EVALUATION OF ODA/DFID SUPPORT TO THE POLICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SYNTHESIS STUDY

VOLUME II

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March 1999
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ANNEX C

DFID EXPENDITURE AND COMMITMENTS ON POLICING PROJECTS

C.1. In the decade 1987/88 to 1996/87, DFID was involved in expenditure on police projects in almost 60 countries.1 This expenditure rose substantially over the decade, from £1.7 m in 1987/88 to £8.6 m in 1996/97, as shown in Table C.1 and Figure C.1. However it should be noted that, in part because technical cooperation accounts for most DFID expenditure on policing, total expenditure was small as compared, for example, with expenditure on good government as a whole, (£235 m. in 88 countries in 1996/97),2 or with total UK aid, (£2,151 m. for the same year, of which 50% was bilateral).3

Table C.1 DFID expenditure on policing projects in different regions, 1987/88 to 1996/97 (£'000)

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<td>3,458</td>
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<td>912</td>
<td>1,357</td>
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<td>2,070</td>
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<td>2,736</td>
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<td>4,237</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>2,933</td>
<td>4,253</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>4,701</td>
<td>5,083</td>
<td>5,717</td>
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<td>6,353</td>
<td>8,628</td>
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C.2. In almost every year the bulk of the expenditure on policing projects was in African and Caribbean countries. In the latter it is far out of proportion to their size, because there are special provisions for dependent territories in the region and because the international drugs control effort is strong in the region. (See Annex E.8). A large project in the West Bank and Gaza, focused specifically on non-military policing, accounted for almost all the expenditure in ‘other’ countries for 1994/95 and 1996/97. Some of the increase from 1990/91 also stems from a significant project in Indonesia, (see Annex E.1), another in Poland, and a range of small projects in Eastern Europe and the Asia/Pacific region.

---

1 See Table C.4. All tables are based on data provided by DFID Statistics Department. They do not include small amounts of direct spending by the FCO, allocations under Aid-and-Trade Provisions or spending on international drugs control which is not concerned with institutional strengthening of police forces.

2 See Table C.2.

3 British Aid Statistics 1997. As a further contrast, we may note that total UK aid for illicit drugs control alone was £14.0 m in 1996/97, including £5.3 m bilateral aid, £5.8 m from the FCO and Home Offices and a contribution of £2.9 m to the UN International Drug Control Programme. (British Aid Statistics 1998).
C.3. The picture of increasing commitment to policing projects is reinforced by the data below and in Table C.3, which give an indication of future spending commitments. In the last five years, total spending commitments were made as follows:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (£m)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.4. Table C.3 shows estimated future commitments (the excess of recent commitments over recent spending) of over £1.0 m for each of six African and 2 Caribbean countries, with especially large commitments in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Uganda and Jamaica. Total estimated future commitments are high in total, almost equaling total, actual expenditure for the seven years 1991/92 to 1997/98, again indicating the upward trajectory of aid to policing.

C.5. This upward trajectory is still comparatively modest, however, as table C.2 indicates. This shows spending on police projects as a proportion of spending on all projects classified as contributing to good government under the PIMS marker system. It may be seen that policing projects comprise only a small proportion of all ‘good government’ spending, (a peak of 6.2% in 1992/93), and that this proportion has decreased since - spending on good government projects generally rose at a faster rate than spending on policing projects.

Table C.2 Expenditure on Policing Projects as a proportion of all expenditure on good government (£’000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Police</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>4,102</td>
<td>4,461</td>
<td>7,978</td>
<td>4,933</td>
<td>7,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Good Government</td>
<td>60,872</td>
<td>65,703</td>
<td>131,388</td>
<td>167,555</td>
<td>197,739</td>
<td>235,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Police</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>3.04</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4 The fall in 1997/98 may stem in part from delay in entering data in the DFID statistics department’s database; it may also result in part from caution in making early commitments just before and after the change of government in July 1997. A similar fall applies to good government commitments as a whole made in 1997/98, as compared with a peak in 1996/97.

5 DFID’s Policy Information Marker System, under which projects of £100,000 + are coded according to their intended contributions to key DFID objectives.
C.6. In summary, it is suggested that the growth of expenditure on aid to policing needs to be seen in the context that it remains very small as compared with other areas of aid expenditure. In this report it is suggested that, in order to make a sustained contribution to broader good governance objectives, projects need to be supported over a relatively long period. It is also noted that the cost of policing is a very high proportion of recurrent expenditure in developing countries. Together, these three points suggest that significant, further increases in expenditure on policing may be justified.

Figure C.1 DFID Expenditure on Police Projects (£) 1987/88 to 1996/97
Table C.3  PIMS Expenditure and commitments 1991/2 – 1997/98 (£’000) for policing projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actual Exp.</th>
<th>Total Commitments</th>
<th>Future commitments</th>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>5,758</td>
<td>1,522</td>
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<td>Gambia, The</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>1,508</td>
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<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>1,163</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
<td>951</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>580</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
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<td>Grenada</td>
<td>308</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1,674</td>
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<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>1,177</td>
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<tr>
<td>St Kitts-Nevis</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1,137</td>
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<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>201</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; Gr.</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>Turks and Caicos I.</td>
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<td>2,322</td>
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<td>Other Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
<td>35,179</td>
<td>70,080</td>
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Notes:
1. PIMS expenditure and commitments data cover only projects of £100,000+, so there are small differences from the data in Table C.4.
2. Future commitments are derived from Actual Expenditure less Total Commitments and are approximate. Expenditure in this period includes some pre-1991/92 commitments.
Table C.4  UK Police Projects Actual Expenditure (£ '000)1987/88 to 1996/97

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ANNEX D

INFORMATION FOR PLANNING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF POLICE PROJECTS.

Introduction

D.1. A recurring theme in these evaluations is the lack of information available as a basis for planning, monitoring and evaluation. We and other evaluators have been handicapped in making judgements as clear, appropriate and verifiable indicators of effectiveness of projects were rarely identified. Beyond that, project planners both in DFID and in police forces lack basic information needed for effective planning and project and programme implementation. Even more broadly, we have emphasised that very little research has been published on policing in developing countries, so that a body of material providing important context for analysis of particular cases is lacking.

D.2. The aim of this Annex, therefore, is to outline the kinds of information needed, both by project planners and managers and by evaluators, governments or donors. In addition to suggesting some guiding principles, we have sought to provide specific illustrations. It should perhaps be emphasised that examples are for illustrative purposes only; information needs vary from case to case and can only be satisfactorily identified in a participatory way, with different stakeholders identifying their own needs. A further caveat is to emphasise the dangers of information overload. Modern technology reinforces the twin dangers of excessive centralisation and production of a dense mass of data, so that key indicators are obscured. It is essential in each case to try to identify a small number of indicators agreed by different stakeholders as key priorities.

Assessing effectiveness

D.3. If projects in this field are to be regarded as truly successful then they must be seen to make some contribution to effective policing. However, the questions of what is “effective policing” and how to assess it are difficult and controversial. We need to go beyond the conventional management concept of effectiveness – success in achieving given objectives – to asking what these objectives should be. There is widespread agreement that, to be successful, the police must have some impact in controlling crime and, in addition, they must do so in ways which are seen as fair and just. Marenin’s concept of ‘good, democratic policing’ incorporates these two ideas. (See the main report, Section 5, and Marenin, 1

1 “It has taken nearly two decades for UK police forces to change to their present ‘strategic management’ and, although we can help other forces to avoid some of the pitfalls, they have to make much of the journey for themselves if they are to have ownership”. Personal communication from Mr Bob Hunt, main author of the Strategic Review of the Jamaica Constabulary Force, (see Annex E.8).
1998). They are also summed up in the phrase “maintaining law and order” – maintaining order while doing so within the principles and procedures of the criminal law.2

D.4. There are at least two major problems behind such statements of aims. First, different aims may be seen as in conflict: the police may see the requirement of following due process as constraining them excessively in controlling crime and maintaining order; furthermore, conflicting demands and expectations may come from different sectors of the population.3 The conventional answer is to say that the police must strike a difficult balance between different objectives, but this leaves open the question of what is an optimum balance and how the police could achieve it.

D.5. The second major problem is that there are serious doubts about the capacity of the police to control crime, although some argue that the police could control crime by adopting more effective methods.4 To the Audit Commission, for example, this would mean targeting known offenders, based on the striking finding that a very high proportion of all known crime is committed by a relatively small number of offenders.5 Other claims have been made for the success of particular strategies, ranging from ‘zero tolerance’ policing in the USA and UK6 to focusing crime prevention resources on high crime estates in the UK.7

D.6. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence compels us to be pessimistic about the success of more efficient policing in crime control. Recent evidence on the extent of unreported crime, in particular, emphasises how far there is to go, when added to low rates of prosecution then low rates of conviction.8 Morgan and Newburn conclude:

“There is little evidence that anything the police do has much more than a very marginal impact on crime levels. Secondly, to the extent that the Audit Commission, like the government, is suggesting that a significant switch in emphasis by the police towards crime fighting, as opposed to the other functions the police perform, will in the long term

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2 The “due process values” emphasised, for example, by Savage 1996 The Judicial System and the Police in Developing and Transition Societies – a Literature Review. There is a similar debate about a police service as opposed to a police force, that the police should use force as little as possible and should see their task as providing service to the public – the notion of service including a wide variety of tasks beyond catching criminals.
4 See, for example, the debate between Hough and Chatterton in the British Journal of Criminology, 1987, and Brady’s report for the US National Institute of Justice, 1996, Measuring What Matters.
5 Audit Commission (1993). Loveday (1997, p. 127), points out that, in England and Wales, around 7% of offenders are responsible for 65% of known offences.
6 Dennis (ed) 1997.
8 Loveday (1997, p 127) says:

“... Home Office research raised serious doubts about the overall utility of the criminal justice system in ‘fighting crime’.... (In 1992) the national clear up rates for crimes recorded by the police stood at 29%. However, if crimes cleared up were expressed as a percentage not of recorded crime but of offences estimated by the British Crime Survey, then the clear-up figure would fall to well under 10% ... the proportion of crimes resulting in a conviction was much lower, standing at 3%”.
be more effective in preventing crime this is, we think, a dangerous illusion”. (Morgan and Newburn, 1997, p 9).

D.7. These conclusions are not surprising, perhaps, when we consider that the police can do nothing about the complex factors which are producing more serious crime problems in most countries around the world.\(^9\) Clearly the problems of increasing efficiency and effectiveness, for which the common answer is increased and more sophisticated use of resources, are likely to be very much greater in poorer countries. Even more than police in the UK, those in less developed countries are in the position of having to make claims, in order to appease critics and obtain additional resources, which they have little prospect of achieving.

D.8. Although police forces will continue to do all they can to at least reduce growth of crime, great attention needs to be given to monitoring their success in achieving other objectives which may be seen as equally important and, perhaps, more achievable. In particular, attention is turned to assessing police success in meeting public concern, how to reduce the fear of crime, to be seen as fair and just and concerned for the rights of victims. This suggests a whole range of other indicators which might be used in monitoring and evaluation.

D.9. It also brings to the fore a point which is central to recent views of successful policing activity, that law and order are not necessarily in conflict. According to this argument, the police cannot control crime on their own, but are heavily dependent on support from the public in doing so. More successful crime control will follow from obtaining public support.\(^10\) This means not simply support of business interests or the more vocal or powerful sectors of society, but of the great bulk of the population. Throughout the developing world, of course, these are very poor or relatively poor people. Thus it may be argued, from the perspective of DFID’s general development policy, that effective policing is that which is approved in the eyes of the poor in particular. This, it is suggested, is the key indicator to use in assessing police effectiveness.

**Official crime statistics**

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\(^9\) Until recently it was believed that there is a correlation between crime, especially property crime, and development. Most recent evidence from surveys of victims suggests, however, that cities in many developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, have serious crime problems equivalent to those of cities in developed countries. This had been hidden previously by the fact that reporting of offences to the police and police capacity to maintain records tend to be lower in developing countries. (Zvekic et al (eds) 1995, Zvekic, 1999, Newman et al (eds), 1999).

\(^10\) The need for policing by consent is emphasised in many recent studies; for example, Morgan and Newburn (1997, p 203) say:

“…we are sceptical of claims that the police can, alone, ‘tackle crime effectively’. All the evidence shows that they cannot. We think it vital, therefore, that the police be tied organizationally into civic life so that, whatever it is that they want to do, they have actively to carry the public with them”.

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D.10. For all their widely recognised difficulties, data produced by the police on offences reported to them are important potential indicators of police effectiveness. They must always be subject to careful interpretation and, although the police in developing countries are often reluctant to publish them, informed public debate about trends seems highly desirable.

D.11. We may distinguish between offences which are more often reported, such as murder, violence with weapons or causing grievous bodily harm, burglary and higher value property offences, including car theft; and offences with low reporting rates, such as assaults, theft, and damage to property.\footnote{Surveys of victims show substantial differences in reporting rates for different offences. Although differences between offences are very similar in developed and developing countries, reporting rates in the latter are consistently lower, as noted earlier.} The more frequently reported offences provide good indications of trends in serious crime, of the kind creating more fear and insecurity among citizens.\footnote{Serious sexual offences are a special case because, despite their seriousness, reporting rates are relatively low.} Because police statistics are collated regularly, on both a national and a local basis, it is possible to keep track of trends and of variations between regions. It is especially important to distinguish urban from rural areas, which have very different crime patterns, but variations between other areas in offence rates per 100,000 population provide a useful basis for analysis of reasons for variation, including possible differences in policing activity.

D.12. Offences with lower reporting rates, on the other hand, are more useful as indicators of reporting behaviour. Paradoxically, increases are often likely to stem from increased confidence in the police, willingness to approach them and provide information or seek assistance. A special note of caution in interpretation is needed, however, as recorded increases in some offences may stem from changed police behaviour, for example, intensified drives against prostitution, or use of drugs, or shop lifting, or vandalism.

D.13. Two other indicators recorded by the police are useful as potential indicators of police effectiveness, rates of offences ‘cleared up’ and offences leading to conviction. Again, great caution in interpretation is needed. Although the ‘clear up rate’ is widely used to indicate performance, an aggregate rate is misleading as it mixes together offences which are difficult to detect and others which are ‘detected’ immediately they are known, for example, possession of drugs or assaulting the police. Generally, clear-up rates tend to be higher in developing countries, where reporting rates are lower, because a major reason for non-reporting is that the police are perceived as unlikely to be able to catch the criminal.\footnote{See Zvekic et al 1995} In examining clear-up rates, therefore, it is important to look at selected offences rather than aggregates.

D.14. Similar considerations, especially the need to disaggregate, apply to conviction rates. It may be noted that conviction rates for more serious offences are often extremely low in
developing countries, if witnesses are unwilling to give evidence and preparation of cases falls short of standards required by the courts.

**Offenders**

D.15. Although very little information on criminal justice systems is published and analysed in developing countries, a great deal is potentially available from the courts, prisons and other agencies, all of which record details of individual cases. It is often difficult to make sense of the statistics which are available because the different agencies do not explain how data are produced, nor do they collaborate, share information or seek some consistency in presentation of data.

D.16. Data from the courts on offenders is potentially very useful to supplement police data, for planning, monitoring and evaluating police services as well as other criminal justice agencies. It is relatively easy, for example, to examine offender characteristics in different areas, including age and sex distributions of those brought to court, together with criminal history data showing, for example, numbers of persistent offenders of different types in different areas. The latter might be used, for example, for selective targeting exercises or to evaluate specific kinds of impact.

D.17. In suggesting the above examples we are thinking especially of quantitative indicators which could be collated relatively easily. However, it may be noted that the public courts are useful access points for obtaining more qualitative information on offender and offence characteristics, on preparation of prosecution cases and, more broadly, for observation of criminal justice systems in action, for example, examining the enormous delays and periods of remand in custody which are typical in many developing countries.14

**Indicators of public support and respect for human rights**

D.18. The most obvious way of obtaining information on public attitudes to the police is through carrying out sample surveys among the general public. This is often cited as the intended means of gauging public reactions, although it is not clear whether the technical difficulties of obtaining such data, especially on the regular basis needed for monitoring, have been thought through.15 These methodological issues are discussed further below.

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14 See, for example, Clegg, Harding and Whetton, 1988, Clegg and Harding, 1990.
15 The Jamaica Constabulary Force *Corporate Strategy* for 1998/99 goes much further than other plans and project proposals in seeking indicators. It says that performance in Community Policing, for example, will be assessed: (p 7)

- “By regular monitoring of the level of fear of crime among citizens in the communities.
- By the use of surveys at police stations to measure the levels of satisfaction with the service we provide.
- By an upturn in the reporting of incidents (including crime in the short term) as a result of increased public confidence.
D.19. As the Jamaica example suggests, and as discussed with reference to crime reporting above, there are other, useful indicators of public attitudes to the police, which are more readily available if less direct than survey information. Some increases in reporting may indicate increased public confidence. Similarly, police concern with human rights and due process may be inferred from data on public complaints made to the police, or to other bodies such as appointed tribunals or local human rights organisations, or even local politicians or doctors. Again, such data must be interpreted with great caution; complaints may be unsubstantiated, and some increases in complaints are likely to reflect heightened confidence in the police, rather than greater dissatisfaction. The Jamaica Constabulary Force again provides a useful illustration of potential indicators.

D.20. It is important to note that, in available papers on the other cases which we have examined, ways of strengthening external control of police behaviour and of monitoring success in supporting human rights, or acting with “integrity, courtesy, fairness and respect”, have hardly been considered. Any reservations about the Jamaican indicators must be seen against this background. From a methodological point of view, however, we may suggest that monitoring responses to complaints is also necessary, and that, in this area especially, finding ways of external monitoring is important, in addition to self-policing. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine who makes complaints, whether any come from poorer sectors of society and how these are dealt with. The Crown Agents’ Report on Jamaica indicated how very difficult it is to put together such information, even in the context in which a very progressive Corporate Strategy is produced.

D.21. Finally, it may be noted that the Crown Agents team’s valuable use of qualitative methods of inquiry is just one example of the way in which direct observation of police behaviour can provide important and useful insights on informal police culture, sometimes referred to as “canteen culture”. Informal culture is a powerful force in any organisation or occupational group, which may or may not reinforce formal goals and training objectives. A

• In the longer term, we will measure the expected decrease in crime, disorder and other incidents”.

16 The JCF Corporate Strategy, p 16, says that progress in “acting with integrity, courtesy, fairness and respect” will be assessed as follows:

• “The number and nature of complaints against us will be a useful indicator of our effectiveness in this area. We acknowledge that in the short term, complaints may increase in number as the public watch our performance and become more confident in our ability to police ourselves.

• We will monitor the number of Habeus Corpus applications.

• Public surveys will also tell us whether the level of public approval is rising”.

17 They were told that some information which they requested on complaints “could not be extracted economically”; that some supervisors did not take action to deal with negligent conduct because they “were reluctant to ‘rock the boat’ and were too keen to remain friends with subordinates”; that “most internal complaints fail due to a reluctance by private complainants to follow through”; and on Force regulations dealing with fatal shootings by police they suggested that “it seems they are honoured more in the breach”. Crown Agents Institutional Development Group, 1998, Final Report, p 48.
great deal of observational research on the police shows that, all too often, this culture conflicts with formal goals.\(^{18}\)

### Surveys of victims and rapid appraisals

D.22. Comparative, international “crime victim surveys” were first carried out in 1989, supported especially by the Netherlands Ministry of Justice, the UK Home Office Research and Planning Unit\(^{19}\) and UNICRI, (the United Nations Inter-Regional Crime and Justice Research Institute in Rome). There have been subsequent surveys in 1992-94 and 1996-97; in total, surveys have been carried out in 18 developing countries, including Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tanzania.\(^{20}\) Standardised methods have been developed and guidance on carrying them out is available from UNICRI.\(^{21}\)

D.23. It is suggested that there would be great value in carrying out such a survey as a matter of course on the initiation of a police project, (or other criminal justice project). They could also make a useful contribution to follow-up studies evaluating project impact. They provide two kinds of information which are of particular value, a detailed profile of what offences take place, as compared with the much smaller selection reported to the police, and material on attitudes to the police, including reasons for not reporting offences to them.

D.24. There are a number of difficulties inherent in such surveys; not least are their high cost and demand on scarce, specialist skills, which make it difficult to envisage carrying them out at regular intervals in a developing country, as would be desirable for project monitoring. Nevertheless it is suggested that baseline and post-project surveys would be of great value. Other difficulties associated with such surveys are:

- They need large samples to capture enough incidents of different kinds, and are really only feasible in urban areas, (which have higher crime rates)
- They omit corporate victims and victimless offences
- High quality researchers and methodology are crucial\(^{22}\)
- Standard lists of offences are necessary for comparative purposes, but they do not take account of variations in perceived seriousness in different cultures.

D.25. There was comparatively little use of low cost, participatory rapid appraisal methods in the evaluations and other case studies which we have examined. Exceptions were the

\(^{18}\) See, for example, the classic study by Skolnick, 1975, *Justice Without Trial* and Chan, 1996, ‘Changing Police Culture’.

\(^{19}\) Later the Research and Statistics Directorate


\(^{21}\) E-mail Unicer@unicri.it URL http://www.unicri.it

\(^{22}\) Very high rates of reported victimization would be obtained, for example, if an interviewee reported victimization by all members of his/her household, when asked about his/her own victimization. This possibility may have given rise to some of the very high rates of victimization reported in surveys in Uganda, and Tanzania. See Zvekic et al, 1995.
evaluation of the Namibia project and external studies of community policing sub-projects, commissioned in Uganda and the Western Cape project in South Africa. (See Annexes E.2, E.3 and E.7). These research exercises made valuable contributions to evaluations and it is regrettable that such studies were not more frequent.

D.26. More broadly, there is an important place for low cost, participatory rapid appraisal methods in planning, monitoring and evaluation of police projects, to support the more quantitative approaches of both routine monitoring and baseline or follow up surveys.\textsuperscript{23} PRA methods could be used during project implementation, both to strengthen interpretation of routine monitoring and to evaluate small-scale sub-projects. At planning and summative evaluation stages, triangulation of methods is essential in order to strengthen understanding, in addition to the important role of PRA methods in facilitating a participatory approach. In devising more limited investigations in this field, it is sometimes economical to carry them out at the most useful, available access points, namely police stations and courts, rather than going out into the community.

**Police activities: analysis for planning and management purposes**

D.27. In reading the three main evaluation reports and papers on other cases we were constantly surprised that they provided very little indication of what the police forces concerned actually do, what specialist sections and human resources they have. There was some information on these questions in Annexes but it rarely found its way into main reports although, for planning, human resources management and monitoring purposes, systematic analysis of police activities is essential. For planning and management this provides a basis, for example, for questions about resource needs and possible changes in the pattern of activities. For monitoring, given the fact that important effects of projects and programmes are likely to take a long time to result, intermediate indicators of likely, longer term effectiveness are needed.

D.28. The following illustrations show the kinds of information important for improved planning and management:

- Recruitment, training and the allocation of responsibilities and tasks according to gender need to be constantly monitored, progressing away from the common situation that use and promotion of female officers are often extremely limited.
- Decisions on training curriculum requirements and recruitment levels need to be based on analysis of tasks performed.
- There is much evidence from studies in developed countries that police officers spend a relatively small proportion of their time on crime related work and law enforcement.\textsuperscript{24} This may or may not be seen as ‘good’; nevertheless efficiency and effectiveness are likely to be strengthened if deployment (and training) are based on knowledge of what is to be done.

\textsuperscript{23} See Eyben, 1998 for a strong statement of the need for participatory appraisals in development planning generally.

\textsuperscript{24} McLaughlin and Murji, 1997, p 88.
• The optimum size and distribution of a police force may be based on rational analysis of needs rather than on considerations such as creating promotion opportunities or achieving budget increases.

D.29. The Jamaican Strategic Review provides most useful detail on optimizing size and distribution. They noted that no less than 44% of non-gazetted officers were based at headquarters, while only 40% of officers were constables. They concluded that there was considerable scope for increased deployment to divisions and operation activities, and for a flatter occupational hierarchy.

D.30. The Review also provides suggestions, (p 33), on methods of calculating personnel needs. They suggest that:

• Existing personnel should be distributed initially to geographical divisions according to known workloads and population figures, allowing some top-slicing for headquarters.
• Local area managers would then assess needs for: supervision and support posts; numbers of patrol beats or zones; lengths, types transport and numbers of patrols needed by each zone.
• Using the current local assumption of 5 officers for 24 hour cover, numbers of officers and vehicles needed per area could be calculated.

D.31. Finally, the Review considers possibilities which are rarely examined elsewhere, despite often-acute personnel and skills shortages, namely, the scope for civilianisation and privatisation and for use of auxiliary officers. These possibilities all depend on careful examination of tasks and activities and are regarded as important options in developed countries. In Jamaica, the Strategic Review reports estimates that 368 police posts, (5.8% of the establishment), could be civilianised, including some senior management posts.

Intermediate indicators of effectiveness

D.32. Data on activities are also needed to provide intermediate or proxy indicators of probable effectiveness of projects and programmes. This is because achievement of important intended effects, such as reductions in crime rates and increased public confidence and support, may take a very long time. It is necessary to emphasise the widely recognised

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25 Crown Agents, 1998, Final Report. This section draws heavily on pp 27-34 of this Report. It may be seen that rational analysis of human resource requirements is long overdue in many countries, when we take account of Burnham’s finding (1980) that ratios of police officers to public are often much higher in developing than developed countries. Reporting on a comparative study of criminological data worldwide he says:

“The overall average rates of law enforcement officers for the two groups were 302 per 100,000 population in the developed countries, and 398 per 100,000 in the developing … Both the highest rate (1,394 per 100,000) and the lowest (81 per 100,000) were recorded in developing countries”.


problem of intermediate indicators, however, that they may be selected not because they are
good predictors of intended effects, but for other reasons. In particular, there is a major
danger that indicators will be selected because they are readily measurable and, moreover,
are likely to be readily achieved, possibly by very misleading means, so that poor projects
may be presented as successful.

D.33. A well-known example in the policing field is the clear-up rate, which may be easily
manipulated either by encouraging offenders to admit lots of offences for which the police
have no evidence, or by holding drives against offences which, by their very nature, are
‘cleared up’ as soon as an offence is known. More generally, it is all too easy to count
activities, for example, the number of community consultative groups formed, without any
regard for the quality of the activity or likelihood that it will contribute to effects intended.

D.34. It is necessary, therefore, to try to select and define activities consciously and
deliberately so that their chance of being good indicators of longer term effects is increased.
It is difficult to suggest examples as convincing as those which might be identified by
imaginative, local debate, but the principle may be conveyed by the following illustrations of
both quantitative and qualitative indicators:

Quantitative:
- Percentage of officers:
  - Trained to level X (male v. female)
  - Capable of providing training in human rights/community policing
  - Trained to deal with victims of sex offences or child abuse
- Number of successful community consultative groups (meeting regularly and
  including cross sections of the community)
- Number of community consultative groups functioning in poor areas
- Number of domestic incidents dealt with in poor areas
- Number of successfully functioning victim support schemes
- Number of senior management visits to police stations.

Qualitative - whether defined and agreed standards are being met in:
- treatment of prisoners
- community consultative groups
- domestic violence units
- victim support schemes
- public complaints procedures

Finance

D.35. Police forces are a very expensive part of national recurrent expenditure everywhere,
but especially in poorer countries. A United Nations report on Economic and Social
Consequences of Crime (1975) reported that, in one developing country, criminal justice
expenditure exceeded the combined costs of education and health services. Research in
Jamaica showed that the recurrent cost of the police force accounted for 8% of all recurrent
expenditure, equivalent to half the cost of education services and approaching the full cost of health services. (Whetton, 1978).28 Budgets increase through a process of managing by crisis; political and public concern about crime increases, which are not predicted in the same way as growth in needs in other fields, lead to surges in police budgets. There is no consideration in such circumstances, for example, of what measures have been demonstrated as effective and, therefore, merit increased support.

D.36. Against this background it is surprising that data and analysis of the costs of policing are conspicuous by their absence from the cases which we have examined, although efforts to strengthen financial management have been referred to in some cases. Again it is useful to refer to the Strategic Review in Jamaica because it paid unusual attention to ways of improving financial planning and control.29 In summary, the following needs were considered by the Review team:

- Appointment of a well qualified civilian as a senior financial manager
- Improved linkages to the government’s wider budgeting system
- Improved use of existing resources and identification of potential savings
- An improved financial management information system
- Linking of expenditure to performance measures.

D.37. It would be surprising if these and other ways of strengthening financial planning and management were not also necessary in other cases. More broadly, however, the high cost of policing suggests a more fundamental question which needs, at least, to be raised in this study, even though the information to examine it fully is not currently available. We may ask whether some developing countries could ever realistically afford a more professionalised police force along the lines of those being sought by conventional aid projects. In the case of Uganda examined in this synthesis, for example, the state of infrastructure, and pay and conditions of service of police officers, are so poor that it is difficult to envisage any significant improvements. In these circumstances there seems to be a clear need for more radical solutions, the search for different kinds of ‘policing’. This Annex is not the place to consider them; but it is noteworthy that they have not been sought in the cases we have examined.

Research

D.38. Throughout this synthesis evaluation we have emphasised the need for research in order to strengthen our understanding of policing in developing countries, and a number of specific examples have been suggested in this Annex, (especially the use of victim surveys and participatory rapid appraisals). First, it is worth pointing out that there has been considerable growth of social research expertise in developing countries, both in quantitative terms and in terms of development of appropriate methodologies. With this expertise, of

28 The police force in Britain costs more than all the other criminal justice agencies combined, (courts, prisons, legal aid and probation). Morgan and Newburn, 1997, p 47.
course, it is possible to avoid many of the difficulties which have stemmed from excessive control by external consultants in the past. The challenge is to encourage local researchers to see criminal justice research as important to development, not simply as a politically suspect activity.

D.39. The basic research priority, it is suggested, is simply to examine current experience systematically, to be able to describe practice and find out what seems to work and what does not. In such a stocktaking especially promising, innovatory approaches and well thought-out theories about practice are likely to be uncovered, which would provide valuable subjects for more intensive, evaluative studies. Although police forces use substantial resources, so require structured approaches to planning and management, it is also important to allow room for development of sub-projects through an experimental, process approach. This is especially desirable in a context in which we know so little about what is effective, and is most appropriate for activities in which community involvement is a high priority.

D.40. It must be emphasised that, in these analyses, we should not be seeking one model of “effective policing”. There will be many different models appropriate for different circumstances, even within one country. Most obviously, rural and urban areas have different requirements. Different cultural or tribal groups may develop their own special approaches to policing. The options available for wealthier countries will be very different from those for poorer countries. Given the very high costs of modern, professional police forces, finding ways of meeting the needs of the poorest countries is especially challenging.

D.41. Another priority area, especially given the dominant contribution of human resources to recurrent costs, is the study of ways of meeting training and human resource requirements for different tasks more effectively. In addition to rational assessment of human resource requirements, and evaluation of curriculum design and different training methodologies, for example, use of field-based training and follow up, there is a need for specific study of civilianisation and privatisation options and potential for use of auxiliaries. These possibilities merit special priority in poorer countries in which the costs of professional policing seem especially daunting.

D.42. An important, neglected area, which may also be especially appropriate for poorer countries, is the study of traditional and alternative approaches to policing. Such approaches are often highly questionable, in that they may be visibly unjust and often serve the interests of some groups in society at the expense of others. As a basic premise, however, we may note as we have throughout this study that policing is not just a matter for the police; it is an activity in which many other groups take part, and in which the police interact both formally and informally with others. We need to know a great deal more about how these processes work today, not simply in ‘traditional’ societies in the past or in isolated rural areas, and to seek to draw lessons from them. In this analysis, it would be

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30 along the lines of the example cited earlier from Jamaica
valuable to take account of findings in the growing field of crime prevention, in which a wide variety of approaches other than conventional policing are used.\textsuperscript{32} It may well be that investment in other measures could have a greater impact on crime prevention than reliance on improvements in policing \textit{per se}.

D.43. A final suggestion is of a very different kind, that there is a need for analysis of ‘appropriate technology’ for policing in developing countries. New technology, often of a very expensive kind, is increasingly becoming available to police in developed countries, added to heavy use of motorised transport, communications equipment and computers. There is a clear need for detailed analysis of optimum use of technology for different levels of national wealth, and of imaginative consideration of most desirable alternatives when higher technology is not available.

\textsuperscript{32} See Ken Pease, 1997.
ANNEX E

INTRODUCTION

This Annex contains evaluative summaries of the projects shown in the following table. The Indonesia, Namibia and Uganda projects, (Annexes E.1, E.2 and E.3), were the subjects of ex-post evaluations commissioned by the Evaluation Department of DFID and the corresponding Annexes are based on these, together with examination of the key documents available to the evaluators. The projects for Ethiopia, (Annex E.4), Nepal, (Annex E.6), Lesotho, (Annex E.6) and St. Kitts Nevis, (Annex 8) were examined through desk studies of documents available in London and, in the case of Ethiopia, interviews with UK personnel involved. For the South Africa projects, (Annex E.7), interviews were conducted in South Africa and documentation available there was analysed. In addition, Annex E.8 contains an analysis of a strategic review of policing needs in Jamaica, where aid to the police has been provided over a long period, (though not through a structured project as such).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1: 1983/84 to 1989/90</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2: 1990/91 to 1996/96</td>
<td>Total £ 1.8 m.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Namibia:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1990/91 to 1995/96</td>
<td>£ 1.1 m.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Uganda:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1: 1991/92 to 1992/93</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2: 1993/94 to 1997/98</td>
<td>Total £ 3.8 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopia:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1: 1993/94 to 1994/95</td>
<td>£ 2.5 m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2: 1995/96 to 1997/98</td>
<td>£ 2.4 m.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nepal:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1: 1994/95 to 1995/96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2: 1995/96 to 1998/99</td>
<td>Total £ 1.0 m.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>St Kitts and Nevis:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995/96 to 1998/99</td>
<td>£ 1.0 m.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lesotho:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1: 1995/96 to 1997/98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2: 1997/98 to 2002/03</td>
<td>Total £ 1.4 m.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grahamstown Community Safety</td>
<td>1994/95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic Training</td>
<td>1995/96</td>
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<tr>
<td>NW Province Community policing</td>
<td>1995/96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free State Community policing</td>
<td>1995 to 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Cape Community policing</td>
<td>1995 to 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape Effective policing</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX E.1.

INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROJECT

Project History

E.1.1. The initial suggestion of support to the Indonesian National Police (INP) came from the British Embassy in Jakarta and was then taken forward following a visit by the then Chief of Police to the UK in 1983. A training needs assessment was undertaken by a consultant from Bramshill Police College. The first phase of the project ran from 1983/4 to 1989/90. Whilst the Embassy’s interest was expressly linked to a view that support to the police could help in obtaining equipment orders from the Indonesian government, the ex-post evaluation notes that there is no evidence in ODA files that this had an influence on the decision to fund the project.¹

E.1.2. The second phase, initially to run for three years from 1990, was approved following an independent review in 1988. The proposal was prepared by the British Council and the training consultants used in Phase 1 were re-engaged. An extension of Phase 2, to run until 1996, was agreed later. Local management of the project was contracted to the British Council. The PCR prepared by the BC was approved by the head of SEADD in October 1996 and judged that the project had “largely realised” its outputs and goals.

E.1.3. The total cost of the project was around £1.9 million.²

PHASE 1

Objectives

E.1.4. The overall objectives of Phase 1 were to improve the overall standard of management of the INP and help create a less militaristic and more community oriented style of policing, based on the UK approach. This was to be achieved through a capacity building and management training programme covering all of the main INP institutions. Training was to be based on interactive, problem solving approaches and more open, democratic decision making processes.

Activities

¹ DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, 1.5
² This figure has been arrived at by adding the totals for Phase I (Part 2) and Phase II - £1.088 million to estimates for the earlier part of Phase I - £0.8 million. Detailed costs for the early period are unclear as this predated the establishment of ODA’s Management Information System (MIS).
E.1.5. Training of trainers (TOT) courses were provided at Bramshill Police Training College until 1986 and then mounted in Indonesia to develop capacity to deliver a new management training package in INP training institutions. There were also study visits by senior INP officers to UK. Bramshill withdrew from involvement largely due to Home Office concerns about reports of civilian killings in Indonesia and the possible complicity of the INP and risks that UK trained police might later commit atrocities.  

PHASE 2

Objectives

E.1.6. A main objective of Phase 2 was to build on Phase 1 through the creation of an Internal Management Consultancy Unit (IMCU) within the INP to ensure that new management skills were actively applied at a strategic level. The wider objectives were the development of an effective and professional national police force with the following characteristics:

- Sound internal organisation alignment and functioning
- Coherent and flexible strategic responses
- Efficient use of resources
- Community based approach to policing

Activities

E.1.7. The core team of the IMCU received a programme of training and skills development, combined with series of short visits to UK (largely hosted by Surrey Police) and postgraduate training awards to UK higher education institutions to develop skills in specific technical areas. There was also continued in-country support to the TOT programme in training institutions.

Management Training

E.1.8. Training was the key input provided by the project, initially UK based training at Bramshill and then an increasing emphasis on in-country training combined with some further UK training. The total cost of the UK training element was around £560,000. In all 84 officers received direct training, of these: 33 were appointed as Trainers of Tutors in Phase 1, 17 as Consultants in Phase 2, together with a further 10 TOTs.

E.1.9. The DFID ex-post evaluation noted that the achievements of the TOT programme were “substantial”. A strong cadre of TOTs was established in all the training centres and some 1,795 tutors were trained to deliver course modules. The introduction of new learning

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3 DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, 2.4
4 DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, 3.3
methods was largely successful. However, the majority of the TOTs have since been posted elsewhere and although the skill modules for management training are still in operation, there has been little spread of new learning methods beyond these modules.

Internal Organisational Development

E.1.10. The establishment of the IMCU was seen as playing a central role in the achievement of the objective of the internal organisational development of the INP. The IMCU was to function as an internal consultancy unit with staff to act as change agents and facilitators within the INP. An emphasis in the project was to establish consultants with skills in improving service to the public and in resource management. The DFID ex-post project evaluation notes that the aims of training a cadre of internal management consultants and establishing the unit were achieved. However, it notes that “important doubts” remained on the long term future of the IMCU. Problems have included: lack of continuity of personnel, insufficient budget resources to establish full time post for consultants leading to pressure to attend to other areas of police work, variable support from Division Chiefs and inadequate indicators and monitoring and evaluation.

E.1.11. The evaluators found little hard evidence to verify the achievement of the objective of wider managerial and organisational improvements in the INP.

Community Based Approach to Policing

E.1.12. The evaluators noted some progress towards community policing in the IMCU supported areas. Examples given included: improved front-line services in some stations, attempts to provide the public with better information on services, setting of service quality standards. However, they noted that crime reporting remained low and that this could indicate a general lack of public confidence in police effectiveness.

E.1.13. More generally, the evaluators noted that community policing in Indonesia did not appear to be associated with greater direct accountability to the public, for example through the establishment of a civilian police authority. They also noted that the impact of any work has been confined largely to urban areas and that there has been little recognition of the need to address the interests of the poor and the disadvantaged.

Impact and Sustainability

E.1.14. Overall, the evaluators judged the project to have been “partially successful”, making a significant impact in relation to the size of the UK investment. Apart from going someway to the achievement of the institutional capacity building objectives, they felt that it

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5 DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, 3.8
6 DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, 3.10
7 DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, 3.11
8 DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, 3.12
had succeeded in laying down important building blocks for the future demilitarisation of the INP.\(^9\)

E.1.15. Whilst the sustainability of the management training and capacity building programme was accepted, there were doubts about the capacity of the INP to revise the programme and sustain quality control. The sustainability of the IMCU was seen as less certain, depending on whether it was allocated more substantial resources and a permanent place in the police establishment.

**Poverty, Gender and Human Rights**

E.1.16. The project did not specifically set out to address issues of poverty, gender or human rights. The evaluators commented that, in retrospect, a more explicit recognition of the needs of the poor would have been desirable and noted the absence of stakeholder analysis in the management training package.\(^10\) Concerns about gender issues were raised in a report from an ODA Assistant SDA in 1991 with recommendations that the consultants investigate why there were no women officers in the IMCU. Gender was not mentioned again in the project files although three women were later trained. The only evidence the evaluators could find of interest in gender issues by the INP was an initiative, with a local university, to set up a rape counselling service in Malang, East Java.\(^11\)

E.1.17. In relation to human rights, the evaluators argue that, despite the absence of any specific concern of the project to address this issue, a concern was implicit in the aim to develop a less militaristic policing style and that there are constant references to human rights in the files. They comment that it would not be reasonable to expect a small project to bring about any significant change in the Indonesian human rights situation, “although greater respect for people’s rights is central to the community policing concept which it promoted”.\(^12\) They also note that local human rights activists interviewed did not see UK government involvement with the police as implying support for or complicity with rights’ violations.

E.1.18. In summary the evaluators concluded:

> “With the benefit of hindsight, and in the light of the UK’s current policy on international development, the project could be said to be deficient in these respects (eg poverty, women, rights). During the 1980s, however, these were less overt concerns in aid policy. From a tactical point of view it is also probable that a more assertive stance on human rights would have diminished the project’s influence and created resistance to change within the force. Improvements in Indonesia’s human rights record depend only in part on internal changes within the police force.”\(^13\)

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\(^9\) DFID, 1999 *Indonesia Report*, Executive Summary, para. 11
\(^10\) DFID, 1999 *Indonesia Report*, 6.8
\(^11\) DFID, 1999 *Indonesia Report*, 6.9
\(^12\) DFID, 1999 *Indonesia Report*, 6.12
\(^13\) DFID, 1999 *Indonesia Report*, Executive Summary, para 13
Comments

E.1.19. Given the human rights record of the Suharto regime, aid to the Indonesian police was always likely to have been problematic and contentious. In its own terms, the project was relatively successful. It would seem that the institutional development objectives were largely realised and that parts of the management training programme can be sustained in the future. However, the long term survival of the relatively innovative work with the IMCU presents greater doubts.

E.1.20. Whether the project was able to make much progress in achieving its wider goals of helping to create a less militaristic and more community-based approach to policing has to be questioned. As the evaluators point out, the political circumstances were not conducive to achieving any major changes in the approach and style of policing in Indonesia. To have placed greater stress on human rights issues would have risked losing the commitment of INP management and ultimately of rejection by the government. In this sense, the project illustrates the dilemma at the heart of many of DFID’s policing projects. The evaluators argue that “it is possible, and can indeed be desirable, to work with police forces in politically sensitive and difficult circumstances” provided that the constraints are understood and difficult issues are not tackled “head-on”. The counter argument, supported by the evidence of the wider political, social and economic situation in Indonesia, is that it is very difficult for aid to the police to contribute to the achievement of wider development policy goals where there is an absence of good government. Relatively small, low cost projects, which focus on institutional development, are not likely to make much impact on the process of democratisation.

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14 This can be seen from the large number of parliamentary questions asked about the project.
15 DFID, 1999 Indonesia Report, Executive Summary, para. 16, a) and b)
ANNEX E.2.

AID TO POLICING IN NAMIBIA

Introduction

E.2.1. Namibia, a sparsely populated country of 1.5 million population, achieved Independence from South Africa in March 1990. Approximately 37% of the population live in urban areas, 150,000 in the capital Windhoek, the majority in the Northern rural area. 86% of the population are black, 7% white, 7% mixed, and it is estimated that 5% of the population control 70% of GNP. Though poverty is widespread, GDP per capita is boosted by mining of diamonds and other minerals to US $1,600.

E.2.2. The project started in January 1990 at the request of the President-elect of the first Independence government, and ended in September 1995. The evaluation was carried out by 3 specialists, in social development, (team leader), policing and M&E, who made a 3 week field study in mid-1997. Though primarily based on documentary analysis and interviews with key informants, the evaluation also included useful enquiries, (necessarily limited by the short time available), among ex-trainees and members of the public.

Project objectives

E.2.3. Project objectives were stated as:

“to provide a sound foundation for training of the police service of an Independent Namibia, by redressing the current deficiencies in the provision of training at all levels within the police establishment and assisting in the management of change from the existing ethos of a paramilitary force to that of a community-based police service. Sensitising the police to the need to create and preserve a positive relationship with the community will permeate the training to be provided”. (p. 2).

E.2.4. The logical framework and project memorandum for this project covered only the first two years, involving £258,000 of expenditure. A set of 71 recommendations made by the leader of the initial appraisal team, a former Inspector of Constabulary, who became the lead consultant to the project, formed the basis for action. This set of recommendations, which are detailed in Annex J2 of the evaluation report, were put into a logical framework format.

E.2.5. The key components were three long term TCO inputs, (11 years in total), an Adviser to the Minister and, later, the IG of police, (5 years), a Training Adviser in the Police Training College, (4 years), and an Adviser in Police HQ, (2 years). There were also

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1 Based on DFID, 1998 *Namibia Police Project 1990-95*, Evaluation Report EV: 5.94
a series of short-term TCOs to support training, some UK training and very limited equipment costs.

E.2.6. Initially the project consisted very largely of training activities, as the objectives suggest. Subsequently, the parameters of the project were widened, following a further meeting with the President-elect. A range of long and short term consultancies were introduced, including Ministry and police HQ support and work on police structures and systems, substantially increasing the eventual costs. A key factor, undermining an effective evaluation, was that logical frameworks and project memoranda were not produced for these subsequent expansions of the project.

Project costs

E.2.7. It is difficult to estimate the costs of this project because they appear to have been combined with those of another institutional strengthening project in Namibia after 1993.\(^2\) Aggregating the expenditure data for police projects in Namibia shown in Annex C, Table 4 provides a total cost of £1.1 million over the whole period from 1989-90 to 1995-96. This case illustrates the importance of having reliable financial data, for an evaluation as well as for efficient project management.

Project achievements

E.2.8. The project was mounted in extremely difficult circumstances, with an attempt involving police officers to overthrow the new government, after a bitter Independence struggle. The key task was to integrate warring factions into a national police service, to succeed a predominantly military force. Both the new government and the evaluators gave full credit to the project for rapidly succeeding in achieving these aims and for making considerable progress in creating a multi-racial organisation, through specially designed training and integration programmes, over the first two years.

E.2.9. The following specific achievements were identified over the duration of the project: (pp 36-37)

- Training: 2367 officers received basic training, while 2314 attended other courses, some in the UK, most at the national training centre in Namibia.

- Training materials and manuals were devised

- Training College staff were trained and gained great confidence, including willingness to question effectiveness of some training designed by UK consultants (p 33) and to redesign more appropriate approaches

\(^2\) The evaluators estimate the total cost of the project as £2.4 m., but this may include the cost of the non-policing project. See Annex M, para. M.2.1 of DFID, 1999 Namibia Police Project 1990-95
• The 71 recommendations for organisational change were largely implemented

• Over 1,000 guidance reports were produced

• A Police Bill was prepared

• Two mission statements were produced

• Job descriptions and performance standards for all police roles were produced, together with a job appraisal system

• A Special Branch and Criminal Investigation Department were established

• Reorganisation of the police HQ and creation of management, departmental and training committees were completed

• Some progress was made in moving towards equality of opportunities in recruitment and promotion for women and men.

E.2.10. The evaluators noted that it was difficult to assess the impact of these changes but suggested that “the project contributed practically towards reconciliation of police from different sectors within Namibian society”. (p. 38). In addition, drawing especially on the enquiries among the public and police officers, that police attitudes had improved, fewer cases of police abuse were being reported and the police were becoming more accessible to the public. A major achievement reported was that policing was extended far beyond what had been the “white” towns and oppressive policing techniques in the black townships and areas were enormously reduced. (p. 40).

E.2.11. They noted that the project had begun to make a response to the needs of the vulnerable. Women and child abuse training centres have been a major achievement. However the project was only peripheral in funding these centres and had not consolidated this by addressing other vulnerability issues such as the poor in squatter areas, poorer and more isolated communities etc. Similarly, while the project promoted the idea of community based policing (mainly through the promotion of Public Liaison Committees) it did not consolidate this action. These important qualifications are returned to later.

E.2.12. The evaluation report recognises that the project, because it tried to take action in such a wide range of ways, has also made a significant contribution to DFID’s understanding of lessons that can be learnt and how such support can work. (pp. 43-44). Key lessons include:

• The need for a coherent strategic framework
• Training needs to be one part of a capacity building response
• Wide stakeholder participation is necessary
• Clear lines of management and oversight are indispensable
• The importance of broad based counterparting and capacity building if institutional reforms are to be sustained
• The involvement of multi-disciplinary teams
• The effectiveness of different styles of TCO support.

Project weaknesses

E.2.13. The evaluators reported some weaknesses in training components, including problems of language and appropriateness of training and materials, both in the UK and locally delivered by short term TCOs, and the practicability and ability to use training in everyday work. In addition the many guidance notes produced, for rather than with local officers, were described as difficult to follow. (pp. 34-35). It is not entirely surprising that the second Inspector General associated with the project “did not express any particular enthusiasm for a British style of expertise”. (p. 34). After considerable early project success in most difficult circumstances, enthusiasm waned as crime escalated and a need for “hard” policing rather than the “soft” UK variety became seen as important.

E.2.14. The evaluators also raised important questions of sustainability. Effective arrangements were not made to provide counterparts for long term TCOs, and key senior figures in the government and police service, who strongly supported the project in its early period, moved on to other roles.

E.2.15. The most significant criticism, however, was made of the lack of strategic planning. The project was characterised as “an ever-increasing range of activities (and) did not develop a strategic vision”, (p. 5). “A coherent strategic framework is essential” (p. 43). In response to Evaluation Department requests the evaluation team indicated in more detail (Annex K) what a strategic framework for developmental action might include:

• an overall strategy that guides action, has identified developmental targets, sets out objectives and is easily accessible to the client.

• use of multi-disciplinary teams (including planners) with wide stakeholder participation in a more participatory planning approach, using local understandings and knowledge and therefore seeking more appropriate strategies which, moreover, are locally owned.

• mechanisms for identifying different needs groups, including the poor and vulnerable, and for providing indicators so they can see what impacts the project has at this most basic level.

• a national strategy, allowing for regional variation and including the Northern area, where large numbers of rural poor are located, but also taking account of the needs of poor slum dwellers.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Neglect of Northern areas of the country was seen as a major limitation of the project. Although the reasons for this are not entirely clear, and there may well have been considerable political and cultural
• a community based policing strategy as an integral part of policing.

E.2.16. There were major problems of coordination between the ODA and other parties in the management of this project and, in particular, in moving towards a more strategic approach incorporating developmental priorities after 1992/93. The evaluators concluded:

“If DFID does not take a strong management leadership from the beginning, it is unlikely to be able to refocus the project at a latter stage. By then the management style and independent action will have been established, particularly where senior professionals/specialists are concerned”. (p. 19).

Comments

E.2.17. While the evaluators’ assessments appear valid and important, it may be noted that some of their considerations relate to more recent ODA/DFID policies and methods, which were not in regular use in policing projects in 1989-92. For example, interests of the poor and vulnerable and development targets have been more strongly introduced recently, and stakeholder participation guidance appeared only midway through the project. However, logframes were in operation and considerable guidance on process projects emerged during the project. A difficulty with this project is that it straddled a period of considerable change within ODA.

E.2.18. Given the importance of community policing it would have been helpful to discuss limitations in this aspect of the project more fully, perhaps in a special annex, (though it is discussed in Annex F of the report, section 4). It is notable that the project objectives were quite vague and needed analysis, referring to the need for:

“…change from the existing ethos of a paramilitary force to that of a community-based police service (our italics). Sensitising the police to the need to create and preserve a positive relationship with the community will permeate the training to be provided”. (p. 9).

E.2.19. Although, in addition to any special training, the creation of limited public liaison committees was the only practical step made towards community policing, it is notable that the first mission statement produced with the support of the project in 1992 (Annex F.1) contained a richer concept:

“To succeed, we must be sensitive to public needs and fears and encourage consultation, understanding and involvement with the public. We are the partner of every law abiding person. The police cannot hope to succeed without the respect and whole hearted support of the public: this is only difficulties of extending the project into the North, it appears to be an important limitation, and one which would be remedied only with patience and great sensitivity to local conditions.
possible if we treat everyone with the courtesy, dignity and consideration they deserve at all times. Respect must be earned”. (p. 78).

E.2.20. However, the succeeding Inspector General included a much watered down version in 1995, (Annex F.2), a comment on the project’s lack of sustainability:

“In carrying out their duty, Nampol members must combine proactive and reactive methods of policing, with an emphasis on involvement of the community in information gathering. To this end Community Policing is seen and should be accepted as the guiding philosophy in the fight against crime and in the maintenance of law and order. The public should be instrumental in getting rid of criminal elements and their activities in all neighbourhoods and villages, towns, cities and anywhere else, by assisting and co-operating with members of the force””. (Our italics). (p. 80).

E.2.21. The evaluators indicate some potential ingredients of community policing in their Annex F, and note that the Namibians are now seeking to learn from South African experience in this field. This could have been pursued earlier by the Namibian police project. The annex also discusses briefly the important dilemma of dealing effectively with rising crime while introducing community policing:

“The need to deal more effectively with crime should not be seen as a discrete activity of crime control but as an integral part of a thoughtful strategy involving, not only the police service, but all sections of the community”. (p. 75).

E.2.22. The Namibian government’s increasing disenchantment with the project stems from the failure to convey that “community policing is not soft policing: it is smarter policing”, (Annex F, p. 75). The evaluators could have also emphasised, perhaps, the need for a very long time perspective in developing community policing in such a context.
ANNEX E.3.

AID TO THE POLICE IN UGANDA

Introduction

E.3.1. The 1990s Uganda Police project was based on a needs analysis carried out in 1989, and was regarded by the BDDEA as a key component of post-civil war reconstruction. President Museveni, who came to power in 1986, took a personal interest in it and, the evaluators note, had direct influence in strengthening at least one component, (police communications). The evaluators also stress, however, that:

“…for most of its life the Uganda Police project was seen as a higher priority by the High Commission than it was by the BDDEA. … So far as the High Commission were concerned the political and strategic importance of the project gave it a pre-eminent position in the UK aid programme”. (pp. 13-14).

E.3.2. The evaluation was based on a three week field mission in September 1997, and carried out by a three person team, an evaluation specialist as team leader, supported by policing and social development specialists. It was based on documentary evidence and interviews with key informants. No field research was carried out, although the evaluators were able to draw on a useful evaluative study of community policing carried out by researchers from Makerere University.2

E.3.3. The project was carried out in two phases as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Jan 1991-July 1993</th>
<th>TC</th>
<th>£ 759,000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>£1,110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>1993-95-Oct. 1997</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>£1,067,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>£ 885,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>£3,821,000</td>
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E.3.4. Over the 6 years of UK police project spending shown in the Annex, this was the largest and most sustained country programme with the exception of the West Bank & Gaza. In 91-93 it represented a very high % of all support for good government, 7.1 and 10.0%; this fell to 3.7, 1.9, 3.8 and 2.4% in 4 later years.

Aims

Phase I:

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2 Tindifa and Kigule, 1997
1. to help restore in the police force the capability to maintain law and order and the confidence of the public;

2. to create a climate in which other forms of aid will increase and be effective;

3. to combat an increasing crime and road accident rate.

Phase II:

1. to contribute to the development of law and order in Uganda, thus creating an enabling environment for stability and sustained economic growth;

2. to contribute to the practice of Good Government in Uganda.

E.3.5. It may first be noted that there was little change or learning from phase I to II, although the evaluators’ noted that Phase I was UK designed with little local input and paid no attention to social development goals:

“The main ambition on the Uganda side seems to have had more to do with improving the facilities available for operational policing … more equipment and less advice”. (p 11).

“… there were issues which the project did not in any direct sense set out to address. Most conspicuous of these is poverty – a word that occurs once in passing in the second project memorandum but otherwise not at all … No attempt was made, as it might conceivably have been, to argue that the limitations and inadequacies of the policing system in Uganda at that time bore most heavily on the poorest, who had therefore most to gain from its improvement. It was enough that better policing should lead to greater social stability, and thus to enhanced economic performance.” (p 37).

E.3.6. The evaluators also highlighted the very general nature of aims, which inter alia made it very difficult to assess effectiveness of the project, noting that many of the 30 indicators included in the logical framework for Phase I alone “proved highly elusive in practice”. (p 35).

Evaluators’ findings and main comments

E.3.7. Almost all the DFID evaluation success ratings were rated only as B (partially successful), except “technical success” and “cost management within budget” which received A ratings. The evaluators emphasised that the project received relatively little
professional advice; there was only one OPA visit in Phase I, three in Phase II, and social
development advice from Nairobi was only available from 1994.

Training

E.3.8. This main component of the project, which was dealt with most fully in the
evaluation report, (pp. 18-23), was based on the 1989 needs analysis. Kibuli Training
School was given considerable refurbishment assistance, in order to become the centre for
all training. In Phase I, the TCO responsible for the project had good Uganda experience
but skills only in criminal investigation support, not in training for management and general
police duties. The evaluators said that:

“These limitations were recognised by the OPA during his visit in August 1991 but
his recommendation that professional help was needed by the UPF to formulate its
strategy for training was not acted upon until the design of Phase II in 1993”. (p. 20).

E.3.9. For Phase II, the appointment to a new training post took 2 years, up to 1995.
However the project coordinator, with British Council support and short terms TCO inputs,
provided a successful programme, including development of a Training Planning Unit and a
training strategy to be included in the (belated) 5 y plan. The perceived successful training
activities contributed to the A rating for technical success. The evaluators summed up that
there was much to do but the programme was going well.

E.3.10. However, they emphasised that over-optimistic assumptions re GOU financial
contributions for local costs of training, conditions of service and pay undermined the impact
of training on performance. Public respect for the police, and police officers’ capacity to
avoid corruption, were undermined by very poor conditions of service, with low pay and
accommodation in shoddy barracks. They concluded:

“BDDEA seem for too long to have interpreted what was in fact a condition of long-
term chronic under-funding as one of short-term cash flow”. (p. 38).

E.3.11. They also emphasised that the continued practice of transferring officers from one
post to another wasted much of the senior training, especially that provided in the UK.

Institutional strengthening

E.3.12. There was clear progress in institutional strengthening. In Phase I statements of
purposes were produced, together with definitions of senior responsibilities and improved
personnel practices. In 1992 the Inspector General’s Strategy Statement was produced. In
Phase II a District command structure was successfully implemented, though this was
hindered by technical communication problems. A Policy and Management Committee
which became an effective decision making body was set up.
E.3.13. However, the evaluators noted that UPF capacity for monitoring police activities, including force objectives, remained largely underdeveloped. Related to this, information systems were also inadequate in that real intelligence gathering, (an important specific project input), was not sustained, information was not interpreted nor retrieved from the HQ computer system. (p. 23).

E.3.14. In 1997 a Five Year Corporate Strategy and Development Plan was produced. They judged that this was a useful if belated start although:

“The draft is based on desirable objectives, rather than costed policy options … Whether it will succeed in unlocking a more substantial and assured budget for the UPF remains to be seen”. (p. 18).

Equipment

E.3.15 Provision and maintenance of equipment, especially for transport and communications, were other important components of the project. (pp. 28-32). A large number of vehicles were provided, a motor repair workshop refurbished, a TCO manager provided, together with mechanics’ training in the UK. Though the TCO performed well, maintenance was poor as the essential recurrent budget was not provided by the UPF. In addition, mechanics trained in the UK quickly moved on to other jobs. These problems were attributed to the BDDEA’s “over optimistic assumptions re GOU financial contributions” noted earlier.

E.3.16 There was more success with communications, especially in Phase II. Hand-held radios were initially provided in Kampala. The programme was extended, with provision of a further 350 radios and improved technical performance, in Phase II. The evaluators praised the competitive bidding process and the work of the specialist consultant. They noted that the programme was very likely to increase effectiveness though it did not, as hoped, given confidence for unarmed patrols – “a policeman without a Kalashnikov AK 47 assault rifle remains however a rare sight on the streets of Kampala”. (p. 31). They noted that 8500 radios were needed for all patrolling officers. The UPF considered this sub-project especially valuable and planned to spend a further £200,000 from its own very limited resources.

E.3.17 Some equipment and training provided for the identification bureau was regarded as well used and successful. But training in ballistics without essential equipment was necessarily a failure. (p. 33).

Community policing (pp 15-17 and Annex 7)

E.3.18 Through community policing was a minor component of Phase I, it was of major importance in the second phase. Phase I included “number of community policing schemes” as a logframe indicator, but no direct support for it was included in the design. In practice there were limited UPF initiatives in 3 districts.
E.3.19 In Phase II a TCO was recruited (for 18 months only) to establish CP throughout Uganda, especially through increased community consultative meetings. The evaluators explained that the UPF were anxious to improve their public image and thus help to secure public confidence and cooperation:

“Widely seen (including by the Ugandan press) as corrupt, inefficient and brutal, the UPF themselves tended to see community policing as a promising way to bridge the gap between the UPF and the public, and establish a new approach to policing based on mutual trust and cooperation”. (p. 24-25).

E.3.20 Over the 18 months a national system of 140 Community Liaison Officers was introduced, “the advantages of the approach are clearly apparent to senior UPF officers”, (p. 25), and training became UPF funded and included in basic training.

E.3.21 The evaluators felt that community policing has “set down roots”, (p. 39), and that achievements were far from negligible. (p 30). However, their overall conclusions, in which they were able to draw on the Makerere University evaluation, were not optimistic:

“it seems doubtful if Community Policing, as currently practised, has yet led to any substantive change in the public image of the UPF. Indeed the obstacles to a full realisation of the benefits of Community Policing in Uganda remain formidable. In discussion with police and non-police sources alike we found clear signs that the police regard community policing primarily as a means of instructing local populations, rather than listening to them. They thus learn less than they might, while doing little to mitigate their authoritarian image. A more practical problem is that the lack of an effective monitoring support service for Community Liaison Officers in the field means that they are left largely to their own devices to interpret and deliver training”. (p. 25).

E.3.22 They concluded that sustainability and further consolidation remained in doubt. In particular, there was a need to consult and tailor the project to meet local needs, especially taking account of urban/rural differences.

Gender and Human Rights issues

E.3.23 The evaluators noted that these issues were given little recognition in the project. (pp. 26-27 and Annex 9). 12% of police officers were female, relatively few in senior positions, yet even in 1993 there was little recognition of gender needs. There were Family Protection Units at major police stations, but their future was doubtful without support. Recommendations for support had not been followed up. Human rights were not included

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in objectives of either phase. The evaluators concluded mildly “..it is arguable in this case that such consideration as went on was both too little and too late”. (p. 28).

**General**

E.3.24. The evaluators concluded (p. 38) that impact was greatest where there were no implementation costs to GOU, referring especially to reorganised command structures and the Policy and Management Committee. In addition support for Kibuli Training College and mobility allowances to Community Liaison Officers were cited, as instances of the UPF being persuaded of the value of limited cost inputs. They were more doubtful about some of the longer term institutional and policy reforms set in hand – “personnel policy seems to be dominated by a compulsion to keep officers on the move” (avoid corruption, but wasted training); corporate planning had barely started, too much was hoped for from community policing.

**Comments**

E.3.25. The evaluation has clearly identified major strengths and weaknesses of the project and, at this point, attention will be drawn only briefly to issues which seem to be especially important. The BDDEA Review of the Uganda Justice System takes account of some of the problems raised.4 First, full recognition is needed of the long time perspective necessary to bring about fundamental changes needed for really effective policing in this context, and especially community policing, and improved human rights, including those of women, children and disadvantaged groups generally. These are discussed in Annexes 7 and 8 of the Uganda evaluation and might have been highlighted more in the main report.

E.3.26. Second, actual and potential police linkages with Local Councils and with the criminal justice system generally need to be fully considered. It is noted in Annex 8 that the former play a role in dispute resolution, while a review of the criminal justice system, referring to police training needs, was recently concluded.

E.3.27. Third, both the evaluation and the BDDEA review, as well as the UPF are handicapped by shortage of planning and M&E information. This chronic problem, which is commented on in all the evaluations, needs to be dealt with and is discussed more fully in Annex D to our main report.

4 DFID 1996 *Uganda: Review of Uganda Justice System*
ANNEX E.4.

AID TO THE POLICE IN ETHIOPIA

Introduction

E.4.1. ODA/DFID, through the Africa Greater Horn Development Division (AGHCDD) has been providing assistance towards the development of policing in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

E.4.2. This report is based on a literature search of the papers held at AGHCDD and interviews with some of the United Kingdom personnel involved in delivering the aid to the Ethiopian Police.

Background: Project Conception and Design

E.4.3. In early August 1992, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) approached the UK Ambassador to Ethiopia for assistance in reforming the Ethiopian Police (EPF). The TGE was anxious for United Kingdom assistance because of the memories they had of the police organisation put in place by British Colonial Police officers following the liberation of Ethiopia from Italian occupation in 1942.

E.4.4. The Ambassador wrote to ODA seeking assistance for an aid to policing project, stressing the importance he attached to it by saying, “Nothing can be done here without law and order.” The response from the head of AGHCDD (28/8/92) was lukewarm and indicated that assistance to policing in Ethiopia was highly unlikely due to a “lack of resources”. On 4/9/92 this was followed by a strongly worded reply from the Ambassador which concluded:

“Nothing is more important for development in the building of democratic institutions and for establishing a climate in which good government can flourish than nation wide law and order brought about by a re-constituted police force.”

E.4.5. The issue was reconsidered by AGHCDD and it was decided that one of the ODA policing advisers (OPA) should visit Ethiopia to make an assessment of the situation. This fact-finding visit took place in late November 1992.
E.4.6. The report sets out the historical context of policing in Ethiopia together with the situation found at the time of the visit and sets the scenario upon which the future aid projects were to be based.

E.4.7. In the days following the Second World War the EPF had been organised on the lines of a British colonial police force and had for some years been headed by an expatriate commissioner. The EPF eventually grew to an establishment of the order of 35,500 and it was well equipped. Indications were that the EPF was perceived to be efficient, although it was not accountable or generally popular amongst the people. The EPF budget was, however, funded by donor countries and estimates indicate that the support provided amounted to the order of 90% of the recurrent budget of US$ 35 million. The principal donors were Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

E.4.8. The EPF were closely identified with the reign of Emperor Selassie. Following the overthrow of the Emperor and the establishment of the Provisional Military Council, later known as the Dergue, the EPF was effectively amalgamated with the military. It became involved in the suppression of the people and the interdiction of those attempting to overthrow the repressive Dergue. In 1991 the Dergue collapsed. Many of the police, particularly the senior officers, fled the country and those police officers that remained were detained in screening camps.

E.4.9. The situation found by the OPA was that the police force had been effectively dismissed and policing was being carried out by former freedom fighters from the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

E.4.10. The TGE saw this method of policing as being unsatisfactory and wished to have a properly equipped, professionally trained and accountable civilian police service, which would serve the people of Ethiopia. To start the process the TGE had formed a commission to oversee the establishment of a police force. A central police department had been established, with responsibility to the Minister of the Interior for policy formulation, standardisation of procedures and quality of training. Fourteen regional police commanders had been appointed with the responsibility of establishing regional police organisations.

E.4.11. The establishment of the police had been set at 22,000, with plans for it to rise to 37,000. However, most of those who had some police training and experience were still in detention, awaiting clearance. Also, it was thought that only twelve police motor vehicles were actually serviceable and radio communication was almost defunct. At the time of the demise of the Emperor the EPF had been equipped with 1,300 motor vehicles and a comprehensive radio communications system.
E.4.12. It was against this background that the TGE sought assistance from the United Kingdom. The Ambassador’s view was that practical first aid assistance should be provided. However, the OPA felt that such first aid assistance would be too close to operational involvement in the policing function and would not be sustainable in the longer term. The OPA’s view was that a strategic approach should be taken, through the provision of management development advice, professional training and education together with the limited provision of vehicles and other essential hardware. This view prevailed. There was also a strong feeling that other donor nations should become involved in any future aid to policing projects.

E.4.13. Following the OPA’s report and recommendations, an eight weeks mission was sent to Ethiopia. This consisted of a management consultant with knowledge of police organisational development, a United Kingdom police superintendent and a senior police officer from The Netherlands. Their brief was to assist the EPF to produce a business development plan for the years 1993-1996.

E.4.14. The team assessed the policing situation in Ethiopia and assisted the EPF to refine the business plan which had already been drafted by an EPF planning team prior to the mission arriving in Ethiopia.

E.4.15. Five key areas were identified for action:

- organisational structure
- transport
- training
- central bureau services
- communications

E.4.16. Following the mission’s report it was decided to undertake a formal DFID aid project to provide advice and assistance to the TGE and EPF. The project was to be United Kingdom led, although the Netherlands would provide financial support to the development of communications.

E.4.17. It was decided at an early stage that a Technical Co-operation Officer (TCO) should be engaged to manage the project and advise the TGE and EPF. The TCO position was not put out to selective competition and the United Kingdom police superintendent, who had been a member of the mission to assist in the production of business plan for the EPF, was appointed to the position. (The nominated TCO had previously worked as a management trainer in Zimbabwe but his appointment to the original mission seems to have been on the grounds of that he had attended the same Senior Command Course at the Police Staff College as the OPA responsible for the original aid assessment.)
The projects

Phase One

E.4.18. The first project memorandum was produced in November 1993 and the project designed to continue through to February 1995 at a projected cost of £2,492,000.00. The TCO Police Adviser, was an influential draftsman of this project memorandum.

E.4.19. The project’s wider objective was to re-establish and develop the EPF into an open and effective police service to be respected by and serve the needs of the Ethiopian people.

E.4.20. The immediate objective was to assist the TGE to establish a basic police service, which would be open and accountable for its actions.

E.4.21. The outputs, based upon the five areas for action identified in the business plan of the EPF, were:

- Management: plans for the future restructuring and strengthening of the EPF to be approved by the TGE;
- Transport: to ensure the efficient use of vehicles to prove a better policing service;
- Training: to develop a training strategy and take initial action to implement professional police training;
- Central Bureau: to improve the EPF capabilities in forensic science and fingerprinting techniques;
- Communications: an improved communications system to be designed and initial steps taken towards implementation - The Netherlands were to fund the acquisition of communications hardware;
- Traffic: to improve road safety so as to reduce accidents and remove traffic congestion from the streets, especially in Addis Ababa.

E.4.22. The project was to be monitored by annual visits from the senior OPA and through quarterly reports to be submitted by the TCO project adviser. The British Embassy was made responsible for locally keeping in contact with the project and monitoring events.

E.4.23. The comments that follow are based upon monitoring reports and interviews with some key UK personnel.
E.4.24. In order to achieve these aims a two pronged approach was taken. In respect of the communications and transport outputs, equipment was provided together with consultancy or TCO advice, whilst, in the other areas, the TCO project adviser was supported by a number of short term consultancies and finance for key EPF officers to make study visits to the United Kingdom.

E.4.25. In the event the transport output was mainly achieved. 72 Land Rover vehicles were delivered, however, many of the 258 main police stations remained without motor vehicle transport. The maintenance and fleet management was greatly improved and a sustainable fleet management system was put in place.

E.4.26. In communications, a basic radio system was designed and delivered through the project. The system is similar to that developed for the Uganda Police by the same consultant. Basically, it provides local area UHF radio networks for urban districts whilst long distance communications are handled by VHF. Second hand equipment from the United Kingdom was utilised so as to obtain good value for money. Over seven tonnes of equipment was provided.

E.4.27. Radio masts, base stations and equipment were installed at six zonal police stations and twenty-eight Wareda (divisional) police stations. In Addis Ababa alone 100 radios were made available to police officers who, prior to the project, had previously been unable to communicate whilst on patrol. Police response times to incidents were reduced from over two hours to around fifteen minutes.

E.4.28. Taken at face value the communications element of the project was successful, however, it became an issue, which illustrates the bickering that became a feature of this project. During a monitoring mission an ODA official expressed the view that the system was not sustainable and that a more sophisticated system was required to facilitate the nation-wide integration of voice and data communications. The United Kingdom police officers concerned were most critical of this input which they considered to be ill conceived. The EPF confirmed their satisfaction with the systems supplied, although they wished to have networked computer information systems.

E.4.29. The TCO adviser, later supported by his chief constable who became a strategic management adviser to the project, felt that the ideas put forward by the ODA official were quite unsuitable for Ethiopia, where there was a lack of a reliable telephone system and uninterrupted electrical power.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) All the United Kingdom personnel involved have been interviewed during this study. The police officers insist that the intervention from the ODA official was wrongheaded and unhelpful. The official, who has considerable experience in specifying systems within the National Health Service, says that the issue was not the efficiency of the systems installed but their long-term sustainability, which was in question. The official believes that a different approach may have produced a better long term solution. Clearly, the communication between those involved was poor. The system undoubtedly
E.4.30. It seems clear that police communications in Ethiopia were infinitely improved by the project and that the EPF were content with the progress made.

E.4.31. In respect of traffic issues, a police sergeant from the United Kingdom was engaged for six months as a TCO to advise on traffic policing. The TCO concentrated his attention upon the streets of Addis Ababa and had success in bringing some order to the chaotic road traffic situation. His work attracted favourable comment from the British ambassador. However, the review of Phase One concluded that the assistance had been of an operational nature only and had not made a significant contribution to the strategic development of the EPF.6

E.4.32. The restructuring of the EPF was undertaken by the TCO police adviser in conjunction with the EPF planning team and progress was made to review the structure, culture, human resource development and training needs of the EPF. The TCO was aided in this work by a professional consultancy.

E.4.33. This consultancy was awarded to the Royal Institute for Public Administration (RIPA). It is generally agreed that the input was not less than successful. In his final report, the TCO police adviser describes it as a “flawed and led to a reluctance within the EPF to accept future consultant management advisers, whom they considered to be a waste of project money.”7 The ODA review team chose their words more carefully, concluding that the inputs of the RIPA management consultants appeared to have been poorly integrated into the work of the EPF Police Planning Team and did not seem to have added much to the work already carried out by the Police Planning team. They also felt that the work lacked depth and that the supporting analysis was weak.

E.4.34. One of the RIPA consultants was engaged to advise upon police training. This short consultancy confirmed the work done by the EPF and TCO police adviser to conduct training needs analysis of the EPF and their identification of the key Wareda commanders to be professionally trained. The consultant’s report made a number of recommendations which were accepted by the commissioner of the EPF, although he indicated that the consultancy had not moved things too far forward and had not provided practical help in recommencing training. At this time the Ethiopian Police College, although fully staffed, had not conducted any training for four years.8

improved the immediate voice communications of the EPF but, perhaps, not its long-term communications needs.

8 Ibid.
E.4.35. RIPA was selected for this assignment ahead of other bidders from academic institutions with experience of working with police organisations undergoing radical change. The TCO police adviser recommended the engagement of an organisation with which he had been working closely in his parent police force. His advice was ignored. Applying the wisdom of hindsight, it might have been better to appoint an organisation with which the TCO - a key figure – was comfortable.

E.4.36. Many of the problems seem to have stemmed from the fact that one of the consultants suffered ill health and the other preferred to prescribe solutions he had utilised elsewhere rather than attempting to tailor a solution for the EPF.

E.4.37. Two consultants were engaged to assist the development of forensic science and fingerprinting within the Central Bureau. Photographic items, fingerprint comparison equipment, scientific instruments and ballistic examination kits were provided through the project, together with in country training. The TCO police adviser felt that the fingerprint expert training had been successful but the forensic science input had been pitched too high for the EPF. The review team reached similar conclusions, believing that the consultants had become bogged down in solving immediate operational issues rather than preparing a strategic plan for a longer-term improvement in the EPF’s forensic capacity.9

E.4.38. A short consultancy to assist the TGE with financial management was included in this phase of the project. This consultancy established that the EPF was seriously under funded and that a lack of recurrent finance was major constraint upon both the operations and strategic development of the police service. This input helped the EPF to identify key issues and provided proposals to improve police budget use and forecasting. For example, the consultant helped EPF to identify that:

- the police share of the national and regional budgets did not actually equate to the number of police officers employed;

- large sums of money from the police budget were being returned at the conclusion of the financial year to the TGE without any attempt having been made to utilise virement procedures to reallocate that finance into other priority areas of police activity.

E.4.39. The consultant also noted that Ethiopian budget procedures across all government departments needed to be reformed and, that without such wider action, the police budget would always be in difficulties.

E.4.40. The overall impression of the review team, the TCO police adviser and the EPF was that progress, albeit slow progress, had been made towards the wider and

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immediate project objectives. It was recommended that the project be developed and continue for a further two years.

Phase Two

E.4.41. The project memorandum was first drafted in March 1995 to extend the project to September 1997 at a projected cost of £2,394,000.00. However, final agreement on the wording of the project memorandum and the Logframe was not reached with the Ethiopians until November 1995.

E.4.42. The Ethiopians, as part of their wider concern about international aid, rejected the first draft. According to the TCO project co-ordinator: “There was a concern that the large budgets for projects were not reflected in country and that much of the money remained with the donor.” The Ethiopians apparently felt that an unacceptably high proportion of aid was being diverted to already well paid consultants and NGOs, rather than being reflected in material development within Ethiopia. In respect of the policing projects, the Ethiopian concern revolved around the imbalance between the provision of advice and the provision of equipment such as motor vehicles or computers.

E.4.43. The overall goal was to help the TGE to develop: “an open and accountable civil police service responsive to the community.”

E.4.44. The purpose was: “to build the capacity of the police to deliver services more efficiently and effectively in line with community needs.”

E.4.45. The principal outputs built upon those of Phase One:

- Improved organisation and management
- Improved information systems
- Enhanced training capacity
- Updated and revised training programmes
- Transport management systems
- Improved vehicle maintenance capacity

E.4.46. The monitoring arrangements for this phase of the project were changed away from the standard ODA/DFID method used in the first phase. Provision was made in the project memorandum for frequent monitoring visits to Ethiopia by

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London based staff on both a planned and random basis. It was planned that the DFID programme manager, senior OPA, the senior engineering adviser and a Government and Institutional Development adviser would, as a team, make monitoring visits to Ethiopia every six months and also would monitor the project whenever they were in Ethiopia on other business. The Ethiopians, already sceptical about the use of aid budgets to fund consultancies, were quick to pick up the fact that DFID project monitoring missions would be paid from the project budget.

E.4.47. Additional supervisory measures were introduced in an effort to ensure that the TCO project co-ordinator reported on time and in a regular manner by using the logframe as the basis for his reports. He had not been following the DFID format, which is designed to facilitate measurable indications of progress.

E.4.48. The project memorandum included a provision for a police strategy adviser to be appointed to help the senior officers of the EPF develop their thinking as a top team. This initiative resulted from a recommendation of the review of Phase One.\textsuperscript{11} The rationale behind this additional post was that although the police adviser had been able to meet the requirements for technical advice in a wide range of areas, the pressure to complete day to day tasks had left little time to devote to developing an overall strategy and action plan.

E.4.49. To assist in the development of strategy the TCO’s chief constable was appointed to make quarterly visits of one week to Ethiopia.

E.4.50. From the papers seen, communication between DFID in London, the TCO police adviser and the British ambassador appears to have been poor. The police strategy adviser commented on this in his first report\textsuperscript{12} making a strong recommendation “that communication is improved by there being:

- more honesty
- more openness and,
- a significantly better flow-systems of communication with the ODA in London, between ODA London and the police project team in Ethiopia, between ODA London and the Embassy and between the Police project team and the Embassy.”

E.4.51. Apparently little heed was taken of this recommendation, as it had to be strongly re-iterated in the following report.

\textsuperscript{11} Review of the Ethiopian Police Project 14-24 February 1995. Paragraph 3.11
\textsuperscript{12} Ethiopian Police Report on Visit 10 march to 17 march 1996. Paragraph 3.9
E.4.52. It is not clear from the papers consulted whether the additional project management measures contained in the project memorandum were introduced because there was a lack of confidence in the ability of those in Ethiopia to deliver.

E.4.53. It was decided, after consultation with the EPF, to deliver Phase Two in two tranches.

E.4.54. The first tranche was projected to cost £1,118,00 and to provide for:

- TCO for police advice, fleet management and the police strategic adviser (£340,000)
- Three person years of training assistance (£300,000)
- Training equipment and materials (£50,000)
- Financial management advice (£50,000)
- Information systems consultancy (£80,000)
- Specialist consultancy (£90,000)
- Contingency at 10% (£105,000)
- Local project costs (£103,000)

E.4.55. The second tranche was to provide:

- A further 3 person years of training support (£300,000)
- Provision of financial assistance and technical assistance to improve information systems (£300,000)
- Refurbishment of classrooms (£100,000)
- 20 new Land Rover motor vehicles
- Further contingency of 10% (£116,000)

E.4.56. The intention was that movement to the second tranche would occur when the TGE and the EPF had met the conditions set out in the project memorandum. In addition to the normal administrative arrangements, the TGE were required to maintain recurrent funding of the EPF at 4% of recurrent expenditure of national and regional government and to contain personnel costs of the EPF to 75% of total police expenditure.

E.4.57. The TGE and EPF made it quite clear early on the project’s life cycle that they were dissatisfied with the preponderance of consultancy advice as opposed to the provision of equipment to assist operations.

E.4.58. Progress to deliver the project outputs was made and the following comments are based upon DFID reports and interviews with a number of UK personnel involved in the project.

Output One: Improved Organisation and Management
E.4.59. Most of the activities specified in the logframe have been achieved. Legislation on policing has been drafted and enacted together with supporting regulations, a planning system has been put in place, organisational structures reviewed, job descriptions for departments and individuals agreed and general orders for the EPF prepared. However, the TGE and EPF had not undertaken a baseline social study, which would have enabled informed judgements to be made on the community effect of changes instituted. According to the TCO police adviser (during interview), this failure reflected the fact that, during the period of the Dergue, social surveys were conducted but were frequently rigged to show that the regime enjoyed popular support. The EPF were reluctant to undertake a social survey as part of the project because they believed themselves to be in a no win situation. If survey results had shown improvement, then allegations would have been that the survey was fixed, whilst if results indicated that the EPF was still totally mistrusted, then they would be pilloried.

Output Two: Improved Information Systems

E.4.60. This output was not fully achieved. In the initial stages the IS component was dogged by misunderstandings. The consultants engaged produced a comprehensive proposal but this was thought to be too ambitious for the operational environment in Ethiopia. The strategy adviser, who has considerable experience of specifying and installing IS/IT solutions, was extremely critical of the consultants’ work. He considered it to be “fundamentally flawed” as it took account neither of the EPF’s inexperience in IS/IT matters nor the lack of development of the country’s infrastructure. Indeed, he considered the proposals would have been considered ambitious for a United Kingdom police organisation. In addition, the commissioner of the EPF doubted the viability of the systems being proposed.

Output Three: Training Capacity Enhanced

E.4.61. The EPF and all other observers have regarded the training component as a success. A strategic plan was formulated for all levels of the EPF and training needs analysis has been completed. The OPR conducted in 1997 viewed the developments as being sustainable. Consultants from the United Kingdom are undertaking the training component.

Output Four: Updated and Revised Training Programmes

15 DFID: Output to Purpose Review. February 1997
16 Ethiopian Police Project; Visit report 21 September to 29 September 1996.
17 DFID: Output to Purpose Review. February 1997
E.4.62. This component has also been declared successful.\(^{18}\) Ethiopian trainers have been trained and latest methods and techniques have been incorporated into the tuition programme, together with feedback and evaluation methods. It is anticipated that the EPF will, in future, be capable of maintaining progress in curriculum development and design. The TCO police adviser reported that a core of trained personnel now exists and this will foster future organisational development.

Output Five: Transport Management Systems

E.4.63. In Phase Two of the project further progress was made to ensure that the EPF vehicle fleet was better utilised. In total, 100 Land Rovers were provided through the United Kingdom projects and this has helped to alleviate some of the transport problems of the EPF. However, 100 vehicles makes little impact on the overall police transport problem and the EPF needs to ensure that it has a proper sustainable vehicle acquisition and procurement programme in place and fully funded by the TGE.

Output Six: Vehicle Maintenance Capacity Improved

E.4.64. Whilst some progress has been made at the central garage in Addis Ababa, problems have persisted in other areas. It was anticipated that this element of the project will still need to be sustained with the support of the TCO transport adviser.

Conclusions

E.4.65. The project was prematurely ended in June 1997 following allegations concerning the killing by police of Ato Assefa, a leading opponent of the TGE, on 8 May 1997. It was claimed that the police officers involved were acting as a “death squad” to eliminate opponents.\(^{19}\) The project training component has since been reinstated.

E.4.66. At the time of its cessation, the project was judged by the OPR to have been developing along the right lines after a turbulent start. However, there was still a long way to go before the EPF could be said to have been sufficiently transformed to meet the overall goals and purposes of the project which were to develop an open and accountable police service capable of delivering services in

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\(^{18}\) Ibid.

line with community needs. Much of the discussion in the 1997 OPR focussed on the difficulty of effecting a change in the culture of the EPF. The problems of attempting to delegate authority and create a more open and responsive police force in the context of a strongly centralised society were extensively discussed. The premature end to most of the project has limited its impact in this wider field.

E.4.67. The EPF was a discerning client. They had decided on a strategy to transform their policing style to that of the developed world. However, they were not always enthusiastic about receiving advice on how to achieve the cultural and organisational changes needed. They believed that the United Kingdom project was too heavily weighted towards advice from TCOs and consultants, which they perceived as a waste of money. It seems that they would have preferred more material help.

E.4.68. Policing is resource hungry and, at the turn of the twentieth century, needs expensive communications equipment together with information technology and motor vehicles. In poor countries, and those recovering from civil war, this type of equipment and technology is often unaffordable, especially given other calls on the resources of government. The EPF felt that it was necessary for strategic management advice, training expertise and consultancy inputs to be accompanied by the material aid to enable them to operate effectively.

E.4.69. This raises the issue both of sustainability and of the extent to which DFID can or should become involved in meeting the equipment needs of police forces. Providing advice on how to police effectively without providing the material needed to ensure the advice can be effective has been likened to giving starving people nutritional education and not providing food. On the other hand, the whole thrust of DFID policy is to ensure the long term sustainability of projects. It may be that larger projects, which involve the extensive rebuilding of the police, will always encounter this sustainability problem. It is also likely that the aid will never be sufficient, on its own, to resolve the difficulties in providing an effective and timely response to crime.

E.4.70. The police strategy adviser underlined this dilemma in Ethiopia in one of his reports:

“The need and priorities of the EPF were shown in stark relief when I visited Awasa. There it was reported to me that recently a very serious crime had been committed in the Kefa Region and it had taken two weeks for the police officer to get the message back to his regional Commissioner. Without wishing to be flippant, the absence of radio/telephone communications and vehicles plays havoc with their response times! The serious point is that given the extent of their problems coupled with their professional knowledge of what is
required, “advisers” like me are infinitely less attractive than Land Rovers and Radios”.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20} Ethiopian police project; visit report 21 to 29 September 1996.
ANNEX E.5.

AID TO THE POLICE IN NEPAL

Introduction

E.5.1. The Government of Nepal approached the British Embassy in 1991 for assistance on policing. Visits were made by the ODA Overseas Police Advisor in December 1991 and the ODA Engineering Training Advisor in March 1992 and the outlines of the assistance proposed were to be agreed with Inspector General of Police in 1992. New proposals were submitted by the new IGP in 1993, followed by a visit of an ODA Police Advisor. A three year project was agreed, to start mid 1994 with the secondment of a consultant from Wiltshire Police, for one year initially.

E.5.2. In April 1995 the project was reviewed by SEADD and the First Secretary of the Embassy Development Division. On the basis of a successful first year, the scale of the reform programme and awareness of the length of time institutional reform takes in Nepal, they recommended an extension of the project to 5 years with a full-time expatriate consultant.

E.5.3. The context of the project was the transition from a one party state to a democratic government in which the police were expected to play a role in strengthening democracy rather than acting as an arm of the state. The project was conceived as a means of assisting the Nepal Police (NP), particularly its senior officers, to define its future philosophy and methods. The full-time TCO was to have a major role in advising the IGP in devising a corporate strategy and development plan as well as on the development of existing command and management training courses and establishing training in investigation methods.

E.5.4. The technical report by the Overseas Police Advisor noted that the transition to democracy was creating problems for the NP. “The difficult balance required in any democracy to ensure freedom of speech and individual rights is generally beyond the experience of the Nepalese Police”. The OPA noted that senior staff of the NP, whilst recognising the need for change, had no clear idea of what model of policing should be used. His view was that, whilst it was not appropriate to transfer the UK model to Nepal, some elements might be adapted if the NP felt this to be right. He emphasised that, despite its importance, training would have to be guided by a clearer view of the future needs and policing philosophy of the NP and that training alone would not provide the momentum “necessary to achieve sustainable institutional change and continuing development”. He stressed the need for a more appropriate organisational infrastructure, for the NP to forge closer links with local communities and the paramount importance of the police being seen to act within the law and being accountable to the people they serve. (Annexe I, Sec 2 of Project Memorandum)
The Project

E.5.5. The project was agreed in April 1994, to run until March 31st 1997, at a cost of £783,000. In November 1995 it was extended to a five year project to run until March 31st 1999 with a total cost of £1,023,000.

E.5.6. The overall goal of the project is to encourage the development of the Nepal Police into an open and accountable service, which earns the respect of and is responsive to the needs of all sectors of Nepalese society.

E.5.7. The purpose of the project is that, by its end, the Nepal Police should be using the fairer and more effective policing methods promoted by the project.

E.5.8. The project memorandum noted that it was in line with the UK’s objectives of supporting developments in open and accountable government in Nepal, with good government as a principal objective and human development (education) and WID as significant objectives. The gender element was tied both to raising awareness on the need for equal opportunities within the NP (only 1% of staff were women) and in wider terms of addressing the issues affecting the relationship between the police and women in Nepal, including a more sensitive response to policing problems involving women and children.

E.5.9. It was designed as a process project in the sense that the areas of activity on which it would focus would depend on where energy and momentum in NP existed. These areas included the following outputs:

- Systems to protect human rights and improve public safety
- Improved law enforcement techniques
- Systems for crime investigation, intelligence and management
- Improved policing of traffic and road safety
- Community policing systems
- Better reporting and investigation of crimes against women and children
- Enhanced scientific support to police
• Recommendations for improvements to the criminal justice system

E.5.10. The activities set out in the project framework mainly involved: the provision of advice and guidance to senior staff in NP, preparing systems and manuals covering various areas of policing, arranging senior staff training in UK and developing in-country training programmes.

E.5.11. The ODA inputs were mainly to be: the provision of a full-time expatriate consultant for the duration of the project, visits of specialist trainers to Nepal, developing in-country training, funding training in UK and elsewhere overseas, and funds for the purchase of books, software, and equipment.

Evaluation

E.5.12. The following comments are based on the OPR, dated 19/11/97, the November 1997 mid-term evaluation report written by the TCO, an impact analysis written by a Nepalese consultant in November 1997, and briefing notes written by the TCO in February 1998.

E.5.13. The OPR notes that, given the difficulties of achieving institutional change in the public service in Nepal, the project had made excellent progress in its first three years. There was evidence that there has been a significant change of attitude amongst senior staff of NP in favour of wanting to provide a fair and effective public service; but this had not percolated down to middle and lower ranks. Credit for maintaining the momentum of the project in difficult circumstances was given to the TCO.

E.5.14. The OPR felt that the project had tried to cover too much ground and that some elements had been taken as far they could go. It recommended a focus on a few specific areas until project completion in March 1999. Outputs 4 (Road traffic policing and safety) and 8 (Recommendations to the improvement of the CJS) were seen as completed. Outputs 2 (Improvement of law enforcement techniques), 3 (Improvement of systems for crime investigation, crime intelligence and management) and 7 (Enhancement of scientific support to police) only required a small amount of follow up. However for outputs 1 (Standard systems to protect human rights and improve public safety), 5 (Community policing systems) and 6 (Better reporting and investigation of crime against women and children) much remained to be done. It was recommended that for the rest of the project the focus should be on these three – which were seen as being consistent with the new DFID policies laid out in the White Paper.

E.5.15. The OPR stressed that “achieving long term institutional change in Nepal takes a considerable length of time” and that despite the good start made by the project “a much longer partnership will be needed to ensure change is effective and sustainable”. It also noted that improving police effectiveness would have limited impact on ensuring access of the poor to justice unless other parts of the criminal justice system became more effective. It recommended further DFID support to the NP police and the criminal justice system, with a
review visit in first half of 1998 and that this should, if possible, come under the auspices of the Enabling State Programme.

E.5.16. The TCO, in his mid-term evaluation report (Nov. 1997), listed the major social and economic development problems facing Nepal but indicated that the key problem behind the perpetuation of poverty is lack of justice. “The corrupt and powerful get rich, exploit the foreign aid and home economy, they do not fear the Criminal Justice System which they have rendered powerless” (p12). He noted that the Nepal Police Project had trained key senior police officers, was setting up good training establishments and providing materials which would give the ability to change the organisation and create reliable justice if they so wished. However, he argued that, unless corruption could be reduced, poor government, instability, the emergence of groups supporting armed struggle, terrorism (Maoists) was inevitable. In his view, it was a mistake to assume that a sound criminal justice system could be achieved through support to the police alone and there was a need for a wider approach. This could be done by donors ensuring that aid was targeted on uncorrupt agencies and applying pressure for reform. “We must set an example of honesty and integrity in our development programme, together with an openness about the objectives”. (13) “Without such an approach our help will continue to be of limited effect”. (13)

E.5.17. This theme is continued in the TCO’s briefing notes (19/2/98) which refer extensively to the DFID White Paper and stresses the need for a sound criminal justice system. The notes, whilst identifying some areas of positive change due to the project, refer to major obstacles, including:

- Difficulties in transferring learning about democratic policing from overseas and local training to practice
- Loss of trained police staff to overseas postings with the UN
- Increased political interference in the police and active government intervention to prevent prosecution of corruption and organised crime
- Low moral and enthusiasm due to political disruption

E.5.18. The Nepal Police Project provides a good example of the difficulties involved in achieving the goal of an open and accountable police service which gains the respect of and responds to the needs of all sectors of society. The majority of the project activities involved the provision of UK and local training, enhancing the training infrastructure, the development of manuals and systems. Within the terms of the initial project design many of these activities were, at least partially, successful in meeting the targets specified in the logframe, as was noted in the generally favourable mid-term review.

E.5.19. Amongst these successes can be noted

- Senior management development: training in-country and overseas for senior staff and the production of development strategies recommending future development in areas
such as, Crime, Traffic, Criminal Justice, Strategic Management, Personnel, Criminal Records, Police Structure, Community Policing.

- Personnel system: designing a new system to allow promotion on the basis of merit and building strategic and personal career development into the NP.

- Training infrastructure: construction of a new Police College at Kakani, improvements to the physical infrastructure at the National Academy and other training establishments, provision of copying facilities, training materials and books.

- Interview and intelligence training: development of a cadre of trainers in crime pattern analysis, surveillance and intelligence gathering, and interview techniques; the production of manuals and videos.

- Scientific support for crime investigation: the establishment of Crime Investigation Departments in 28 Districts and the development of forensic analysis facilities at the National Academy

- Traffic: expansion of the traffic department, training of traffic officers, the production of manuals containing criminal law, traffic law and highway rules

- Community policing: pilot projects in a small number of districts

- Women and Child Units: provision of training and the establishment of one fully functioning unit in Kathmandu.

E.5.20. Despite these achievements, the main point brought out strongly by the TCO, and less strongly by the mid-term review, is the extent to which the process of change initiated by the project has been substantially blocked by wider political, social and institutional factors.

E.5.21. There appear to be a number of interconnecting issues. Firstly, the process of initiating and sustaining change within a police force, which has developed as an arm of the state in a non-democratic society, is a long one. Change of vision and attitudes at the top takes time to percolate down to middle and lower ranks. Training key senior staff and improving local training facilities is not necessarily sufficient to initiate changes in practice. Secondly, technical and operational improvements to policing do not necessarily impact on wider policing aims such as improvements in the protection of human rights and public safety, the development of community policing, or the recognition of specific issues involving women and children. Thirdly, support to the police in the absence of wider reforms to the criminal justice system is not alone sufficient to increase the extent to which justice can be achieved. Fourthly, the absence of ‘good government’ in terms of widespread corruption and state or political interference in both the police and the wider justice system is likely to vitiate the impact and sustainability of the majority of the activities undertaken by the project.
E.5.22. The Nepal project raises the question of the viability of policing projects particularly in societies which are either undergoing a ‘transition’ to democracy or where open accountable government is still weak and the boundaries between political and civil society are fluid. The mid-term review of the NPP concluded that, despite the good start, five years were not enough to ensure effective and sustainable change. It also noted that improving police effectiveness alone has limited impact on giving the poor access to justice if nothing is done to remedy problems in other parts of the justice system. In suggesting that further support to the police and the justice system should come under the auspices of the Enabling State Programme, the OPR appeared to be supporting the trenchant views of the TCO on the absence of good government in Nepal.

E.5.23. The review and associated recommendations provide evidence of a clear recognition of the interconnectedness of policing, human rights, justice, good government, poverty alleviation within a more ‘holistic’ perception of development. Indeed, the mid-term review, reflecting recent changes in DFID policy, put greater stress on giving the poor access to effective justice than in the original project memorandum. However, the review did not clarify what role support for reform in policing or the justice system might be expected to play in widening access to justice, the attainment of human rights and the development of good government or under what set of conditions such support can be judged to lead to sustainable changes. Failure to achieve clarity on such issues, accompanied by recommendations to extend project time frames, brings with it the danger of an open ended commitment to long term support.
ANNEX E.6.

AID TO POLICING IN THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

Introduction

E.6.1. DFID/ODA has been providing professional assistance towards the development of policing in the Kingdom of Lesotho.

E.6.2. Since 1964, when Lesotho gained independence from Great Britain, assistance has been given to help the development of the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police (RLMP). The assistance provided was of a professional nature aimed at improving tactical ability through training and the development of investigative techniques. Additionally, several RLMP officers were invited to study in the United Kingdom at the Police Staff College and other police training institutions.

E.6.3. The RLMP was a very militaristic organisation and the Major General (or Commissioner) in command was accountable to the military council and not to the people. Lesotho had been under military rule for twenty-three years until 1993 when a fully democratic government was elected at free and fair election. This style of para-military policing was seen to be inappropriate and unacceptable for a country aspiring to introduce democratic and accountable government.

E.6.4. Following the 1993 election Lesotho was seriously affected by civil strife and this included strikes and mutinies by both the armed forces and the police.

The Need for Change

E.6.5. The Government of Lesotho (GOL) approached the United Kingdom for help to create a more community based police service. The initial approach was made through the British High Commissioner (BHC) to Lesotho and was one of number of requests made to the United Kingdom to help in rebuilding the institutions of the State.

E.6.6. Policing experts from the United Kingdom visited Lesotho and identified a number of issues requiring immediate attention. These were attended to by the two resident United Kingdom Technical Co-operation Officers (TCO) who were assisting the development of recruit training and the improvement of criminal investigation. Although the notions of accountability, community consultation and the respect of human rights were paramount in the work being done by the TCO, the assistance was too narrowly based to bring about the type of radical change that was seen to be needed.

E.6.7. An ODA Overseas Police Adviser (OPA) visited Lesotho in 1994 and concluded that assistance was required not only for the RLMP but also to assist the GOL to develop robust police policy and effective civilian oversight of the policing function. Acting upon this
advice, BDDSA decided that a design mission should visit Lesotho to assess what was required and to help prepare appropriate projects. In mid 1994 approaches were made to the United Kingdom Home Office for an experienced civil servant, well versed in policing issues, to under take the mission. Unfortunately, the Home Office, at that time, was unable to release anyone. In the event, a former United Kingdom chief constable undertook the design mission and visited Lesotho in the spring of 1995. This visit was supplemented by a simultaneous visit from the BDDSA Policing Consultant who was to advise the Commissioner of Police on the production of a long-term business plan. The coincidence of these two missions was productive, as police business planning is contingent upon a clear policing policy from governmental level.

E.6.8. The outcome of these two missions was the introduction of two mutually supportive projects:

- to develop an effective police department within the Lesotho Ministry for Home Affairs and;

- to provide assistance to the RLMP to assist its transformation from a largely unaccountable para-military force to an organisation providing policing services consistent with needs of a democratic nation.

These two projects dovetailed with the GOL’s long-term developmental strategy of attracting inward investment to develop an export-oriented economy. It was recognised that a key element of attracting investors would be the promotion of good governance and the creation of a stable, safe and secure social environment. The need for a professional, effective and respected police service was felt to be essential. (A third project to assist in the development of the magistrates’ courts system was also commissioned separately but it never got beyond the stage of the preparation of a report by a DFID consultant).

E.6.9. The projects supported the overall DFID policy aim of promoting good governance, respect for human rights and the paramount importance of the rule of law.

E.6.10. Whilst this type of reform to the police and policing was accepted by the GOL, it was noted in the design phase of the project that there was a marked reluctance, and even fear, on the part of civil servants to direct police officers and a dogged resistance to either co-operation or change from senior police management. But, this is hardly surprising given the twenty-three years of military rule and domination.

The Projects

Lesotho – Police Development Programme

E.6.11. The project was agreed in June 1995, to run for two years at a cost of £530,000.00. In January 1998 approval was given for its extension for up to five
more years at a projected cost of £520,000.00. The proposal to extend the project life cycle followed a project review in October 1997, which demonstrated success.

E.6.12. The original project had as its overall goal:

“To promote stability and respect for the rule of law in Lesotho, thus contributing to an enabling environment for social and economic development."

E.6.13. The purpose of the project was stated to be:

“To assist the RLMP prepare and implement a rolling five year strategic development plan which will enable the RLMP to give a high quality of service to the people of Lesotho.”

E.6.14. The project outputs were quite simply stated:

- as the production of a five year strategic development plan for the RLMP to be approved by the GOL and;

- a time-bound implementation plan for the delivery of the strategic development plan.

E.6.15. To facilitate the project and assist the RLMP a United Kingdom police officer was appointed as a resident TCO. The appointee was competitively selected from a strong list of contenders. This TCO has proved to be a most effective operator possessing a widespread of police management skills, operational expertise which are complemented by a common sense approach and diplomatic manner. This appointment shows that good quality police TCO can be found through normal personnel selection procedures.

E.6.16. The TCO police adviser has forged strong links with the RLMP and representatives of the GOL. Close contact has been maintained with the TCO developing the police department within the Ministry of Home Affairs and this has been mutually beneficial to both projects.

E.6.17. The outputs have been achieved, as is noted below after the project to assist in the development of the police department has been described.

Lesotho Ministry of Home Affairs – Establishment of Police Department

E.6.18. The project was agreed in December 1995 to run for two years at a projected cost of £330,000.00.

E.6.19. The overall goal of the project was stated as:

“To develop an efficient and accountable police service in Lesotho to help maintain
a stable political and economic climate conducive to development.”

E.6.20. The **purpose** of this project was stated to be:

“To establish within the Ministry of Home Affairs a police department which can provide policy advice to ministers, strategic guidance and oversight of the operations of the RLMP.”

E.6.21. The project **outputs** were to be:

- a government policing strategy to be developed and promulgated
- a police advisory board to be established
- police department structure and objectives to be defined and agreed
- the legislative framework and environment to be established
- work plans to be prepared and agreed for implementing the GOL policing strategy.

E.6.22. A United Kingdom Home Office civil servant, possessing wide experience in formulating national policy for policing and ensuring police accountability through effective civilian oversight of policing activity, was appointed as TCO Adviser to the Minister for Home Affairs. The TCO Police Adviser has noted that it was unfortunate that his arrival in country preceded that of the TCO Adviser to the Minister by several months. He felt that the process of policy formulation and establishment of civilian oversight mechanisms should have been well on their way to completion before work was started on the project to professionalise the strategic business planning of the RLMP. The initial reluctance of the United Kingdom Home Office to release a civil servant may have been a significant factor.

E.6.23. Notwithstanding the foregoing observation the two TCOs have worked closely together to achieve success.

**Achievements**

E.6.24. The two projects have been deliberately placed on parallel courses so as to bring about a coordinated approach by the GOL and the RLMP to the development of national policing policy and its transformation into police practice.¹

- A five year rolling business development plan has been prepared, published for public consultation and is now the basis of policy for the RLMP.

¹ Partly based on comments made to consultants in a meeting in DFIDSA, Pretoria, 21/4/98
• The five year plan has the approval of the GOL and, because of the wide consultation, general approval from the people of Lesotho.

• Annual policing plans are in the process of formulation, both nationally and locally, by the RLMP and reflect the policing priorities of the GOL together with the requirements of local communities.

• There is a more professional outlook in the RLMP and the resistance to either co-operation or change has been much reduced.

• The GOL has established within the Ministry of Home Affairs a Police Directorate which is responsible for assisting the Minister of Home Affairs to formulate policy, and to ensure that there is robust accountability for the RLMP, together with an independent police complaints procedure and independent annual inspection of the RLMP.

• A comprehensive White Paper on policing was published and, following wide consultation, a new Police Statute has been prepared. The new statutory procedures embrace the ethos of policing with the consent of the people and embody a partnership approach to policing as well as the development of professional policing and crime prevention. The White Paper was widely available to the public. However, to increase accessibility a succinct, readable and very informative bilingual leaflet was made available to all citizens. This type of consultative good consultative document reflects good practice which could usefully be copied elsewhere.

E.6.25. The two major documents\(^2\) which support the development of policing in Lesotho are well written and are worth further study by those having either responsibility for establishing democratic policing and policing structures in a post conflict society or are involved in designing and managing aid projects.

E.6.26. The general conclusion is that these two complementary projects have each met their objectives. The outputs achieved have reflected the purpose of the projects and, in the longer term, the assistance given to the GOL and the RLMP - now renamed the Lesotho Mounted Police Service to reflect its community policing based role – should, in the long term, meet the overall goal of promoting stability and the rule of law in Lesotho. However, the events of 1998, which involved a major breakdown of order, indicate just how difficult this goal is to achieve and the extent to which wider political and regional factors can undermine progress in reforming policing.

Conclusion

E.6.27. These two projects show the benefit of careful project design, professional selection of TCO advisers and the setting of realistically achievable outputs. Importantly, GOL was strongly committed to both of the projects as being needed to improve the environment of a country striving to improve its economy and image after a long period of non-democratic rule. The GOL has appreciated the assistance given: without their enthusiasm the projects would not have been so successful and the many of the problems encountered would not have been solved.
ANNEX E.7.

AID TO POLICING IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

E.7.1. DFID have been providing a range of development assistance towards the reform of policing in the Republic of South Africa. This aid has complemented the objective of the South African Government of National Unity (GNU) to transform the policing of South Africa to a style, which embraces the concept of community consultation and consensual operational activity.

E.7.2. The involvement of the Development Division (BDDSA now DFIDSA) in the reform of policing commenced in May 1994, following the first universally representative elections in South Africa. There had been British support in the run up to the election, aimed at helping to ensure that the elections took place in a peaceful climate and were free and fair.

E.7.3. Since the election, aid has been given in two ways:

- a number of short inputs to provide expertise at a tactical level, for instance, advice on personnel management;
- substantial projects, which have been supported by BDDSA appointed resident Technical Co-operation Officers (TCOs), to aid the development of community policing.

This review will concentrate on the major projects.

Policing in South Africa: The Historical Context

E.7.4. Policing in South Africa developed from the police organisations of the four provinces, which were amalgamated to form the Union of South Africa in 1910 (from 1961 the Republic of South Africa), and was principally the responsibility of the South Africa Police (SAP). The City of Durban retained its own police service based upon the British model of local policing.

E.7.5. The SAP developed as an armed and paramilitary force, which took its direction and orders from the government. Consequently, the SAP became the enforcement arm of the repressive Apartheid regime. It has been estimated that during the Apartheid era only one in ten members of the police force was actually
involved in routine policing issues. The task of preventing and detecting crime was secondary to the policing of the Apartheid law and procedures.1

E.7.6. The nominally independent homelands and autonomous territories, created by the Apartheid regime within the boundaries of the RSA, also raised and directed police forces. These police forces, in Bophutaswana, Ciskei, Kwazulu Natal, Lebowa, Qwa Qwa, Transkei and Venda, were based on the model of the SAP and the senior officers were frequently recruited from within the ranks of the SAP.

E.7.7. The police forces, especially the SAP, adopted a reactive and aggressive style, which resulted in almost any form of public protest being crushed with overt force. Frequently, the operational style of policing in South Africa attracted international condemnation.

E.7.8. Police officers from the SAP took part in counter insurgency operations in Namibia and Zimbabwe and these operations were of a direct military nature. The recent book of Eugene de Kock, a former colonel of the SAP, graphically describes the incursions into Namibia and the excesses of the SAP2.

E.7.9. The police of South Africa were not highly regarded by the majority population, were unrepresentative of the population at large, and were generally not accountable to the communities they policed. The role of the police in supporting the Apartheid regime has become clearer through the proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which has confirmed many of the suspicions held by those who opposed Apartheid.

E.7.10. By the time that the RSA started to move towards political reform in 1990, the SAP had become totally committed to the fight against those organisations and people struggling to end Apartheid and was merely an arm of the government. It had become almost indistinguishable from the military and the abuse of human rights of suspects had become routine practice. In terms of conventional policing, it was an inefficient and ineffective police force. It had lost the confidence of the South African public.

The Move Towards Community Policing

E.7.11. In the years leading up to the elections of April 1994, a considerable amount of work had been done by universities, non-governmental organisations, political parties and the SAP itself to find solutions to the problems presented by crime and disorder and the policing of the country. The consensus of opinion was that the way forward was to develop a community policing model, which would be based upon the consensus style of policing found in developed democratic countries.

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E.7.12. The GNU, through the Ministry of Safety and Security, set in motion a programme of police transformation. The SAP was renamed the South African Police Service (SAPS) and community policing became the dominant theme. The SAPS also launched a comprehensive organisational transformation process which was to look at every aspect of the business of policing, including the development of community policing.

E.7.13. The SAPS had also to amalgamate with the police forces of the homelands and autonomous territories. In addition, bodies created in the run up to democracy to ‘police’ difficult township areas had to be assimilated into the policing equation. These tasks have proved not to be simple and, four years on, problems are still being encountered in respect of the competence of some former homeland police officers and the lack of infrastructure and equipment in poorer areas.

E.7.14. The need for policing reform was recognised in the interim 1993 constitution. Chapter 3, Section 25 established the right of all people to be properly and fairly treated during the course of police enquiries. Chapter 14, Section 221 outlined the requirement for the SAPS to change its style of delivery to that of community policing.

E.7.15. The South African Police Service Act 1995 gave statutory effect to the constitutional requirement for community policing by requiring the SAPS to establish community consultation at all police stations, together with consultation mechanisms to be created at the provincial and area level. The responsibility for implementing these statutory requirements was firmly placed in the hands of the SAPS.

E.7.16. A definition of community policing produced by the National Secretariat of Safety and Security in 1996 noted:

“Community Policing can be defined as a philosophy or approach to policing which recognises the interdependence and shared responsibility of the police and the community in making South Africa a safer, more peaceful and more liveable country. Community Policing aims to establish an active an equal partnership between the police and the public through which crime and community safety issues can be jointly determined and solutions designed and implemented”.

E.7.17. To assist the process, the GNU, through the Ministry of Safety and Security, requested help from donor countries. Denmark, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have been, and still are, the principal partners in assisting the development of community policing.

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3 Government of the RSA, National Secretariat of Safety and Security (1996), Guidelines on Community Policing, p.4
The United Kingdom Approach

E.7.18. Aiding the development of policing in South Africa was a strand in the policy of the UK government to assist in the transformation of the RSA towards a pluralist democracy. The aim of all police projects in South Africa has been to contribute to the GNU initiative of transforming the SAPS into a more accountable organisation which would operate efficiently and effectively within the values of a democratic multi-racial society and would be acceptable to the majority of the population. It was envisaged that the United Kingdom assistance would:

- generally assist with the reorientation of the SAPS towards the concepts of service and accountability to the communities policed;
- promote constructive dialogue between community members and police officers;
- help to bring about greater community confidence in the efficiency, effectiveness and impartiality of the police.

E.7.19. The main thrust of United Kingdom assistance was directed towards the development of community policing and, in particular, to assist in the creation of formal community-police liaison bodies as required by the South African constitution. Initially, a great deal of effort was put into the recruitment and training of police officers who would be the first recruits to enter the newly created SAPS and to experience from the outset of their careers the ethos of community policing. The assistance given by the United Kingdom was as part of a multi-national approach involving The Netherlands, Sweden, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

E.7.20. BDDSA concurrently became involved in piloting community policing in the Province of the North West and at Grahamstown in the Province of the Eastern Cape. The experience gained from these small and relatively inexpensive projects helped to formulate the more substantial and expensive projects that were to follow in the Provinces of Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Free State.

E.7.21. In the early projects, United Kingdom assistance was aimed to assist NGOs in their work to promote community understanding and to bring about improvements in policing. This was simply because the NGOs had been in the vanguard of change throughout the struggle against Apartheid and, in direct comparison with the SAPS, were generally respected and trusted by the majority population. Although the NGO route facilitated the involvement of community members, it did not always bring the SAPS into the equation. There were many reasons for this, but a primary bar to meaningful participation by SAPS was that many of the NGO fieldworkers and local political groupings felt that SAPS should
be kept away from the process. The turbulent history of police - community relations frequently intervened and SAPS did not help the situation by mainly appointing former security branch police officers to head up community policing.

E.7.22. The channelling of aid through NGOs became less appropriate when the responsibility for the establishment of community policing structures was firmly placed with the SAPS by the South African Police Services Act 1995. BDDSA, following a study by the BDDSA Consultant on Policing, switched the emphasis of its aid towards assisting the SAPS and Provincial Members of the Executive Council (MEC) to establish sustainable community policing structures, which conformed with the requirements of the constitution and the provisions of the South Africa Police Service Act 1995.

E.7.23. The link with NGOs was kept firmly in place in that NGOs were contracted to service the workshop process aimed at increasing the understanding of community policing and community liaison and consultation. However, the involvement of SAPS personnel in training in community policing was built in to the process.

E.7.24. The following paragraphs provide details on the design and implementation of each of the projects.

THE PROJECTS

Assistance to the Basic Level Training Programme for the South African Police Service.

E.7.25. This project took place between April 1995 and July 1996 and cost £1,195,000.00. The aim was:

“To assist towards the development of a human resource strategy to improve the representativeness and competency of the SAPS and to reorientate the SAPS towards the concepts of service and accountability to the community.”

E.7.26. To help to achieve this overall aim, assistance was provided by the appointment of Commonwealth and United Kingdom policing experts to advise the SAPS on recruitment, approaches to training and the management of field training.

E.7.27. The SAPS, together with a multi-national advisory team (MIT), were looking towards developing a basic level training programme (BLT) which would

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5 See ante 2c
6 Project Memorandum dated 4 May 1995.
prepare recruits to work in an environment of community policing. The former SAP recruit training was of a para-military nature and was conducted on racial lines, with white officers being trained at a police establishment in Pretoria, whilst black officers were trained in a separate establishment in Hammanskraal.

E.7.28. The project was divided into four phases:

- Assistance to the work of the MIT
- Assistance to the recruitment of personnel
- The training of trainers
- Field training

E.7.29. A United Kingdom police superintendent with wide experience in the management and development of police training was appointed as the TCO with responsibility for working with the MIT, the training of trainers and the development of the field training programme. This TCO also provided general advice to the SAPS on the training of police officers.

E.7.30. In addition to the resident TCO, United Kingdom police training experts were contracted to provide short term in-country inputs to assist the SAPS in designing the course curriculum, training of trainers and, in particular, the development of role play exercises.

E.7.31. A United Kingdom police superintendent undertook the assistance to the recruitment of personnel phase and was in South Africa as a TCO for four months. This input was widely appreciated and helped the Ministry for Safety and Security and SAPS to set the personal standards, minimum educational levels and physical fitness criteria for aspirants to the police service. It also ensured that equality of opportunity was central to the selection process from the first written application through to actual appointment to the SAPS or rejection of an applicant’s candidature.

E.7.32. 1760 officers were recruited and trained in a multi-racial environment at the police training establishments at Hammanskraal and Pretoria.

E.7.33. The field-training element of the project was phased in two stages. Planning was undertaken by the MIT but the actual execution of the aid was left to a dedicated team of TCOs from the UK and other Commonwealth countries (India, Kenya, Malaysia and Zimbabwe). This team was led by a UK superintendent, who possessed experience, not only in the training sphere, but also of South Africa, having been the TCO in the assistance to recruitment phase of the project. The
field training team had TCOs of both sexes and was multi-racial in its composition. The team divided into groups and undertook the training of field trainers and assisted in the field training of the recruits who had undergone the new style of training and had recently been posted to police stations throughout South Africa.

E.7.34. This project has been independently evaluated and was found to have been successful. Unfortunately the SAPS has not yet recruited any further new police officers since 1995. This is due to a combination of budgetary issues including pressures to replace trained police officers performing non-operational duties with non-police personnel and the need for in-service training for existing SAPS officers. It is anticipated that recruiting will recommence in 1998/99 and that the work done with the assistance of this project will form the basis of the next phase of BLT.

E.7.35. In the meantime the SAPS have assisted their colleagues in Namibia by facilitating a similar course of BLT for 400 Namibian Police recruits at Outschoorn in the Western Cape in 1996. The course used the same approach as the BLT developed through the project and, although adapted for Namibian circumstances, had a similar curriculum. The Namibian Police regard the BLT as being capable of producing a more rounded and competent police officer to work in a Southern African policing environment.

E.7.36. Overall this project appears to have delivered valuable and wanted help to the Ministry for Safety and Security and SAPS. The philosophy of training has been reoriented and the para-military content of the training reduced from the norm to only preparing new entrants to the SAPS for those elements of para-military policing which have to be faced by police officers who work in a gun saturated country. Central to the curriculum were the themes of respect for human rights, accountability for individual and collective action and the philosophy of community policing.

E.7.37. It is difficult to come to a firm conclusion about the sustainability of the BLT project. On the one hand, the principles developed will be implemented in future training of recruits by the SAPS and the method was successfully used in training recruits from Namibia. On the other hand, there is evidence that the initiatives were not built on after the South African recruits were assimilated into normal policing.

Support to Community Policing in the Eastern Cape: The Grahamstown Community Safety Project

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E.7.38. Grahamstown is the administrative centre of District 12 of the Province of the Eastern Cape and has a population in the region of 250,000. District 12 incorporates a vast rural area and the towns of Alexandria, Alicedale, Nathurst, Boknes, Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, Kenton on Sea, Port Alfred and Riebeek East. The area was widely settled by white Europeans from around 1820. Grahamstown itself is a collegiate city being home to forty churches, prominent public schools and the Rhodes University.

E.7.39. The project, which was known as the Grahamstown Community Safety Project, commenced in November 1994 and was completed in December 1995, when it was subsumed under a larger project intended to help to bring about effective community policing throughout the Province of the Eastern Cape. The cost was £78,000 and this project helped to formulate the BDDSA strategy for assisting in the development of community policing.

E.7.40. The BDDSA programmes manager, in consultation with the resident UK TCO for community policing and local stakeholders, designed this project, which built upon existing local initiatives. It was conducted under the auspices of the Community Law Centre at Rhodes University and day to day management of the project was in the hands of a professor with wide knowledge of the theory and processes of community policing. A UK TCO was not appointed, although advisory and monitoring visits were undertaken by the BDDSA programmes manager and consultant on policing.

E.7.41. The overall aim of the project was:

- to contribute towards the reorientation of the SAPS towards the concepts of service and accountability to the community
- to promote the creation of constructive community/police consultation and dialogue by establishing community police fora throughout the Grahamstown administrative district. This required the creation of a new community police forum (CPF) at eight locations.

E.7.42. During the course of the project significant community policing developments were achieved. The required eight CPF were established. These brought about heightened awareness of policing issues in some of the more troublesome areas of the Grahamstown District in addition to formally creating dialogue between interested community members and police officers. The SAPS also maintained a keen interest in the progress of the project through a dedicated officer, a colonel from the Community Relations Branch, although community policing was kept mainly separate from the every day policing activity.

E.7.43. The development of community policing as a discrete and specialist activity rather than the universal method of service delivery is common throughout South
Africa and may have contributed to the doubts that many now have about the effectiveness of community policing in combating crime.

E.7.44. A significant achievement was the establishment of a community visitors’ scheme. The purpose of the scheme was to enable accredited members of the community to visit police stations unannounced to check on the conditions and treatment of prisoners detained in custody. This scheme contributed towards community confidence and brought about a limited, although welcome, transparency and accountability of SAPS.

E.7.45. A crime survivors’ programme was also successfully developed. This programme concentrated on providing support to the victims of child abuse and domestic violence. The programme also included training for police officers in the handling of offences against women and children. The training of police officers by civilian social workers in an operational field of work was a major step in the process of resocialising the SAPS in the Grahamstown District and helped heighten awareness of the seriousness of such crimes.

E.7.46. The success of the crime survivors’ programme highlighted the difficulty of keeping a balance between the constitutional right of a suspect to bail and the community demands that rapists be kept in custody. Frequently, there were allegations that police had not treated matters seriously by granting bail or that corruption had taken place to allow the suspect to escape justice. Such issues were often the subject of discussions at CPF meetings and the project workers spent a great deal of time explaining the legal position to communities so as to prevent rough justice from being meted out to bailed persons. In township areas such rough justice often results in the death of the person who has incurred the wrath of the community.

E.7.47. The project was concluded in December 1996. BDDSA funding was not extended because the work of the Grahamstown Community Safety Project was subsumed under the much larger BDDSA and European Union (EU) funded project for the whole of the Province of the Eastern Cape.

E.7.48. On completion, Rhodes University reviewed the project, in accordance with the project memorandum. The review, whilst not indicating marked success in respect of empowering communities to take a positive role in the direction and encouragement of policing activities, indicated that the relationships between the community and the police had improved and that the police had been encouraged to provide a better quality of service. The supervising professor concluded:

“Relationships between the police and members of the community are very different now and the project had a direct impact on those relationships.

ODA, in turn, can rightly claim that it served as a catalyst towards the improved relationships.\textsuperscript{9}

E.7.49. Overall, it can be said that this small and relatively inexpensive project achieved some success and set the tone for future projects aimed at improving the community - police relationship component of community policing.

Support to Community Policing in the Province of the NorthWest.

E.7.50. The Province of the NorthWest was created from the former Western Transvaal, parts of the former Northern Transvaal, part of the Northern Cape and the six main parts of the former independent homeland of Bophutatswana.\textsuperscript{10} The population is in the order of 2,500,000. The North West is a mainly rural area with considerable mining reserves of diamonds, precious metals, uranium and other industrial ores. It is a stronghold of Boer tradition and the Apartheid regulations were strictly enforced in the former RSA provincial areas, whilst such matters were totally relaxed in the former Bophutatswanan areas. The North West is home to many holiday and recreational sites such as the Pilansberg game reserve and the Sun City leisure development. It is, however, a generally poor area.

E.7.51. The project came about as a result of a request from the Provincial MEC for Safety and Security. Its aim was to help in the establishment of meaningful community - police consultative arrangements that would contribute to the development of community policing. The BDDSA programmes manager, in collaboration with the resident UK TCO for community policing and local stakeholders designed the project. The project was approved in April 1995 and was completed in December 1996. The cost was £445,000.

E.7.52. A UK TCO was not appointed to help with the management and implementation of the project but frequent assistance and advice was available from the BDDSA resident TCO for community policing. Additionally, the DFID Overseas Police Adviser (OPA) and the BDDSA consultant on policing made monitoring visits.

E.7.53. The management and day to day operation of the project was placed with the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), who were contracted by BDDSA. IDASA, which was founded in 1986, is a NGO which had taken a prominent stand against Apartheid. It had the reputation of being

\textsuperscript{9} Letter of 4 March 1996 from Professor Rob Midgeley to Sue Wardell at BDDSA covering the report Grahamstown Community Safety Project: End of Project Review.

\textsuperscript{10} Bophutatswana was not an homogenous “nation” and was made up of seven tracts spread throughout the RSA. The seventh tract, which was several hundred of kilometres from the North West and on the borders with Lesotho, has now been incorporated into the province of the Free State.
respected and competent organisation with wide experience in the development of community structures and the resolution of conflict through mediation and negotiation. IDASA had also developed expertise in the promotion and consolidation of democracy through educational programmes designed to assist in the transformation of national institutions and the empowerment of individuals and communities. As part of its work, IDASA had been successful in facilitating community policing programmes in Gauteng and Mumpamalanga.

E.7.54. In the North West, IDASA joined with the Wilgespruit Fellowship to deliver the community policing workshops. The Wilgespruit Fellowship, a church based NGO, was founded in 1948 and had a history of successful involvement in conflict resolution and the development of community educational programmes. In the course of preparing the project aims, the BDDSA TCO for community policing assessed community and police training courses being delivered by the Fellowship and found them to be of a high standard.

E.7.55. The overall aims of the project were:

- to contribute towards the reorientation of the SAPS and Bohutatswana Police towards the concept of service and accountability to the community
- to promote constructive community - police relations through the establishment of a CPF for each of the 124 police stations in the Province of the North West
- to contribute towards the restoration of community confidence in the police

E.7.56. To achieve these aims it was planned that two workshops would be delivered in each police station area (248 workshops), together with eight workshops at the provincial and area level. The workshops were designed to concentrate on community needs in public safety, community - police relations and to aid the introduction of CPF. It was also planned to train forty five persons from local communities in the facilitation of dispute resolution and chairmanship skills. These objectives were achieved and CPF were established in 96 locations.

E.7.57. At the project conclusion in March 1996 it was evaluated by IDASA.\textsuperscript{11} The achievements reached, as measured against the project log frame aims were described as follows:

- \textbf{Contribute to the establishment of community/police consultation forums in line with the Constitution}

This aim was achieved. When the project commenced a large number of communities had CPF established by the SAP and Bop police before the elections.

\textsuperscript{11} North West Province Community Policing Project: Project Narrative Report. IDASA March 1996.
of April 1994. While some of these forums were functioning well, the majority required substantial intervention in order to ensure that they were, in line with the Constitution, truly non racial and democratic. In several other areas, where no forum existed, the project succeeded in establishing such forums.

- To build community/police relationships, particularly in areas where these have been destroyed under Apartheid. This will contribute to the broader reconciliation process.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which this aim has been achieved and the extent to which this is as a result of the project. In general community police relations have improved and the project has had an impact.

- To deliver a uniform approach to setting up forums from the Province.

A serious problem with the previously existing forums was the lack of uniformity. The SAP and Bop police had pursued completely separate programmes. The project did, within the framework of the amalgamation process of the two forces, contribute to the establishment of uniformity amongst forums and the establishment of the four area boards helped this process.

- To contribute to building community policing in a democratic consultative process.

On the level of the local workshops, IDASA co-ordinators definitely achieved this aim. In many instances the police and communities were brought together on an equal footing for the first time. This enabled democratic debate. On a provincial level, however, a major failing of the project was the inability to draw other NGOs and stakeholders in to the consultative process.

- To empower communities in relation to the police.

To some extent, the creation of forums led to empowerment of communities with regards to the police. It would be wrong, however, to see such empowerment as a one off event. It is a process which is intricately linked to all aspects of policing and policy development in general.

E.7.58. These assessments made by IDASA are relatively subjective as they lack empirical support. Also the criteria for measurement do not faithfully reflect the “outputs” of the log frame. It might have been better for the project to have been independently evaluated. The project did, however, supply BDDSA with food for thought and future project design benefited from the lessons learned. The main lessons were:

- TCO advisers should be introduced to bring professional police expertise and to assist BDDSA and its partners with the management of the project
• The MEC responsible for Safety and Security and SAPS management should be totally committed to the project aims

• Greater attention should be paid towards ensuring that all relevant NGOs and community stakeholders were engaged in the project design and committed to its progress

• All project workers should be subjected to a more thorough vetting procedure to ensure that all shared a common view of the project aims

• Aims and objectives should be clearer and more measurable.

Support to Community Policing in the Province of the Free State

E.7.59. The Province of the Free State incorporates the homeland of Qwa Qwa, the seventh tranche of Bophutatswana and the former Orange Free State. The Free State is a vast area and large scale mining operations, engineering and farming dominate its economy. It is not, however, prosperous and there are many townships around the main centres of population and mining and industrial sites. In the rural areas there is a great deal of subsistence farming.

E.7.60. The policing of the Free State had been conducted by three distinct police forces the SAP (8,000 personnel), the Qwa Qwa Police (400 personnel) and the Bophutatswana Police (800 personnel) which were amalgamated into one organisation on 1 September 1995.

E.7.61. This project originated from a joint request from the Provincial MEC for Safety and Security, the SAPS Provincial Police Commissioner, IDASA representing community bodies and the chairman of the Central External Policing Forum. The SAP in the former Orange Free State had become heavily involved since 1992 in developing a type of community policing and it was envisaged that a United Kingdom sponsored project would help to further that process and assist the introduction of the style of policing demanded by the Constitution.

E.7.62. In contrast to other projects, all stakeholders were working together to bring about better policing and were engaged on a regular basis in free and vigorous dialogue on the subject. IDASA drew up the initial proposal and this closely followed their strategy, which had dominated the project in the Province of the North West. Although the basic strategy was adequate, it concentrated upon developing CPF and did not make real provisions for the education of police officers or to develop effective policing. The IDASA proposal was drawn up at the same time as the Bill which led to the enactment of the South African Police Services Act 1995 so the two documents had to be considered together. Additionally,
lessons from the Grahamstown and North West projects, which were still in train, had to be assimilated.

E.7.63. The final project proposal was made following a study visits by the BDDSA programmes manager and consultant on policing and thorough consultation with the principal stakeholders. Recognition was made of the need to provide education for police officers through the workshop process and provision made in the project budget for police officers, politicians and community members to be able to make study visits to the United Kingdom and elsewhere to see effective community policing in action. The BDDSA team also felt that a resident UK senior police officer, acting as a TCO, would help to steer the project towards its goals. The stakeholders warmly welcomed this initiative.

E.7.64. The project was approved in December 1995 at a cost of £1,300,000.00 and it is still ongoing.

E.7.65. The overall goal of the project is:

“To improve the effectiveness of police services to communities in the Free State.”

E.7.66. The purpose of the project is:

“To promote constructive community/police liaison to advance community safety.”

E.7.67. The goal and purpose of this project comply with the wider aim of BDDSA to support the GNU in bringing about the transformation of the SAPS into a more accountable and acceptable police service.

E.7.68. The project consists of four complementary elements.

- A programme, implemented by IDASA, to assist with the establishment of CPF throughout the Free State.

- An in-service training programme on the implementation of community policing for members of SAPS.

- A programme of regional visits for senior provincial officials, police officer and community representatives to gain comparative experience in community policing and community - police relationships.

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13 Ibid.
• The provision of a TCO community policing adviser and professional consultancy support.

E.7.69. In the special conditions attached to the project, in addition to the normal management arrangements, an interesting condition was imposed upon IDASA. This required IDASA to establish a Recruitment Committee, with the TCO as a full member, to make all appointments to the project team in respect of the programme to facilitate the establishment of CPF. All subsequent appointments were to be ratified by the Project Management Board. This condition resulted from lessons learned in other projects and was introduced to help ensure that all project workers were acceptable to all stakeholders.

E.7.70. In previous policing projects in South Africa, the UK TCO had been appointed through the OPA at DFID in London. Such appointments had always been at short notice and, other than the appointment of the UK element of the Field Training Team for the BLT project\(^\text{14}\), had not been subjected to open recruitment procedures. Although nominated TCOs had discharged their terms of reference, the enforced nomination of personnel had narrowed the field and not allowed a wide cross section of well-qualified people to compete for positions in South Africa. In this project, the TCO position was widely advertised in the United Kingdom and this attracted an impressive range of applicants. Competitive selection techniques were employed and there was positive stakeholder involvement in the selection process, as the selection team included the OPA, BDDS programmes manager and the MEC for Safety and Security for the Province of the Free State.

E.7.71. The project is still ongoing and progress has been made.

E.7.72. There was a requirement for 106 police stations throughout the Free State to establish effective CPF and, at the time of this evaluation, 98 have been successfully introduced. Additionally the statutorily required Provincial and Area Boards have been established.

E.7.73. A system of certification has been introduced to ensure that CPF meet a set of standards in respect of:

• the development of partnerships between local government, the local business community, police and the community at large,

• strategy,

• managerial and administrative capability.

\(^{14}\) See 4a above.
E.7.74. Each CPF has to prepare a detailed business plan and this is submitted to the MEC for Safety and Security, who may issue the CPF with a certificate of confidence. This initiative was introduced, with the assistance of the TCO, to ensure conformity to good practice and agreed operational standards.

E.7.75. The SAPS has successfully managed the amalgamation process in the Free State and it did not prove to be too painful a process. Prior to the project, the Provincial Police Commissioner and MEC had been providing support to QwaQwa Police and the Bophutatswana Police so as to make the amalgamation process easier. This is in contrast to other areas of the RSA, where police force amalgamations have not been without problems. In relation to the amalgamation process, project resources were directed towards the introduction of community policing in the amalgamated areas, which are mainly of a rural nature and relatively undeveloped.

E.7.76. In order to improve the public’s perception of their abilities and efficiency, the SAPS are working towards improving the quality of operational service delivery. The TCO has been closely involved in helping to facilitate these developments. The project provisions for study tours have been utilised to introduce key community members to community policing principles and a range of United Kingdom initiatives to improve the quality of police service delivery.

E.7.77. The subject of police accountability has also been the subject of study visits to the United Kingdom. In particular, the TCO has been keen to emphasise the paramount need for civilian oversight of policing and visits have been made to the Home Office, police authorities and the United Kingdom equivalent of a CPF.

E.7.78. IDASA has proved to be a supportive and competent partner in this project, providing a reliable interface with the community representatives, and has professionally facilitated the workshop educational process.

E.7.79. The original members of the Provincial Government involved in commissioning this project have now moved on: the Free State premier, Mr Patrick Lakota, was voted out of office and the MEC for Safety and Security, Mr Papi Knagare, has been given a new portfolio in a recent cabinet reshuffle. The incoming MEC for Safety and Security has indicated that the services of a TCO adviser will no longer be required, even though BDDSA were prepared to extend this facility. However, negotiations are under way to extend the project in respect of the continued development of CPF structures through IDASA. The continued progress in respect of policing in the Free State following these changes will be a test of the resilience of the project and its outputs.

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15 See 4e regarding Assistance to Community Policing in the Province of the Eastern Cape
E.7.80. Perhaps a more real threat to the sustainability of progress is the debate about the general future of policing strategy in the RSA. There is presently a police bill being prepared to amend the South Africa Police Services Act 1995 and many believe that policing needs to move away from the softer image represented by community policing to a more law enforcement culture. This is discussed in more detail in the conclusion to this Annex.

E.7.81. The project will, in accordance with the provisions of the project memorandum, be evaluated upon its completion and the sustainability of the project outputs can then be assessed as the results of the debate surrounding the preparation of new police statute will then be known.

Support to Community Policing in the Province of the Western Cape

E.7.82. The Province of the Western Cape is contained within the boundaries of the former RSA Western Province and has a population of 3,812,000. It is the only Province to have elected a Nationalist Party government.

E.7.83. The Western Cape was the first part of South Africa to be settled by Europeans and many of its towns have European origins dating from the mid seventeenth century. It has a prosperous viniculture and agricultural economy together with engineering, banking, insurance and a healthy tourist industry. Despite the apparent wealth of the regional economy, the Western Cape has many social problems. These are associated with the legacy of the segregationist policies of apartheid and are mainly confined to the townships occupied by black Africans and the extremely large coloured populations, who mainly form the poor of the Western Cape. The formal and informal townships of Cape Town were heavily engaged in the struggle against Apartheid.

E.7.84. Policing in the Western Cape was the exclusive province of the SAP, who were as distrusted and discredited as elsewhere in the RSA. Following the elections, it was realised that the police had to be transformed into a community based police organisation that would command the trust and confidence of all members of society. In consequence, the MEC for Safety and Security approached BDDS for assistance in the development of policing. In conjunction with local stakeholders, the BDDS Programmes Manager and resident TCO for community policing designed a project. The TCO for community policing, who had been involved in community policing issues in the RSA since 1993, was offered the post of Adviser to the MEC for Safety and Security. As this offer was accepted the position was not put to open competition.

E.7.85. The project was approved in December 1995 at a total cost of £1,350,000 and it was officially completed on March 31st 1998.
The overall goal of the project was:

To improve the effectiveness of policing services to communities in the Western Cape.

The purpose of the project was:

To promote constructive community/police liaison to advance community safety.

E.7.86. The goal and purpose of the project were seen to be in line with ODA’s wider programme objectives of “assisting the transformation of the SAPS into a more accountable service which will operate competently and efficiently within the values of a democratic society, and be acceptable to the majority of the population”.

E.7.87. The project consisted of four complementary elements.

- The establishment of Community Police Fora throughout the Western Cape Province.

- An in-service training programme on community policing awareness and implementation of community policing for members of the SAPS.

- A programme of visits to the UK (and the region) for senior provincial officials and police officers to gain comparative experience in community policing and police/community relations.

- The provision of a TCO Community Policing Advisor and additional professional consultancy support.

E.7.88. The project was developed by the Western Cape Joint Forum on Policing in consultation with the Provincial Ministry for Safety and Security and the SAPS. The Joint Forum represented 24 NGOs that were active in facilitating community policing and monitoring police activity in the Province and which were seen to be at the forefront of adapting the concept of community policing to local needs. IDASA (Institute for Democracy in South Africa) was formally requested by the Joint Forum to take the lead in implementing the programme to establish community police fora throughout the province and the programme was modelled on three previous projects conducted by IDASA in Mpumalanga, Gauteng and North West provinces.

E.7.89. The Project Memorandum noted that the breakdown in police-community relations had meant that communities were not prepared to cooperate with the police and that this in turn had hampered criminal investigation and adversely affected the fight against crime. The economic justification for the project was that it would reduce time and resources spent in law and order policing and make it
possible to redirect resources to providing a safer environment for citizens. The social and institutional appraisal, apart from noting the clear support of the Provincial Government and Commissioner for Police, stressed the extent to which women were expected to play a major role in the establishment and running of CPFs as well as the intention of the project to give special attention to crimes against women.

Achievements

E.7.90. Most of the immediate project objectives have largely been met, apart from police training. A history and evaluation of the project has been commissioned from the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE). This was not available at the time of writing this Annex. The comments below are based on project documentation held by DFIDSA and interviews.

E.7.91. By May 1998, 159 out of 162 police stations in the province had properly registered CPFs and four Area Police Boards and a Provincial Police Board had been established and functioning since 1996. In the process, the project had to develop assessment criteria for the formal registration of CPFs, given the vagueness of the relevant section (19) of the South African Police Service Act 1995 on this. These criteria included the adoption of a written constitution and mission statement, elections for executive posts, regular meetings, representation of and accessibility to the community, the existence of a community visitors scheme and the development of an effective partnership with the police.

E.7.92. Reports by IDASA indicate many of the CPFs were bedevilled by problems reflecting wider tensions and conflicts in the community. These included: issues of race (over-representation of whites on some CPFs and suspicion that they were working with SAPS to derail the transformation process), conflicts between ANC and the NP supporters and/or domination of meetings by political parties, marginalisation of farm workers by dominant white farmers in rural areas, struggles between different civic associations and NGOs for local dominance. There were also problems about ensuring a proper gender balance. The IDASA quarterly report for July-October 1997 notes that only 23% of representatives at CPF meetings were women as well as the point that, despite being the majority of project staff, women occupied junior positions.

E.7.93. A draft IDASA research report (15/1/97) indicated problems of exclusion, measured in terms of low rates of attendance at CPF meetings, of the poor (eg informal settlement representatives, informal street traders, street people, farmworkers) and of groups such as gays and lesbians. It also noted that community members on CPFs felt the police were dominating meetings and that CPFs were spending the majority of their time and energy on police-community relationships rather than actively developing community safety initiatives.
E.7.94. Despite the success in eventually registering nearly all the CPFs, the associated programme of training workshops fell badly behind. A BDDS A monitoring report (6/11/97) noted that only 50% of the planned workshops had been held. This was due to the time taken to develop project staff skills and the low demand for workshops which reflected the difficulties in building trust between project staff and communities (a problem constantly mentioned in IDASA reports). However, more success was achieved in training community facilitators (92 out of 100) who, the Project Manager noted (memo of 10/11/97), would remain as sustainable, community level resource after project termination.

E.7.95. Concern has also been expressed by the TCO, project members and members of the Provincial Police Board about Neighbourhood Watch (NW) schemes. Some of these involve security companies, others involve armed vigilantes patrolling streets and have not been cooperating with police. There are also problems of liaison between NW schemes and CPFs. Underlying this there appears to be a wider political struggle as NW is supported by radical ANC members. The US government is funding training for NW members to be provided by UCT, Institute of Criminology. The Provincial Police Board has voiced concern that, unless NWs can be structured and pulled into the CPFs, there is a danger of the breakdown of the established system of community policing. The NWs are part of the recently established Anti-Crime Forum (which is reportedly dominated by radical ANC activists) and there is evidence of the hostility of members of the Forum and its newly established Gang Commission towards coordination with SAPS and the CPFs.

E.7.96. Some 90% of the police attended workshops mounted by the project and aimed at attitude and behaviour change in tune with the principles of community policing. However, comments from some of those involved in the project indicate strong feelings that, whilst police have learned to use the ‘right’ language about community policing and participation, they are still resistant to change. There were views that, especially in rural areas, the police still try to control CPFs.

E.7.97. More problematic was the failure of the SAPS in-service training programme, which was not funded by the project budget, to get off the ground. This was to have been provided for some 600 key police officers in the province. The BDDS A monitoring report of 6/11/97 notes the failure was due to “National SAP intransigence and inflexibility”. According to the TCO, funds were available from the provincial Secretariat but SAPS procedures meant that it would have had to go into general funds rather than being ear-marked for community policing training. There was also the problem of the continued absence of a national training curriculum on community policing.

“This lack of formal training has been a constant irritation and despite numerous local initiatives has proved to be a major hurdle preventing the successful introduction of community policing. Our communities often have
a better understanding of Community policing than the Police themselves.”
(Paper presented to W. Cape Provincial Summit 20/10/97)

“In addition to under-resourcing, lack of internal police training means that
most members of the SAPS are unaware of the community policing ethos”.
(Memo to DFIDSA by Project Manager 10/11/97)

Conclusions

E.7.98. Overall, it is difficult to assess whether the goal and purpose of the project
had been achieved. Certainly it has been successful in terms of the logframe
outputs as regards the establishment and registration of CPFs in nearly all police
stations. Area and Provincial Boards have also been established and training
workshops have been held. It is too early to tell about the sustainability of these
structures and some of them may, indeed, be changed as a result of national level
policy on the SAPS and community policing contained in the White Paper. It is less
clear whether full community participation in CPFs and Boards (OVI for measuring
increased community knowledge about policing and increased community
confidence in dealing with police) has been achieved. The IDASA reports cited
above indicate problems of exclusion on the basis of race, gender, economic status.

E.7.99. At a more general level, in terms of the purpose of promoting more
constructive community-police liaison to enhance community safety, there is not yet
sufficient evidence to conclude whether there is an increased accord between police
and community over priorities, although it is clear that, via the CPFs, regular
consultation has been taking place. Whether this has lead to improved service
delivery is uncertain and the failure to implement the planned service level
agreements at each station is a cause for concern.

E.7.100. The log frame identified very general OVI for the goal of improving the
effectiveness of police services: enhancement of community confidence,
reorientation of the police towards community policing and higher crime clear-up
rates and reporting levels. At present there does not seem to be sufficient time-
series data to make a judgement on these. Oral evidence from project staff throw
some doubt about the extent of police reorientation and the failure of the SAPS to
deliver on in-service training cannot have helped.

E.7.101. The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Capetown victim survey may help
here, but was not available at the time of writing. An overview of the findings16
indicates that vast majority of Africans and coloureds believe that they live in the
most unsafe area of the city. Most respondents (77%) said crime had increased.
However, based on victim surveys it appears that property crimes decreased

1616 NEDCOR ISS Crime Index Vol 2, no.2, 1998
marginally 1996-97 whilst there was an increase in assaults and robbery and no
decrease in murder.

E.7.102. In terms of the original economic justification for the project, it is not
possible to draw any conclusions about whether it has reduced the time and
resources devoted to law and order policing. The relevant evidence was not
available at the time of writing. The original social and institutional appraisal
stressed, especially, the promotion of the role of women in establishing and running
CPF's and of dealing more effectively with crime against women. The available
evidence seems to indicate some degree of exclusion and/or marginalisation of
women from the CPF's and there was no firm evidence on dealing with crime against
women.

E.7.103. Finally, in addition to the evidence of exclusion of the poor from CPF's,
there is, as yet, little sign of either a reduction in crimes that affect poor, or
enhanced feelings of safety or confidence in police. The ISS Capetown victim study
reportedly contains evidence of a majority feeling that crime had increased. It also
indicates that Africans and coloureds feel that they live in the most unsafe areas of
city. There is also some evidence from interviews and from IDASA reports that the
police are still perceived by the African and coloured communities as racially
biased and as closer to the rich and employers.

Support to Effective Policing in the Province of the Eastern Cape

E.7.104. The Province of the Eastern Cape, which has a population in the region of
6,500,000, incorporates the former RSA Eastern Province with the former
autonomous homelands of Ciskei and Transkei. It is the second largest Province of
South Africa but also is the second poorest area. Its economy is dominated by a
high concentration of manufacturing industry, mining, fishing and productive
agriculture. The Province ranges from some of the most prosperous residential
areas surrounding the principal cities of Port Elizabeth and East London to some of
the poorest rural areas in the RSA. Additionally, the township areas adjacent to
Port Elizabeth, East London and Uitenhage are as poor as any found elsewhere in
the RSA.

E.7.105. The Province was a centre for the struggle against Apartheid and, in
consequence, there is a great deal of mistrust of authority, in particular of the
police. The policing of the Eastern Cape had been the responsibility of the SAP
(10,000 officers), the Ciskei Police (3,000 police officers) and the Transkei Police
(5,000 officers). These three police organisations, which each had a separate
identity and culture, were amalgamated into one SAPS provincial command on 1 September 1995.

E.7.106. This project came about following a request from the representatives of the MEC for Safety and Security and the SAPS Provincial Police Commissioner. It was envisaged that the project would help in the process of amalgamating the three police organisations and, building upon the experience of the Grahamstown Community Safety Project,\textsuperscript{17} would assist in the introduction of effective community consultation arrangements, which would comply with the requirements of the South Africa Police Service Act 1995.

E.7.107. Upon first reading the problems facing the policing authorities in the Eastern Cape look very similar to those faced by their counterparts in the Free State\textsuperscript{18} but closer scrutiny shows that the situations were entirely different. The Eastern Cape did not have a history of community involvement in policing and there was neither community trust nor confidence in the police services. Also the political scene was less stable than that in the Free State.

E.7.108. A project proposal, drawn up by a consortium of NGOs and universities, in collaboration with policing officials, was submitted to BDDSA. This initial proposal, which concentrated on the facilitation of community liaison structures, was thought to be too narrowly based and would not contribute to an improvement in the effective policing of the Eastern Cape. The BDDSA Programmes Manager and Consultant on Policing then undertook further research, in conjunction with the stakeholders.

E.7.109. Research indicated that, in the Ciskei and Transkei, morale was almost non-existent and the policing infrastructure was in a poor state. The police stations and police officers’ residential accommodation were in unsanitary condition, facilities for holding prisoners were poor, bordering on the inhumane, mortuary facilities were, in many cases, a health hazard and the command and control of police operations was poor. In addition most police vehicles allocated to the former Ciskei and Transkei Police Forces were either off the road beyond repair, off the road awaiting repair or had disappeared (it was believed that they had been misappropriated by police personnel).

E.7.110. At this time, with the agreement of the representatives of the MEC for Safety and Security and the SAPS Provincial Commissioner, it was decided that further research was needed before BDDSA could agree to an aid project. It was also realised that, for the statutory requirement for community policing to be met, the policing infrastructure had to be brought up to an acceptable standard and that this would also require help from international donors. It was agreed that a design

\textsuperscript{17} See ante: paragraph 4b “Support to Community Policing in the Eastern Cape: the Grahamstown community Safety Project.”

\textsuperscript{18} See ante: paragraph 4d “Support to Community Policing in the Province of the Free State.”
mission, financed by BDDSA, should be mounted to assess the situation more accurately.

E.7.111. This mission, which was led by a former chief constable from the United Kingdom, included, in addition to policing expertise, specialists in social development, institutional development, vehicle fleet management and building design. As it had been recognised at an early stage by the BDDSA Programmes Manager that the potential scope of any project would require considerable donor support, a development counsellor from the European Union (EU) was included within the team. The MEC for Safety and Security, the SAPS Provincial Commissioner and the National Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) were also fully represented.

E.7.112. The team consulted a comprehensive range of stakeholders and visited widely throughout the Eastern Cape. At the end of their mission they submitted to both the EU and BDDSA a comprehensive report\(^\text{19}\) which recommended that assistance be given to aid the development of policing. After consideration it was decided that the EU would fund and resource aid to develop\(^\text{20}\):

- the policing infrastructure,
- the efficient management and maintenance of the vehicle fleet in the Ciskei and Transkei (including the provision of a new vehicle workshop at Umtata in the Transkei, three further auxiliary workshops in rural areas and five mobile workshops),
- a human resource capacity.

E.7.113. BDDSA agreed to design and fund a project to bring about improvements in the quality of policing services.

E.7.114. The total cost of the complementary BDDSA/EU inputs is projected to be £9,725,000.00.

E.7.115. The BDDSA project was approved by DFID in August 1996 and was planned to operate for three years at a projected cost of up to £2,400,000.

The overall goal of the project was:


\(^{20}\) The EC element had only just commenced at the time of the visit to the RSA by the CDS evaluators in April 1998.
“To contribute to the creation of a safe and secure environment in the Province of the Eastern Cape.”

The purpose was:

“To improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of policing services in Eastern Cape to a democratic society.”

E.7.116. The goal and purpose of this project support the wider aim of BDDSA to assist the GNU in bringing about the transformation of the SAPS into a more accountable and acceptable police service.

E.7.117. The project comprises of three principle elements:

- strengthening the capacity of the Provincial Ministry for Safety and Security to exercise, effectively, its civilian oversight of the SAPS,
- improving the community police liaison by assisting the establishment of CPF and programmes to re-orientate policing styles,
- improving the quality, distribution and management of personnel and physical resources required to meet agreed policing standards of service delivery.

E.7.118. The project was to be managed by a steering committee chaired by the Minister for Safety and Security. The steering committee was to include the SAPS Provincial Commissioner, representatives of the CPF structures, representatives of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), who had been actively engaged in providing ‘police’ patrols in some townships and African areas of settlement, representatives of the Council of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRELSA), who still enjoy considerable influence in the rural areas and the project service providers.

E.7.119. A full time Project Co-ordinator was appointed together with a United Kingdom police officer as a TCO adviser to the Minister for Safety and Security. The appointed Project Co-ordinator had been the leader of the consortium of NGOs and universities, which, together with the MEC and SAPS, had made the first approach to BDDSA and had, at that time, been the principal adviser to the MEC on policing. The appointee had been the supervising professor of the Institute for the Resolution of Conflict at the University of Port Elizabeth but who had unproven project management skills.

22 Ibid.
23 BDDSA monitoring visit report submitted by Asha Newsome, Senior Government and Institutions Adviser, 16 October 1997.
E.7.120. The need for professional police advice was a strong recommendation of the design mission who said:\textsuperscript{24}

“A police adviser (preferably of ACPO rank) is necessary to support the implementation of the project over a period of three years. To advise and assist on all policing matters.”

The TCO police adviser was seen as a key position. The design mission envisaged, correctly, that the post holder would have to be comfortable not only with the community policing issues but also in operating at the political level. It was this reasoning which caused them to seek a senior officer, preferably one having experience of working as a chief officer of police.

E.7.121. In the event, DFID appointed a United Kingdom police chief inspector possessing wide experience of training issues and community policing both in the United Kingdom and Uganda. The appointee had been a member of the European Union Police Monitoring Team at the time of the elections in South Africa and, having been raised and educated in Southern Africa, possessed knowledge of the region together with a sound grasp of the Afrikaans language. The appointee was identified at the open competition for the Free State post and was the second preferred candidate for that position. However, no member of the Eastern Cape government or SAPS was represented at that selection competition. The appointee was, after nomination, visited in the work place in the United Kingdom by a delegation from the Eastern Cape and they approved the appointment.

E.7.122. It was decided that, in accordance with the practice adopted in the Free State and Western Cape, the TCO would be an adviser to the minister rather than being based with SAPS.

E.7.123. The project has now been effectively underway since April 1997 and the monitoring reports of both the Project Co-ordinator and BDDSA monitoring missions show that progress has not been as smooth as anticipated by the project designers. Difficulties have been encountered because of the resignation of the Provincial Police Commissioner and the long delay in appointing a permanent successor. In addition the MEC for Safety and Security, who supported the request to BDDSA for aid, has moved on and, at the time of writing, the new minister was still in the process of getting to grips with his portfolio.

E.7.124. In addition, there are internal communication and logistical difficulties due to the locations of the government and the police command. The government resides in Bisho, the capital of the former Ciskei, whilst SAPS has remained in its

headquarters at Port Elizabeth, which is more than 200 miles away. This particularly affects the TCO who spends a great deal of time travelling between the two locations for meetings. This situation is exacerbated by the TCO’s provided residence being in East London, which is equidistant from Bisho and Port Elizabeth.

E.7.125. These difficulties have slowed progress and, at the time of writing, it was hard to identify developments directly attributable to the project in terms of the logframe outputs.

E.7.126. Nevertheless, progress has been made:

- a full audit of all police stations has been completed,
- work has commenced on creating CPF in areas where they were not already in place and to consolidate those that were already constituted (35 have been certified as being effective, 112 are in the process of development and work is in train to institute CPF at the remaining 59 police station areas),
- the TCO has presented seminars and instituted workshop activities to help the development of the Ministry for Safety and Security and the management of SAPS,
- plans are advanced to appoint a service provider for the CPF development process,
- the EU building and fleet management team has commenced their inputs to the project.

E.7.127. The slow progress, compounded by political considerations and management issues within the SAPS, has been noted by BDDSA. The OPA and BDDSA Programmes manager are working with the Ministry for Safety and Security, the recently appointed SAPS Provincial Police Commissioner and the project management team to help bring the project back onto course.

E.7.128. This project was the most carefully prepared and designed of all the BDDSA policing projects in the RSA and with more easily measurable outputs than previous projects. The risk analysis undertaken at the design stage identified as a risk the failure of key staff at the Ministry for Safety and Security and SAPS to be retained in post. At that time, it was felt that the risk to project viability was low, but events have proved that assessment to be wrong. However, the effect of the risk was accurately assessed as likely to lead to delay in project achievement.
E.7.129. In addition to these issues, it is worth noting some recent research evidence\textsuperscript{25} which indicated that feelings of insecurity in the province were higher than in any other province and growing, although there was no evidence of higher crime. These feelings were linked to perceptions about police ineffectiveness. The report also noted that in poor rural areas, like much of the Eastern Cape, with poor physical and administrative infrastructure, the burden on the police is enormous, and concluded that effective and democratic policing can only occur within the context of wider developmental initiatives by government.

CONCLUSIONS

E.7.130. The main strategic thrust of United Kingdom aid to policing in the RSA has been aimed at assisting the transformation of the SAPS into more respected and trusted police service which would be acceptable to the vast majority of South Africans and would respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons. In particular assistance was given towards developing the concept of community policing.

E.7.131. Community policing was defined by the SAPS in 1995 as:

“a philosophy or approach which guides the methodology of policing. It is based on the assumption that the objective of policing, namely the provision and maintenance of safety and security for all individuals and communities, can only be achieved through the collaborative effort of the Police, other government institutions, non-governmental organisations, community structures and individual citizens. A major objective of Community policing is, therefore, to establish an active partnership between the police and public through which crime and other safety related problems can jointly be determined and appropriate solutions designed and implemented. This, however, requires that the Police should consciously strive to create an atmosphere in which potential community partners are willing and able to engage in joint problem solving.”\textsuperscript{26}

E.7.132. In general, this was a definition with which the Development Division and OPAs concurred and it was on this basis that the various community policing projects were designed, with an emphasis on facilitating the creation of institutions and processes that would incorporate and develop the idea of partnership. Assistance to the police in changing attitudes and practice was also built in to all the projects, together with an increasing recognition of the need to improve police effectiveness.

\textsuperscript{25} Louw, A. and Shaw, M. (1997) ‘Stolen Opportunities; the impact of crime on South Africa’s poor’, ISS Monograph Series No, 14, July
\textsuperscript{26} South African Police Service, Change Management Team document on Community Policing, 1995, p.6
E.7.133. However, since the 1994 elections, the incidence of crime, which had grown alarmingly in the 1990-1994 period, has continued to increase. This has been the case for the rates of both property crime and violence against the person. This has been accompanied by a shift in public perceptions about the issue of law and order. One survey\(^{27}\) noted that since 1995 the number of respondents identifying law and order as a significant national issue had doubled. The same survey showed steadily decreasing feelings of safety since 1994 and diminishing public confidence in the police together with an increased support for vigilante activity. As public confidence in the police has fallen so has the rate of crimes reported to crimes committed, making the job of the police ever more difficult.

E.7.134. The debate on policing in South Africa has, thus, moved on to considering ways of achieving better crime prevention and making the police more effective in combating crime. A White Paper on policing, In Service of Safety, 1998 – 2003, has been drafted and was about to be published at the time of the consultants’ visit. In parallel, DFIDSA is in the process of reviewing its strategy on the criminal justice system as a whole and the place of policing within this.

E.7.135. Within this debate, the role of community policing in combating crime and contributing to safety and security has been the subject of much discussion. There appear to be strong views, within both the SAPS and the government, that community policing concentrated too much on the establishment of community police fora (CPF) and gaining legitimacy for the SAPS rather than in improving the outcomes of policing in terms of better detection and crime reduction. There are also concerns that, in many areas, the CPF have seen their role as one of control and direction of the police rather than providing oversight and being the community link in the chain of police accountability. In addition, as has been noted in this report, there has not always been a clear understanding, both within the SAPS and community associations, that community policing is about more than developing the appropriate CPF structures.

E.7.136. This report provides much evidence on the success of the DFID funded community policing projects in achieving their basic aims of developing local partnerships of stakeholders, establishing functioning CPF and providing training for community members and the SAPS in the philosophy and practice of community policing. Project documentation and interviews also provide evidence of the way in which these projects, at local level, helped to increase the level of trust and understanding between members of the community and the police in the period of transition.

E.7.137. On the other hand, there is evidence that the impact of the projects on the attitudes and practice of the police has been less than was anticipated. There is also convincing evidence on exclusion or marginalisation in the CPF on the basis of gender, race or poverty. This problem of the representativeness of the CPF has

\(^{27}\) NEDCOR ISS, Crime Index, Vol.2, No.1, 1998
been compounded by the way in which they have, frequently, been the site of struggles between political parties or civic associations for local dominance.

E.7.138. At a wider level, research in South Africa\(^{28}\) raises the question of whether community policing can work effectively in communities that are divided and have little commonality in needs and aspirations. Indeed there is evidence that, whilst the richer white areas are still supporting local community driven solutions to crime, Africans in poorer areas are increasingly preferring national government intervention and more effective policing.

E.7.139. These issues have implications for the way in which DFID approaches the design and management of community policing projects. Essentially, they raise the questions of whether community policing should be seen as separate from more general support to increase the effectiveness of policing and the extent to which poor and divided communities have the capacity to sustain interest, participation and long-term commitment. However, it should be noted that, whilst it is difficult to reach a judgement on the sustainability of the individual projects, as a whole they have provided an important learning experience for a whole range of institutions in South Africa and for DFID.

E.7.140. The draft White Paper acknowledges the importance, in the period immediately following the elections, of the CPF structures in helping to build trust, legitimacy and understanding of the police, particularly in areas where police-community relations were characterised by conflict and mistrust. Particular mention is made of the value of the CPF in bringing about innovative and productive partnerships between the police and local associations to create a safer and more secure community environment through the prevention and combating of crime. The draft White Paper proposals are to supplement and strengthen the CPF and enhance the partnership approach to policing by introducing the newly created local government structures into the equation of community policing and police accountability to local communities.

E.7.141. Universally elected local government structures are a relatively new innovation to many parts of the RSA and many are still coming to terms with their brief. It is proposed that the role of the CPF should include:

- co-operation with local government in the development of crime prevention schemes,
- helping in the identification of flash-points, crime patterns and community priorities and communicating these to local government and the SAPS,

• participating in local problem solving,
• mobilising and organising community based crime prevention campaigns,
• providing oversight of police activity on behalf of the community.

E.7.142. The draft White Paper recognises that the membership of the CPF will have to include mandatory seats for elected local government representatives. It recognises the role local government will have in directing and monitoring the activities of CPF in their area and in resolving disputes within CPF.

E.7.143. Although the CPF structures will be changed if the draft White Paper proposals become law, this will be unlikely to undermine the substantial work done by DFIDSA to support the development of CPF and to encourage both community involvement in policing issues and the SAPS to engage in meaningful consultation with the communities they serve. The proposed changes can be seen as a positive, evolutionary development of the systems and structures supported.

E.7.144. In respect of the BLT project, it is hard to come to a decision about sustainability because there has not been any further recruit training since the first intake supported by BDDSA and other donors.

E.7.145. However, it seems that the principles developed during the BLT project will be continued into future SAPS training curricula. In particular, the work done to show that police should be seen as servants of the people rather than their oppressors is now seen as central to police training. Ultimately, the retention of the fundamental principles is more important than the continuation of the classroom teaching techniques designed during the BLT project.

E.7.146. In relation to the Field Training component of the BLT project, there is some evidence to show that the initiative was not continued after the recruits were assimilated into normal policing. This underlines the point that the long-term impact of basic training is dependent on follow-up support by comprehensive in-service continuation training and education.

E.7.147. The overall impression is that the projects provided timely support and assistance at a time when the GNU and SAPS did not have the expertise and resources. The aid given was targeted to areas of priority activity identified by the government and police, who, together with a large range of other local stakeholders, were actively engaged in the design and implementation of all of the projects.

E.7.148. It is encouraging to note the progressive development of project design: lessons learned were incorporated into the design and implementation of new projects. The recent moves, by the GNU and the SAPS, away from a focus on
community policing does not reflect adversely on the projects. It indicates the great difficulties in getting the balance of policing right in a society undergoing transition and faced with serious crime problems.
ANNEX E.8

AID TO THE POLICE IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

Introduction

E.8.1. The Commonwealth Caribbean has long been a major recipient of UK aid to policing, far in excess of its population size, as shown in Table E.8.1. Though this aid has tended to decline over the last seven years, whereas that to other countries has increased substantially, (see Annex C), very recent commitments to Caribbean countries have again increased significantly.

Table E.8.1 Expenditure and Commitments for Policing Projects in the Commonwealth Caribbean (£’000), 1991/92 – 1997/98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Expenditure per year</th>
<th>7y Totals</th>
<th>Future Commitments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91/2 92/3 93/4 94/5 95/6 96/7 97/8</td>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>Commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td>217  98  80  2  2  48  26</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>0  383  75  77  20  0  0</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Virgin I</td>
<td>110  237  274  47  60  153  157</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>162  84  53  10  0  0  0</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>268  173  186  276  274  199  297</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>6,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>83  281  455  94  81  105  77</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>1,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts-Nevis</td>
<td>136  15  13  0  248  346  265</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>69  0  0  0  0  0  0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent /Gr.</td>
<td>0  284  451  45  22  0  0</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks &amp; Caicos</td>
<td>140  5  156  11  0  16  6</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>2,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Caribbean</td>
<td>3  30  53  34  83  48  0</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caribbean</td>
<td>1,188 1,590 1,796 596 790 915 828</td>
<td>7,703</td>
<td>15,667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Data were provided by DFID Statistics Department. Some expenditure figures are a little smaller than those shown in Annex C, Table C.4, as some smaller projects are excluded above. Future commitments are derived from total commitments less total expenditure and are approximate. Expenditure in this period includes some pre-1991/92 commitments.

E.8.2. A high proportion of Caribbean aid is associated either with the fact that there are still a number of small dependencies in the region, for which the UK often provides senior officers or infrastructure, or with the fact that drug traffic from central America to the USA and Europe passes through it. These factors account for much of the support shown in Table E.8.1. Indeed, total UK expenditure on illicit drugs control in the region greatly outweighs general expenditure on policing. In 1997/98, for example, total expenditure on illicit drugs control was £4.3 m, (£3.8 m by the FCO and Home Office). In the same year, DFID alone agreed future commitments of £5.2 m for illicit drugs control in the region. This Annex, however, focuses only on the broader police support projects in Jamaica and St. Kitts-Nevis, which are discussed below.
JAMAICA

E.8.3. Jamaica has been the main Caribbean recipient of UK policing aid since the 1960s, following Independence in 1962. This aid has consisted very largely of placement of senior UK police officers as TCOs. Earlier TCOs were concerned very largely with training but by 1997 there were two resident advisers, a strategic adviser and a crime adviser. In this year the Caribbean Development Division commissioned a strategic review of policing needs in Jamaica, and substantially increased funding was committed, as shown in Table E.8.1, in anticipation of the findings of this Review. The Review is one of the main documents on which this Annex is based.

E.8.4. The Review is forward-looking rather than an evaluation of former projects – indeed past UK aid had consisted of a series of ad hoc inputs rather than planned projects with specific objectives. It is examined here, therefore, not as a project evaluation, but because it is a good example of useful, analytical methods for appraisal and strategic planning of police forces. In additional it is of particular interest because it was commissioned before the transition from ODA to DFID, but carried out after that. In addition to the agreed TOR, therefore, the authors attempted to add a specific poverty focus.

E.8.5. Perhaps the most significant features of the Review are that it tried to ensure that the JCF “owned” the main products, a new, five year Corporate Strategy which has now been published by the JCF and a series of implementation plans, intended to ensure that the strategic Review really led to significant action. Though the authors say that fully participatory planning would have taken longer and been more extensive in coverage of stakeholders, there was considerable consultation in the time available, especially within the JCF, police counterparts for review team members were identified and, most importantly, implementation plans were produced almost entirely by JCF officers. They were thus trying to avoid a major, recurring problem of policing projects, including many we have examined and past reviews in Jamaica, that they are seen as externally imposed and their methods are often inappropriate for local conditions.

E.8.6. Another feature of the Review which makes it of particular interest to us is that it is based on relatively detailed analysis of the police organisation itself and of the social and economic context in which it operates. As compared with the evaluations and analyses in other countries it was able to take into account relatively large amounts of available statistics and other research information; further, the multi-disciplinary consultancy team were able to carry out enquiries over 30 man-weeks, more than twice that of other cases. The Review

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2 Jamaica Constabulary force 1998 Corporate Strategy: taking the Jamaica Constabulary Force into the new millennium Kingston, Jamaica
is, therefore, the most thorough examination of a police force available to us. It contains especially full sections on finances, indicators, ethics and accountability and human rights. We have made use of their detailed suggestions in this report, both in the body and in the Annex on information systems.

E.8.7. The Jamaican case is relatively unusual in that it is a society which was relatively prosperous at Independence in the early 1960s, with a correspondingly developed police force and a continuous record of democratically elected government. However, the country has also suffered from severe economic decline since the late 1960s. It was badly affected by the international rise in oil prices in the early 70s, then by failure of a major foreign exchange-earning industry, bauxite mining. “There is a widening gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. Although car ownership is increasing at one extreme, 32% (in 1996) of the population were deemed to be living in poverty”. (Review, p iii). Consequently the police, in common with other major consumers of recurrent public expenditure, have faced substantial declines in funding, infrastructure and human resources.

E.8.8. Over the same period the country has faced major increases in crime. These are fully documented in the Review and, in stating planning priorities, the Corporate Strategy identified control of the high rate of murder, associated gang warfare and drug trafficking, economic crime (especially money laundering), as well as divisional patrolling and reducing serious road accidents. The Review noted that public confidence in the police had deteriorated steadily over the period. Faced with major increases in serious crime over the last 25 years, seen as especially as damaging the economy through threatening the important tourist industry, JCF use of a wide battery of arms has been an increasingly prominent feature; the Review notes that there were around 100 fatal shootings by police in each of the last three years. In this “macho” context, “the Review Team saw many examples of officers in plain clothes carrying weapons in plain sight inside their trouser waist bands, ie without using holsters”, (p 49).

E.8.9. The wider interest of this situation is that the review team and JCF are seeking to strengthen such characteristics as community policing, increased accountability, public support and respect for human rights, in a context of major crime problems and financial constraints, a combination of circumstances which is only just becoming recognised in other countries with policing projects. They have to reconcile the potential contradictions of placing major constraints on use of force, while facing circumstances seen to require greater force.

Efficiency and effectiveness

E.8.10. The review team spent a lot of its time in seeking ways of improving JCF efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with priority concerns. The Review noted that the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) was “overwhelmed”, (p 16), especially in the high crime areas of Kingston, and that clear up rates and conviction rates were very low. Further work in specialised training was urgent, together with improved recruitment to the CIB; an increase in the narcotics squad was needed, intelligence was poorly co-ordinated and analysed; many
management problems long identified still needed attention; recruitment practices, career development and promotion were strongly criticised, together with aspects of training, including excessive militarisation; a “serious breakdown of supervision at middle management level” (p iv) was identified; financial management was seen as especially defective; (7 ½ pp of the Review (37-44) focused on this; buildings, especially police stations and cells for prisoners, were seen as a “disgrace”.

E.8.11. In the context of projects covered in this report, their proposals were unusually detailed, including some innovative ideas not raised elsewhere. In particular, distribution and numbers of personnel were closely examined. (p 33) They noted that a very high proportion of personnel were in management, non-operational or headquarters specialist posts, (40%), and a very small proportion at constable rank. They also suggested a practical formula for calculating numbers of personnel needed in different areas, as opposed to the normal absence of a rationale found in most developing countries, including Jamaica. (p 33. Also see the discussion of this in Annex D).

E.8.12. The discussions in Jamaica of civilisation of police posts and activities, of the future of special constables and of the role of privatised policing are innovative in the context of evaluations of policing in developing countries. It is notable that none of these potentially important subjects is considered in any of the other country cases which we have examined. In Jamaica, it was estimated in 1996 that 368 posts of the establishment of 6,317 policemen could be civilianised, and the Review discussion indicates that this is only a start, (p 34), in that skills urgently needed in some senior management positions could be provided by civilians.

E.8.13. In all the evaluative reports which we have examined, a constant theme is that effective management, monitoring and evaluation are extremely difficult as adequate indicators of performance and impact have not been devised. Sometimes there are no indicators, sometimes they are not verifiable. Though the general point is frequently made, specific illustrations of what is lacking are less frequent. These problems are directly addressed in this Review and, in particular, a range of specific indicators are suggested in the associated project proposals³ and the JCF Corporate Strategy. We have found these, together with the consideration of financial management, very useful for the fuller discussion of information systems in the accompanying Annex D.

Community Policing

E.8.14. Almost all policing projects claim that community policing is a high priority for them, and Jamaica is no exception. Its statement on this is worth quoting at length. Against a background of very low public confidence and support, the JCF Corporate Strategy says:

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“Our experience suggests that policing is most effectively done in association with an active and co-operative citizenry that is prepared to share with us the responsibility for their security and the maintenance of stable social order.

We intend to make a transition from the traditional para-military and reactive style of policing to a more service-orientated and proactive style appropriate to Jamaican conditions. This will better engage communities in finding solutions to the varied local crime-control problems, and in so doing, assist them to improve their quality of life. Such an approach will serve to further improve the relationship between the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the people we serve.

This transition will involve a paradigm shift in our organisational culture and may extend beyond the life of this plan but must be consistently pursued. ....

- This objective will be achieved by innovative adaptation of Community Policing to our environment. We will improve our accessibility and responsiveness to the community.
- We will increase high visibility uniform foot-patrols in the communities and build personalised relationships with the people.
- We will establish organic linkages to communities via joint determination of local policing priorities and the extension and development of structures of direct accountability to the people at community level such as the Citizen Consultative Committees.
- While retaining and improving our capacity to respond to calls for police services, we will place greater focus on crime prevention and problem solving rather than just incident dealing.
- We will work with those providing services in conflict management and help to better equip community institutions and individual citizens with the skills and knowledge to better manage and resolve their conflicts.
- We will build partnerships and inter-agency co-operation in order to better mobilise local goodwill and resources and facilitate more effective problem-solving.
- We will assist in better educating people on how to make themselves less vulnerable to criminal victimization.
- We will work with other agencies to tackle sources of crime and problems of public disorder, especially in the field of poverty alleviation.
- We will elevate the status of Community Police Officers and those engaged in the delivery of service to the public. We will ensure that all persons assigned to the territorially based Divisions are properly trained in Community Policing and are assisted by supervisors and managers to become proficient practitioners of this style of policing.

We will assess our performance:
- By regular monitoring of the level of fear of crime among citizens in the communities.
- By the use of surveys at police stations to measure the levels of satisfaction with the service we provide.
- By an upturn in the reporting of incidents (including crime in the short term) as a result of increased public confidence.
- In the longer term, we will measure the expected decrease in crime, disorder and other incidents”.

E.8.15. Despite this emphasis on community policing in the Strategy, the Review pays relatively little attention to it as a discreet subject. The Executive Summary simply says in the penultimate paragraph:

“The Review Team see the JCF as poised to make a significant transition from a para-military state police into a civilian police, to become the champions of justice and the guardians of the weakest members of society. Its senior officers feel ready to embrace the concept of working in partnership with communities and other agencies to improve the quality of life. To enable them to do so the JCF will be revisiting its role in society, in particular developing community policing”.

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E.8.16. The main body of the Review contains only 1 ¼ pages of specific discussion, (pp 21-2), shorter than the discussion of traffic management and much shorter than the discussion of financial management. This reflects the consultants’ views that community policing as so far developed, separated from convention or mainstream policing, has had little impact, is confused with public relations, consultation Committees “tend to be restricted to business interests and community notables”, CPOs have low status within the force and are unco-ordinated with other sections, and:

“…. It is necessary to re-invent the concept as a style of divisional policing which embraces all officers, including CIB, not, (as it is now seen) as an adjunct to policing, mainly involving CPOs”. (p 22).

E.8.17. They have a number of important suggestions on how to achieve this mainstreaming. The most significant point, perhaps, is that “the patrol constable rank represents the foundation of all operational policing (and) is the mainstay in providing a professional, valued service to Jamaica and its citizens …. The prime role of senior ranks and specialist officers is to support and service the patrol constable”. (p 50).

E.8.18. Elsewhere in the Review it is emphasised that a larger proportion of personnel should be deployed to mainstream policing in territorial divisions (p 33) and that “urgent steps will be taken to slant recruit training towards ‘community service’ rather than a para-military type of operation”. (p 47). This is a practical step towards the Commissioner’s emphasis in his forward to the Corporate Strategy that:

“We shall also address those aspects of our style and culture – referred to in our Mission Statement under the words ‘courtesy, integrity and proper respect for the rights of all’. We acknowledge that we have some changes to make before those fine words become a reality”.

E.8.19. In sum, community policing needs to be mainstreamed rather than discreet. The enormous difficulty of doing this is also acknowledged in the Review, when it is recognised that:

“There is a balance to be struck, which will vary from one division to the next, between resources deployed pursuant to a community policing style and those with a sharper, anti-crime role. At the present time the hazards in some parts of the Corporate Area may require the present multiple patrols (mixed JCF and Jamaica Defence Force) to be maintained, but some community orientated activity will be possible. Elsewhere a reversion to (approachable) foot or cycle patrol is possible and intended as a 1998/9 priority”. (p 28).

E.8.20. It and the JCF also recognised that some obstacles are internal rather than external to the force in acknowledging the need for “a paradigm shift in organisational culture”. The need for and enormous difficulty of achieving this are widely recognised in literature on policing, (eg Chan, 1996). Greater priority tends to be given to values such as controlling crime, preserving respect for the police and colleague solidarity, to force rather than to service or to the values associated with community policing. At a more mundane level the basic problem of finding time to do everything is evident, for example, when the list of tasks associated with community policing in the JCF Strategy is considered.

E.8.21. The highly militarised JCF, as the Review indicates, has major problems to overcome in order to give priority to respect for human rights and, especially, to the rights of suspects and of the poor generally. “Those in society who are without power and influence
– the poor – are most vulnerable to such abuse of power”. (p 47). “They need to radically change their culture, a process begun but with far to go yet”. (p 57).

**Human Rights and Accountability**

E.8.22. The review team devote an unusual amount of attention, in the context of these country case studies, to examining issues of rights and accountability, (pp 10-12 and 46-50 of the *Review*, together with production of four sub-project proposals for potential UK funding. After consulting the Jamaica Human Rights Council and information on public opinion they concluded that the Force’s human rights record and public image had improved somewhat, after an earlier picture of corruption, discourtesy, class bias, high degree of politicisation and excess use of force. Strong leadership by the current Commissioner and his predecessor were seen as largely responsible for change, together with willingness by external bodies to make public criticisms. In addition there had been helpful changes in laws as recommended by previous inquiries, reducing police powers of detention and discouraging political interference in day-to-day policing issues.

E.8.23. However, they recommended confirming depoliticisation further by inserting a citizens’ body between police and politicians, and suggested two consultancy-based projects to further strengthen systems for dealing with complaints against the police. They suggested that “the depth of the investigations … are well short of an acceptable standard”\(^4\) and were especially concerned about inquiries into shootings of the public by the police. We may note that their concern with strengthening external controls over the police is unusual in the context of this report, though it reflects the depth of public concern expressed in the past in Jamaica. Other country reviews we have examined have focused on the police’s own preference, relying on improvement of internal control mechanisms.

E.8.24. However, internal controls were also considered in the Jamaica *Review*. It was noted that:

> “Training in attitudes and values is lacking. This may be a contributory factor to the widespread perception in Jamaican society that poor and uneducated citizens are treated in a rude and uncaring fashion by police and do not receive quality service”, (p 36).

E.8.25. Three sub-project proposals were put forward to strengthen internal controls; one for changing organisational culture, one for training of trainers in principles of human rights, human dignity and equal opportunities and one for training supervisors in promotion of integrity and ethical standards and in proving quality service delivery to all sectors of society.\(^5\)

E.8.26. Although these sub-projects are not entirely convincing, relying heavily on the capacity of external consultants to bring about especially difficult changes, they at least go

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\(^{4}\) Supplementary *Report to DFID*, Section 2, p 15.

\(^{5}\) Supplementary *Report to DFID*, Section 2, Proposals C1, 3 and 4.
beyond abstract statements and are based on detailed problem identification. The Commissioner’s emphasis, in his mission statement and Corporate Strategy, on a basic need for “courtesy, integrity and proper respect for the rights of all” provides a helpful starting point.

A Pro-Poor Strategy

E.8.27. The Review notes that DFID specifically requested the review team to consider issues of poverty alleviation in the process of the Review. (p 56). In responding to this they said that:

“The poor are the main victims of crime and the depressed economy will never remedy their employment problems until foreign money is attracted by a safe and stable, as well as democratic society. By reasons of its historical para-military role, the JCF is seen by the poor, whose lack of power and influence makes them vulnerable, as part of the problem, rather than part of the solution”, (p 56).

E.8.28. In making project proposals to DFID to take account of issues of poverty alleviation, the review team had relatively little to add to what they and the JCF had already proposed: improving performance against crime, changing police culture and style and playing a full part in inter-agency and community initiatives. They are making what seems to be a strong and valid point, that the poor would be major beneficiaries of the kind of policing envisaged by the JCF Commissioner. The major problem is how to achieve this.

E.8.29. What is not sufficiently emphasised is the point well-recognised in social analysis, that “the community” is not homogeneous. Indeed, what is “good policing” to upper and middle class groups may well not be “good policing” to the poor. This dilemma of differing stakeholder perceptions faces all development efforts and is especially stark in seeking just and effective policing.

E.8.30. There are some pointers in the recent World Bank studies in Jamaica intended to provide a basis for the design of social investment funds; these initiatives are referred to on p 10 of the Review. They suggested that the level of violence, especially drugs-related gang violence, in urban areas was such that it was “an important economic and social development issue”. Using participatory research methods they concluded that it led to substantial erosion of the assets of poor communities, including: damage to human capital through preventing access to education and health services; to household relations through reducing capacity to work as a family unit; to productive assets, through hindering provision and maintenance of infrastructure, investment in local employment and access to work; and to social capital - the networks, norms and trust that facilitate mutually beneficial co-operation in a community.

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6 This focus was not included in the original TOR but was added as the Team were setting off for Jamaica.
7 Caroline Moser, Jeremy Holland and Sarah Adam, 1996. These initiatives are referred to on p 10 of the Review.
E.8.31. World Bank social investment funding is available for community-based interventions intended to tackle these problems, including community strengthening projects, conflict resolution programmes, drugs counseling and prevention, family life education, careers and skills development. Projects may be undertaken in partnership with NGOs or the private sector and must be identified and sponsored by community groups.

E.8.32. The Review rightly concluded (p 10) that:

“Police need to be full and active partners in such co-ordinated inter-agency approaches, promoting them wherever possible. These local initiatives may be strengthened by more deliberately introducing a crime control aspect to them. This could be done by better integrating these efforts with Community Policing. However, Police are not generally seen to be ready, willing and able to take full part in such community and inter-agency initiatives”.

E.8.33. Given the lack of confidence in the police in these poor communities, and lack of experience and, perhaps, willingness on the part of the police themselves, project proposals involving the police have been very slow to emerge. What are urgently needed are detailed consultations leading to concrete proposals for such projects.
ST KITTS AND NEVIS

E.8.34. This project was completed over three years, from November 1995 to November 1998, at a total cost of £967,000. Objectives were to:

- restructure the police force to facilitate better management and operational efficiency and effectiveness
- develop and implement strategies for the creation of a force capable of unbiased and apolitical application of its duties and responsibilities in order to restore public and international confidence, and
- provide leadership, training and personnel management expertise in support of these objectives.

E.8.35. In order to meet these objectives, three resident TCOs were provided from the UK at an estimated total cost of £ 635,000:

- one to be Police Commissioner for two years then to become adviser to a locally appointed Commissioner for a further year
- a training adviser for two years
- a CID Adviser for two years.

E.8.36. Additional inputs were short term assignments by a management consultant, (£95,000), training in the UK (£100,000) and small amounts for immediately essential equipment, (£50,000), together with a 10% contingencies allowance.

E.8.37. This appraisal is based on examination of the Review produced in 1995, the Project Memorandum, Reports of the Commissioner of Police, (a TCO), and other TCOs, produced in March 1997, a BDDC visit report of May 1997 and their initial reactions to the Commissioner’s report.

E.8.38. The strongly worded Review suggested that the police force in these small islands, (total population 42,000), was in crisis. It reported that, after a public meeting in 1994 representing a wide range of interests, a signed statement had been issued, expressing strongest concern about the growth of drug-related crime, including use of guns, and asking for:

“unequivocal condemnation of all drug related criminal activity by all political parties and a joint declaration of party leaders to attack this scourge of our society … and the reassurance of the Police Force that its members will receive full support in clamping down on gun and drug related crime in particular;

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8 W.J. Cheeseman, 1995, Review of the Royal St Christopher and Nevis Police Force, Report to the Government of St Christopher and Nevis and the UK ODA. Mr Cheeseman was a former Chief Superintendent from the UK.
immediate review of the operations of the Police Force to improve its morale, strengthen its crime fighting capacity and to redress the current politicisation of its Officers and ranks”, (p 5).

E.8.39. The Review concurred fully with these views, adding that they were supported from both sides of the political divide and that the dangers of drugs-related crime could readily spread from St Kitts and Nevis to adjacent small islands. It said that “the future of St Kitts and Nevis hangs in the balance” (p 1) and that the important tourist industry was likely to be severely damaged.

E.8.40. On the police force, it concluded that efficiency and effectiveness in virtually every aspect had deteriorated sharply for a number of years; (the Review contains a damning catalogue of defects on pp 3-4). It emphasised severe limitations in particular in criminal investigation,¹⁰ personnel practices, excessive politicisation and failure to investigate complaints, so that public confidence in the police was at an extremely low ebb. There were no objectives and priorities, no effort to develop strategic planning, no analysis of training needs, while “party political allegiances, suspicions as to the corruption of some Officers and the breakdown of discipline has created a deeply divided Force”, (p 3).

Implementation

E.8.41. The Review’s recommendations were accepted almost in their entirety. Though there was not a full output-to-purpose appraisal, the information available indicates that reasonable progress was made in implementing training and institutional development activities along the lines of the Review. The major limitation reported was that the project fell some eight months behind schedule. One reason given by the Commissioner was that there was considerable delay in acting on recommendations which he had produced in early 1996. Second, delay stemmed from the fact that the TCO responsible for CID development had to spend half his time in operational activity because the Department was so overwhelmed; third, as the Commissioner said, it resulted from:

“the very low standards of knowledge and practices prevalent throughout the police force, which required a considerably longer and more intensive effort to rectify than assumed in the Cheeseman report, on which the project had been based. Consequently the project objectives were too ambitious to achieve within the prescribed timeframe, and might never be achievable”.¹¹

E.8.42. By mid-1997 a successor for the TCO Commissioner had still not been identified, whether from St Kitts and Nevis or from another Caribbean island. It is not clear from the available papers what the reasons for this were; nevertheless, it was a serious problem, as

¹⁰ 50% of reports to the police were not investigated at all, only 14% of those investigated led to convictions, and the head of the CID was untrained in investigation and there was no system for gathering and using intelligence.
the intention was to provide a long period of guidance for a new Commissioner, first in an assistant role then with the continuing advice of the current, TCO Commissioner.

E.8.43. The major stumbling block identified by the Commissioner and the BDDC, however, was refusal by the Police Service Commission (PSC) to delegate some of its powers to the Commissioner, specifically, the capacity to appoint, discipline and dismiss officers up to the rank of Superintendent. This was an important aspect of the “politicisation” identified in the Review, and it was regarded as a major obstacle to increased efficiency and effectiveness. A major purpose of the BDDC visit in May 1997 was to persuade the government and PSC to accept this delegation of powers. They were not successful, though it is not entirely clear what the main obstacle or obstacles were.

E.8.44. There was uncertainty on the UK side on how to react. Choices identified were: to close down the project; to terminate it at the end of 1998 – the original agreed date three years from the start; or to extend it for a further (fourth) year. However, it was argued in the BDDC that the project should be terminated at the end of 1998, even though:

“It is (the Commissioner’s) view, which is probably an accurate assessment, that the project would sink without trace if kept to its planned lifespan of 3 years. He has therefore argued for an extension of one year to ensure its sustainability. However, without devolution of the PSC’s powers, the Police Commissioner is strictly limited in what he can achieve by way of lasting impact on the Police Force, and a one year’s extension is not likely to make a significant contribution to sustainability. To achieve that in the constraints within which the project has had to work would require not only the devolution of powers, but probably a 5 year project … Therefore, unless BDDC is prepared to support this project for a considerably longer period, (which would involve both financial and personnel considerations), and the PSC were to devolve its powers, there is little justification for extending it beyond its terminal date of November 1998”.

Comments

E.8.45. Although the project had been in existence for a relatively short period and only limited information on project performance is available, a number of points of relevance to this synthesis evaluation may be noted. First, it could have been recognised in 1995 that, given the need for fundamental change in the Police Force, a longer term programme was essential. This was not envisaged either in the Review or in the Project Memorandum. Even though the population is very small, so that the project is comparatively costly, any sustainability required a longer term view.

E.8.46. Second, although the Review had noted the need for strategic planning, this was not taken up in the situation when the Commissioner and his TCO colleagues were heavily engaged in urgent operational activities. There was also no evidence of a bottom up, participatory approach, of the kind applied in Malawi, Lesotho and, recently, Jamaica. The

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Review was most concerned with achieving a quick impact, in a crisis situation, and did not suggest a participatory emphasis, nor was it introduced by BDDC, although it might have been especially suitable in the circumstances.

E.8.47. Third, there was a lack of emphasis on good government and social development issues and approaches, though the Review had commented on a complete failure to investigate complaints, collapse of public confidence and the very limited role played by female police officers. “Community policing” was not mentioned; this is not surprising, perhaps, given the short term view adopted generally.13

E.8.48. Fourth, it is noteworthy that two specialist sections of the police force, concerned principally with control of drugs trafficking, were singled out in the Review as relatively efficient. There is, perhaps, a lesson in this, also hinted at in the Review, Cheeseman, that it is a mistake to concentrate on specialist sections, which may become an elite, while neglecting a more holistic view.

E.8.49. Fifth, a notable feature of the Project Memorandum was an economic analysis, (p 12), derived from the Review’s criticisms of deployment of police officers, of the possibility and benefit of reducing their numbers. While the Review’s comments appear valid generally, (though they are based on a very short visit), it may be suggested that the economic appraisal was unrealistic, (even though qualified), in that it could not take account of detailed examination of resource needs, in relation to analysis of the tasks which need to be performed in order to produce effective policing.

E.8.50. Finally, it may be suggested that the search for senior management and an effective succession process merited even higher priority than the question of delegation of powers from the PSC. Widespread cross-party and public support for changes in policing indicates that a persistent attempt to reach an accommodation with the PSC would eventually be successful. All this adds even further weight to the argument in favour of a longer term approach.14

13 There has been significant progress since the project ended in initiating community policing and in strengthening human resources management and financial management.
14 Subsequently, however, a new Commissioner has been appointed from within the force and a number of major, potential crises have been dealt with successfully.
COMMUNITY POLICING

F.1 The majority of the DFID projects reviewed for this report have included references to the development of community based approaches to policing amongst their overall objectives. However, (as noted in Section 2) it seems that DFID has only recently begun to clarify its own approach to community policing and much of its implementation in practice has reflected the perspectives of individual project teams. Given the importance attached to community policing as a particularly British contribution and as a form of policing which attempts to extend the notion of partnership to the public as a whole, this section reviews the experience of projects which have included community policing among their goals.

F.2 Whilst there is no clear consensus on what community policing implies in practice, it is possible to indicate some generally accepted basic ideas. One of the classic texts\(^1\) from the late 1980s identifies four main elements of community policing as: 1) community based crime prevention; 2) reorientation of patrol activities to emphasise non-emergency servicing; 3) increased accountability to the public; 4) decentralisation of command, including civilianisation. It also usefully summarises the main themes.

“\(^{\text{a}}\)The central premise of community policing is that the public should play a more active part in enhancing public safety. Neither the police nor the criminal justice system can bear the responsibility alone. In an apt phrase, the public should be seen along with the police as “co-producers” of safety and order. Community policing thus imposes a new responsibility on the police to devise appropriate ways for associating the public with law enforcement and the maintenance of order”\(^2\)

F.3 The majority of the DFID projects reviewed were undertaken in countries emerging from long periods of authoritarian government in which the police had largely acted as an arm of the state. In many of them, this was reinforced by the inheritance of colonial traditions of policing\(^3\). Others had experienced long periods of internal war, with the consequent dislocation of normal policing. Thus, for most there was no strong tradition of policing by consent or of accountability to civilian authority. This allied to the need, in some cases, to rebuild the police force almost from scratch, presented unusual difficulties for the introduction and implementation of concepts of community policing.


\(^{\text{2}}\) Skolnik and Bayley 1988, 4-5

\(^{\text{3}}\) See, for example, Brogden, M., (1987) ‘The Emergence of the Police: The Colonial Dimension’, British Journal of Criminology, 27, 4-14
The evidence from the evaluations of Indonesia, Namibia and Uganda

F.4 Both phases of the Indonesia project included the development of more community oriented styles of policing in the INP as part of their objectives. The ex-post evaluation study noted that there was evidence of minor progress towards community policing in the Internal Management Consultancy Unit supported areas. More generally, it judged that the idea of community policing in Indonesia was not associated with greater direct accountability to public. The study concluded that any impact was confined to largely to urban areas and that there had been little attempt to address the needs or interests of the poor and disadvantaged.

F.5 The Namibia project objectives included the aim of “assisting in the management of change from the existing ethos of a paramilitary force to that of a community-based police service”, and stressed that “(s)ensitising the police to the need to create and preserve a positive relationship with the community will permeate the training to be provided”. Apart from training inputs on community policing, the creation of limited Police/Public Liaison Councils appears to have been the only practical step towards its implementation. The evaluators noted that, by the time of their visit (1997) most of these had become moribund and that they had, in any case, tended to neglect the poor in squatter areas and the poorer, more isolated rural communities.

F.6 There appears to have been an increasing disenchantment at senior levels of the Namibian police with what they perceived to be the concept of community policing. The first mission statement, produced with support of project in 1992, noted the importance of sensitivity to public needs, consultation with and involvement of the public and stressed the idea of police/public partnership. However, the next Inspector General, near the end of the project in 1995, produced a revised mission statement which significantly changed the role of the community to that of “assisting and cooperating with members of the Force”, especially in terms of information gathering.

F.7 The evaluation notes that this shift of emphasis came at a time of increased crime, particularly increased cross-border crime subsequent to the ending of apartheid in S. Africa and hints that Namibian disenchantment with community policing stemmed from misperceptions that it meant ‘soft policing’. It suggests that an effective strategy for developing community policing would have been to involve local councils, traditional leaders, NGOs, churches, community representatives to produce a nation-wide community policing model, noting that the Namibian police is now looking at the community policing programmes in S. Africa.

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4 Viz. Indonesia Report, Annex B which also contains a useful definition of community policing
5 Mission Statement by the Inspector General of the Namibian Police, 19/11/92
6 Mission Statement by the Inspector General of the Namibian police, 18/12/95
F.8 Community policing was a minor component of Phase 1 of the Uganda project. The number of community policing schemes was included as a logframe indicator but no direct support was included in the design and in practice there were limited Uganda Police Force (UPF) initiatives in 3 districts. In Phase 2, which added contributing to the practice of good government to project objectives, a TCO was recruited to establish community policing throughout Uganda. Following training, Community Liaison Officers were deployed in all districts in the country; although the UPF’s target for covering all stations and posts has yet to be achieved. A major part of the work of CLOs has been to increase public awareness in terms of legal and civic issues and running programmes on fire and road safety, and crime prevention.

F.9 The evaluators noted that the UPF “tended to see community policing as a promising way to bridge the gap between the UPF and the public, and establish a new approach to policing based on mutual trust and cooperation”. However, while it seemed that the advantages of community policing had become apparent to senior members of the UPF and that it had begun to set down roots, the report’s conclusion was less rosy.

“…it seems doubtful if Community Policing, as currently practised, has yet to lead to any substantive change in the public image of the UPF. Indeed the obstacles to a full realisation of the benefits of Community Policing in Uganda remain formidable. In discussion with police and non-police sources alike we found clear signs that the police regard community policing primarily as a means of instructing local populations, rather than listening to them. They thus learn less than they might, whilst doing little to mitigate their authoritarian image.”

F.10 The three ex-post evaluation studies provide evidence of limited progress towards the implementation of community policing. Apart from Indonesia, where wider political conditions were simply not conducive to the concept, let alone the development of effective police-community partnerships, one major factor inhibiting progress in community policing was the reluctance of the police to engage fully in a major change in vision and style of working.

- In Namibia, senior management became increasingly concerned that what they perceived as the UK model of community policing would undermine their effectiveness in combating increasing levels of crime. Limited experiments at local level, which never moved to the stage of developing active local partnerships, rapidly became moribund without support from the top.

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7 The main aims of Phase 1 were: to restore the police’s capacity to maintain law and order, public confidence in the police and create a climate in which other forms of aid would increase and be effective.
8 Uganda Police Project, Annex 7
9 Uganda Police Project, p15
10 Uganda Police Project, p. 16
11 We have referred to this issue in the discussion on congruence in Section 3
• In Uganda, despite the relatively successful training input by a TCO, senior management saw community policing as a way of addressing their negative image but failed to grasp that it required a radical change in their relationship with the public.

• In Namibia and Uganda, senior police officers appeared to see community policing as a means of involving the public on terms set by the police, rather than a process by which, in Skolnick and Bayley’s terms, police and public jointly ‘co-produce’ safety and order. In both countries there were limited attempts to secure the full involvement of all stakeholders.

F.11 The ex-post evaluation studies on Namibia and Uganda both refer to the DFID community policing projects in S. Africa as experiences which are likely to provide evidence of greater success in implementing the concept. Before looking at these, we briefly note how ideas about community policing have been incorporated into the Lesotho project. Of the other projects reviewed, Ethiopia provides little evidence. For Nepal, the 1997 mid term review indicated limited progress on a number of pilot community policing projects and recommends a major focus on this area (together with protection of human rights, improved public safety and better investigation of crimes against women and children) in the future.\(^\text{12}\)

Lesotho

F.12 Whilst the Lesotho project documents\(^\text{13}\) reviewed provide no direct evidence on the implementation of community policing, both the development plan of the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police and the White Paper on policing contain important statements of intent. These indicate the extent to which it is possible to incorporate more fully articulated ideas on community policing into the planning of future developments within the police.

F.13 The mission statement in the development plan of the RLMP\(^\text{14}\) refers to providing a high quality police service “in conjunction and consultation with the community, other organisations and agencies”. It goes on to state that “as the police derive powers from the community, we serve and are accountable to the people” and “(w)e view the community as our customers who deserve our concern, care and attention”.\(^\text{15}\) The development plan accepts that there is a need for a high level of community interaction and consultation if operational performance is to be improved and targeted. It reviews the existing situation, noting: the low level of community involvement, the divisions created by para-military styles of policing, the mismatch between community need and the distribution of police resources, the failure to take on board the diversity of priorities and needs in the community. It

\(^{12}\) OPR written by Philip Rose and Lionel Grundy, 19/11/97
\(^{13}\) DFID have been involved in two mutually supportive projects in Lesotho. The Police Development Programme had the main purpose of assisting the police in preparing and implementing a five year strategic plan. The other project had the main purpose of establishing, in the Ministry of Home Affairs, a police department to provide policy advice to ministers, strategic guidance and oversight of the police.
\(^{15}\) Beyond 2000, p.3
proposes a number of steps aimed at enabling the RLMP to deliver “community service” at district level and establishing working partnerships with civil society which would allow public input into planning, implementation and evaluation of policing.

F.14 The draft White Paper on Police Reform\textsuperscript{16} reflects similar themes and lays out the basic foundations for a new approach to the public.\textsuperscript{17} These include: the right to be informed and consulted as a means of ensuring that the public feel that they are genuine stakeholders in policing; the right to standards of service and redress when things go wrong; the right, and public duty, to be involved in tackling crime on the basis of locally established partnership schemes. It also stresses the importance of maintaining the traditional role of chieftainship in peace-keeping and of giving other local people the chance to take on part-time policing. This is the only project which gives explicit recognition to the fact that policing is carried out by other bodies than the formal or public police – see Section 5 for a fuller discussion.

South Africa

F.15 The South Africa community policing projects were implemented within the context of transition from apartheid and the main thrust of UK aid to policing was aimed at assisting the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the transformation of the South African Police (renamed the South African Police Service – SAPS) into a respected and trusted service, acceptable to the vast majority of the population and which would respect and protect the rights and freedoms of all citizens. Community policing was seen by the GNU as a major aspect of this transformation.\textsuperscript{18}

F.16 The projects were designed with an emphasis on facilitating the creation of institutional structures and processes which would incorporate and develop the concept of a community/police partnership. Assistance to SAPS in changing attitudes and practices was built into the projects, together with the recognition of the parallel need to improve effectiveness (particularly emphasised in the Eastern Cape project).

F.17 The consultants own review (see Annex E.7) of the projects provides evidence of their success in achieving partnerships and building trust between local

\textsuperscript{16}A New Partnership with the Police: the Lesotho Government Strategy for Policing, GoL, Draft 1(d), April 1997
\textsuperscript{17}A New Partnership with the Police, Chapter 3
\textsuperscript{18}“Community Policing can be defined as a philosophy or approach to policing which recognises the interdependence and shared responsibility of the police and the community in making South Africa a safer, more peaceful and more liveable country. Community Policing aims to establish an active and equal partnership between the police and the public through which crime and community safety issues can be jointly determined and solutions designed and implemented.” National Secretariat for Safety and Security, 1996, Guidelines on Community Policing, p.4
stakeholders (police, provincial governments, NGOs and civic associations), particularly through partnership institutions (Community Police Fora – CPF). There is also a wider recognition, within S. Africa, of their help in sowing the seeds for a different approach to policing from that characteristic of the apartheid period\textsuperscript{19}.

F.18 However, the impact on the attitudes and practice of the SAPS has been less than was anticipated. More importantly there is clear evidence of marginalisation or exclusion from CPF of the poor, racial groups and women. Problems of representativeness have been compounded by CPF becoming the sites of struggle between political parties and civic associations and the external review of the W. Cape project concluded that political tensions still threaten the community policing structures.\textsuperscript{20}

F.19 On a wider level, rates of crime have continued to increase, accompanied by increased public concern about safety and security and decreasing confidence in the police, both within project areas and in the country as a whole.\textsuperscript{21} This has lead to a marked change in the South African debate in policing with a shift to a search for policies which will lead to better crime prevention and more effective combating of crime. The draft White Paper on policing – \textit{In Search of Safety: 1998-2003} – whilst recognising the innovative and productive role of the CPF, seeks to strengthen partnership through the introduction of elected local government into the police/community equation, together with a much stronger emphasis on law enforcement.

F.20 The lessons emerging from the S. African projects (particularly the W. Cape) provide a valuable addition to the points made in the evaluations of Namibia and Uganda. These are incorporated in the conclusion to this section.

CONCLUSION

F.21 This review of the community policing aspect of DFID projects indicates that there have been major difficulties with implementation. These can be summarised as follows.

- In countries with an inheritance of colonial policing and/or emerging from long periods of authoritarian rule or internal insecurity there is likely to be no strong tradition of policing by consent.

- In the context of high rates of crime senior police management frequently perceive community policing as a soft style of policing that detracts from other

\textsuperscript{19} Based on interviews with members of the S. African Department of Safety and Security
\textsuperscript{20} The most clearly documented evidence comes from the W. Cape project. See IDASA quarterly report for July-October 1997, draft IDASA research report dated 15/1/97, Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) 1998 \textit{Evaluation of the Western Cape Community Policing Project}
\textsuperscript{21} see NEDCOR ISS \textit{Crime Index Vol. 2 Nos. 1 and 2}, 1998
priority areas such as crime busting and internal security. Very often there is a problem of achieving a balance between priorities. Police may also fear that, as in S. Africa, community partners will see their role as control of the police, raising dangers of local ‘ politicisation’ of policing and infringing on what the police see as their need for operational independence.

- In many cases the police have seen community policing as a separate area rather than a style or approach to policing that should be integrated into all police activities and which requires a radical change in organisational culture.  

- Frequently the police have been reluctant to develop the range of local partnerships necessary for community policing to put down strong roots. Even where there has been a will (by police and government) to implement community policing, as in the case of S. Africa, there have been problems in involving all sections of the ‘community’. Political parties and more dominant groups in civil society saw CPF as sites of local power and there was a marked tendency for those most vulnerable (the poor, women, minorities) to be excluded from full involvement in partnership institutions. A major issue is to ensure that all stakeholders are adequately represented in the bodies that constitute the police-community partnership.

- There has been a tendency for projects to ignore the existence of communal and/or traditional processes and institutions which are involved in the maintenance of social order.

- Whilst there is some evidence that police-community attitudes have changed as a result of projects, the CASE review of the W. Cape project emphasises that the time required for changes in attitudes and power relationships was underestimated.

Finally, perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the ability of community policing to make a marked impact on levels of crime. Research in the UK indicates an absence of evidence for the effectiveness of community policing in relation to crime reduction. In South Africa there is little evidence of impact on crime or increases in feelings of safety and security in project areas. As noted by Skolnick and Bayley, community policing is not a crime control panacea.

“The classic social and economic correlates of crime – high rates of youth unemployment, family breakdown, social dislocation,

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23 see Fielding N. (1997)
24 see NEDCOR ISS Crime Index, Vol. 2, Nos. 1 and 2, 1998, the CASE review of the W. Cape project also noted that issues such as domestic violence, child abuse, substance abuse were not adequately addressed.
violence, gangs, drugs, illiteracy, and historical patterns of racial discrimination – will not be removed by community policing. Community policing is no substitute for social and economic change. As a crime-control measure, it must be understood in a limited perspective, not as a long-run or keystone feature of a successful anti-crime policy.”

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25 Skolnick and Bayley 1988, 35