Role of development assistance in countering extremism and terrorism

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26.03.2015

Question

What is the available evidence on the role of development assistance in countering extremism, violent extremism and terrorism? If possible, identify approaches, lessons, and guidance.

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1. Overview

The relationship between development assistance and security has long attracted academic and practitioner attention, particularly during the post-2001 ‘war on terror’. Heightened international concern about religious extremism has placed the development-security nexus into a renewed focus, with increasing recognition of the links between development, governance, and terrorist threat (Briscoe and van Ginkel 2013).

This rapid review identifies evidence on the role of development assistance in countering extremism, violent extremism and terrorism. There is a growing body of literature in this area, with much of the
evidence situated under the banner of ‘countering violent extremism (CVE)’\(^1\). The terms ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ are often used interchangeably, and there is no internationally-accepted definitions of these or CVE\(^2\). Some authors caution that donors and the wider community should prioritise developing suitable definitions of the CVE to avoid it being inconsistently applied (Khalil and Zeuthen 2014). ‘Radicalisation’ is also commonly used in the available literature on violent extremism, mainly in the context of understanding why people engage in violent acts, and in the processes of countering extremist behaviour.

Much of the readily available literature on approaches to tackling violent extremism and terrorism focuses on de-radicalisation and CVE efforts in Europe and America. However, there is emerging literature on programmes from Asia and North Africa. Most of these tend to be country-based approaches that are driven by national or local government. There is limited literature available on donors’ approaches or policies to CVE.

Drawing from the available literature, donor approaches to tackling violent extremism and terrorism include:

- **Funding community activities.** USAID operates a system of small grants to fund activities such as livelihood training, cultural events, community debates and post-traumatic stress disorder counselling (Khalil and Zeuthen 2014).

- **Support to local government.** The Danish government, through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund, has provided support to local governments and other local actors to prevent radicalisation and extremism. This includes institutional support to the Kenyan National Counter Terrorism Centre, and assistance to governments’ in drafting new national CVE strategies (Chowdhury Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat 2013).

Other approaches to countering violent extremism and terrorism, which are typically nationally or locally led, include:

- **Internet based de-radicalisation:** The internet has become an important tool for radicalisation and extremism. The Saudi Arabian Al-Sakina programme aims to tackle radicalisation through appointed groups of academics and intellectuals visiting websites popular with Islamic radicals and challenging extreme interpretations of Islam (Hearne and Laiq, 2010).

- **Public awareness campaigns:** Various governments and civil society organisations have used public awareness campaigns to convey anti-terrorism and CVE messages. This includes an information campaign in Saudi Arabia that highlighted the impact of violence on victims through signs and billboards (Boucek 2008), and civil society supported public rallies, conferences and seminars in Pakistan (Mirahmadi et al. 2012).

- **Radio programming:** Radio can be an effective medium for reaching densely populated urban areas, and has been used by some agencies and organisations to tackle animosity between groups (Ranstrop 2009).

- **Prison based de-radicalisation and counter-extremism:** Prisons can be ‘incubators for peaceful change and transformation’ (ICSR 2012, p. 1). Counter-extremism approaches have been individual and collective, and have had variable levels of success (El-Sai’d 2012).

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\(^1\) There is some existing GSDRC research in this area. See: Herbert (2014) and Carter (2013)

• **Role of women in tackling extremism**: Women can have a critical role in counter-extremism efforts; however, their ability to identify and respond to terrorism and extremism in their families can vary greatly (SAVE 2010). Prominent initiatives include Sisters Against Violence, Women Moderating Extremism, and Women Preventing Extremist Violence.

Some of the lessons identified in the literature for actors engaging in CVE work include:

• **Context is critical**. Terrorism and violent extremism are often context specific, and approaches to addressing them must take into account local environment and culture. Supporting national governments and regional organisations can help to develop tailored and context-sensitive approaches to violent extremism (Global Center 2014, p. 8).

• **Enhance south-south cooperation**, particularly for developing countries that share common cultural and historical ties, and development challenges (Global Center 2014).

• **Broader stakeholder engagement** is beneficial (USAID 2013, p. 7). Donors should emphasise local sustainability and partnerships, and could consider direct support to established community organisations (USAID 2013, p. 7).

• **Programmes are effective when they are voluntary** (ISD 2012).

• **More refined beneficiary targeting** can help ensure a broad representation of beneficiaries are exposed to programming. Targeting should be able to adapt to locally changing conditions and have mechanisms built in to programmes to enable rapid response to opportunities (USAID 2013, p. 7).

### 2. Relationship between development assistance and security

The nexus between development assistance and security (including anti-terrorism and counter-extremism approaches) has attracted much academic and practitioner attention, particularly in the context of the post-2001 ‘global war on terror’. Some authors caution that during this time there seemed to be little common ground between development practitioners who sought socio-economic improvement and institutional reform in developing countries, and those tasked with protecting Western security (Briscoe and van Ginkel 2013). In a policy brief for the International Centre for Counter Terrorism, Briscoe and van Ginkel (2013) note that ‘to caricature the stereotypes held by each side, counter-terrorism was perceived to be about quick wins, armed coercion and imposition of security by a foreign hand. Development policy, on the other hand, appeared to its security critics as an exercise in wishful thinking as regards poverty reduction and improved governance’ (Ibid, p. 1).

In a peer-reviewed academic article, Bell, Goodfellow and Putzel (2006) note that during the ‘war on terror’ some bilateral and multilateral donors changed their approach to development in light of the new security agenda. Development came to be viewed by some actors as a ‘means of addressing looming threats emanating from the global South towards the North’ (Ibid, p. 1).

In recent years, antagonism between the two communities has subsided, with increasing recognition of the links between development, governance, and terrorist threat (Briscoe and van Ginkel 2013).
3. Donor approaches

USAID

USAID’s policy on the development response to violent extremism and insurgency identifies the structural factors that influence the radicalisation of individuals, including high levels of social marginalisation, weak governance, human rights violations, and cultural threat perceptions (USAID 2011). The policy directs the agency to:

- Consider key engagement criteria at the earliest stage of the programme, including an assessment of the drivers of violent extremism and insurgency, a determination of the appropriate role for development assistance, and an identification of risks to the agency and its partners (USAID 2011, p. iv);
- Apply a core body of programme principles at all stages of the programming cycle, including for analysis, planning and design, and operational and management responsiveness. This includes focusing on the drivers of violent extremism and insurgency, and promoting inclusive country ownership (USAID 2011, p. v);
- Establish and empower a steering committee to oversee the policy’s implementation, provide technical leadership and support, and support interagency planning, strategy and coordination (USAID 2011, p. v).

Many of USAID’s CVE programmes have an emphasis on livelihood training or employment support, and directly target young people. One programme in Somalia, for instance, emphasised livelihood training and job placement (USAID 2013). While another from Kenya focused on the role of young people in the local communities and provided messages about behaviour and choice (USAID 2013). A 2013 midterm evaluation of USAID’s support to CVE programmes in East Africa drew from focus groups and survey data from almost 1,500 beneficiaries in Somalia and Kenya and found a high level of engagement with the programme (USAID 2013).

A recent academic article identified lessons from a pilot USAID CVE programme in Kenya (Khalil and Zeuthen 2014). The programme aimed to counter the drivers of violent extremism by operating a system of small grants, funding activities such as livelihood training, cultural events, community debates on sensitive issues, and counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder. An overarching finding was that programming decisions would have benefited from a more comprehensive understanding of violent extremism in the local context. For instance, groups who were narrowly ‘at risk’ of being attracted to violent extremism could have been better identified and targeted, and a greater focus could have been placed on understanding the relevance of incentives. It also found that the implementation team would have benefited from additional top-level guidance from the donors. The authors conclude that ‘as a priority donors and the wider community…should provide suitable definitions of the CVE concept, rather than leaving practitioners to construe (undoubtedly inconsistently) its meaning from the available definitions of violent extremism’.

Denmark

The Danish government has been involved in various CVE programmes both nationally and internationally. Much of their work centres on the Horn of Africa and involves support to local governments and other local actors in preventing radicalisation and extremism (Chowdhury Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat 2013).
Their approach is particularly interested in the early identification of risky behaviour, and focuses on a ‘preventive social agenda rather than a security one’ (Ibid, p. 10).

In 2011, Denmark founded the **Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF)** to help stabilise and rebuild fragile states, as well as counter the threat of violent extremism in those countries. Through the fund, the Danish government has provided both funding and personnel to a number of countries in the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the greater Afghanistan/Pakistan region.

An independent evaluation of the PSF identified some outputs relevant to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in Kenya. This includes increasing awareness of the risks of radicalisation in the prison service within Kenya, drafting of a new Kenyan CVE strategy, and institutional support to the National Counter Terrorism Centre (Coffey 2014). The evaluation cautions, however, that ‘it remains to be seen how far these will translate into outcomes in terms of preventing radicalisation’ (Coffey 2014, p. 40).

### 4. Examples of programmes and approaches

#### Countering internet radicalisation

The internet has become an important tool for extremism and radicalisation. Various reports detail trends in internet use for extremist purposes, including the use of You Tube to post extremist videos, and internet forums and social networking to build a community, convey extremism messages, and secure new recruits (Bergin et al. 2009). While the internet is undoubtedly an important tool in modern extremism, so far few de-radicalisation and counter-extremism programmes have included an online component (Bergin et al. 2009).

One of the few approaches that aims to tackle online extremism is the **Saudi Arabian Al-Sakina programme**, which was launched by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in 2003 (Hearne and Laiq, 2010). Al-Sakina focuses on individual interventions through online chat rooms, and involves appointed groups of academics and intellectuals visiting websites popular with Islamic radicals and challenging extreme interpretations of Islam (Hearne and Laiq, 2010). The programme also holds a comprehensive online database of religious texts, research and education materials related to jihad, political violence and radicalisation. To target younger audiences, the organisation uses social media and produces video materials in English and Arabic (ISD, 2013).

#### Public awareness campaigns

Some civil society organisations have made use of public awareness campaigns to convey anti-terrorism and CVE messages.

In Saudi Arabia, a public awareness campaign was a core component of the Government’s three-pronged approach to counterterrorism: the **Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Post-Release Care (PRAC) programme**. The three separate but interconnected elements of the programme aimed to deter individuals from becoming involved in extremism, promote the rehabilitation of extremists and those involved with them, and provide aftercare programmes to facilitate reintegration into society (Boucek 2008). The public information and communication campaign aimed to highlight the impact of violence on victims as a means of countering extremist behaviour (Fink Chowdhury and Hearne 2008, p. 6). This involved signs and billboards throughout cities that focused on ‘the evils of terrorism’ (Boucek 2008, p. 10). Other signs aimed

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to foster greater cooperation between the security forces and the general public, such as one featuring two clasped hands - one belonging to a member of the public, the other belonging to a person in a uniform (Ibid). Other photos depicted members of security forces coming to the aid of children, the elderly and the infirm. A prevention programme in schools was also a core component of the PRAC, and involved distributing books, pamphlets and materials on the dangers of extremism and effects of terrorism and violence (Ibid).

One study from Pakistan details the role of civil society in peace building and counter extremism initiatives, drawing from twelve weeks of field work in 35 cities and villages at risk of violent extremism (Mirahmadi et al. 2012). The study finds that CSOs have had a prominent role in organising public rallies, conferences and seminars to promote awareness of the threat of extremism (Mirahmadi et al. 2012). Religious scholars have also had a role in denouncing terrorism at the theological level through public lectures and debates (Ibid).

Radio programming

Radio programming has been used by some agencies and organisations to tackle animosity between groups and counter extremist behaviour. Some experts note that radio is an effective medium for reaching densely populated urban areas (Ranstrop 2009). In an article drawing from survey data with 1,000 respondents from Mali, Chad and Niger, Aldrich (2012) explores whether peace and tolerance programming has changed perspectives and altered behaviour. Results indicate that participants who listened to such programmes participated more frequently in civic activities and supported working with Western states to combat terrorism. They also found, however, that high levels of radio listening had no measurable impact on opposition ‘to the use of violence in the name of Islam or opposition to the imposition of Islamic law’ (Ibid, p. 1). Gender is noted as an important factor to how people listen to and respond to programming; men were found to be less likely to listen to peace and tolerance radio, less likely to support both violence in the name of Islam and the implementation of Sharia, and less likely to support working with the West to combat terrorism (Ibid, p. 54). Women were more likely to listen to radio programmes in radio groups and in groups in shared, covered areas (Ibid, p. 54).

Improving governance and social welfare

While the link between poverty and extremism is disputed, there is substantial evidence that some extremist groups, particularly radical Islamist groups, have exploited weak economic conditions and high unemployment to attract followers (Alonso and García Rey 2007; Pargeter 2009; Aning and Abdallah 2013). Tackling the socio-economic environmental factors that can fuel radicalisation is therefore an important component in strategies to counter violent extremism. The Government of Pakistan, for instance, has recognised the significance of socio-economic factors in their 14 point anti-terrorism strategy and acknowledged that economic development is key to stabilising conflict regions and to preventing terrorism (Mirahmadi, Maehreen and Zaid 2012, p. 21).

Prison-based de-radicalisation and counter-extremism

Many CVE programmes have focused on de-radicalising individuals or small groups, particularly in a prison context. Drawing from evidence of de- and counter-radicalisation approaches in 15 countries, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and the Political Violence (ICSR 2012, p. 1) finds that prisons can be ‘incubators for peaceful change and transformation’.
Experience in Algeria, Egypt and Israel indicates that collective de-radicalisation approaches can be successful; however the circumstances in which they are likely to succeed are limited. Evidence indicates that the radicalised group should have three characteristics to increase the chance of success: the existence of strong and authoritarian leadership; the existence of hierarchical command and control structures; and, most importantly, an environment in which leadership perceives that there are weaknesses in an armed campaign (ICSR 2012). Two prominent case studies of prison-based collective de-radicalisation efforts that have been successful are the disengagement of the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG) in Egypt and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in Algeria (ICSR 2012, p. 42).

Individual de-radicalisation prison-based programmes have been used in a variety of countries, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, Yemen and Saudi Arabia (El-Sai’d 2012). Drawing from experience in these and other contexts, the (ICSR 2012, p. 47) finds that programmes are too context specific and locally customised to be effectively compared. Nevertheless, some of the components that underlie the more effective individual de-radicalisation approaches include: a mix of prison programming that incorporates religious re-education and training; the existence of credible interlocutors who can relate to prisoners’ particular needs; and consistent efforts to build social networks outside of prison that support the transition towards de-radicalisation. In addition, inducements were found to have a role in individual programming, though these in themselves were not found to be decisive.

An analysis of programmes in South Asia details a number of initiatives that have aimed to challenge violent extremist behaviour without demanding individuals renounce particular ideals, including the ideal of a Sharia-governed state (Chowdhury Fink and Hearne 2008, p. 8). Respected clerics and former combatants have had a prominent role in de-radicalisation efforts and have proven to be a vital resource in reversing violent extremist teachings (Ibid).

Peacebuilding perspectives

The methods and expertise of peacebuilding practitioners can help develop a more expansive understanding of extremism and its causes, and a more localised and sustainable approach to countering it (Holmer 2013). In a Special Report by the United States Institute of Peace, Holmer (2013) explores the nexus of peacebuilding and countering violent extremism, and identifies areas of mutual engagement and benefit. The peacebuilding community has a role in CVE by supporting a non-securitised space to build the capacity of civil society and to help reform the security bodies charged with counterterrorism and CVE. Policies to help counter violent extremism can in turn provide the impetus and enabling conditions for effective peacebuilding. The author concludes, ‘closer collaboration between the two domains, with coordinated and clearer lines of engagement, would advance efforts to prevent extremist violence’ (Holmer 2013, p. 1). Peacebuilding perspectives can also aid in the recognition that gender plays a role in both mitigating and fostering trajectories of violent extremism (Holmer 2013).

Role of women in tackling extremism

In a rapid review of the available evidence, Carter (2013) identifies literature on women and violent extremism, including the role women have played in preventing, promoting and participating in extremist groups and violent acts. Counter-terrorism approaches have historically tended to ignore gender perspectives, however more recently, attention has been paid to the role of women as ‘policy shapers, educators, community members and activists’ in countering violent extremism (OSCE 2013, p. 2). The capacity of women to spot and react to terrorism and extremism in their families varies greatly, with variable factors including levels of education, local awareness, and geographical remoteness (SAVE 2010).
There are a number of initiatives, many funded by international donors and non-governmental organisations, which have aimed to harness women’s roles in the prevention of violent extremism. Examples include:

- **Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE):** Launched in 2008, SAVE is the world’s first female counter-terrorism platform and currently operates in Yemen, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Israel, Palestine and Northern Ireland. Activities include the ‘Mothers for Change’ campaign, which encourages and empowers mothers, strategically placed at the centre of the family unit, to take a stand against ideologies of violent extremism in their homes and communities (Women Without Borders/SAVE 2011).

- **Pakistani Women Moderating Extremism (PWME):** The PWME programme was developed through a partnership between the Institute for Inclusive Security and the US Institute of Peace. Its aim is to ‘increase the visibility and capacity of women to moderate extremism’ (Chatellier 2012, p. 1). Over the course of the two-year programme, staff from the Institute of Peace have travelled to Pakistan to convene trust-, capacity- and coalition-building workshops (Chatellier 2012). Some of the challenges to programme implementation and success include: tensions between coalition members; political context; deteriorating US-Pakistan relations; and the requirement that participants comprehend and speak proficient English (Chatellier 2012, p. 11).

- **Women Preventing Extremist Violence (WPEV):** The US Institute for Peace’s WPEV project aims to support women in civil society in preventing violent extremism, and foster trust and cooperation between women in civil society and the security sector.

5. **Lessons from the literature**

There are various lessons provided in the literature. Examples include:

- **Context is critical.** Much of the literature emphasises that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to countering violent extremism (Chowdhury Fink and Hearne 2008). Terrorism and violent extremism are often context specific, and approaches to addressing them must take into account local environment and culture. Supporting national governments and regional organisations can help to develop tailored and context-sensitive approaches to violent extremism (Global Center 2014, p. 8).

- **Enhance south-south cooperation.** Some experts advocate deeper south-south cooperation to tackle violent extremism, particularly for developing countries that share common cultural and historical ties, and development challenges (Global Center 2014). International actors can support this by facilitating platforms for sharing learning and experiences, and supporting the development of knowledge products to be shared among partners (Ibid).

- **Adopt a whole government approach to countering violent extremism.** This can help ensure that all relevant parts of government are working together in implementing CVE initiatives (Global Center 2014).

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- **Programmes are effective when they are voluntary:** Drawing from 13 brief case studies, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue finds that personal, voluntary, commitment leads to greater success (ISD 2012).

- **More refined beneficiary targeting.** This can help to ensure a broad representation of beneficiaries are exposed to programming, particularly those who do not have the capacity to self-select into programme activities. Targeting should be able to adapt to locally changing conditions and have mechanisms built in to programmes to enable rapid response to opportunities. Undertaking a strategic analysis can help identify the people most-at-risk of extremism in implementation areas (USAID 2013, p. 7).

- **Broader stakeholder engagement** Lack of involvement of parents and caregivers in CVE programmes is a ‘critical oversight’ (USAID 2013, p. 7). Donors should emphasise local sustainability and partnerships, and could consider direct support to established community organisations (USAID 2013, p. 7).

- Donors could consider a more direct approach in working in madrasas, given the significant participation of youth in some form of Islamic education (USAID 2013, p. 8).

- Low capacity was identified as one of the biggest challenges to the implementation of USAID CVE projects in East Africa. **Capacity building** should therefore be integrated into all programmes (USAID 2013).

- **Emerging areas** that CVE programming could consider expanding into include: countering the rise of youth gangs, implementing prevention-orientated programmes with a younger cohort of children, and the innovative use of ICTs (USAID 2013, p. 8).

6. References


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content/uploads/2012/10/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf


Key websites

- Counter extremism:
  https://www.counterextremism.org/index.php?clID=1
7. About this report

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Suggested citation