How do institutional arrangements affect the way public servants are managed? This paper from the Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) looks at the post-independence institutional framework in Tanzania. Excessive presidential powers and centralised staffing authority have resulted in the duplication of functions between central and line agencies. A climate of corruption and favouritism has reduced confidence in civil service staffing. Institutions need to be realigned to serve development needs.
Tanzania is one of the world’s poorest countries, with over 50 percent of people living in poverty. While post-independence nation-building achieved relative political stability, there were unfavourable consequences for the public service. The interim constitution turned the country into a de jure single party state. Under the populist socialist ideal of Ujamaa, political leaders believed that the Westminster model of governance was designed for administration rather than development. They were influenced by socialist states which deliberately fused politics and administration. Decentralisation saw the number of civil servants increase as local councils were absorbed into the system. As salaries dropped during the economic crisis, corruption spread. Subsequent reforms have not improved matters.
The following findings emerged from interviews, focus groups and questionnaires with civil service officials in Tanzania:
- The president accrued enormous power after independence. He is able to appoint and dismiss almost all public servants at will. Some staff have been dismissed with no right of appeal.
- Some staffing authority is delegated to agencies and line ministries but these are under indirect presidential control. There is also duplication of functions and confusion amongst these bodies.
- The most important staff management agency, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), is a ‘rubber stamping’ body, approving all documents and decisions. It is overstaffed, under-funded and not perceived as independent. The public have no way of holding the CSC to account.
- The power of line ministries and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) is constrained by the centralised system. Presidential power to appoint and dismiss Permanent Secretaries gives CEOs little job security.
- In many ways, civil service law conforms to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines. But there is no requirement for regulations to be approved by a statutory agency, no code of ethics and no grievance procedure.
- The perception of unfairness and corruption in public appointments is widespread. There is a lack of internal and external checks, vacancies are not advertised and criteria for appointments are unknown.
Tanzania’s experience shows that:
- institutions convey powerful messages about the integrity of government to civil servants and the public at large
- the extent to which institutions are adequate facilitates or constrains the work of government; like company structure, they are an unobtrusive and unglamorous, but powerful influence on public management
- having moved decisively away from the Westminster model by fusing politics and administration under the leadership of the dominant party, Tanzania has gravitated back towards it, and ought to move closer still
- the civil service is, ironically, better equipped to serve political and development objectives when it has some degree of autonomy, because autonomy fosters civil service capacity and confidence
- there is a need to realign institutions when necessary so that they serve current understandings of development and current political objectives, rather than persisting with institutions that have become ‘frozen constraints’: obsolete, and a significant drag on national development.
