFID on developmental impact. (Section 3. 3-6). There have been problems of congruence between project teams, local police forces and DFID itself over both aims and what is required to meet these aims. This has particularly concerned the place of community policing but also the balance of aid between ‘advice’ and material assistance. (Section 3. 7-9). Most of the earlier projects were designed and implemented without any full stakeholder analysis, in particular the needs and interests of poorer and more vulnerable groups were neglected; however more recent projects have involved a relatively widespread process of consultation (Section 3. 11 and 12).

10. Some projects witnessed major management problems in terms of the relationship between project teams and ODA. (Section 3. 14-17). There have also been problems both with open selection procedures and in providing effective induction and
professional support for TCOs, the majority of whom have had no prior experience of working in developing countries (Section 3.18-21).

Institutional Development

11. Institutional development, especially through strengthening training and improving organisation and systems, has been the main component of police projects. The evaluations regard much of this work as very successful. In some cases forces have been rebuilt almost from scratch while, in all, major obstacles originating in colonialism and neo-colonialism, including strong para-military emphases and alienation from citizens, have had to be faced. (Section 4.1-3)

12. High level training in the UK has now been largely discontinued by DFID, for good reasons, though there is still a useful place for specialised training in the UK and short attachments to police forces. There remain problems of appropriateness and sustainability of the in-country training and organisational development supported through TCOs. (Section 4.4-10). Training aimed to increase police respect for human rights and public respect for the police, though now included in curricula, is given low priority in practice as compared with concern for increasing crime. (Section 4.12-14) Gender issues remain generally neglected in police projects, both in terms of strengthening recruitment and promotion of women and in terms of supporting female and child victims (Section 4.8 and 9).

13. Equipment and infrastructure available to some forces are chronically inadequate, but there is disagreement between stakeholders on the role of aid in redressing these defects. In some cases they clearly limit the effectiveness of non-material aid. (Section 4.14-17).

14. Strong criticism was expressed by evaluators of ad hoc approaches and a lack of strategic planning, both in project design and in on-going management of police forces, coupled with widespread limitations of information needed for planning, monitoring and evaluation. These major weaknesses were most apparent in earlier projects, though not confined to them. In addition to damaging projects themselves, these limitations made it especially difficult for evaluators to reach firm judgements on effectiveness. (Section 4.18 and 22). Institutional development efforts are liable to be negated by the informal culture of police forces and by lack of commitment to just and democratic policing. (Section 4.26-32).

Policing and Good Government

15. DFID support for policing is justified in terms of its perceived contribution to the achievement of wider UK development assistance goals. A basic premise has been that effective policing contributes significantly to law and order, stability, safety and security which are essential pre-conditions for economic and social development.

16. There are a number of problems with such an assumption. First, the debate on the relationship between crime, social order and the economic and social transformations considered characteristic of development is inconclusive. (Section 5.2-5). Second,
the extent to which the police are an essential functional pre-requisite of social order can be questioned. Making a distinction between ‘the police’ and ‘policing’, allows us to note that while ‘policing’ is universal and can be carried out by many different groups, ‘the police’ is an essentially modern institution. DFID projects have largely ignored the presence and role of many other traditional and communal institutions involved in the maintenance of social order. (Section 5. 6-8).

17. Accountability is one of the major principles of democratic policing. However, the issue of accountability, except in the narrower terms of community policing, has received little attention in police projects. There is evidence that DFID is now beginning to recognise the extent to which the development of accountable and open policing is dependent on the wider issue of the legitimacy and accountability of the state itself. (Section 5. 9-14)

18. Despite seeing community policing as a special UK contribution to developing more accountable and accessible policing, DFID has only recently begun to clarify its own approach to community policing and much of its implementation has reflected the perspectives of individual project teams. (Section 5.14). The circumstances under which community policing was implemented presented unusual difficulties: emergence from internal conflict, little tradition or experience of policing by consent or of accountability to the public. (Annex F)

19. There have been problems in engaging the full support of police forces for community policing. Senior management have been concerned that community policing, whilst useful in image terms, could undermine their effectiveness in combating crime. Despite relatively successful training inputs, there has been a failure, by many forces, to grasp that community policing requires a radical change in police-public relationships. Frequently, the police have wished to involve the public on terms set by themselves and, in many projects, there have been limited attempts to secure the participation of all stakeholders. (Section 5. 15 and 16 and Annex F).

20. In general, assisted police forces have been reluctant to mainstream community policing as a total approach to policing and projects have failed both to consider the needs and the interests of those most vulnerable to crime and to incorporate them fully into partnership. The South African projects show that, with relatively strong government, police and public commitment, it is possible to build effective police-public partnership institutions and begin to develop a different approach to policing. However, even here, vulnerable groups (the poor, ethnic groups, women) have been marginalised or excluded and there has been little impact on crime or public concern about safety. (Section 5. 16 and Annexes E.7 and F).

**Policing, Equity and Poverty**

21. Recent DFID policy recognises that the poor and the vulnerable suffer disproportionately from both crime and poor policing and that safety from crime and access to justice are as important as access to food, shelter, health and education. Recent World Bank studies indicate that violence and crime are now perceived as an important economic and social development issue. In this, particular importance has
been given to the way that crime and violence significantly increase the vulnerability of the poor by eroding their assets. Amongst the poor, women and children are most at risk. (Section 5. 15-16; 24-26).

22. The evaluations of older projects stress that they were deficient in addressing the needs and interests of the poor, and the vulnerable (especially women). There is mixed evidence on the extent to which more current projects are addressing these needs. (Section 5.18-22)

LESSONS LEARNT

Policy and project management

23. Many of the projects have produced evidence of a lack of congruence, throughout the project cycle, between major stakeholders: DFID and FCO in London and locally, partner governments and police forces. At times it was not been clear who was driving policy, whether agreement on project aims had been secured and who was responsible for implementation and management oversight. Such conditions are not ideal for the elaboration of consistent policy, identifying clear and realistic goals, achieving these and deriving lessons. (Section 2.38 and Section 3)

24. Apart from the developing clearer policy frameworks and more precise project goals, there is a clear need both to ensure the commitment of stakeholders to these and to widen the range of stakeholders to include ‘important’ as well as ‘influential’ stakeholders. (Section 3, 10 and 13). Despite recent improvements, there remains a need for DFID to maintain strong management leadership, especially in relation to project teams (Section 3, 4,7,17). Pressure on the time of OPAs seems to have reduced their capacity both to provide professional advice and generate and disseminate lessons. TCOs, who have little experience of overseas work, have noted inadequate briefing and professional isolation. There is a need to explore more effective ways of providing training and professional support for TCOs, matching their skills to local conditions and project aims and, finally, of enabling OPAs to spend more time on developing institutional learning. (Section 3, 20 and 21)

Institutional Development

25. Although specialist police forces are an essential component of effective criminal justice systems, there are good arguments in favour of seeking to develop relatively small, well trained organisations, efficiently and effectively focused on the dual aims of crime control and maximising public support, especially among more disadvantaged groups in society. (Section 4.20 and Annex D). Civilianisation, privatisation and use of auxiliaries merit fuller analysis than they normally receive. (Section 6.12) Careful analysis is needed of appropriate improvement of equipment and infrastructure to produce effective policing, tailored to the widely differing capacities of different societies. (Section 4.17).
26. Longer term, strategic approaches are necessary if efficient and effective policing as defined above, is to be achieved. These need to be grounded in stakeholder analysis and participatory planning, emphasising full involvement of disadvantaged groups. (Sections 3.13, 4.19). Careful development of both short term and long term indicators of effectiveness and impact are urgently required. (Section 4.22-24). Given our chronic lack of knowledge of what kinds of policing are truly effective, organisational learning through use of process projects and carefully monitored experiments is important, as well as more basic research. (Section 4.21 and Annex D). Focused effort is needed to change informal police cultures and to strengthen commitment to just and democratic policing among all sectors of society. (Section 4.30-33).

27. There is a continued place for technical assistance from the UK, provided that it is carefully fitted to the social and economic contexts of partner societies. However, it may be desirable to give priority to strengthening the promising developments in South-South co-operation which are emerging, both in creation of regional training centres and in exchanges of expertise. (Section 4.26-28).

Policing and Good Government

28. A policy framework which sees support to the police as a means to create a climate in which economic and social development can take place is based on generalisations about the pre-conditions for development and largely untestable assumptions about the role of the police. Setting such goals can lead to situations in which too much is expected from the outcome of projects which have relatively short time frames and comparatively low levels of funding. There is a need both to reconsider some of the assumptions about the potential contribution of effective and democratic policing and to consider what other institutions and processes are involved. (Section 5. 2-8)

29. One of the main ways in which DFID has sought to assist in the development of open and accountable policing has been community policing. Implementation has met with difficulties partly because there has been no consistent vision of the role that community policing should play in the overall strategic framework and partly because police forces have often been reluctant to accept relatively radical changes in policing approaches and style. A clear vision of the place of community policing and full commitment by police partners to the concept of public-police co-production of safety and order is essential (Section 4.2,10,21). Community policing must not be seen as a separate area of policing but should be developed as a style integrated into all areas of police activity in which all police are community police. (Section 4.21, Section 6.10).

30. To be effective, the police need to pursue policies which have the consent of the public, especially of the poor who are not only most vulnerable but often the most alienated from the police. (Section 6.9). Where partnerships with the public have been developed there has been a tendency for poor and vulnerable groups to be excluded and partnership institutions have, sometimes, become targets for powerful local groups and political associations who may seek to control rather than work with the police. Preventing exclusion or domination by particular interests requires careful
stakeholder analysis. (Section 4.21) Finally, more thought needs to be given to appropriate indicators of success for community policing. Whilst there is little evidence to suggest that it is directly effective in crime reduction, it may markedly contribute to increases in perceptions of safety and security and provide better protection for victims of crime. (Section 4.22 and Annex D)

31. A more holistic approach would recognise that strengthening the effectiveness of the police without addressing other parts of the formal justice system, or increasing the openness and accountability of government is likely to be unproductive in increasing access to justice. It would also recognise the role played by other ‘informal’ agencies in the maintenance of order and the settlement of disputes and the value of diversion from the formal system. (Section 4.14, 6.11) Concentrating on increasing the effectiveness of ‘professional’ justice systems is not only costly but ignores the extent to which members of the public prefer to use more traditional or communal solutions. (Section 6.12)

Policing, Equity and Poverty

32. The impact of crime is not uniform. Whilst the rich suffer from property crime, the poor suffer from both property crime and violence. The recognition that the poor and vulnerable suffer disproportionately from crime and its effects, particularly through the erosion of assets is an important step forward. In consolidating efforts to meet the needs and interests of the whole population, these groups need particular attention. (Section 5.23-26, 6.9)

33. In particular there is a need to for more local understanding of the links between crime and poverty and policing. Apart from the wider social and economic factors which contribute causally to crime, the physical environment of the poor exposes them to greater risk from crime. Preventive responses must recognise that, too often, the rich are policed preventively by a mixture of public and private policing, whilst the poor are policed reactively by the public police. (Sections 5.27-28)

34. Whilst tying support to the police more closely to reducing the impact of crime on the poor and vulnerable may lead to a more focussed policy with clearer goals, it will require diverting resources from the protection of dominant groups. Achieving this will require greater commitment by government and the police than has been the case in most projects. (Section 5.30)

35. If police projects are to move in the direction of greater integration with the rest of the justice system and address the needs and the interests of the poor and vulnerable, there will be a need to develop an integrated multi-disciplinary approach at all levels of DFID activity. (Section 6.13)
SECTION 1

BACKGROUND

1.1 From 1987/88 to 1996/97 DFID\(^2\) was involved in expenditure on projects in the police sector in some 60 countries, totalling £52 million in actual expenditure. During this period there were a number of significant changes which bear on the management and policy environment of UK support to policing.

1.2 Lead responsibility for policing was transferred from the FCO to the ODA in 1992, creating the possibility of linking aid to policing more clearly with ODA’s overall policy and strategy, particularly its good government agenda. In the following years, expenditure on good government and on police projects increased markedly. The collapse of socialism and the decline of single-party regimes provided opportunities for tying support to policing to the wider issues of accountability, justice and rights. Within the UK, the publication of the Sheehy report\(^3\) and the White Paper on police reform\(^4\) in 1993 signalled the government’s intentions to modernise British policing both by internal reform and changing the system of accountability at the level of police authorities. These gave rise to widespread debate and affected the thinking of DFID police advisors and TCOs. More recently, the election of a new government in the UK has been accompanied by a shift in policy emphasis within the renamed DFID. This has provided an impetus to sharpen the focus on the relationship between policing, security, justice and, in particular, poverty.

1.3 These changes have been accompanied by a slow move from essentially ad hoc police projects, characterised mainly by efforts to improve effectiveness and accountability through institutional strengthening, to ones which have begun to address the creation of firmer partnerships between the police, civilian authorities and local communities. The change in focus has not been unproblematic. There have been major difficulties in achieving and sustaining major changes within the police and, even more, in addressing the political, social and legal contexts within which the police operate. In addition questions have arisen about the overall nature and purpose of support for policing, especially in terms of its contribution to DFID’s wider development goals.

**Purposes of the Synthesis Evaluation Study\(^5\)**

1.4 The objectives of this synthesis evaluation study are:

- To review the evolution of ODA/DFID policy and strategy frameworks for support to the police over the past 10 years and assess the extent to which funded activities have been consistent with, and in support of these.

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\(^2\) For the purposes of brevity, the report uses DFID, rather than ODA/DFID, especially when referring to continuities in policy and practice covering the period before and after the change in designation in May 1997.

\(^3\) Sheehy, P., et al 1993 *Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards*

\(^4\) Home Office 1993 *Police Reform: A Police Service for the Twenty-first Century*

\(^5\) Detailed Terms of Reference are at Annex A
• To assess the effectiveness, strengths and weaknesses of ODA/DFID support in promoting the development of efficient, effective, accountable and community-based police forces in developing countries.
• To assess the likely impact of ODA/DFID support to police in contributing to the achievement of wider criminal justice and good government goals in recipient countries.
• To identify lessons to be learnt from experience over the past 10 years of ODA/DFID and others, of value in strengthening future DFID work in the sector.

1.5 This evaluation uses the following questions about the purpose and the nature of DFID’s involvement in policing projects as a basic focus.

When should DFID be involved in policing projects?

1.6 DFID has used a number of broad policy reasons for justifying support to the police. These have included the contribution that effective policing can make to the achievement of economic and social development, human rights, good government and, more recently, poverty elimination and equity. A basic premise appears to have been that law and order, political stability, safety and security are essential preconditions for economic and social development. However, whilst order and stability and development are linked, and the police are an indispensable part of this equation, it is by no means clear what is their precise contribution. Many police projects appear to have proceeded on the basis that improving the managerial and professional skills of the police is a sufficient means of achieving these wider goals. Beyond this, there is the question of what kinds of commitment from project partners are necessary before projects are undertaken. This includes a commitment to both good government generally and to democratic and effective policing.

1.7 The projects show that local partners do not share all of DFID’s wider objectives. In particular, senior police management have been critical of the lack of material assistance and have been less than enthusiastic in implementing concepts such as community policing which are perceived as ‘soft’ forms of policing and which may require radical changes in police culture. There has been a lack of congruence over definitions of ‘good’ and ‘effective’ policing.

How are the police necessary to the achievement of DFID’s goals?

1.8 In emphasising the contribution that the police can make to the achievement of order, security, justice and rights, DFID has tended to ignore the fact that they are only one part of the wider criminal justice system. There is a clear case to be made that strengthening the effectiveness of the police whilst the rest of the justice system is characterised by inefficiency or corruption is unproductive. DFID has also largely ignored the extent to which ‘policing’ (and the resolution of disputes) in a more general sense is carried out by many other agencies in society.
To what extent have projects been able to achieve effective policing?

1.9 Effective policing can be defined as policing which both reduces the level and the fear of crime, and is successful in achieving support from all sectors of society.\(^6\) Effective policing is not just a matter of having an effective police force. It requires forming partnerships with civil society and particularly with those in civil society who are most vulnerable to crime – the poor. Until recently, police projects have not seriously tackled the issue of the protection of the vulnerable or of developing partnerships with all sections of the public. Most of the assisted police forces are only just emerging from a style of para-military policing in which they have been isolated from the public and have seen their major role as defending the interests of political and economic elites.

Evaluation Methodology

1.10 The report has been produced on the basis of a review of DFID project documentation and wider UK government policy documents, bibliographic research and interviews and consultation with key actors within DFID and other agencies in the UK and abroad. A number of DFID police projects were analysed in detail: projects in Namibia, Uganda and Indonesia which were the subject of ex-post evaluation studies commissioned by the Evaluation Department and projects in South Africa, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Nepal, and the Caribbean.\(^7\) Data on expenditure were provided by DFID Statistics Department.

1.11 There were some difficulties in accessing relevant project documentation, much of which is held in Development Divisions abroad. In consultation within DFID and on the basis of a review of outline data on all projects supported in the period (see Annex C), a decision was made to limit the number of projects used for detailed evaluation to those listed above. The selection of projects provided coverage of both geographical areas and different types of project. Whilst this sample excluded some projects which could have provided additional insights,\(^8\) we believe that the information generated allows us to reach general conclusions.

1.12 The evaluation raised the problem of hindsight. Projects initiated in the earlier part of the period pre-dated significant shifts in DFID policy and project management. Whilst recognising the problems inherent in applying more recent criteria, we have generally taken the position that such a retrospective approach can help in the process of drawing lessons.\(^9\) At the same time it should be acknowledged that this involves

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\(^6\) The questions of what is “effective policing” and how to assess it are difficult and controversial. We need to go beyond the conventional management concept of effectiveness – success in achieving given objectives – to asking what these objectives should be. There is widespread agreement that, to be successful, the police must have some impact in controlling crime and, in addition, they must do so in ways which are seen as fair and just. Marenin’s concept of ‘good, democratic policing’ incorporates these two ideas. (See Section 5). The phrase “law and order” similarly incorporates twin objectives.

\(^7\) Documentation on Nepal and the Caribbean was provided by Development Divisions. Files on Ethiopia were consulted in London. South Africa, given its importance in terms of community policing projects was visited by the consultants to identify documentation held in DFIDSA and conduct interviews and project visits.

\(^8\) For example, larger current projects such as that in Zimbabwe, (see Annex C).

\(^9\) The ex-post evaluations of Indonesia, Namibia and Uganda took a similar position.
some unfairness in judging earlier projects, and that it indicates progress in institutional learning within DFID.

1.13 As a recent overview of international police assistance programmes notes, there is very little published material on support to policing within the context of overseas aid.\textsuperscript{10} Whilst there are some studies of US aid to the police and of international crime and policing\textsuperscript{11}, there are very few accounts or analyses of the police in developing countries. This has limited the extent to which this evaluation can contextualise UK aid to policing within the experience of other donors.

**Report Layout**

1.14 The report is organised on the basis of identifying and evaluating the evolution of policy and practice during the period under review. In so doing, it moves from an assessment of direct inputs to transform and strengthen police forces to a consideration of the contribution of such assistance to the achievement of wider policy goals.

Section 2 provides a brief account of the evolution of policy and practice on support to the police from the late 1980s and then identifies the wider themes and issues which are raised by this experience.

Section 3 reviews the problems of lack of congruence between stakeholders and absence of clarity over areas and levels of management responsibility.

Section 4 covers the main thrust of DFID policing projects which has been to enhance efficiency and effectiveness through institution building, particularly by means of training.

Section 5 deals with the complex relationship between policing and wider DFID goals: good government, economic development, equity and poverty alleviation.

Section 6 draws conclusions.

1.15 Individuals and agencies interviewed or consulted are listed in Annex B. Annex C provides a statistical analysis of the range of policing projects based on expenditure data. Annex D discusses information required for effective planning, monitoring and evaluation of policing projects. Annex E contains summaries of reports on all the projects reviewed, including the more lengthy report produced by the consultants on projects in S. Africa. Annex F examines a key aspect of UK support to policing, the development of community-based forms of policing. Annex G contains a bibliography of major documents and academic publications used in the preparation of the report.

\textsuperscript{10} Marenin, 1998.

\textsuperscript{11} See the Bibliography in Annex G.
SECTION 2

UK AID TO POLICING: POLICY AND POLICY EVOLUTION

Introduction

2.1 This section provides a general review of the evolution of DFID policy and strategy frameworks for support to the police over the past 10 years. From this, it distils a number of issues around which we later review the consistency, effectiveness and impact of policing projects and their contribution to wider criminal justice and good government goals in recipient countries.

2.2 Given the relative absence of studies and documentation on policy, this section relies heavily on the evidence of a number of projects funded by DFID and interviews with key actors. The projects include those which were the subject of ex-post evaluation studies commissioned by the Evaluation Department – Namibia, Uganda and Indonesia - as well as those which were reviewed by the consultants. Brief details of all of these projects are listed in the box below and fuller summaries and comments are contained in Annex E.12

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<th>Project</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
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<td>Indonesia:</td>
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<td>Phase 1: 1983/84 to 1989/90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free State Community policing</td>
<td>£ 1.3 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 to 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape Community policing</td>
<td>£ 1.4 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 to 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective policing</td>
<td>£ 2.4 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex E.8 also contains a summary of a Strategic Review of policing in Jamaica, which has received ad hoc UK support over a long period.
2.3 In order to set the scene for a review of policy and its evolution, we carried out a short analysis of DFID expenditure and future commitments on policing projects. Details are included in Annex C. It may be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1 below that expenditure rose steadily after the transfer of police advisers from the FCO to ODA in 1992. The bulk of expenditure has been in Africa and the Caribbean, though there was a fall for the Caribbean as a whole in the most recent period. The substantial increase for ‘other’ countries is almost all accounted for by expenditure in the West Bank and Gaza.

2.4 Annex C shows that expenditure was incurred in almost 60 countries. However, in part because technical cooperation accounts for most DFID expenditure on policing, the total is small as compared with expenditure on good government as a whole, (£235 m. in 88 countries in 1996/97), or with total DFID aid, (£2,144 m. for the same year, 50% of which was bilateral). Annex C also shows estimated future spending commitments, and it may be seen that in 1996/97 there were commitments of over £1.0 m. for each of six African and two Caribbean countries, with especially large commitments in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Jamaica.

Table 1: DFID expenditure on policing projects (£'000): three year averages, 1988/89 to 90/91, 1991/92 to 93/94 and 1994/95 to 96/97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>88/9 to 90/1</th>
<th>91/92 to 93/4</th>
<th>94/5 to 96/7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2,162</td>
<td>2,433</td>
<td>3,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,429</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,168</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,098</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Expenditure trends: Three year averages in different regions (£)
POLICY EVOLUTION

2.5 The following paragraphs provide an outline of the evolution of DFID policy on support for the police. This is broken down into three main stages.

FCO stage

2.6 In 1992 lead responsibility for assistance to Commonwealth and foreign police forces was transferred from the FCO to the ODA.\(^\text{13}\) Until the transfer a large proportion of the time of the Overseas Police Advisors (OPAs), who were sited in the FCO, was spent in arranging training for overseas police officers, providing advice to the FCO and ODA on assistance to police forces and in their role as inspectors of police forces in the Dependent Territories.\(^\text{14}\)

2.7 Most requests for assistance came through UK embassies or High Commissions and were for limited, one-off inputs in terms of technical police training in operational and professional skills. In general, the FCO was keen to offer assistance for political reasons rather than on the basis of any general policy about the role of the police and policing. The costs of training were carried by the ODA. Requests for equipment usually came through ODA programme managers to the OPAs for appraisal. Such requests and their approval were, seemingly, not based on any general policy but reflected local initiatives and priorities.

2.8 Whilst the majority of projects were small in scale, (See Annex C), there were a small number of larger projects which aimed, more generally, at improvement in the overall standards of management of the police. The Indonesia National Police Management Training Project, initiated in 1983, is an example of this approach. The project also contained the objective of assisting the creation of a less militaristic, more community-oriented style of policing based on the UK approach to policing. Community policing was to become one of the key components of DFID police support during the 1990s.

2.9 Around the time of the transfer of lead responsibility to the ODA, a more explicit emphasis on justifying support to policing as contributing to wider economic development aims emerged, in terms of creating a climate of order and security in which investment could take place. Both phases of the Uganda project (initiated in 1991 and 1993) contained objectives referring to the restoration of law and order.

\(^{13}\) Apart from project documentation, there appears to be no record of policy in this early period and an account of policy is largely reliant on the memories of actors involved at the time.

\(^{14}\) An entry in the internal Whitehall telephone directory in May 1989 summarises the role of the OPAs office at the time:

“Advice to and liaison with government departments and services on matters relating to assistance and advice to Commonwealth and foreign police forces in accordance with HMG’s overseas policy; central point in Whitehall for all enquiries on overseas police matters in which HMG has an interest; to assist in making arrangements for both regular and specialist training; to visit independent Commonwealth and foreign countries (at their request) and Dependent territories and advise on police organisational, training and equipment problems; to advise and assist in the selection of officers for service overseas”.
public confidence in the police and the creation of a situation in which other forms of aid can be effective and economic growth can occur. The Namibia project (initiated in 1990) had objectives that addressed the provision of a sound foundation for training of the police and assistance in the management of change from a para-military force to a community-based service.

2.10 Although the Indonesia, Namibia, and Uganda projects contained wider developmental aims they were all initiated through suggestions or requests channelled through the FCO and in each case the ex-post evaluation studies indicate that political or strategic, rather than development, considerations were a high priority for the FCO. The issue of FCO involvement and divergence between their aims and those of DFID is explored in Annex Section 3.

The ODA Stage

2.11 The reasons for the transfer of lead responsibility from the FCO to ODA seem to have been a mixture of pragmatism and higher policy considerations. The transfer grew out of an FCO management review in 1991 which was concerned with efficiency saving. It was also felt that, as most of the work of OPAs led to activities funded by ODA, it would be more logical to site policing advice there. At a wider level, the Minister at the time wanted to give higher priority to policing projects within ODA as part of the emerging emphasis on good government.

2.12 Following the transfer, a more explicit policy on support to policing as part of the good government agenda began to emerge. In 1993 GID placed support to policing within the wider context of good government goals, especially in relation to enhancing human rights and the rule of law. Such support was seen in terms of increasing the competence, effectiveness and probity of the police, particularly through assistance in enhancing organisational capacity, training and the provision of equipment.\(^\text{15}\)

2.13 As data in Annex C show, spending on good government increased markedly, rising from £60 million in 1991/92 to £168 million in 1994/95 to £235 million in 1996/97. Whilst spending on police projects did not increase at the same rate and actually fell as a proportion of good government spending, project objectives were more explicitly tied to this wider agenda. Key actors recollect a much increased workload for OPAs from 1994 onwards, in providing advice, assessing potential projects and in increased monitoring of existing projects.\(^\text{16}\) An internal GID review in 1995/96 considered the question of enlarging the scope and role of policing projects.

2.14 Support to policing was moving strongly away from ad hoc responses to requests for technical assistance towards more integrated projects which looked at the police as a whole. Projects were being tied more closely to themes such as openness, accountability, safety and security (and to a lesser extent, gender), with a stronger emphasis on community policing and the need for attitude change amongst the police.

\(^\text{15}\) GID, 1993 Taking Account of Good Government.
\(^\text{16}\) To a certain extent this increased workload reflected the new involvement in Eastern and Central Europe.
They were also influenced by organisational learning within ODA as a whole, including changing practices and methodologies for project preparation and management. At the same time there was relatively little evidence of learning from earlier police projects, for which systematic analysis was not available.

2.15 The impact of this more explicit policy can be seen in a number of projects initiated around this time. The Ethiopia project (initiated in 1993), which aimed to assist the establishment of a basic police force, stressed the goals of effectiveness, accountability and service delivery in line with community needs. The Nepal project (initiated 1994) stressed the development of the Nepal Police into an open and accountable service, responsive to the needs of all sectors of society and was specifically tied to the UK government’s wider objectives of supporting open and accountable government in Nepal. The two Lesotho projects (initiated in 1995) both had the goal of contributing to the development of an efficient and accountable police service to help maintain a climate conducive to social and economic development. The main projects in S. Africa (initiated in 1995/1996) had a clear emphasis on assisting the development of community policing within the context of the transformation of the South African Police Service into an accountable organisation able to operate effectively in a democratic multi-ethnic society.

2.16 By 1996/97, as data in Annex C indicate, commitments for police projects had grown substantially. Future commitments in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Jamaica were especially large, and there were also commitments of over £1 million in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

**DFID stage**

2.17 The most recent period, since the change of government in 1997, has seen a series of policy initiatives, which are placing support to policing in a much wider context. This evolution appears to have stemmed partly from lessons drawn from project experience. For example, the mid-term review of the Nepal project stresses the extent to which organisational reforms and attitudinal change within the police can be vitiated by the absence of reform in the wider criminal justice system or at the level of the state and political society.

2.18 However, central to the change has been the emerging stress within DFID on the links between development, human rights, justice, equity and poverty. These themes, set out in the DFID White Paper and internal GID reviews and memos, reflect the view that the poor and vulnerable suffer disproportionately from crime and poor policing. Freedom from crime, safety and security, safeguarding of human rights and access to justice are seen as essential ingredients of a pro-poor approach to economic growth and sustainable development. Connected with this is the increased emphasis on the necessity for thorough stakeholder analysis in project design and the incorporation of stakeholder participation in all stages of the project cycle. For police projects this means expanding the definition of stakeholders to include not just police and governments, but those whose life and livelihoods are at most risk from crime and insecurity – the poor.
2.19 Alongside this wider perspective, has come the recognition that policing is only one part of the justice system and that, to be effective in achieving greater access to justice, projects must also begin to target other aspects of the justice system. Wide ranging reviews of criminal justice systems as a whole have been supported in, for example, Uganda, Ghana and Zimbabwe. An Access to Justice and Human Rights Advisor has been appointed in GID and studies commissioned on issues such as the access of the poor to justice. It is still too early to assess the impact of these new initiatives on projects.

MAJOR POLICY ISSUES AND DILEMMAS

2.20 The above account shows an evolution in DFID policy on support for policing in the context of wider DFID development policies and of the shifts within this policy environment. However, there are a number of key themes which have underlain policy on policing throughout most of the period under review. These themes raise a series of interconnecting issues and policy and practice dilemmas. These are outlined below and form the basis of the discussion contained in the following sections.

Responsibility for Policy and Project Implementation?

2.21 The question of responsibility for policy and project implementation, (see Section 3), gives rise to a number of dilemmas and a lack of congruence between the policy aims of DFID and aid recipients is often evident. In several projects, (Uganda, Ethiopia and the later phase in Namibia), senior police officers indicated that they were more interested in receiving material assistance (transport, communications equipment) or specific technical skills training than in receiving advice on organisational change. Whilst those who were interested in enhancing their operational capacity through improved management and planning systems gave greater priority to dealing with serious crime and internal security than to developing community policing or to wider issues of accountability and rights.

Institutional Development

2.22 For most of the period, the main drive of DFID projects has been to enhance the accountability and efficiency and effectiveness of the police, mainly through institutional development, with an emphasis on training. This has been based on the assumption that the key to achieving change lies in improving the managerial and operational capacities of the police and, at the same time, in trying to re-orientate what might be called police ‘culture’ in the direction of greater openness and service to the community.

2.23 Whilst, as Section 4 indicates, much of the institutional development has been successful, in terms of achieving shorter term project goals; DFID has increasingly come to recognise that it is, on its own, not enough. Many of the factors that affect effectiveness as well as accountability, enhancement of access to justice, and
protection of rights lie outside the police themselves. Organisational, technical and operational improvements to policing, whilst essential for effectiveness and efficiency, do not necessarily impact on the wider policy goals such as: improvements in the protection of human rights, public safety, access of the poor to justice, accountability, protection of vulnerable groups. The absence of wider reforms to the criminal justice system, the failure to empower civil society and develop transparent and accountable political processes are all likely to vitiate the impact and sustainability of projects. These wider issues raise the question of the appropriateness of the emphasis on institutional development. We go on to assess what contribution building institutional capacity makes to the achievement of wider policing goals and suggest that efficient and effective police forces are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for this.

Policing and Good Government

2.24 Good government has been one of the priority objectives of the UK aid programme since the early 1990s. DFID policy has located support for policing within the good government agenda of assisting in the creation or maintenance of sustainable democracies. A particular stress has been on enhancing the accountability and the competence of the police as well as their role in ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law.  

2.25 However, the majority of the DFID projects have been implemented in situations which present difficulties and dilemmas in achieving these wider aims. Most of the police projects reviewed have taken place within the context of a transition from single-party or more-or-less undemocratic regimes to forms of multi-party democracy. Many of the police forces have a history of being essentially instruments of and for the state. Frequently combating crime and providing safety and security for the citizen took second place to maintaining public order and internal security.

2.26 The development of greater accountability by the police to legitimate forms of civilian government has been paralleled with the aim of assisting the police to become more effective in dealing with crime and creating a situation of greater safety and security. As already noted, these twin objectives can present an uncomfortable dilemma. Should priority be given to organisational reform of the police or the creation of a set of formal external controls backed by a clearly defined framework of legal accountability? There is also a question of whether the wider environment – the justice system or the nature of the state and politics - makes it possible for a transformed police service to pursue the larger goals of ensuring access to justice and protecting human rights.

2.27 During the 1990s one of the major shifts in emphasis in DFID projects has been to increase the priority given to assisting the development of community-based policing services and expanding the concept and practice of wider partnership

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17 This general approach to the role of support to the police is shared in the USA. Marenin, 1998.
between the police and the public. Indeed community policing has been seen as one of the special contributions that the UK has to offer to overseas police forces.

2.28 Behind the advocacy of community policing lies a long running debate over different models and styles of policing which tend to be aligned on the axis of force versus service or control versus care. In the former, major policing responsibilities are seen in terms of crime control and the maintenance of order, in the latter, emphasis is placed on the service functions the police may provide in terms of protection against crime, support for the victims of crime, safeguarding rights.

2.29 Achieving a balance between these two aspects of policing has proved particularly difficult in most of the countries in which DFID has been providing support to the police. Historically, police forces have been rooted in traditions of force and control, often with a primary function of protecting the security of the state and elites, and have operated with para-military styles. Many of them, in more recent times, have been faced with the problems of internal insurgency and rapidly rising crime rates. They have tended to view community policing as a ‘soft’ form of policing, not appropriate to their situation. This has lead to the problems of congruence referred to above.

2.30 A further problem is with the notion of community, which has very often been left unexamined. In reality, communities are characterised by a lack of homogeneity and are made up of groups with differing interests and power. Frequently poorer and marginal groups, who suffer disproportionately from the impact of crime, have been excluded from participation in community policing. Finally, there is the, still debated, question of whether introducing more open, participative policing at the local level is an effective means of both reducing crime and vulnerability and increasing perceptions of safety and security.

**Policing, Equity and Poverty**

2.31 Closely allied to the issue of good government has been the emphasis on the contribution that effective policing can make to creating a climate in which economic and social development can take place.

2.32 In the earlier part of the period under review the essential argument was that ‘law and order’, stability, safety and security were amongst the essential preconditions for encouraging both national and non-national capital to invest in the countries concerned. More recently the emphasis has shifted from linking policing with a more narrowly defined economic concept of development to a wider more social concept. This can be seen in the 1997 White Paper with its stress on rights within the development agenda and the identification of the denial of rights and access to justice as a component of poverty.

2.33 A recent GID memorandum on police projects notes that the poor and the vulnerable suffer disproportionately from crime and poor policing and that safety from crime is as important as access to food, shelter, education and health. It makes
the general point that freedom from crime, safety from violence in the home and on the streets, public safety and the means to make cities safer are essential ingredients to economic growth and sustainable development and suggests ways in which police projects can contribute to poverty alleviation. Ministerial speeches have stressed the extent to which reforms to the police and the justice system are seen as important in ensuring the rights of the poor.\textsuperscript{18} There has also been an increasing emphasis on the need to take into account the specific needs of women and children\textsuperscript{19}. This has taken two main directions. Firstly, in ensuring that there are more equitable opportunities for women in the police and secondly, in developing project components that address the issue of women and children as victims, either through the better reporting and investigation of crime or the development of victim support schemes.

2.34 Evidence from most of the projects indicates that they have not seriously tackled the needs of poor and vulnerable groups and have not developed wider partnerships. Implementing a more pro-poor policy will present major challenges. A major problem to be overcome is the difference of interests between socio-economic groups over the issue of policing and development. In its simplest terms, this can be seen in the pressure of international and local business or elites for forms of crime control which protect their property and create secure conditions for commerce and production. This can frequently run counter to the development of forms of policing which are designed to protect the poor and vulnerable minorities both against crime and abuses of their human rights. Failure of the police to get the balance right can lead to loss of faith in the police by either group and the emergence of private solutions to the perceived absence of effective policing.

CONCLUSION

2.35 The following sections of this report review, in more detail, the DFID project experience in relation to the major policy issues and dilemmas outlined in this section. An underlying question is whether support for policing, despite the clear evidence of short-term achievements, is now expected to contribute too much to the general policy goals of DFID The setting of such extensive goals for police projects may reflect a lack of clarity about the role of policing in society and the relationships between policing and social and economic development.

2.36 There is an additional question over where responsibility for policy, project design and project management lies. The evidence indicates that there have been major problems of ensuring effective congruence between stakeholders and absence of clarity over areas and levels of responsibility. There have been differences in policy perspective between the FCO and DFID and between DFID and local governments and police. In addition, it would seem that defining and implementing management oversight of TCOs and project teams has presented difficulties. The pressure of work

\textsuperscript{18} See Clare Short, speech at Manchester University, 30\textsuperscript{th} July 1997.
\textsuperscript{19} Whilst the White Paper explicitly recognises children’s rights, there is, as yet, little evidence of the development of specific policies in relation to juvenile justice or the wider issue of the protection of children.
on OPAs has meant that they have had little time to devote to framing policy or to the process of learning and disseminating lessons from projects.

2.37 These conditions which are explored in the following section, are not ideal for the elaboration of consistent policy, for identifying clear and realistic goals or creating the possibility of learning from projects.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 The evidence from the projects reviewed for this evaluation indicates that, especially in the earlier part of the period, there were difficulties in ensuring effective liaison between the actors involved in the design and implementation of projects and a lack of clarity about areas and levels of responsibility. To some extent, this was due to the transfer of lead responsibility from the FCO in 1992 and the time taken to bed in new management arrangements as well as re-orientate policy towards the more developmental concerns of DFID. However, some of the difficulties are, perhaps, more intrinsic both to the nature of policing projects and, at a wider level, to the way in which DFID has managed policy formulation and project design and implementation.

3.2 This section examines the nature of these difficulties, especially problems encountered in ensuring a good degree of congruence between major stakeholders and in gaining and maintaining a high level of commitment by project partners.

Project Initiation

3.3 Many of the projects reviewed received their initial impetus through the support of UK Embassies or High Commissions. This, partly, reflects the fact that the initiation of the projects dates back to the period before or soon after the transfer of lead responsibility from the FCO. However, it also seems that Embassies and BHCs have, throughout the period, tended to give greater emphasis to the importance of policing than has DFID London or the Development Divisions.  

3.4 Examples of strong Embassy or BHC involvement in project initiation would include Indonesia, Namibia and Ethiopia. In Indonesia, the Embassy interest was originally linked to the view of the Commercial Section that support for the police could help in obtaining valuable equipment orders from the GOI. The Namibian project is recorded as having begun “in considerable haste” responding to fears of the Namibian government and the BHC about destabilisation in the period immediately after independence. (Three months after the initial planning visit, the first training courses were being conducted). The Ethiopian project was pushed strongly by the Ambassador in the face of lukewarm reactions by AGHCCD and of concerns by the OPA over the dangers of operational involvement. In both the Namibian and Ethiopian cases, the BHC and Embassy continued to play a major role in project management.

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20 Interviews with past and present OPAs indicate the feeling that some Development Divisions are less than keen on police projects, regarding them as too politically sensitive or not sufficiently central to development.
21 Although, as the ex-post evaluation report stresses, there is no evidence that this had an influence on the ODA decision to implement the project. DFID, 1998 Indonesia Report, Sect. 1.5
22 DFID, 1998 Namibia Report, Sect. 1.4
23 See Ethiopia Project Summary in Annex E
evaluation report notes that, for most of its life, the BHC gave it a higher priority than BDDEA in the UK aid programme.  

3.5 The comments of the Namibia project evaluators on the differences in perspectives of the FCO and ODA help to indicate the underlying differences bearing on both policy and implementation. “The FCO is focussed on diplomatic and political issues and the ODA has to focus on developmental impact”.  

They go on to note that there were occasions during the project when the priorities of each were not automatically compatible and ask whether this or any police project can meet both requirements.

3.6 Within DFID itself, most project initiation and design stems from the interest shown by Development Divisions. As already noted, Development Divisions vary in the extent to which they regard policing as a priority area in their aid programme. In addition, they do not necessarily have easy access to professional advice, given the location of OPAs in London. Indeed, Development Divisions may agree police projects without calling in OPAs for advice on overall project design. To this extent, policy may be being driven at a regional level without the benefit of an overall view of lessons being gained from the totality of DFID police projects.

### Congruence and Stakeholder Participation

3.7 DFID has come to place great emphasis not only on stakeholder analysis but also on ensuring the effective and wide participation of stakeholders in project design and implementation. In this a key concern is to ensure and maintain a good degree of congruence between stakeholders. Apart from the differences in perspective between the FCO and DFID noted above, there is strong evidence of difficulties over congruence between project teams, local police forces and DFID in most of the projects reviewed. These have been largely based in differences of interpretation of what is required in order to meet the overall project aims, but there has also been a lack of agreement on the aims themselves.

3.8 One of the most common areas of disagreement has been over the mix of material assistance and ‘advice’ within projects. The Ethiopia project clearly ran into difficulties over this. The Ethiopian Police Force (EPF) appear to have been persistently critical of the amount of project money being spent on consultants and visits by ODA monitoring missions. The police strategy advisor, in noting the deteriorating relationships between the ODA and the Commissioner of the EPF, commented on the differences in view over the acquisition of sustainable skills and the provision of assets and concluded: “Put simply, the ODA have different objectives from the Ethiopian Police”.  

He also felt that the EPF were not being allowed to participate enough. In the Uganda project, the evaluators commented that, whilst the UK wanted to emphasise the contribution of the project to good government, the UPF wanted better facilities for operational policing.

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25 DFID, 1998 Namibia Report, Sect. 3.9.2  
26 The Strategy Advisor was the Chief Constable of the Cheshire Constabulary  
27 Ethiopia Project Strategic Advisor’s, September 1996 Report, Sect. 6.2
There have also been deeper disagreements over the balance of force versus service in policing, especially where crime was seen to be increasing. In both Namibia and Uganda there were differences of view over the relevance or appropriateness of community policing between project teams and the police force. In Namibia these appear to have contributed to the deteriorating Namibian commitment to the project in its later stages. In S. Africa there is some evidence of lack of commitment by the South African Police Service at national level to community policing and there has been a growing emphasis, on the part of the police and government on the need for more tough responses to crime.

Police projects often aim to increase the independence of operational policing, whilst putting into place mechanisms to secure accountability. Governments do not always fully recognise that this is likely to mean a reduction in their opportunity to exert direct control over the police. This needs to be clearly stated and understood at the project design stage, as was the case in the two Lesotho projects. Similarly, many projects involve changes in the nature of policing, possibly beyond what governments expect, and, if this is not explained early in the project cycle, there may be a danger of reduction in support and commitment.

Most of the earlier projects were designed and implemented without any stakeholder analysis either to assess needs and interests of different population groups or to explore the extent to which project objectives were shared more widely in the society. Involvement was limited to influential stakeholders such as the government and the police. As noted in Section 5, the evaluations of the Indonesia, Namibia and Uganda projects all stressed the extent to which the needs and interests of poorer and more vulnerable groups were neglected.

However some more recent projects, for example in South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Jamaica and Zimbabwe, have engaged in a process of widespread consultation. The South African community policing projects are a particularly good example of the inclusion of groups in civil society in the process of project design, management and evaluation. To some extent this is likely to be due to the special circumstances of the heavy involvement of civil associations in the struggle against apartheid and the transition to democracy as well as the strong lead given by the Government of National Unity. Even so, as Annexes E.7 and F indicate, poorer and more marginal groups tended to be excluded.

If DFID wishes to tie support to policing firmly to its policies on poverty elimination and the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, more thoroughgoing stakeholder analysis will be necessary. This would involve identifying both ‘influential’ and ‘important’ stakeholders. Influential stakeholders are those who can make a significant impact on project outcomes and for police projects would include: the donor agency, government, police, other parts of the justice system as well as business interests and civic associations. Important stakeholders are those whose interests, needs and rights are central to project goals. These would include poor and vulnerable groups (minorities, women, children) who, as the South African projects

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28 see Eyben, 1998.
show, can frequently be marginalised in joint police-community partnership institutions. Whether a more thorough stakeholder analysis can then be developed into an effective partnership with the full range of stakeholders depends partly on the commitment of the police and on the strength of civil society, but also requires projects to find ways of empowering poorer and more vulnerable groups to demand and gain access to services.

**Project Management**

3.14 Two of the projects reviewed (Namibia and Ethiopia) produced evidence of quite major management problems in terms of the relationships between ODA and the consultants/TCOs. Whilst these may not be typical of all police projects, they raise significant questions about management arrangements.

3.15 The ex-post evaluation of the Namibia project makes clear that there were significant complications with the management arrangements in this project. There was the strong personal stance taken by the Project Adviser and the project team with their focus on activities, which seemed to override a number of concerns. On an operational level, the project team related to and were supported more by the BHC than by the ODA Desk in London. There were also problems over lack of feedback from the Desk to requests and reports. The evaluation notes that, initially, much of this weak response was to do with staffing pressures, concurrent transfer of lead responsibility to the ODA and the preoccupation with other issues in Southern Africa. The very senior status of the Project Adviser also had an effect on how the project was managed and handled. Despite the appointment of the OPA in ODA and the transfer of management to the Development Division in S. Africa, attempts to move the project on from a series of activities and develop a more strategic framework failed. Reflecting on the difference in approach between the consultants and ODA and the failure of ODA to develop effective management oversight, the evaluators drew a key lesson. “If ODA does not take a strong management leadership from the beginning, it is unlikely to be able to refocus the project at a later stage. By then the management style and independent action will have been established, particularly where senior professionals/specialists are concerned.”

3.16 The evidence from Ethiopia is less clear. However, the two reports by the police strategy advisor in 1996 contain criticisms of serious communication difficulties between ODA, the Ambassador and the TCO project coordinator. The reports note a breakdown of trust between London and the project coordinator which lead to the coordinator being by-passed in communications between other members of the project team and London. Members of the project team were also going directly to the Ambassador who appears to have played a major management role in the project. Although the Ethiopia project post-dates that in Namibia, there appear to have been similar problems over coordination between the major actors on the UK side, with the Ambassador in Ethiopia playing a central role and the ODA unable to assert effective control over the project team or project direction. In addition, the police

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29 DFID, 1998 *Namibia Report*, Sect. 3.4.2
30 DFID, 1998 *Namibia Report*, p.19
strategy advisor (who was the coordinator’s manager in the UK) appears not to have fully agreed with the project aims.

3.17 These two projects raise the wider problems not only of providing effective management oversight and of divergent interests between the FCO and ODA, but also of the availability of professional advice to projects in both the design and implementation phases. The Ethiopia project coordinator records having only received one visit from the OPA. The Uganda report notes that there was only one visit by an OPA in Phase 1 and that from the start until the end of 1995 there were only 4 professional advisory visits, by 3 different OPAs.\(^{31}\) OPAs themselves have suggested that their capacity to give advice is weakened not only be conflicting pressures on their time but also by the fact that they have often only been called in after projects have been agreed by Development Divisions.

TCOs

3.18 The Uganda ex-post evaluation report identifies the key role of TCO project coordinators in police projects, especially in terms of their capacity to build up knowledge and mutual trust with local stakeholders. All the ex-post evaluation reports also stress the need for proper selection procedures, raising concerns about the extent to which appointments were not always made on the basis of open competition or the failure to apply an equal opportunities policy. Whilst it would seem that appointments are increasingly being made on the basis of open competition, the evidence suggests that this is still not always the case.

3.19 Very few UK police officers, selected as TCOs, have overseas experience and thus start work with very little knowledge either of the country concerned or the specific, local nature of the policing problems they are likely to encounter. All the TCOs interviewed for this synthesis evaluation felt that their pre-project briefing was sketchy and inadequate. This concerned both the project itself, DFID police projects in general and the wider policy aims of UK overseas aid. Most of them felt there was a lack of clarity over management systems and lines of responsibility and accountability within DFID. They also expressed feelings of professional isolation whilst in post.

3.20 A lack of effective pre-project induction and limited ongoing professional support clearly limits the ability of TCOs to learn from the experience of previous projects. Whilst this may be a more general issue within DFID, police projects appear to have been unusually at risk in terms of institutional learning. There is a need to explore more effective ways of providing training and professional support for TCOs. In this, it may be that a more specific role could be found for Bramshill or for developing the role of South-South agencies such as SARPCCO (see Section 4)

3.21 A further point, stressed in the Namibia evaluation, is the need to ensure that the skills of project teams match the aims and requirements of the project. This may

\(^{31}\) The evaluators felt that the absence of a resident PA in Nairobi weakened design and implementation in the first years of the project and suggested that Development Divisions should give more thought to the provision of advice on a regional basis rather than on a case by case basis.
mean involving those with specialist skills in institution building or community policing and considering a more multi-disciplinary approach to team building, appointing team members whose primary formation is outside the police. This is likely to become more important as DFID moves towards a closer link between police projects and the wider criminal justice system as well as with poverty alleviation and human rights.

**Conclusion**

3.22 This section has indicated that there have, sometimes, been major problems in ensuring effective congruence between influential stakeholders and absence of clarity over areas and levels of responsibility. These problems may have been due to DFID’s long term difficulties in developing a clear policy rationale for support to policing. They have also reflected the differences in perspective both between the FCO and DFID and, frequently, between DFID and the governments and police forces receiving assistance. Within DFID itself, there have been difficulties in clarifying the roles of Development Divisions, OPA’s and project teams at all stages of the project cycle. There have also been problems over providing adequate professional support and learning opportunities for TCOs. Finally, stakeholder analysis has frequently been less than adequate. The concentration on influential stakeholders to the neglect of important stakeholders has contributed to the failure to address the interests, needs and rights of poor and vulnerable groups in civil society which has been noted in project evaluations.

3.23 Whilst some of these problems can be attributed to the early difficulties associated with DFID assuming lead responsibility or to the more general question of project management within DFID, they also appear to have been rooted in the wider uncertainty about the goals of DFID’s policy on policing.
SECTION 4

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

4.1 Police forces are large, complex and expensive organisations.\textsuperscript{32} The main policy drive of DFID policing projects has been to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of these organisations. Institutional development, with a heavy emphasis on training, has been the main means by which it has tried to implement these policy objectives. In the evaluations, much of this activity has been judged to be especially successful. Similarly, evaluation ratings for organisation development activities were largely favourable, as shown in the case summaries in Annex E. The main reservations, which are discussed further below, were concerned with limited project design and, especially, a lack of strategic planning and adequate monitoring systems. Beyond this, we need to ask what contribution institutional development makes to wider policing goals, such as increasing access to justice and providing a greater sense of public safety and security.

TRAINING

4.2 Training of police officers at all levels has been the major component of UK aid to policing. This has included training for senior managers, for a wide range of specialists at lower levels and basic training. For senior officers and specialists UK training has been used though, for these groups as well as lower ranks, in-country training has been used increasingly.

4.3 Training problems were substantial. In some cases police forces had to be largely rebuilt. In almost all, rooted in colonialism, the need to move away from heavy emphases on para-military training for police officers is still important. Certainly drill and armaments training is less emphasised in curricula although, given the continued need to deal with armed incidents and to live in military type barracks, they remain prominent. In addition, it is extremely difficult to get away from a culture emphasising hierarchy and military-type discipline, as opposed to the high level of discretionary activity associated with modern, professional policing.

4.4 Training in the UK has always been an important part of aid to policing, although it has reduced considerably since the mid 1990s. In the earlier projects examined in this report, considerable use was made of the National Police College at Bramshill.

\textsuperscript{32} Morgan and Newburn 1997, p 47, note that the police in England and Wales cost over £ 6 billion in 1991, equivalent to over £ 110 per head of population and more than the combined cost of the rest of the criminal justice system. The UN 1975 estimated that the cost of police forces in developing countries absorbs a very high proportion of recurrent budgets, often approaching or even exceeding the costs of health or educational services. (Also see Annex D, para 35). It is notable that such data were not examined in evaluations of any of the projects we have considered.
and other UK police training institutions and courses. The Bramshill Overseas Command Course, (now the International Commanders Programme), established in 1970, the key aim of which is “to further develop the management and operational command skills of potential senior police officers”, was especially heavily used. In addition, officers from projects are sent to a wide variety of specialist skills training programmes in the UK, and short attachments to police forces are also frequently used.

4.5 DFID use of the Bramshill International Commanders Programme has diminished since around 1995 and is now almost nil, largely as in country training was seen as more cost effective. In addition doubts were beginning to be raised about the appropriateness of UK training. Most students on the Bramshill course are now funded either by their own governments or by the FCO. An attraction is that it is now University accredited and graduates receive a post-graduate Certificate in Criminal Justice and Police Management. However, although the course has the benefits of regular curriculum review, it may be noted that most lecturers are drawn from the programmes for UK officers, lack overseas experience and are handicapped by the lack of published research on policing practice in developing countries.

4.6 A great deal of other specialist training has been provided, both in the UK and in-country, through either resident TCOs or short term inputs. Most common subjects are criminal investigation and associated scientific skills, together with intelligence gathering and use. However, a resident TCO selected for specialist skills may not have the broader management and training experience, or inter-personal skills, to meet the management development needs which are likely to emerge (Namibia, Uganda). For specialist inputs, short term consultancy or TCO inputs may be very successful; in particular, financial management, which is often questionable, may be effectively strengthened, (Ethiopia). In South Africa, though management development expertise is plentiful locally, special help is being provided in ‘succession planning’ for highest level posts.

4.7 This training has generally been popular with host governments and regarded as successful by evaluators, though some problems have arisen when necessary, supporting equipment or infrastructure has not been available. In addition, chronic and continued shortages of good criminal investigators are common, when the educational levels of basic recruits or selection for the Criminal Investigation Bureau are poor, or good officers are moved on to other duties.

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33 Available training programmes are described in a brochure *International Police Training Opportunities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland*, produced by the National Police Training programme.

34 By the Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order at Leicester University.

35 Recently Bramshill has been used by DFID in a consultancy role, helping to design management training for police officers in Kenya. This kind of role could well be developed further, helping to fill a number of gaps identified in this report: opportunities for police TCOs to receive improved induction before taking up assignments, and to share experiences both within and after assignments; going beyond the role of its present, very useful library collection, to contribute to the body of published research, especially analysing and evaluating practice.
4.8 In almost all projects, although improvements in recruitment and promotion of women were noted, there was room for significant strengthening of the role of women in policing. Further, although female offenders are comparatively infrequent in developing countries, women and children are very often victims. A UN report on Women’s Victimisation in Developing Countries says:

“The traditional tendency to consider women as subordinate to men has led to a perception of justification of traditional violent practices and gender-based violence, such as domestic and family violence, as a form of control or “protection” of women. It has also helped to hide various types of violence such as sexual harassment, rape, incest, and the sexual exploitation of women for profit”. \(^{36}\)

4.9 There was little evidence in the case studies of full recognition of the need to provide specialised support for women and child victims, though some special training was offered in Namibia and Nepal. Generally, there is a need for consideration of the ways in which taking account of gender issues can help in producing more effective policing. Recent involvement of the International Association of Women Police Officers, which is seeking ways of supporting female officers in developing countries, could play an important role.

4.10 Although the emphasis is now heavily on in-country training, in line with wider DFID thinking, the questions of relevance of UK approaches and slow development of appropriate curricula are recurring themes in the evaluations. A major problem is that TCOs involved in training, inevitably, teach what they know, have few or no local training materials, begin with little or no local expertise and use language and terminology which is often unfamiliar. Further, the educational level of police force recruits is often limited, in line with salaries, conditions of service and job status, so that acquiring knowledge is slow and difficult. Third, with a shortage of research on what is effective local policing, and even on the context of social conditions and relations, trainers are considerably handicapped. Progress is made through training of trainers in all projects, but this too is handicapped by the above factors and by competition for the services of higher quality personnel. \(^{37}\)

4.11 Despite the success generally attributed to training components, doubts about its sustainability were expressed in most projects. A major problem was that trained officers were likely to be moved out of specialist posts, especially at senior levels, as happened in the Namibia project. This familiar problem wherever highly skilled personnel are in short supply can, of course, do major damage to policing projects, once high level management development or training of trainers programmes are no longer available. At lower levels special problems stem from shortage of government funding, especially to support continuation of training posts. This has been a particular problem in the Uganda and Indonesia projects. More generally, training

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\(^{36}\) Alvazzi del Frate, 1995, p 2

\(^{37}\) A special situation exists in South Africa, where experienced local trainers are plentiful. Nevertheless senior UK TCOs contributed to a successful project to redesign post-apartheid basic training, working with a national team. The South Africa basic training model, one of the projects supported by ODA and discussed in Annex E, has subsequently been used in Namibia.
projects do not adopt more recent approaches to capacity building, including broader awareness of development issues and follow-up support for application of skills.

**Human rights, accountability and community policing**

4.12 These topics are dealt with more fully in Section 5 and training aspects only will be noted briefly here. Although good government objectives did not become explicitly high priority in ODA until the mid-1990s, even the earliest projects examined in this report paid some attention to public accountability. For example, the aims of the Indonesia and Namibia projects referred to the change from a paramilitary ethos to a community based service; those of the Nepal and Ethiopia projects sought an “open and accountable” police service.

4.13 In practice, however, training components to achieve these aims were hardly visible in crowded curricula. They were not a priority for local governments and police forces, especially as crime problems began to create more concern. In an analysis of consumer requirements for an evaluation of Bramshill courses, trainees and their managers gave priority to enhancing professional and managerial skills and hardly mentioned issues such as accountability, rights and community policing.  

4.14 More recently, human rights and community policing have become normal components of basic police training; this will be reinforced by the recent, additional provision by the FCO and DFID of human rights training programmes, for both military and police personnel, in post-war reconstruction contexts, and by involvement of the UN Commission for Human Rights in police training. There is still a long way to go, however, in developing training methodologies likely to be genuinely effective in changing police attitudes and cultures. (This is discussed further below, paras 4.25 et seq). Quite apart from the general tendency of police forces to give less weight to the interests of the less powerful and, like other professionals, to give priority to colleague solidarity even when professional norms are infringed, simple professional ambitions suggest giving primacy to controlling criminals.

38 Police Central Planning and Training Unit 1995 *An Evaluation of the Overseas Command Course* Harrogate


40 This was recognised in the priority given to special project proposals, with these objectives, put forward by the Jamaica review team. (See Annex E). It should be emphasised that it is by no means a problem for developing countries alone. A recent report for the UK Police Federation (Davies, 1998) concluded that police officers had little confidence in their training and that it is an “astounding waste of money”. They were particularly concerned that many officers had no follow up to basic training, and that they were ill equipped to deal with sensitive issues such as racism, young offender problems and victims of sexual offences.

41 "Research on neighbourhood policing in London in the 1980s found that although approximately nine tenths of supervisors felt that great emphasis should not be placed on making large numbers of arrests, less than one fifth of constables held a similar view. Being seen to be engaged in making arrests, issuing summonses, and stopping and searching suspects was, from their perspective, a necessity for anyone interested in being transferred to the more favoured CID work or, more generally, in promotion”. Morgan and Newburn 1997, p 211.
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS

4.15 Together with training, police projects have increasingly included a range of other institutional development components. Especially in the post-civil-war projects (Namibia, Uganda and Ethiopia), there was a need to create almost entire policing systems. Assistance has been given in strengthening legal frameworks and financial management, creating new, specialist departments, developing committee structures and new systems for human resources management. Much of this, like training, was regarded by evaluators as successful and, in the above cases, it was said with some justice that the UK aid projects had contributed substantively to the development of police forces.

4.16 The question of what equipment and infrastructure should be provided is the subject of considerable disagreement. Whereas High Commissions and Embassies often support partner governments and police forces in giving high priority to such components, especially to improve transport and communications and, in some cases, police infrastructure, DFID and Development Divisions have been reluctant to accept this, placing stress on non-material components.

4.17 The key question, it is suggested, is whether and when material aid is likely to increase the effectiveness of policing projects. In some cases it may be essential to support specialist training; there were instances, for example, when expensive training in forensic science and ballistics could not be applied as equipment was lacking, as in the cases of Namibia and Uganda. On a larger scale, the needs for transport, communications equipment and improved buildings were acute in some projects, raising the question of what aid should be provided in such cases. In the Uganda and Ethiopia projects, lack of support for transport maintenance was very damaging.

4.18 In noting these problems it is not necessarily suggested that material support on an increased scale may be needed in some cases, although this has been argued in Ethiopia, or that material support should never be given. What is needed, on a case-by-case basis, is a careful analysis of how material and non-material aid are likely to interact positively in order to achieve policing aims. Further, as suggested in Annex D, (paras 40-42), it may be necessary to seek radical and innovative solutions for poorer countries, which cannot afford the material resources which are familiar to police forces in the North.

42 Unrealistic assumptions about funding were evident in Uganda; effectiveness of the Namibia project could not be monitored and, like the Uganda project, it had serious problems of sustainability; ‘needs analyses’ in a number of projects were limited, not clearly linked to means of meeting needs, did not allow for subsequent loss of trained personnel and, again, progress was not systematically monitored.
Malawi and Zimbabwe largely avoid this weakness. These variations are associated with the shift from FCO to ODA approaches in the early 1990s, then with changing practices within ODA. More broadly, they reflect the development of ‘managerialism’ in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s.43

4.20 A major emphasis in the Lesotho and Malawi projects and the Jamaica review has been on ensuring that the local police force feels a strong sense of ‘ownership’ of strategic plans, so at least increasing the probability that plans will be implemented and sustained, in addition to incorporating the best available expertise. These are also costed, with linkages between means and ends made explicit, so that their progress and effectiveness can be monitored. They are supported by detailed annual and local plans, facilitating regular review of progress and needs for modification. Though it is too early to say whether this latest generation of projects will be more successful, it seems highly likely that they will be more efficient and effective in meeting short term goals, even if they do not overcome the complex obstacles stemming from contexts, factors which go well beyond ordinary policing.

4.21 It is important to emphasise three additional planning requirements which are largely neglected in the cases examined.45 First the very high cost of policing makes it imperative to carry out thorough analyses of personnel requirements, including necessary entry standards and distributions according to area, skills, gender and rank. The scope for civilianisation of police posts, privatisation of some services and use of auxiliary staff or special constables need special investigation. There is a very real possibility that poorer countries will never be able to afford the kind of professional police force which we are used to in Britain. This has to be taken into account in

Though DFID help was not needed for strategic planning in South Africa, it made a contribution to production of the recent White Paper on policing, (as it did in Lesotho).

43 Especially, more comprehensive and participatory approaches as summarised, for example, in Austin, 1994 and Eyben, 1998. The enormous difficulty in achieving institutional development and institutional strengthening goals in all fields is widely recognised. Austin’s study of institutional strengthening projects, (1994), noted that results were often disappointing and that, for success and sustainability, the following are needed:

• A realistic assessment of the whole institutional framework – social, political, cultural, budgetary, economic and legal, including analysis of essential prior conditions
• A multi-disciplinary, team approach including specialist skills
• a strong commitment to and ownership by the partner institution of mutually agreed objectives
• flexible project design, responding especially to the recipients’ absorptive capacity and willingness to change
• realistic objectives and careful and detailed monitoring
• cost-effective (especially local) training
• consideration of institutional twinning or NGO links
• dynamic and committed leadership
• motivated project staff and beneficiaries
• a long term approach to both design and longer term aid.

44 This has taken two decades of often-painful implementation. See Sheehy, P. et al 1993; McLaughlin and Murji, 1997. Maguire (1998), in an analysis of trends and styles of policing in Britain, says:

“If there has been one dominant theme to the language of police management in the 1990s, it is that the way forward lies in the scaling down of traditional reactive or demand-led policing, and the adoption of a more forward looking reflective approach characterised by the setting of clear objectives, systematic collection and analysis of information, planned use of resources, and monitoring of outcomes”.

45 These are discussed further in Annexes D and E.8.
strategic planning in such countries, including the search for creative, low cost but realistic alternatives.\textsuperscript{46}

4.22 Second, our lack of knowledge about what kinds of policing are effective in developing countries means that it is essential to adopt an experimental, process approach to many policing activities, difficult as this is in large organisations with rigid hierarchies. This means that, in addition to full involvement of stakeholders in planning, systematic means of organisational learning are essential.\textsuperscript{47} It also indicates that a search for local problem-solving is especially desirable.

4.23 Third, agreed, verifiable indicators of performance; activities, outputs, effects and impact are urgently needed. The fact that they are lacking is the most common criticism of these projects by evaluators. This makes it extremely difficult for the evaluators to reach firm judgements. In addition, police managers lack important tools necessary for effective management, while DFID planning and monitoring activities are severely handicapped. Given the frequency and importance of these problems, it is perhaps disappointing that evaluators refer to them only generally, without providing examples of the development and use of indicators. Even given that indicators need to be identified from within projects, illustrative examples would increase the utility of evaluations.

4.24 In Annex D, \textit{Information for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation}, these problems are examined more fully, including consideration of what might be regarded as “effective policing” as well as provision of illustrative indicators. Basic principles suggested are that:

- key indicators are needed to assess success in the twin, primary goals of improving crime control and increasing public satisfaction and confidence, taking account of the views and interests of poorer and more vulnerable sectors of society
- recorded crime data, despite their limitations, are useful with careful interpretation, including offences reported to the police, together with rates of offences ‘cleared up’ and leading to conviction, in different areas
- qualitative indicators are often as useful as quantitative, provided that they are carefully defined and verifiable
- Collaboration with courts is needed to produce analyses of data on offenders, including age and sex distributions and criminal histories
- Sample surveys of victims and rapid appraisal methods provide invaluable information for planning, monitoring and evaluation
- information overload must be avoided through reaching agreement on key indicators.

4.25 So far ‘effectiveness’ indicators have been stressed, though it was noted earlier that real effectiveness is unlikely to be observed for some time. In addition, a small number of key indicators of activities and progress need to be identified, focusing

\textsuperscript{46} See Annex D, paras 40-42. A thought-provoking book is Findlay and Zvekic 1993 \textit{Alternative Policing Styles}. This includes a very varied set of case studies, by no means all using methods to be recommended, though it has some examples of interesting, low cost ideas involving informal, community-based approaches.

\textsuperscript{47} See Eyben, 1998.
especially on variables which are thought most likely to produce eventual effectiveness – to be highly correlated with it. In particular, it is suggested that key, verifiable indicators are needed covering the following areas:

- strengthening of human resources
- public accountability
- costs, seeking especially to relate costings to outputs and effectiveness.

CULTURAL CHANGE AND THE NEED FOR COMMITMENT

4.26 Institutional development efforts are liable to be negated by the informal culture of police forces and by lack of commitment to just and democratic policing, both among the police themselves and by the wider public and host governments. These issues were frequently raised by our informants and in the case studies, and are also prominent dilemmas identified in the literature on policing.48

4.27 The negative effects of informal police culture, often referred to as the “canteen culture”, are widely discussed in the literature. The conventional explanation is that police officers have a great deal of discretion in decision making, which is often abused. Enormous job pressures, especially threats of danger and pressure to control phenomena which are frequently beyond their control, lead to values such as cynicism about due legal processes, the need for toughness and violence, machismo, racism and perceived threats from minorities, and the vital importance of group solidarity and maintaining colleague support.

4.28 This general picture, as Chen, 1996, points out, has been qualified by some recent commentators, noting that informal culture is neither homogeneous nor unchanging. A number of potential sources of cultural change have been identified. In particular, individuals and groups may resist pressures; laws and procedures may be changed; rules may be tightened to limit discretion, systems of rewards and sanctions developed to modify behaviour. Crucially, linkages between individual police officers or sub groups and the wider environment may exert influence, whether positive or negative.

4.29 The fact that police culture has positive as well as negative aspects is often overlooked and deserves emphasis. Providing collegiate support in a crisis, or help and support to the general public, often very courageously, are matters of professional pride. Recognising and reinforcing these positive aspects could also make an important contribution to overall cultural change.

4.30 The important of police sub-cultures received very little consideration in the case studies and there has been very little research on police culture in developing societies.49 In some respects it may be expected that their problems will be greater: when police are comparatively isolated from other members of society; when

resources are limited and police feel relatively powerless to control crime; when low pay leaves them more vulnerable to corruption; when wide social and economic inequalities exert pressure on them to serve the interests of the powerful, neglecting rights of suspected offenders and of the poor generally. On the other hand, it should not be assumed too readily that the legacy of strong hierarchies and para-militarism is entirely dysfunctional, as findings on the effectiveness of ‘participative management’ would suggest.\(^50\) It is possible that, while reducing militaristic aspects, the authority of senior officers and firmer regulations could be used as primary weapons against the more damaging aspects of informal culture.\(^51\)

4.31 What is likely is that there will be considerable variation between societies and in the nature of informal police cultures; the ways in which the police relate to external forces and groups and, therefore, the potential for positive cultural change. To be fully effective, policing projects need to be grounded in detailed understanding of such dynamics at a local level.

4.32 Commitment of the police themselves to more just and democratic policing is just one facet of the need for commitment. In addition, it is unlikely that such policing values will be maintained if they are not widely supported both in the host society, especially its more powerful and vocal sectors,\(^52\) and in the host government. Where increases in serious crime are giving major concern, for example in Namibia, South Africa and Jamaica, such commitment is liable to reduce rapidly.

4.33 A number of our informants suggested that policing projects should develop through a series of planned stages. While retaining a longer term vision giving strong emphasis to the interests of disadvantaged groups, the initial priority may be to achieve minimum acceptable standards in matters of organisation, management, training, effectiveness and efficiency. One of our informants\(^53\) suggested that each project should later have a “commitment sub-project”. Beginning with systematic analysis of the views of stakeholders able to influence police behaviour, both positively and negatively, it would progress to seeking ways of developing their commitment to just and democratic policing. The means of achieving this would vary considerably from one context to another, with pressure at the highest level often a necessary component.

CONCLUSIONS

4.34 As far as training support and other institutional development are concerned, there is a continuing, useful role for specialist training and short term attachments in the UK, together with in-country TCO support. However, major dangers of inappropriate curricula and lack of sustainability must be emphasised. A key remedy is to ensure that TCOs are better prepared for their task, especially through increasing

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\(^{50}\) See, for example, Thompson, 1995; Grindle, 1997.

\(^{51}\) The blend of centralisation and decentralisation found in the Grameen Bank programme in Bangladesh is a useful example. See Holcombe, 1995.

\(^{52}\) It seems extremely unlikely, for example, that the very high level of police killings of suspects in Jamaica, reported in Annex 8, would be maintained without support from some sectors of the society.

\(^{53}\) Former Assistant Chief Commissioner Robert Hunt, Metropolitan Police; personal communication.
their awareness of development issues and by enabling them to work more closely with specialists working on other development projects.

4.35 It is also suggested that the kind of South-South support developing in Southern Africa is an especially promising vehicle for strengthening of both training and organisational development more generally. Recently, DFID gave initial support to an admirable innovation in South-South co-operation, SARPCCO, the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs’ Co-operation Organisation, involving 11 countries. This goes much further than the South Africa-to-Namibia support noted earlier.

4.36 Originally formed to find ways of dealing with cross-border crime and to improve communications, SARPCCO is now seeking to develop centres of excellence for training and management development. Annual meetings are funded by DFID and a normal pattern is for police chiefs to meet, then to propose resolutions for potential agreement at a meeting of Ministers. This innovation may be seen as a potential means of combating many of the problems which have arisen in our analysis: sharing ideas on new policies and methodologies; developing a core of expertise based on developing country practice, rather than imported from the North; providing appropriate, cost effective training opportunities on a long term basis; persuading more reluctant member countries that priorities other than direct crime control are important.

4.37 If this innovation is to fulfil its potential, long term and increased external support is likely to be required, especially to develop centres of excellence. Additional support might usefully be provided to facilitate exchange visits between member countries and movement of consultants between countries. There is a strong case for moving some UK aid to such support, from direct provision of UK expertise to individual countries.

4.38 Whilst much of the institutional development appears to have been successful in terms of achieving shorter term project goals, DFID has increasingly come to recognise that this, on its own, is not enough. A longer term, strategic approach, including improved planning, monitoring and evaluation, will help. In order to ensure that their impact is sustained, sub-cultural change and widespread commitment to improved policing are essential. Further, as emphasised in the following sections, the police must be able to collaborate closely with other agencies, in order to have a real impact in enhancing accountability, access to justice, protection of rights and effectiveness in proving a greater sense of public safety and security.

54 Interviews with DFID police advisers.
SECTION 5

POLICING, GOOD GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

5.1 DFID support to policing ultimately finds its justification in terms of its contribution to wider UK development assistance goals. For much of the period under review, a basic premise appears to have been that effective policing contributes significantly to law and order, stability, safety and security which are amongst the essential preconditions for economic development. More recently the emphasis has shifted to the links between policing, crime, poverty and development in the context of current concerns about poverty alleviation. Identifying the role and contribution of policing within these wider developmental goals is not easy. In many of the projects reviewed for this study there appears to have been an assumption that better management, improved technical skills and attitude change within the police, would assist in the achievement of the general framework within which development can take place.

5.2 The argument that economic development and law and order go hand in hand is as old as colonialism. One of the primary justifications for the imposition of British justice systems was that it was both part of the civilising mission of colonialism and laid the foundations for peaceful economic transformation of backward subsistence economies. However, two of the major development paradigms, modernisation theory and neo-marxism, have both tended to see the process of economic and social change associated with ‘development’ as producing higher levels of crime. Modernisation perspectives have seen the breakdown of traditional forms of social cohesion and control and the rise of (particularly urban) crime as a more or less inevitable component of modernisation. Neo-marxist approaches have noted the way in which the development of capitalist economic and social relations require the use of coercion backed up by the law and have been accompanied by the criminalisation of the poor. They have also noted that orthodox criminology has overemphasised ‘ordinary crime’ (by the poor) and neglected the crimes of the wealthy and of the state.

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55 For example Uganda Phase 1 included the aim of creating a climate in which other forms of aid would increase and be effective and Phase 2 refers to creating an enabling environment for stability and sustained economic growth. The Lesotho projects had the overall project goal of promoting political stability and respect for the rule of law, thus contributing to an enabling environment for social and economic development. In Ethiopia, the issue was put even more pointedly by the UK Ambassador: “Nothing is more important for development in the building of democratic institutions and for establishing a climate in which good government can flourish than nation wide law and order brought about by a re-constituted police force.” (memo to head of AGHCDD, 4/9/92).


57 A good example of this line of thought can be found in Clinard, and Abbott, 1973.

5.3 More recent writing\textsuperscript{59} has criticised the over-general approaches of both of these paradigms and emphasised the need to take into account national and local differences. This has been paralleled by a recognition that, at a general comparative level, the efforts to seek a correlation between indices of social development and crime have, so far, proved fruitless. Indeed, most recent evidence from victim studies indicates that urban areas in developing countries have at least as much property crime as those in industrialised countries, contrary to the assumptions of modernisation theory.\textsuperscript{60}

5.4 However, the generalised assumption that effective policing can make measurable impacts, in terms of creating an enabling environment for economic growth and the development of good government, raises a number of questions:

- How does the production and maintenance of the social order which is assumed to be a pre-requisite for development depend on the presence of an organised formal police force?
- What are the appropriate characteristics of police and policing in a society which aspires to democracy?
- How can resource poor countries afford the levels of expenditure on manpower and infrastructure required for the sustainability\textsuperscript{61} of effective and democratic policing?
- How is the contribution of policing to development objectives to be assessed? (This question is discussed in Annex D).

**Police and policing**

5.5 Recent writing on the police and policing has suggested that modern societies are characterised by an assumption that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order and that it is important to distinguish between the ideas of ‘police’ and policing:

“The ‘police’ are a particular kind of institution, whilst ‘policing’ implies a set of processes with specific social functions. ‘Police are not found in every society, but ‘policing’ is arguably a universal requirement of any social order, which may be carried out by a variety of different processes and institutional arrangements’.”\textsuperscript{62}

5.6 In this perspective policing is defined as the set of activities directed at reserving the security of a particular social order, but does not include all the activities aimed at producing order, such as: punishment or socialisation and the encouragement of religion or other ethical systems. Policing can be carried out by different people using different techniques. It may be carried out by professionals employed by the state with a general mandate (the classic modern idea of the police), by specialist private policing companies, by citizens in a voluntary capacity acting within or alongside the state or public police or as vigilantes. Until modern times most policing

\textsuperscript{59} See Birkbeck, 1985; Clegg, and Whetton, 1995.
\textsuperscript{60} Alvazzi del Frate, 1998.
\textsuperscript{61} See for example the points made in the Uganda report, p. 38, and in Section 4 above.
\textsuperscript{62} Reiner, 1997 p.1004.
functions were not carried out by specialised policing institutions. A recent review of the development of the police concludes that the development of specialised police is linked to economic specialisation and the differential access to resources which occur during the transition from a kinship to a class dominated society. During this process, communal policing forms are gradually converted to state dominated ones which begin to operate as agents of class control as well as their more general social control function.

5.7 Defining policing as universal but the police as a specialised body with primary responsibility for the use of legitimate force to safeguard security and maintain order as a feature of relatively complex societies, is useful. It serves as a reminder that for, many developing societies, the police are a relatively recent innovation, frequently imposed as part of colonialism, and that many other forms of policing continue to coexist with the police. The same point can be made about institutions and processes for resolving disputes and sanctioning ‘offenders’ which were part of the mechanisms of social control, before the advent of colonialism and have continued to exist in parallel to formal courts. DFID projects have, until recently, largely ignored this and have concentrated on the police and the formal (state) justice system, which only deal with a very small proportion of de facto crime.

Police and democracy: accountability, legitimacy and good governance

5.8 Whilst there may be debate about the extent to which the social order is dependent on the police, there is some agreement on what policing in a democratic society entails. Marenin, for example, has recently summarised thinking about democracy and the police in terms of six basic principles of good, democratic policing: **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **accessibility**, **accountability**, **congruence** and **general order**. In discussing **accessibility** and **accountability**, Marenin stresses that the police should not be autonomous and self controlled but a government organisation constrained by democratic values, whose services are available to all, not just the rich and powerful. In terms of **congruence**, there is a need for the beliefs held by the police to overlap with the generally accepted normative order in society. Finally good policing should strive to promote **general order** and not use coercion to defend the interests of the powerful. Marenin concludes that: “Policing cannot be reformed in a vacuum, but requires a concurrent transformation of the criminal justice system, civil society and the state.”

5.9 These principles of ‘good democratic policing’ point to the necessity of seeing police reform in the wider context of governance and to the difficulty of dissociating such reforms from more general changes in the relationships between political and

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64 For a more general discussion of transformations in institutions and processes of social control, see Cohen, 1985.
65 See Clegg and Harding, 1985; Clegg and Whetton, 1995; Merry, 1992.
67 Marenin, 1998
civil society. They also provide a set of general tests that might be applied to assess progress towards democratic policing.

5.10 The issue of accountability, despite being stressed in the DFID good government agenda and featuring in many of the police project goals, has, in practice received varied attention. Many of the projects did not set out to address the issue of accountability to elected political authorities, whether at national or local level, and appear largely to have operated within constitutional frameworks that had already been established. This may account for the relative neglect of this issue in the three DFID evaluations of the Indonesia, Namibia and Uganda projects which generally focussed on the police’s own preference, that of relying on improvement of internal mechanisms of accountability and control.

5.11 The Lesotho projects were unusual in that they targeted both the strategic development of the police and the establishment of a Police Department within the Ministry of Home Affairs which could provide policy advice, strategic guidance and oversight of the operations of the police. The White Paper makes it clear that the aim of the proposed legislation is to provide mechanisms for legal and political accountability but to leave the Commissioner of Police with complete operational independence from political interference. However, there is little evidence from this or other project documentation on the operation of accountability at the political and legal level or of the extent to which the police forces in question have managed to retain operational independence.

5.12 As Alice Hills in her study of policing and development in Africa points out: “policing by civil organisations on behalf of a legitimate state requires an ordered state”\(^69\). She goes on to note that, as the police, whatever mechanisms are developed to protect their independence and political neutrality, are part of society, it is likely that their development will parallel that of the state itself. Policing will be “shaped by the internal dynamics of hierarchies and cliques, as well as by corporate and personal ambitions, and by traditions, to say nothing of political judgements”\(^70\).

5.13 The development of accountable and open policing is, thus, heavily dependent on the relationships between civil and political society and the extent to which the state manages to gain and maintain legitimacy.\(^71\) There is recent evidence (for example, the Nepal project) that DFID now recognises the extent to which the absence of legitimacy undermines attempts to engage in police reform.

**Community Policing**

5.14 The problems of building democratic, accountable and open policing can be illustrated by examining the experience of projects which sought to implement forms of community policing. (Annex F contains a fuller account of this analysis). As noted in Section 2, during the 1990s there was a shift of emphasis in DFID projects towards

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\(^69\) Hills, 1996, p.275.
\(^70\) Hills, 1996, p.291. See also Healey and Robinson, 1992.
\(^71\) See the discussion about the absence of a clear division between political and civil society in Africa in Bayart, 1993.
assisting the development of community-based policing services which aimed at creating wider partnerships between the police and the public.

5.15 The overall concept of community policing is associated with ideas about policing by consent, where policing takes place on the basis of approval and active support by the community. It’s advocacy is rooted within a perspective on policing which emphasises the service functions of the police in terms of protection from crime, support for victims and safeguarding rights rather than crime control and the maintenance of order. As noted in Annex F, however, there is no clear consensus on what community policing implies in practice.

5.16 In the UK it has tended to be associated with idea of policing by consent where public policing should, ideally, take place on the basis of approval and active support by the community and implies operational procedures which gain a high level of legitimacy from the community. Despite its relatively high profile in the objectives of many of the projects reviewed, DFID’s approach to community policing appears to have been only recently explicitly defined. Before this, interpretations of community policing have been largely left to individual TCOs and this may account for the lack of consistency in implementation documented in this evaluation.

5.17 Not surprisingly, there have been a number of difficulties with implementation. A major factor (clearly present in the Indonesia, Uganda and Namibia projects) has been the reluctance of the police to engage fully in a major change in vision and style of policing. This is partly influenced by the absence of traditions of policing by consent in countries with histories of authoritarian rule, internal insecurity and colonial policing styles. In addition, senior police management, especially in situations of perceived high crime rates, frequently see community policing as a soft approach which detracts from other priorities such as crime-busting and internal security. There have also been fears (as in South Africa) that partners may see community policing as a means to exert control over the police, thus infringing on operational independence as well as politicising policing. In many cases, community policing has been introduced as a marginal activity, separated from mainstream policing, which has remained relatively unchanged in terms of organisational culture and styles of policing.

5.18 There is also evidence that the police have often been reluctant to become involved in building the range of local partnerships needed for the development of community policing. Even where there has been a strong drive to implement community policing, as in the case of South Africa, it has proved difficult to involve

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72 A recent DFID/GID memorandum describes community policing as follows:
- Effective policing is based on consultation, participation and partnership with the community
- The community should be empowered to influence the style of policing to one that is most appropriate to local needs and traditions
- Policing should be proactive rather than reactive
- Emphasis should be placed on the prevention of crime, deterring and diverting offenders rather than solely on law enforcement
- Policing is about providing a service to those who need it most
- Particular attention should be paid to crimes against women and children
- Police should respect human rights
all sections of the community. The South African projects show the exclusion of the most vulnerable groups (the poor, women, minorities) from full participation in partnership institutions as well as attempts by locally dominant groups in civil society to use such institutions to protect their own interests.

5.19 In general, an analysis of the community policing aspects of the DFID projects indicates two major areas of concern. Firstly, (as discussed in Section 4) there is the problem of achieving the cultural and organisational change amongst the police, which is a prerequisite for successful integration of community policing. Secondly, there is the need to ensure that police-community partnership institutions adequately represent the interests of all stakeholders, particularly the poor and the vulnerable.  

5.20 Finally, the extent to which the adoption of community policing can, alone, make a marked impact on levels of crime or provide greater safety and security, especially for the poor, needs to be considered. As noted in Annex F, there is no strong research evidence on the positive contribution of community policing to crime reduction and there are strong arguments for recognising the contribution of wider economic and social factors to determining levels of crime and insecurity.

5.21 The rest of this section examines the extent to which DFID projects have been able to address wider developmental issues such as poverty alleviation and equity. It then outlines some of the reasons why it is important to contextualise support for policing within a wider framework, which addresses the causes of the vulnerability of the poor as well as more conventional policing concerns.

**Policing, Equity and Poverty Alleviation**

5.22 Recent DFID policy has moved strongly in the direction of focussing on poverty elimination. With this has come the recognition that poor and the vulnerable suffer disproportionately from both crime and poor policing and that safety from crime and access to justice are as important as access to food, shelter, health and education. Whilst freedom from crime and safety are still seen as major benchmarks of good governance and essential ingredients for economic growth and sustainable development, the emphasis has changed to a greater concentration on the impact of crime on the poor and on enhancing their access to the justice system.

5.23 A recent review of the Jamaica police, commissioned by DFID, noted that: “(t)he poor are the main victims of crime and the depressed economy will never remedy their employment problems until foreign money is attracted by a safe and stable, as well as democratic society”. A World Bank study on poor urban communities in four continents showed that the poor perceive intensifying violence and crime as threatening personal safety, access to jobs and the sustainability of

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73 These issues have received detailed attention recently in Jamaica. (See Annex E.8).
74 The recognition of the major impact of crime on the poor and vulnerable came somewhat earlier in UK criminology, see Young and Matthews, (eds), 1992.
76 Moser, 1996.
community based organisations. A recent World Bank paper on the Jamaican Social Investment Fund\textsuperscript{77} has noted that violence is now perceived as an important economic and social development issue:

“Costs of violence can range from low investor confidence; higher health and police costs; the disaffection and migration of the urban middle class; higher mortality and morbidity rates; reduced access to social services; dysfunctional families; and deeper oppression of women, to the breakdown of community spirit and participation, and the substitution of a climate of fear amongst neighbours.”

5.24 This marked change in the discourse on crime, policing and development in the last few years post-dates many of the police projects reviewed in this study. Despite the dangers of hindsight, the three ex-post evaluation studies make useful points about the neglect of cross-cutting issues and summarise areas which current and future police projects need to address.

5.25 The \textbf{Indonesia} evaluation noted that there was little evidence of concerns about gender either in terms of recruitment and training or of developing services for women as victims of crime. It concluded that, with the benefit of hindsight, the project could be “said to be deficient” in respect to the absence of a focus on the poor, the disadvantaged, women and human rights.\textsuperscript{78} The \textbf{Uganda} evaluation comments, pungently that:

“… there were issues which the project did not in any direct sense set out to address. Most conspicuous of these is poverty – a word that occurs once in passing in the second project memorandum but otherwise not at all … No attempt was made, as it might conceivably have been, to argue that the limitations and inadequacies of the policing system in Uganda at that time bore most heavily on the poorest, who had therefore most to gain from its improvement. It was enough that better policing should lead to greater social stability, and thus to enhanced economic performance.”\textsuperscript{79}

5.26 The \textbf{Uganda} evaluators also noted that “little if any thought seems to have been given in 1990 to the particular needs of women” or of how Phase 1 might have addressed them.\textsuperscript{80} Recommendations for support in training strategies for equal opportunities and awareness of women’s legal rights were not taken up. Finally, the evaluation report noted that, whilst human rights was not included in the objectives of either phase, “aid support for the police involves issues of human rights. These need to be recognised clearly in project design and documentation”.\textsuperscript{81}

5.27 The \textbf{Namibia} evaluation identified the social and economic dimension of police work as an area where project action had fewer benefits. It noted that, whilst there was evidence of positive changes in the police, (policing methods and attitudes),

\textsuperscript{77} Moser, Holland and Adam, 1996, p.1.  
\textsuperscript{78} DFID 1998 \textit{Indonesia Report}, p.4  
\textsuperscript{79} DFID 1998 \textit{Uganda Police Project}, p. 37.  
\textsuperscript{81} DFID 1998 \textit{Uganda Report}, p. 28
and in the responses of the community to the police, the project had not consolidated efforts to address the needs of all sectors of the population, particularly vulnerable
groups, or develop community based policing. The evaluation devoted a specific
annex (I) to social development considerations, focusing on a number of issues that
should have affected the types of police service proposed and the project approach.
These included paying attention to needs at national, regional and community levels,
and especially those of vulnerable groups, both in the community and within the
police force itself.

5.28 More recent projects show the growth of a recognition of such developmental
issues. For example, in the 1997 mid term review of the Nepal project the OPR noted
slow progress on outputs dealing with rights and public safety, community policing,
protection of women and children and recommended that the rest of the project focus
on these. It also recognised that improving police effectiveness alone would have
limited impact on improving the access of the poor to justice.82

5.29 However the adoption of a wider developmental agenda has not been uniform.
The Lesotho Police Development Plan accepts that, in the past, “little or no
cognizance was taken of local population sizes, growth rates, crime problems and the
needs of the local community”83, but does not go much further than stating that one of
the aims will be to ensure a more equitable and efficient distribution of police
resources across the country. Cross-cutting issues such as poverty or gender are not
mentioned, nor is gender mentioned at all in the section the Human Resource and
Deployment strategy.

Policing, Crime and the Poor

5.30 Given the current emphasis on the safety and security needs of the poor and
vulnerable, it is important to examine the links poverty, crime and policing.

5.31 A recent study on the impact of crime on the poor in S. Africa84 notes that the
impact of crime is not uniform and that race, class and gender are significant
determinants of the nature of victimisation. “In comparative terms, the wealthy are
victims of property crime, while the poor are the victims of violent crime as well as of
property crime”.85 In explaining these differentials the authors place stress on the
role of infrastructural and environmental factors. The poor are likely to live in areas
(informal settlements, townships, rural areas) where there are few police stations and
the kinds of infrastructural developments such as street lighting, access to roads,
telephones, which facilitate crime prevention are absent. In addition the sparse
distribution of public services such as water, health posts, schools means that the poor

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82 DFID, 1997 Nepal Police Project, OPR. The TCO, in his own report (p.12), listed the major social and economic development problems facing Nepal but stressed that a key problem behind the perpetuation of poverty was the lack of justice, especially the inability of the justice system to curtail corruption amongst the rich and powerful.
83 Lesotho Police Development Plan Draft p.26
84 Louw and Shaw, 1997.
85 ibid p.12
are likely to have to travel longer distances by public transport or on foot, placing them at greater risk.

5.32 The study also emphasises that the more wealthy are able to hire physical protection in terms of private security. This leads to a situation in which the wealthy areas are increasingly policed preventively by commercial security and the poor policed reactively by an enforcement-oriented public police, reinforcing the situation of lesser security for the poor. The authors note that there is much evidence to doubt whether poorer communities (especially in urban and peri-urban areas) are sufficiently homogenous and supportive to provide an effective alternative to private security protection.

5.33 The authors also refer to the heightened vulnerability of the poor to domestic violence, rape and child abuse and the extent to which women are trapped in abusive relationships due to dependence on partners for economic support. As noted in Section 4, the United Nations has also documented the ways in which women in developing countries are victims of gender-based violence more than women in other countries, but this often remains unreported and unrecognised.  

5.34 Being victimised by crime makes the poor more vulnerable by eroding their already reduced means to withstand and recover from its effects. The Jamaican Social Investment Fund study, argues that violence significantly increases vulnerability by eroding assets in the following ways:

- **Labour**: when it reduces access to jobs
- **Human capital**: when it reduces or limits access to education and health facilities by users and providers
- **Household relations**: when it reduces the capacity of households to function effectively as a unit
- **Productive assets**: when housing-related infrastructure like water, electricity and telephones are vandalised or their installation is prevented
- **Social capital**: when it reduces the trust and cooperation between community organisations and households, which are the basis of the coping strategies of the poor, or when it restricts mobility for social interaction and leisure activities.

### Crime Prevention

5.35 Despite the importance of effective reactive responses by the justice system as a whole to the impact of crime, for the poor, who bear the burden of crime, successful **crime prevention** is critically important. Prevention here refers to altering the environment in which specific types of crime occur or intervening more broadly to alter the social or other conditions which may have a causal significance. In most countries, the problem is that policies on crime prevention tend to focus on the interests of the rich who, because of the uneven distribution of private and public policing, are already more protected than the poor.

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[^87]: see Pease, 1997 for a useful taxonomy on prevention.
The variation in the distribution of types and causes of crime and the implementation of preventive strategies raises questions of governance. Forms of governance that have been developed to service the needs of single party states or to deal with issues of public order and internal security often result in uneven criminal justice and policing responses to crime control and prevention. For example, rural areas are frequently under-resourced and require different policy responses to urban areas. Within urban areas, there are marked differences between the areas where the poor and the wealthy live, not only in the vulnerability of citizens but also in the availability of resources for crime prevention. Given this, it can be argued that greater responsibility and political accountability for both reactive policing and crime prevention initiatives should be devolved to local levels rather than remaining at national levels.\(^8^8\)

Crime control and prevention, within the context of devolution or decentralisation, in turn implies the need to develop local partnerships that effectively include the poor. As is stressed in the evaluation of the Namibia project, such local partnerships may need to be built within a wider developmental framework which begins to address the causes of the vulnerability of the poor. Similar points are made in the recent review of the Jamaica police which suggested that the police need to be full and active partners in co-ordinated inter-agency approaches, but went on to doubt the willingness and ability of the JCF to engage in such initiatives.\(^9^9\)

**CONCLUSION**

This section has assessed some of the difficulties involved in identifying the contribution of support to the police to DFID’s wider policy goals. It has argued that, whilst effective and democratic policing is part of the equation which links order, stability and security with development, it is much less clear what the nature of that contribution is. There are obvious dangers in expecting too much of relatively small and time-limited projects in terms of achieving the wider goals which have been set. There are also dangers in ignoring the context within which the police operate. Strengthening the effectiveness of the police without addressing other parts of the justice system is likely to be unproductive in terms of enhancing access to justice. Supporting police reform without parallel reforms to increase the legitimacy and accountability of government as a whole is also likely to be unproductive.

The recent emphasis on tying support to the police more closely with assistance in reforming justice systems and the impact of crime on the poor and the vulnerable offers the possibility of developing a more focussed policy with clearer goals. However, much of the project evidence indicates that there have been limits to the extent to which the police and the governments, who ultimately control and fund the police, are prepared to countenance tying aid to policing to making progress on wider issues of good governance. Community policing has provided a useful test for this. The same problems are likely to emerge in tying policing more closely to

\(^8^8\) This has been recognised in the recent S. African White Paper on safety and security – *In Service of Safety, 1998 – 2003*

\(^9^9\) Crown Agents Institutional Development Group (1998), op.cit, p.10
reducing the vulnerability of the poor, especially when it may require the diversion of policing resources from the protection of wealthier groups who are both economically and politically dominant.\(^{90}\)

Many of these issues about policing are not restricted to developing countries. A recent analysis of policing and the police in the UK rather bleakly refers to the difficulties of maintaining traditional forms of British policing in a society undergoing rapid social and economic change:

“Whilst the majority participate, albeit unevenly and insecurely, in unprecedented levels of consumption, a substantial and growing ‘underclass’ is permanently and hopelessly excluded. Certainly with the political predominance of free-market policies there is no prospect at all of their incorporation into the general social order. In other words the ‘police property’ group is far larger than ever before, and more fundamentally alienated. This economic fragmentation interacts with a long and complex process of cultural diversification, declining deference, erosion of moral absolutes, ‘desubordination’ and growing anomia to create a more turbulent, disorderly social world.” (Reiner, 1997).

The author, Robert Reiner, argues that, in this context, will be difficult retain traditional policing. There will be specialist units for serious crime, terrorism, public order, large-scale fraud. Local policing will be divided between service provision in the better-off stable areas and ‘watchman’ bodies keeping the lid on underclass locations. Much of the provision of security will be privatised in commercial and middle class residential areas, leaving poorer areas to be policed by the public police in an essentially reactive and coercive manner.
SECTION 6

CONCLUSIONS

6.1 The significance of support to the police is very small if measured in expenditure terms, in relation to good government initiatives or to total DFID spending on all forms of aid. However, the significance of this sector is much greater than expenditure would appear to indicate. This is because effective policing is seen to play a major role in the creation of a climate of law and order, in which democracy can be assured and economic and social development can take place. Support to overseas police forces also has a high political profile in terms of the risks associated with forms of aid that may be misused by states that have a poor or uneven human rights record.

6.2 In this conclusion we return to the three questions about the purpose and nature of DFID’s involvement in policing projects which were set out in Section 1.

When should DFID be involved in policing projects?

6.3 We have argued in this report that, whilst the police can undeniably make a major contribution to social order and stability and to the safety and security of citizens which are all seen as preconditions for development, it is by no means clear what is their precise contribution. Earlier projects appear to have been based on the idea that improving managerial and professional skills was the best way of enabling the police to contribute to these wider aims. These have been largely successful in terms of institution building. However, it is not obvious how this has helped meet the more general goals. Part of the problem lies with setting goals which are too wide and placing too great an expectation on the police as an agent of change. But there is also evidence that project partners have not always shared these wider goals and that projects have not addressed the needs and interests of those who are most vulnerable to crime and abuses of rights.

6.4 In any future support to the police, DFID will need to ensure a much greater local commitment, not only to the overall goals of development aid but also in recognising that effective and democratic policing cannot be achieved without a wider approach. Such an approach would clearly link reforms to the police with wider reforms to the criminal justice system as a whole and, at a higher level, to changes in the relationship between the state and civil society. Of equal importance, is the need to ensure that projects have explicit pro-poor, equity and human rights components and that they form multi-sectoral partnerships with other agencies concerned with poverty alleviation and the protection of vulnerable groups.

91 See Annex C.
In this report we have indicated how the appropriate commitment of project partners might be achieved. This may take time; it is a matter both of seeking to change police culture and of developing programmes in stages, including a focused effort to generate widespread commitment. One test of such commitment is that host governments are willing to commit their own resources, jointly with DFID, to support the specific kinds of project component identified as protecting the interests of poor and disadvantaged groups.

**How are the police necessary to the achievement of DFID’s goals?**

6.6 The major goals of most projects have been based on the assumption that the police are a key element in the production and maintenance of social order. In section 5, we introduced a distinction between the ‘police’ and ‘policing’ and noted that the maintenance of social order has never been a function carried out by the police alone and that the emergence of the police (as a specialised state institution) is largely a modern phenomenon. Although an effective and democratic police service can make obvious contributions to the achievement and maintenance of order, security, justice and rights, the distinction between police and policing is important. It serves as a reminder that, in the maintenance of social order, other institutions and processes than the police (and the formal justice system) are involved. These, which range from private security companies, through varieties of traditional and communal policing and justice, to self-help vigilantism, have been largely overlooked in the projects under review.

6.7 Secondly, it reminds us that models of policing and of the ‘police’ are historically and culturally specific. In many of the projects there appears to have been an underlying assumption that the British model was appropriate and transferable. Indeed, most of those who were involved as advisors and TCOs had little to go on apart from their own professional experience within the UK. This runs counter to the contemporary emphasis on the need to recognise diversity and the importance of finding ‘local solutions to local problems’.

**To what extent have projects been able to achieve effective policing and how could effectiveness be increased?**

6.8 We have defined effective policing as policing which both reduces the level and the fear of crime and is successful in achieving support from all sectors of society. Effective policing requires the formation of partnerships with civil society, particularly those who are most vulnerable to crime or the abuse of rights. In most of the countries to which support has been given, the police, historically, have been controlled by and acted in the interests of dominant elites. The needs of those who are more vulnerable to crime and its impact have been largely ignored. The poor have been policed reactively and little support has been given to the victims of crime.
6.9 Turning this situation round is not easy. There is an obvious need for the police to pursue policies which have the consent of the public. In many of the countries concerned many of the public are as afraid of the police as they are of crime. The poor are especially hostile and alienated. There is a need for community policing in its broadest sense as a style of policing in which all police are community police and in which there is close partnership with civil society, especially the poor. There is a particular need to protect the interests of the vulnerable, especially women and children.

6.10 The comprehensive approach to remedies suggested in a report on *Women as Victims in Developing Countries* indicates lessons applicable to policing more generally:

> “State intervention in this sphere should involve the enforcement of a series of provisions that are not limited to penal sanctions but also include compensatory and civil solutions, victim support measures, education and information programmes …”

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6.11 The attempt to build community-based policing into the process of changing the balance of policing away from ‘force’ towards ‘service’ and increasing local accountability and accessibility has been less popular and more difficult to achieve. This is partly due to the time needed to move away from inherited para-military and reactive cultures and styles of policing. Senior police management, whilst recognising the image benefits to be gained from community policing, have also seen it as a softer form of policing that may hamper their capacity to deal vigorously with rising crime rates or continuing threats of internal political insecurity. Community policing has been side-lined as a separate area of policing rather than being integrated into the full range of police activities. In many cases, community policing initiatives have failed to develop sustainable partnerships with the local community or have developed these with wealthier groups, ignoring the interests of poorer groups and areas.

6.12 Apart from the promotion of a broader concept of community policing, there is a need to take a more holistic view of the interdependence of the criminal justice system. Effective policing without a criminal justice system which is seen as just and effective is not possible. This requires bail, remand and prosecution systems that are effective, efficient, timely and sentencing and penal systems which provide effective and publicly acceptable alternatives to the present predominant use of fines and/or prison which tend to disadvantage poor offenders and do little to compensate victims. There is also a need to ensure the protection of the rights of all those caught up in the justice system – victims, witnesses, suspects and convicted offenders.

6.13 However, the principle of reducing the scope of formal justice systems should also be considered. Professionalised systems are not only costly but run the danger of isolation from the public. For the police this may involve greater civilianisation, privatisation of some policing functions and adoption of forms of auxiliary police (as in

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Lesotho). For the resolution of disputes and dealing with more minor crimes there is a need to recognise the value of diversion from the formal system to the range of traditional and communal processes which, in general, work on the principle of restorative justice. Although the extent to which the more informal system can be punitive, is often controlled by local elites, and is not necessarily pro the poor, women, children, must be carefully analysed.

6.14 Developing a more inclusive and pro-active approach to policing, equity and justice is likely to require the setting up of multi-disciplinary team which can draw on a range of skills within DFID and which should also be ready to use the experience of NGOs which have developed particular areas of expertise. Such a team might have the mandate to develop policy, commission research, design information systems (see Annex D), engage in a more on-going process of evaluation than has hitherto been the case and, finally, ensure that project experience is effectively disseminated. Establishing similar multi-disciplinary teams in Development Divisions would have the advantage of ensuring that policy is translated into locally appropriate projects as well as addressing the need for closer project support and oversight.

6.15 Adopting such an approach may help in resolving the basic dilemma implicit in the policing and development equation: is effective and democratic policing a key factor in enabling wider forms of development to take place or is it only achievable once other transformations have taken place?

93 For example Save the Children (UK) which has considerable project experience in the fields of juvenile justice and children’s rights. A greater than present use of North-South and South-South cooperation (viz section 4) would also be valuable.
ANNEX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

EVALUATION OF ODA/DFID SUPPORT TO THE POLICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SYNTHESIS STUDY

Introduction

A.1. DFID’s Evaluation Department (EvD) wishes to appoint consultants to prepare a synthesis study, which will be the major output of an evaluation work programme currently underway of the effectiveness of ODA/DFID\textsuperscript{94} support to developing country police forces since the late 1980s.

A.2. The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the effectiveness of a selection of ODA/DFID-funded police support projects in achieving their purpose, and in particular in assisting developing countries to develop accountable, democratic, and community-based approaches to policing. The evaluation will also consider the likely impact of ODA/DFID support to police forces in achieving wider good government goals in recipient countries.

A.3. Ex-post evaluation studies are currently being conducted of three major ODA/DFID-funded police support projects, in Namibia, Uganda and Indonesia. Data will also be gathered from Output-to-Purpose Reviews (OPRs) of a selection of ongoing police projects.

A.4. A synthesis report will be produced, drawing together the empirical findings from the ex-post evaluations and OPRs, and placing these in the context of an analysis of the evolution of ODA/DFID’s policy for police support and its wider criminal justice and good government aims, and a broader review of evaluation studies and relevant literature from selected bilateral and multilateral donors and other institutions. These Terms of Reference refer specifically to the synthesis study.

Background

A.5. UK government support to the police has evolved significantly since the late 1980s, with a transfer of lead responsibility for this work from the diplomatic wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to ODA in the early 1990s being of particular significance in placing this work within the framework of ODA/DFID’s wider criminal justice and good government aims.

A.6. Support to the police is a sensitive area, carrying political and other risks not normally encountered in development assistance work. DFID is one of the few donors which engage in this work on any significant scale.

A.7. DFID’s current approach to police support is relatively new, and definitive findings are unlikely to result from evaluation work at this stage. Although there will be significant summative elements to the evaluation, it will also have formative elements which will seek to draw lessons from current experience of relevance to the continuing development of DFID’s policy and strategy frameworks for police work.

Objectives

A.8. The police evaluation synthesis study will have the following objectives:

\textsuperscript{94} Following the General Election of May 1997 the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) was replaced with a new Department for International Development (DFID).
• to review the evolution of ODA/DFID’s policy and strategy frameworks for support to the police over the past 10 years and assess the extent to which funded activities have been consistent with, and supportive of, these to assess the effectiveness, and strengths and weaknesses, of ODA/DFID’s support in promoting the development of efficient, effective, accountable, and community-based police forces in developing countries
• to assess the likely impact of ODA-support to the police in contributing to the achievement of wider criminal justice and good government goals in recipient countries
• to identify lessons learned from experience over the past 10 years, by ODA/DFID and others, of value in strengthening future DFID work in this sector.

Tasks

A.9. The synthesis study will be undertaken as a desk study and will draw together the empirical findings from the ex-post evaluations and OPRs, and place these within the context of an analysis of ODA/DFID policy and strategy, and wider experience within the development community. Prior to drafting the synthesis study report, the consultant will undertake the following tasks:

• review and analyse the evolution of ODA/DFID’s police support policy and strategy over the past 10 years, with particular emphasis on the changes of approach and investment pattern brought about in the wake of the transfer of lead responsibility from the diplomatic wing of the FCO to ODA in the early 1990s
• summarise and assess the findings of ex-post evaluation studies commissioned by EvD of three major ODA-funded police projects, in Namibia, Uganda, and Indonesia
• review and analyse the findings of OPRs of a selection of ongoing police projects, undertaken by ODA/DFID staff and consultants during 1996, 1997, and early 1998
• review selected ODA/DFID police project reports and other documentation relevant to the study
• review key documents and evaluation and other study findings from selected multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, and policy/research institutions
• hold consultations with DFID programme managers and advisers, and key informants in the FCO and other institutions (including service providers) with an interest in assisting police forces in developing countries

A.10. In compiling the synthesis study, the consultant will pay significant attention to cross-cutting issues, particularly community involvement, gender concerns, and human rights, and the likely impact of ODA/DFID support on the poor.

Outputs

A.11. The consultant will produce the following outputs:

• a draft synthesis study report
• a presentation, containing the key findings of the study, to be given at a DFID seminar
• a final draft of the synthesis report, reflecting comments received from selected DFID staff and other stakeholders and feedback received at the proposed seminar.

A.12 The final report will be presented to the DFID Projects and Evaluation Committee (PEC), chaired by the Director-General (Operations). The consultant will be expected to participate in this meeting with the Head and other members of EvD.

95 The final selection will be discussed with the consultant, but is likely to include reviews of projects in South Africa, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Nepal.
Timing and inputs

A.13. The work will commence during the last quarter of 1997 and draft report completed by May 1998. It is estimated that a total of not more than 15 person weeks of input will be required.

Management and reporting arrangements

A.14. The consultant will report to the Social Development Adviser, EvD, who is responsible for the overall management of the police evaluation work programme. An internal consultative group will be established within DFID to provide oversight to the implementation of the synthesis study and to review the findings. Membership of the group will be agreed with the Senior Police Adviser and the Head of EvD.
ANNEX B (draft only)

PEOPLE CONSULTED

B.1. Ex or present ODA/DFID staff

Colin Dinsdale, retired OPA
Lionel Grundy, retired OPA
Geoff Bredemear, OPA
Chris Gale, OPA
Annabel Grant
George Turkington
Stephen Chard, BDDSA
Frank Black, BDDSA
Alex Harper, BDDSA.
Mary Straker
Phil Evans

B.2. Ex or present TCOs and Advisors

Bob Hunt
Alex Marnoch
Elder
Lawson
Peter Stevens, TCO W. Cape
Graham Matthias, TCO, Free State
Graham Balchin, TCO, Lesotho and Swaziland
Piet Biesheuvel, TCO, E. Cape
David Williams, TCO, Ethiopia
Mervyn Jones, Strategic Advisor, Ethiopia

B.3. Academics and Consultants

Sue Jones
Nicole Ball
Mike Maguire, University of Wales, Cardiff
Joe Frost, Bramshill Police College
Andrew Willis, University of Leicester, Scarman Centre
Ugljesa Zvecic, Research Director, UNICRI, Rome
Anna del Frate, Research Officer, UNICRI, Rome
Mark Shaw, Director of ISS, S. Africa

B.4. In addition in S.Africa

Commissioner Zelda xxx, SAPS
Superintendent Vanessa Goundem, SAPS
Peter Cachalia, Secretariat for Safety and Security
Eliane Ventner, Secretariat for Safety and Security
Mduduzi Mashiyone, IDASA
Nico Bezuidenhaur, IDASA
Nomonde Mandla, W. Cape Secretariat for Safety and Security
John Clotte, W. Cape Community Policing Project, Field Manager
Patrick Smith, Department of Social Work, University of Cape Town
Members of the W. Cape Provincial Police Board
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