



Applied Knowledge Services
Governance · Social Development · Humanitarian · Conflict

Lessons from interventions that address livelihoods and cross-border conflict systems

Evidence Synthesis
January 2022

Siân Herbert

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Rebecca Bradshaw, Christine Cheng, Ruth Citrin, Tim Eaton, and Rowshan Hannan for peer review and advice on the development of this report, Dwi Rachmawati for formatting, and Imogen Mathers for copyediting. All errors are the responsibility of the author.

Suggested citation

Herbert, S. (2022). *Lessons from interventions that address livelihoods and cross-border conflict systems*. Evidence Synthesis. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

About GSDRC

GSDRC is a partnership of research institutes, think-tanks and consultancy organisations with expertise in governance, social development, humanitarian and conflict issues. We provide applied knowledge services on demand and online. Our specialist research team supports a range of international development agencies, synthesising the latest evidence and expert thinking to inform policy and practice.

GSDRC, International Development Department, College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK

www.gsdrc.org; helpdesk@gsdrc.org



UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

Contents

1. Executive summary	1
1.1. Key findings.....	1
Connections between livelihoods and conflict systems	1
The evolution of livelihood interventions.....	2
Types of livelihood interventions.....	2
Lessons by intervention type	3
Cross-cutting lessons.....	5
1.2. Literature base and questions for further consideration	6
2. Connections between livelihoods and conflict systems	7
3. The evolution of livelihood interventions	11
4. Types of livelihood interventions responses	12
4.1. Overall impact.....	13
5. Lessons by intervention type	14
5.1. Displacement livelihood interventions	14
5.2. Pastoralist livelihood interventions	15
5.3. Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) livelihood interventions.....	17
5.4. Microfinance livelihood interventions.....	19
5.5. Alternative livelihood interventions targeted at ex-combatants	20
5.6. Migration livelihood interventions	20
5.7. Serious and organised crime (SOC) livelihood interventions.....	22
5.8. Vocational training and skills development livelihood interventions.....	23
6. Cross-cutting lessons	23
6.1. Border-sensitive interventions	23
6.2. Context-specific interventions.....	24
6.3. Analytical tools for better context analysis	25
6.4. Conflict-sensitive approaches.....	26
6.5. Participatory and locally relevant programme design and implementation.....	27
6.6. Role and capacity of external actors.....	27
7. References	28

1. Executive summary

This rapid literature review brings together lessons from interventions that address the link between livelihood pressures and cross-border conflict systems. There is limited literature on this exact question, thus, this paper draws together findings from: the general livelihoods literature; literature on livelihoods programming in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) related to conflict systems; the state- and peacebuilding literatures; literature on borderlands, conflict and development; and literature on demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) interventions, including some livelihoods-related activities. Some livelihood challenges and interventions have clear potential cross-border elements and links to conflict systems (e.g. refugee responses, cross-border pastoralists, violence against women during cross-border trading, transnational serious and organised crime, etc.). Where possible, this literature review focuses on lessons regarding these types of interventions, and specifically on the cross-border elements.

This paper is organised as follows: Section 1 provides a summary of the findings and explains the method taken; Section 2 provides definitions for the paper, and traces the varied connections we can make between livelihoods and conflict systems; Section 3 explains how livelihood interventions have evolved to the current day; Section 4 explains the main types of livelihood interventions; Section 5 provides illustrative lessons from a number of intervention types, including interventions related to: displacement; cross-border pastoralists; informal cross-border trade (ICBT); microfinance; alternative livelihoods, migration; serious and organised crime; and vocational training and skills; and Section 6 provides cross-cutting lessons.

1.1. Key findings

Connections between livelihoods and conflict systems

The term 'livelihood' is understood as the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living (Chambers and Conway, 1992). People need a range of 'capitals' to sustain their livelihoods (e.g. human, natural, physical, economic/financial, political, and social), and the capacity to absorb, adapt, and transform these determines the impact of a crisis on livelihoods (what can be called 'livelihoods resilience') (UNDP, 2013; Scoones, 1998; Béné, Wood, Newsham and Davies, 2012).

In FCAS, livelihoods may be underpinned by structures of violence, and livelihood strategies may be negative, involving unsustainable or harmful long-term activities that may be illicit or perpetuate violence, conflict, and exploitation. Conflict can reconfigure labour market dynamics, access, and participation, with characteristics often including illicit activities; weak regulation; high risk, high return (for some); and exploitative work (Mallett & Slater, 2015). This can further exacerbate the conditions for violence (Cramer, 2010 in Mallett & Slater, 2015). Indeed, understanding how economic motivations and dynamics contribute to the emergence and persistence of conflict, violence, and exploitation is of central importance.

This paper examines *conflict systems*, rather than just *conflict*, and thus includes analysis of the wider processes and actors that we understand might contribute to the conflict economy across borders, at borderlands, and relating to borders and transnational issues (e.g. through trade, displacement, arms, drugs and people trafficking, (illegal) resource extraction, etc). It also takes a broad understanding of conflict to include conflict that occurs at all levels (e.g. interpersonal, group/community, national, and transnational), that includes personal/direct violence and structural/indirect violence (Galtung, 1969), and that includes open conflict (very visible and deep-rooted), surface conflict (visible but shallow), and latent

conflict (with potential to emerge) (Fisher et al., 2000). This approach recognises the complexity of the manifestations, causes, and accelerators of conflict, violence, and exploitation.

The combining of livelihood and conflict-related interventions reflects security-development nexus thinking that has evolved over the past few decades, and draws on the view that “development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development” (Duffield, 2001). The broader literature on livelihoods in FCAS tends to focus on: (1) the impacts of conflict on economic activity and livelihoods; (2) the (in)effectiveness of programming; and (3) the role of enabling environments in shaping livelihoods and business (Mallett & Slater, 2012, pp.1-3).

The evolution of livelihood interventions

Over the past decades, the expanding international development agenda has broadened its focus from aid and poverty only, to include peacebuilding and statebuilding, fragile states, stabilisation, radicalisation and extremism, and global public challenges/goods (Herbert, 2017). This affects the lens through which livelihoods are understood, the prioritisation of this issue in the policy agenda, and programming decisions, with linkages often made between economic opportunities, conflict, engagement in illicit economies, radicalisation, and migration (Stites & Bushby, 2017).

Some criticise the merging of agendas as the “radicalisation of development”, while others argue it reflects the reality of doing development in FCAS (Duffield, 2014; Barakat & Waldman, 2013). This broadening, in specific contexts, has brought together ambitious and sometimes contradictory goals that can undermine what many people still consider to be the primary purpose of aid: poverty reduction.

Interventions in politically expedient areas may be carried out despite limited evidence of their effectiveness, or despite risks of them causing harm. However, although some livelihood interventions state higher objectives like contributing to peacebuilding, they are often designed without specific peacebuilding or social cohesion goals (Mallett & Slater, 2015). In order to mitigate against the negative tendencies of securitisation, Saferworld (2011, p.11) recommends a further “‘developmental-isation’ of the security discourse” by: taking an inclusive approach; making sure reforms are locally owned; always beginning with the context; and coordinating and even integrating – but not subsuming – development into defence and foreign policy. As this paper demonstrates, there are further considerations related to enabling effective livelihoods interventions in cross-border/transnational/regional conflict contexts.

Types of livelihood interventions

Livelihood interventions encompass a wide range of activities with varying ambitions, including protection, provision, recovery/rehabilitation, and promotion. The types of intervention are also suitably broad. Examples include: seeds-and-tools provision; seed vouchers and fairs; livestock interventions; cash; food aid; public works programmes; infrastructure projects; microfinance; value chain development; making markets work for the poor (M4P); job creation; and training (Mallett & Slater, 2015).

Cross-border livelihood interventions are typically conceived of as including activities where: an activity is implemented with communities across borders; coordinated/parallel interventions occur across borders; or where good practice is replicated across borders (Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011). However, as borderlands are part of broader systems, interventions to target cross-border challenges are needed in sites near and far from borders.

Although livelihood programmes in FCAS are a key donor intervention, there is limited evidence of their impact, finds seminal work by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) (Maxwell, et al., 2017, p.vi).

Lessons by intervention type

Internally displaced people (IDP) and refugee livelihood interventions - Humanitarian livelihood interventions that target displaced people include cash transfers, food aid, safety and basic need provision for refugees and IDPs (in camps and home communities), job creation, etc. Employment-related refugee livelihood programmes include supply-side strategies (e.g. that aim to increase refugee employability); and demand-side strategies (e.g. that aim to create employment opportunities).

Factors shaping the success of these interventions include the host country's political and policy context, and the types and extent of economic opportunities in the host economy – especially whether refugees are able to work in the host country, legally and in practice. However, livelihood programmes are frequently designed with insufficient understanding of the local labour market context and of the needs of beneficiaries (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.2). The literature widely recommends that refugee services be integrated into existing host community structures, with services provided to both refugees and host communities, as important ways to promote social cohesion and inclusive attitudes to refugees, and to reduce tensions and strains on host communities (Chatelard, 2011).

Pastoralist livelihood interventions - There has been renewed attention on pastoralist interventions, which in the context of FCAS often includes multiple objectives of supporting livelihoods, managing movement, peacebuilding, and social cohesion, etc. (Avis, 2018). However, there is limited understanding of: how these interventions can directly contribute to stability; how to provide security to these populations; and how to cooperate with them on security initiatives related to terrorism, criminality, etc. (De Haan, Dubern, Garancher & Quintero., 2014, p.9). Although there are some cross-border initiatives with pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa, there is limited documentation on these (Pavanello, 2010). Emerging trends in regional and multilateral pastoral development policies include a shift from conventional approaches such as livestock development to pastoral development, and shifts from national to regional pastoral resilience programmes (Avis, 2018).

Pastoralist livelihood initiatives that have achieved the best results have tended to: take a cross-border and conflict-sensitive approach; involve and build on traditional institutions and practices; balance commercial interests and community needs; integrate peacebuilding; take a market approach; support already-existing mechanisms; be accompanied by stabilisation measures; and take a participatory implementation approach (Building Opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa (BORESHA), 2018, p.3; De Haan et al., 2014). Common criticisms of pastoralist livelihood interventions are that they are often poorly implemented, lack adequate funding, and are implemented by ill-equipped non-pastoral administrators (Avis, 2018).

Pastoralist, climate change and natural resource livelihood interventions - There has also been an increased focus on the link between livelihoods and climate change adaptation. Despite this area having a logical cross-border application, development actors still tend to take national rather than regional approaches.

Features of successful programming in this area include strengthening and expanding existing cross-border relations through: the establishment of cross-border committees related to natural resource management; the sharing of early warning information; and making agreements on seasonal grazing patterns. Other

lessons show that programmes should: link traditional and formal governance institutions; broker joint planning that is inclusive across groups; and build the capacity of local institutions on issues such as risk assessment and adaptive planning (Standley, 2012). Challenges to programming include: huge and remote border areas that make it difficult to reach communities frequently, to develop deep links, and to monitor project activities; and insufficient context and historical analysis (Levine & Pavanello, 2012; Pavanello, 2010).

Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) interventions

ICBT and gender-based violence (GBV) – GBV at border crossings is a serious challenge to women informal cross-border traders (WICBTs), who make up about 70% of ICBTs in Africa. There is some evidence that gender-sensitive interventions aimed at improving facilities and processes to support ICBT among women have successfully reduced violence and harassment. Interventions include: simplifying customs procedures, taxes and charges; improving sanitation and sleeping facilities; installing lighting at the border; and providing 24-hour security presence (Jacobson & Joekes, 2019; UNCTAD, 2019b; Parshotam & Balongo, 2020). Other promising approaches include: gender-sensitive training of border officials; awareness raising and information sharing with WICBTs; supporting WICBT labour organisations; and improving the design and maintenance of border infrastructure services (Jacobson & Joekes, 2019).

ICBT and pastoralists – ICBT interventions related to pastoralists include: setting up cross-border committees, workshops, and meetings; developing drought disaster resilience plans; training in natural resource management; and using technology to share information across communities. An intervention that includes ICBT measures is the regional pastoral resilience project BORESHA. Its activities are developed through a participatory approach which has successfully led to the joint identification of community-managed drought disaster resilience plans and natural resource management committees. Yet a key challenge has been constraints from border restrictions on the movement of programme staff and key beneficiaries (BORESHA & Danish Demining Group (DDG), 2020). Lessons for future cross-border projects include: contextualise and pursue cross-border access rights; strengthen integration for all stakeholders at the borderlands; facilitate gender-transformative enterprise development and training; and leverage technology by designing, developing and promoting information sharing platforms for better cross-border trade (BORESHA & DDG, 2020). Regional bodies can play important roles in coordinating and enabling the policy and legal environment (Pavanello, 2010).

Microfinance – As migration and refugee flows increase, the importance of cross-border microfinance service delivery is growing and requires greater attention. The main constraints facing refugees in starting or growing their businesses are access to credit and capital, and government restrictions. The Asia-Pacific Forum on Financial Inclusion (2012) outlines plans for better facilitation of cross-border microfinance including: regulators moving migrant workers from cash-to-cash transfer to account-to-account transfers; financial education to increase awareness of formal channels and strengthen financial literacy; and allowing recipients' remittances to be considered income to help establish credit and credit history. Context awareness is essential in programme design, yet too often is lacking (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18).

Alternative livelihood interventions targeted at ex-combatants – Overall, the reintegration elements of DDR programmes face daunting challenges due to limited economic opportunities in the areas of implementation, limited information on the local political economies, and limited donor funding (Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP), 2012).

Migration livelihood interventions – While migration and remittances have been key livelihood strategies throughout history, interventions targeting migration have only recently come under increased focus. Migration interventions combined with livelihood interventions are often critiqued for: having unrealistic goals, or goals that may be contradictory and lead to negative side-effects; lack of alignment with partner countries' agendas, undermining aid effectiveness principles and alienating development partners; and overlooking local knowledge, priorities, and capacities (Castillejo, 2017).

Serious and organised crime livelihood interventions – In general, there have been limited livelihood interventions in the area of serious and organised crime, and there is limited evidence of the effectiveness of these, with some examples where alternative development programming has led to negative impacts (Schultze-Kraft, 2018).

Vocational training and skills development livelihood interventions - There is little evidence – and no definitive causal link – on the relationship between livelihoods and skills programming and conflict prevention (Altai Consulting, 2019).

Cross-cutting lessons

Border-sensitive interventions - Interventions should be 'border-sensitive', as border areas can be conflict and insecurity hot spots where political and geopolitical interests may be heightened, and where interventions may have multiple, conflicting goals. With heightened insecurity, interventions may impact more on state-society relations, political settlements and conflict dynamics in borderlands (Goodhand, 2018). Thus, it is key to assess how the costs and benefits of interventions are shared, and how they affect stability (Goodhand, 2018). Interventions should also be more honestly assessed according to the context and interests of local, domestic, regional, and international actors (Holzaepfel & Jacobsen, 2015; Paris & Sisk, 2007). Analysis should include examination of: cross-border war economy networks; cross-border commodity chain analysis; conflict sensitivity; and national and regional legal and policy frameworks (Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011).

Context specific interventions – Conflict economies are highly complex and dynamic, and as local contexts vary, the extrapolation of lessons from one context to another is problematic. Ultimately, the effectiveness of livelihoods programming is shaped by the context, and interventions that are not underpinned by good context analysis are negatively affected. Despite this, too often there is a lack of sufficient analysis, or analysis is not followed during programme implementation, meaning that many livelihood programmes neglect the context, needs and priorities of the population (Maxwell et al., 2017). Factors constraining the extent and quality of analysis include lack of time, funding, and staff capacity and knowledge to design and implement initiatives; the complexity of FCAS environments; limited evidence and data; and biases (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18).

Analytical tools for better context analysis – To address the knowledge deficit and the need for context specific interventions, the literature recommends more and better analysis; programming based on the analysis; and the integration of local actors into analysis processes and programme implementation. Recommended analytical models and analytical elements include livelihoods analysis; conflict analysis; political economy analysis; commodity chain analysis; economic market assessment tools; analysis of national legal and policy frameworks; and analysis of networks.

Conflict-sensitive approaches – The literature widely acknowledges the need for livelihood interventions to be conflict sensitive, recognising that interventions in FCAS can cause serious harm. Interventions should also be "border sensitive" as border areas can be conflict and insecurity hot spots, and as interventions can

have magnified impacts there on conflict dynamics, state-society relations, and political settlements (Goodhand, 2018; Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011).

Participatory and locally relevant programme design and implementation – A core theme across the literature is the need for programming to integrate participatory processes with local communities to ensure programmes are locally relevant, and appropriate according to the needs, knowledge, aspirations, assets, and skills of the beneficiaries. Yet despite their unique knowledge and capacities, borderlanders are often not included in formal governance and development practices (Eulenberger, et. al., n.d.).

Role and capacity of external actors – The wider donor context and political shifts in donor countries are also important contextual aspects to understand and integrate into planning – for example, how new and intensified challenges like migration and terrorism affect aid flows, aid priorities, safety concerns for aid workers, etc. (Holzaepfel & Jacobsen, 2015). Ultimately, the legitimacy and effectiveness of external actor engagement in state- and peacebuilding processes is characterised by tensions, contradictions and dilemmas (Paris & Sisk, 2007).

1.2. Literature base and questions for further consideration

There is limited literature that focuses on lessons from interventions that address the link between livelihood pressures/coping economies and transnational/cross-border conflict (Mallett & Slater, 2015; Rohwerder, 2013). However, there is a patchwork of literature on related aspects – e.g. from the livelihoods literature, there is some literature on livelihoods programming in FCAS related to conflict systems, though very little that focuses specifically on cross-border issues and programming. And from the state- and peacebuilding literatures, there is literature on borderlands, conflict and development, and on DDR interventions, including some livelihoods-related activities. Although the DDR reintegration interventions are not necessarily related to cross-border issues, these are livelihood interventions with clear links to peacebuilding, and have thus been included in this report.

This report also includes findings from broader literatures on livelihoods in FCAS, and from state- and peacebuilding programming in FCAS. Some livelihood challenges and interventions have clear potential cross-border elements and links to conflict systems (e.g. refugee responses, cross-border pastoralists, violence against women during cross-border trading, transnational serious and organised crime, etc.). Where possible, this literature review focuses on lessons regarding these types of interventions, and specifically on the cross-border elements.

This rapid literature review draws mostly on grey literature with some academic literature; most of the grey literature is working papers and policy briefs, rather than comprehensive impact evaluations. This is due to the policy/practitioner focus of the research question (i.e. due to the focus on lessons from policy interventions). A large number of searches were carried out using different combinations of keywords, due to the limited literature base.¹

¹ This rapid literature review started by conducting searches in Google Scholar, Google, ReliefWeb, and the UK Government Development Tracker using varied combinations of the keywords: livelihoods, programme, programming, evaluation, lessons, conflict, “fragile states”, violence, “coping economy”, “conflict economy”, “war economy”, “shadow economy”, cross-border, borderlands, border, and transnational. Due to the limited literature found at the programme level, more searches were conducted using combinations of the keywords with specific intervention type names, including: refugee, pastoralist, microfinance, “alternative development”, migration, informal cross-border trade, reintegration, and “disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration” (DDR). Snowballing was also used to identify further texts.

This review found that searches on lessons from livelihood interventions across borders in FCAS resulted in limited literature, yet when searches were carried out on specific intervention types, more literature was available (e.g. on pastoralist livelihood programmes, refugee livelihood programmes, etc.). As this paper covers such a broad range of interventions, the lessons gleaned from the literature must be taken as illustrative, and in no way comprehensive or conclusive. Follow-on literature reviews may benefit from examining single, specific intervention types across fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

The broader literature on livelihoods in FCAS tends to have a number of weaknesses – e.g. methodological weaknesses including: lack of clarity on methodology or data sources; analysis being based on minimal evidence with unarticulated, ideological assumptions underpinning it; and unclear connections made between the evidence and conclusions (Mallett & Slater, 2015; Stites & Bushby, 2017; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). The available analysis on livelihoods programming tends to focus on outputs, not outcomes, or conflate outputs with impacts, and where information on impact is available, it is often inconclusive, and not coherent or consistent across studies (Mallett & Slater, 2015, p.238; Stites & Bushby, 2017). It is also extremely difficult to measure the long-term outcomes of interventions in emergency contexts, as situations can change rapidly, beneficiaries may move on, and interventions are not always aimed at the long term. It can be difficult to decide what a successful intervention is when programme goals are contradictory – e.g. alternative livelihood interventions targeting drug crop production (Fishstein, 2014, p.57). Many lessons focus on the technical side of programme design and implementation, but miss the socio-political realities of implementation – e.g. programme documents may acknowledge that ‘context matters’, but then base the programme intervention on lessons from other contexts (Mallett & Slater, 2015; Browne, 2013).

From this paper, the following key questions emerge for how to better address livelihoods interventions in cross-border conflict contexts:

- How to ensure that livelihoods interventions integrate a cross-border/borderlands approach?
- How to ensure that livelihoods interventions in cross-border conflict contexts are adequately informed by conflict-sensitive analysis of the local and regional contexts, and of the policies and politics of those funding, designing, and implementing the interventions?
- How to ensure that livelihoods interventions in cross-border conflict contexts are based on realistic and honest goals, while also taking a transformative approach to development?
- How to ensure that livelihoods interventions in cross-border conflict contexts are resourced and planned so they can meet their goals?
- How to ensure that interventions are informed by, and build on, local and regional actors’ interests and capacities?

2. Connections between livelihoods and conflict systems

This paper understands a livelihood as “the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation” (Chambers and Conway, 1992, p.7). It also understands it more broadly as “what people themselves do to get by over time, including response mechanisms to shocks” (Stites & Bushby, 2017, p.2).

The concept of ‘capitals’ is useful to understand what people need to sustain their livelihoods, and includes (Scoones, 1998, p.7; UNDP, 2013, p.6; USAID, 2005):

- **Human capital** – e.g. skills, knowledge, experience, education, ability to work, health
- **Natural capital** – e.g. natural resources (water, land, forests, and minerals), genetic resources, environmental services (hydrological cycle, pollution sinks), resource management practices
- **Physical capital** - e.g. livestock, tools, infrastructure, water and sanitation facilities, information and communication technology, shelter, schools, health facilities
- **Economic/financial capital** – e.g. cash, savings, wages, credit, remittances, enterprise holdings, insurance, pensions, livestock, supply chains, financial infrastructure and technologies
- **Political capital** – e.g. citizenship, access to and participation in decision making processes, political connections, a functioning legal system;
- **Social capital** - e.g. family, networks, affiliations, social relationships, social claims.

These capitals are shaped by the wider governance environment: the policies, institutions and processes that determine access to and control over these capitals – locally, nationally, and internationally (Avis, 2018). While this paper focuses on aid-related livelihood programmes, livelihoods are also shaped by non-aid and non-livelihood interventions such as sanctions, control regimes, strengthening regulations and rule of law, improving resource governance, and improving the investment climate (Rohwerder, 2013). “In crisis and post-crisis situations, capital assets are easily lost, destroyed, or stolen. The capacity to preserve or recoup these capital assets determines the impact of a crisis on livelihoods” (UNDP, 2013, p.5).

As this list demonstrates, the term ‘livelihoods’ has an extremely broad application, which can complicate its use (Avis, 2018; Maxwell, Mazurana, Wagner & Slater, 2017). The international development community’s interest in livelihoods has fluctuated over time, waning in periods where economists dominated the development agenda, and growing in importance from the 1980s, with a key moment of growth from 1997 onwards as the human development and human security agendas began to dominate (Scoones, 2009; Stites & Bushby, 2017).

A related concept is ‘livelihoods resilience’, which can be understood as the capacities (attributes, abilities, strategies and resources) of individuals, households, and communities to *absorb, adapt, and transform* their livelihoods when confronted with shocks and stresses (Herbert, Haider, Lenhardt & Maguire, 2021, forthcoming; Béné, Wood, Newsham and Davies, 2012, p.21; Levine, et al., 2017, p.5). The theoretical link between resilience and livelihoods – that a successful livelihood is resilient to shocks and stresses – is often made in the literature, but the practical application of resilience (also a problematic concept²) remains complicated due to the lack of consensus about how individuals, households and communities can build resilience, and the variability of contexts meaning that lessons from one context or time may not be appropriate for another (Stites & Bushby, 2017). “Relatively few sources examine resilient livelihoods in the face of conflict” (Stites & Bushby, 2017, p.7). Further, some question the recent popularity of the resilience agenda within the international development sector, questioning whether the resilience

² Resilience is a term used across sectors, and by a range of actors, and there is no universal definition, understanding or application – e.g. it is used in reference to: disaster resilience, climate resilience, conflict resilience, livelihoods resilience, health sector resilience, etc. (Herbert, et al., 2021, forthcoming). ‘Resilience’ can be used to refer to a goal, an analytical tool, an indicator, and, often, as a buzzword (Tanner, et al., 2017). As an analytical tool, the resilience lens is underpinned by ‘complex adaptive systems’ thinking, which emphasises complexity, change, interconnectedness, non-linearity, and uncertainty (Herbert et al., 2021 forthcoming).

concept will be moulded to focus on interventions that help individuals, households and communities *absorb* and *adapt* their livelihoods, rather than *transform* them – e.g. a resilience focus could detract from addressing the root causes of violence and vulnerability (Herbert et al., 2020, forthcoming; Stites & Bushby, 2017).

This paper understands the ‘conflict economy’ or ‘war economy’³ as “a system of producing, mobilizing and allocating resources to sustain competitive and embedded violence, both directly and indirectly” (Eaton, Mansour, Khatib, Cheng, Yazigi & Salisbury., 2019, p.iv; Goodhand, 2004; Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005). Conflict economies form part of broader ‘conflict systems’ which are “the social, political and economic institutions and agents that support competitive and embedded violence” (Eaton, et al., 2019, p.4), and are “characterised by a multitude of (intermeshing) causes and accelerators of conflict, power asymmetries, cultures of violence, and a range of directly and indirectly involved local and international actors” (Wils Hopp, Ropers, Vimalarajah & Zunzer, 2006, p.1). This acknowledges that it is “difficult to disentangle the causes and effects of violence and conflict from wider processes at work in poor societies” (Collinson, 2003, p.6).

By looking at *conflict systems* across borders and at borderlands rather than just *conflict*, this paper includes analysis of the wider processes and actors that we understand might contribute to the conflict economy (e.g. displacement, arms, drugs and people trafficking, (illegal) resource extraction, etc), as well as conflict and violence (Collinson, 2003). *Conflict systems thinking* is underpinned by ideas of complexity, change, interconnectedness, non-linearity, and uncertainty; and *systems analysis* focuses on the dynamics of interactions and connections among factors and actors (Wils et al., 2006; Goodhand, 2004; Eaton et al., 2019; Herbert, et al, 2021, forthcoming). This paper uses a broad understanding of conflict to include conflict that occurs at all levels, including the interpersonal level, as well as the group/community, and national levels. This means that household violence and criminal violence, for example, are analysed alongside armed conflict and political violence (Herbert, 2017). It also takes a broad view by understanding violence to include both personal/direct violence and structural/indirect violence, with both connected along a ‘continuum of violence’ (Galtung, 1969; Cockburn, 2004).⁴ This means that analysis includes not only open conflict (conflict that is very visible and deep-rooted), but also surface conflict (visible but shallow), and latent conflict (below the surface with potential to emerge) (Fisher et al., 2000; Herbert, 2017).

The ‘coping economy’ is part of the conflict economy, and refers to “the numerous survival based economic interactions that occur during armed conflict, primarily involving the poor and most vulnerable” (Eaton et al., 2019). The boundaries between formal and informal economies, and between violence and local livelihoods are blurry and enmeshed (Eaton et al., 2019). The coping economy may be

³ Goodhand’s (2004, p.157) explanation of the conflict/war economy includes three interconnected and overlapping domains:

- **Combat economy:** includes the production, mobilisation and allocation to economic resources to sustain a conflict and economic strategies of war...
- **Shadow economy:** refers to economic activities that are conducted outside of state-regulated frameworks and are not audited by the state institutions... unlike the conflict entrepreneur, the economic entrepreneur operating as part of a shadow economy may have an interest in peace...
- **Coping economy:** refers to population groups that are coping (i.e. maintaining their asset base) or surviving (i.e. undermining their asset base).

⁴ Structural/indirect violence is injustice and exploitation derived from a social system that privileges some classes, ethnicities, genders and nationalities over others, and institutionalises unequal opportunities for education, resources and respect. Personal/direct violence is physically experienced violence (war, murder, rape, assault, verbal attacks) (Galtung, 1969).

the main functional economy for most people in FCAS (TDRP, 2012). TDRP (2012, p.6) argues that policymakers need to avoid categorising coping economies as abnormal or illegal, and instead understand how they are rational, functional and resilient. Relatedly, Eaton et al. (2019, p.vi) recommend that policymakers “acknowledge that ‘legality’ is a relative, not fixed, concept in conflict economies”.

In fragile and conflict affected situations (FCAS), livelihoods may be “underpinned by structures of violence, coercion and threat” (Mallett & Slater, 2012), and livelihood strategies may be negative, involving activities that may be unsustainable or harmful long-term, that may involve illicit activity, or that may perpetuate conflict (USAID, 2005). Examples of negative livelihood strategies include sex work, looting, precious stone trading, environmental exploitation, trafficking in women and children, child marriage, etc. (USAID, 2005).

Conflict can reconfigure labour market dynamics, access, and participation, with characteristics often including illicit activities; weak regulation; high risk, high return (for some); and exploitative work (Mallett & Slater, 2015). This can further exacerbate the conditions for violence (Cramer, 2010 in Mallett & Slater, 2015) – e.g. economic motivations play “a critical role in the persistence of open fighting, localised violence and coercion” in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen even if these were not the initial motivations for the conflict (Eaton et al., 2019, p.iv). “Some of the greatest suffering and repercussions of conflict and crisis arise from the damage done to these systems and the institutions that support them”, argue Stites and Bushby (2017, p.v). Thus, supporting sustainable livelihoods and inclusive economic growth is often considered a foundation for development that can contribute to peacebuilding and stability, among other outcomes, in high-level policy strategies (UNDP, 2013, p.6).

The relationships between labour and conflict are complex and variable – e.g. there is no consensus that unemployment predicts violence, though it is often assumed (Cramer, 2015). The idea that unemployment is a strong probable cause or motivating factor of violence and violent conflict is “based more on intuition and assumption than on evidence” (Cramer, 2015); it is not that available data disproves the link but rather that there are insufficient data to establish a link (Idris, 2016a). For example, Berman, Callen, Felter and Shapiro (2009, in Cramer, 2015) found that unemployment did not predict participation in political violence in Iraq and the Philippines. In a review of the literature, Cramer (2015, p.3) finds that “it is not only unemployment but also the characteristics of existing labour market opportunities that matter” (e.g. including the broader relationships between institutions, policies, economic trends, and social relations). Ultimately, these debates are underpinned by broader ideological ideas – that “development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development”, as explained by Duffield (2001).

Meanwhile, borderlands are central to contemporary dynamics in the combat economy, with shadow and coping economies being “incubators of conflict, strategic nodes in the shadow economy and centres of poverty” (Goodhand, 2004, p.169). Border areas in FCAS tend to be characterised by neglect, underdevelopment, state weakness, governance gaps, weak state-periphery relations, and are often “regions paradoxically empowered by their centrality to trade in shadow economies” such as global commodity markets, arms, finance, people, and narcotics (TDRP, 2012, p.2). Borderlands are part of broader systems, with important dynamics in terms of relations with the centre, and across borders.

The broader literature on livelihoods in FCAS focuses on (Mallett & Slater, 2012, p.1-3):

- **The impacts of conflict on economic activity and livelihoods** (especially on human and physical capital; local level perceptions, attitudes and social capital; coping strategies and risk management; markets and the private sector; and aggregate economic activity)

- **The (in)effectiveness of programming**
- **The role of enabling environments in shaping livelihoods and business**

3. The evolution of livelihood interventions

Since the 1990s, the remit of aid and development work has broadened in line with the expanding international development agenda, moving from a predominant focus on aid and poverty to include peacebuilding and state-building, fragile states, stabilisation radicalisation and extremism, and global public challenges/goods (Herbert, 2017). This shift of interests and competencies has altered the fundamental *purposes* of development and peacebuilding – shifting from poverty reduction, economic development and aid effectiveness to stability in poorer countries and the security of the West. And it has altered the *systems* for development and peacebuilding – as increased collaboration and approaches across government departments (“whole-of-government” approaches) have led to changes in institutions (e.g. the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq (Herbert, 2017)).

The broadening of the livelihoods agenda has affected the lens through which livelihoods are understood, the prioritisation of this issue in the policy agenda, and programming decisions (Stites & Bushby, 2017). Linkages are often made between economic opportunities (or lack of) and conflict, engagement in illicit economies, radicalisation, and migration (Stites & Bushby, 2017, p.v).

Some criticise the merging of agendas as the “radicalisation of development” while others argue it reflects the reality of doing development in FCAS (Duffield, 2014; Barakat & Waldman, 2013). Seminal work by Duffield (2001) argues that the merging of agendas has manipulated international aid actors, policies and practices to pursue western foreign policy goals, with the ultimate goal – the “liberal peace”, and the enemy – underdevelopment. This perspective sees war and war-affected societies as dysfunctional (Duffield, 2001). Similarly, it has given birth to the “new humanitarianism” where the “traditional and primary purpose of saving and protecting lives [is] in peril” (Duffield, 2001). However, in contrary to this perspective, others welcome this agenda shift, noting that external actors are not neutral and that the previous approaches to development and peacebuilding were out of date with ‘securitisation’ trends initiated after 11 September 2001 (Barakat & Waldman, 2013). Indeed, the idea that aid programming can be separated from the conflict system is problematic in itself. Barakat and Waldman (2013) highlight that joint analyses and integrated action across actors – development, foreign policy, military, humanitarian, and trade – are essential in conflict contexts.

This broadening, in specific contexts, has brought together ambitious and sometimes contradictory goals that can undermine the primary purpose of aid: poverty reduction. A classic securitisation critique is that by combining livelihood interventions with foreign policy issues – such as radicalisation or migration – development aid is diverted from its overarching aim of poverty reduction. This may result in programming that pursues the donor countries’ foreign policy agendas, and it may lead to programmes that undermine human rights – e.g. by working with authoritarian actors that do not uphold human rights standards (Castillejo, 2017). It can also skew aid allocation to wealthier middle-income countries e.g. those that are important to migration routes, as opposed to lower-income countries that are not as strategically important to migration flows (Castillejo, 2017). Similarly, alternative development and alternative livelihood programmes in drug crop-producing regions are criticised as aiming to suppress the illegal production, trade and use of substances rather than improving the livelihoods of impoverished rural populations (Schultze-Kraft, 2018). However, although some livelihood interventions state higher

objectives like contributing to peacebuilding, they are often designed without specific peacebuilding or social cohesion goals (Mallett & Slater, 2015).

Interventions in politically expedient areas may be carried out despite limited evidence of their effectiveness, or despite risks of them causing harm. For example, there are cases where alternative development programming related to serious and organised crime has led to negative impacts. In Afghanistan “the increased production of staples or high value horticulture, have marginalised the land-poor, leading to changes in land tenure arrangements, the migration of vulnerable groups and the concentration of drug production in more remote and insecure regions” (Schultze-Kraft, 2018).

In order to mitigate against the negative tendencies of securitisation, Saferworld (2011, p.11) recommends a further “‘developmental-isation’ of the security discourse”, with the following steps:

1. **Take an inclusive approach**, based on human security, prioritising “the needs of people and the state, but always with an ultimate focus on the security of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups”.
2. **Make sure reforms are “locally-owned**, informed by a good understanding of realities on the ground, and involve the meaningful participation of those they affect”.
3. **Always begin with the context**, as challenges and needs vary according to place and time, and as it is more effective to support and build on what already exists.
4. **Co-ordinate and even integrate, but do not subsume development into defence and foreign policy.** Coherent development, diplomatic, and defence policy should be aligned according to common goals and based on a shared understanding of the context, but should not be subsumed.

4. Types of livelihood interventions responses

Livelihood interventions encompass a wide range of activities which can be analysed according to their broad objectives – livelihood protection/mitigation, livelihood provision/protection, livelihood recovery/rehabilitation, and livelihood promotion – see Table 1 (Mallett & Slater, 2015; Holzaepfel & Jacobsen, 2015). Livelihood programmes are usually carried out in relatively stable environments. In less stable environments, humanitarian interventions focus on saving lives, and may, if possible, include livelihood protection (Holzaepfel & Jacobsen, 2015). State and peacebuilding interventions are carried out in conflict, post-conflict, and more generally, in FCAS contexts, and may include livelihood elements, including with cross-border elements (e.g. as part of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration processes).

Cross-border livelihood interventions are typically conceived of as including activities where: an activity is implemented with communities across borders; coordinated/parallel interventions occur across borders; or where good practice is replicated across borders (Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011). However, as borderlands are part of broader systems, interventions to target cross-border challenges are needed in sites near and far from borders. This also includes, e.g. how to address governance challenges between borderlands and metropolitan areas, especially to mitigate against the dominant focus of analysis and interventions on the national-state, the capital, and the central governance systems and actors.

Table 1: Livelihood programming – objectives and examples

Stage of crisis	Objectives	Examples
Early	Livelihood protection/mitigation Protecting assets and preventing negative outcomes	Seeds-and-tools; seed vouchers and fairs; and livestock interventions
Acute	Livelihood provision/protection Saving lives. Directly affecting outcomes through meeting basic needs and contributing to personal safety	Cash; food aid; public works programmes; and infrastructure projects.
Post-crisis	Livelihood recovery/rehabilitation Protecting and promoting livelihoods of people recovering from emergencies. Restoring productive assets.	
Development	Livelihood promotion Improving strategies, creating assets, enhancing access to markets and supporting appropriate institutions and policies	Microfinance; value chain development; making markets work for the poor (M4P); job creation; and training.

Source: Adapted from Mallet and Slater (2015) and Holzaepfel and Jacobsen (2015).

4.1. Overall impact

While livelihood support programmes in FCAS are a key donor intervention, there is limited evidence of their impact, find Maxwell et al. (2017, p.vi). Quantitative and qualitative research by the SLRC across eight FCAS from 2011 to 2016 found overall “there was little evidence of livelihood programming, and even less of people reporting that such programming made a difference to their lives”. One of the supporting analyses for this finding was an SLRC paper that focused on five livelihood interventions: microfinance; value chain development; making markets work for the poor (“M4P”); job creation; and skills training (Mallett & Slater, 2015). They found the evidence on all of these programmes to be “thin” (Mallett & Slater, 2015). However, a key limitation is the lack of evaluations of these programmes (Maxwell et al., 2017, p15).

The next section provides illustrative lessons from livelihood programmes that relate to cross-border conflict systems; while the final section draws out some cross-cutting findings from these programmes. The relevance of these lessons varies, e.g. some apply just across borders or at borderlands, and others are relevant to borderlands-metropolitan relations, and others apply more universally (e.g. across borders and also domestically).

5. Lessons by intervention type

5.1. Displacement livelihood interventions

Movement has been a key livelihood strategy throughout history. Humanitarian livelihood interventions that target displaced people include: cash transfers,⁵ food aid,⁶ safety and basic need provision for refugees and IDPs (in camps and home communities), job creation, etc. Displacement and migration are often hard to disentangle, and occur within countries and across borders, for various reasons, including conflict, human rights violations, and resource scarcity. The primary objectives of IDP and refugee-related interventions tend to be protection, integration, and self-sufficiency, and some include social cohesion objectives, when the context requires so. They also serve secondary donor objectives of containing refugee flows (Stites & Busby, 2017). Displacement tends to be protracted, rather than temporary, therefore donor interventions often aim at refugee integration, though this may not be the approach of the host country.

Employment-related refugee livelihood programmes include (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.1):

- **Supply-side strategies – e.g. that aim to increase refugee employability** or facilitate entrepreneurship, and can include skills-building programmes, technology access and training programmes, and microfinance and credit initiatives.
- **Demand-side strategies – e.g. that aim to create employment opportunities** and connect refugees with employers, and can include job-creation programmes that pay refugees to work, or participate in agriculture and farming, to connect to online work opportunities.

Factors shaping the success of these interventions include the host country’s political and policy context, and the types and extent of economic opportunities in the host economy – especially whether refugees are able to work in the host country, legally and in practice (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). However, despite this need, livelihood programmes “are often not designed with the local labour market context and needs in mind, with the result that even those refugees who successfully complete training programs may not be able to find work. Employers may be reluctant to hire refugees, even after legal barriers are removed, due to concerns about refugees’ skills, security concerns, or discrimination” (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.2). Another factor shaping the success of livelihood interventions for refugees is the capacity and willingness of refugees to invest in livelihoods, as refugees may struggle with a different language or with limited education; they also may not want to integrate if they plan to move on to a third country or back to their country of origin (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.2).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the main actor providing direct support to displaced people, and aims for its livelihood programmes to bridge protection and durable solutions (UNHCR, 2018). Its programming focuses on economic inclusion and market-based activities, with the most common interventions (in order) as: vocational training, agricultural interventions, artisan livelihood opportunities, entrepreneurial training, and facilitating access to financial services (UNHCR, 2018). An evaluation of UNHCR’s livelihoods programming from 2014 to 2018 finds, overall, beneficiaries experienced: at least moderate increases in income, savings, and access to employment and business opportunities; variable results related to access to loans from a financial institution and access to formal and long-term employment; and positive outcomes in household well-being and protection (UNHCR, 2018). There was also some evidence of resilience capacities being strengthened (UNHCR, 2018).

⁵ Although cash transfers and food aid are two key livelihood interventions, this paper focuses on the interventions more directly linked to the coping economy and employment generation.

⁶ For lessons on food aid interventions related to livelihoods, see Browne (2013)

Challenges include: small budgets; the one-year project cycle limits multi-year planning and leads to rushed and therefore poor partner selection; and situation analysis not being adequately applied to intervention design (UNHCR, 2018). As above, it is the local context – political, legal, security, environmental, and economic – that ultimately determines the extent of refugee economic inclusion (UNHCR, 2018). The evaluation highlights how the resilience framework is key as most UNHCR programmes operate in contexts of protracted displacement (UNHCR, 2018).

The literature widely recommends that refugee services be integrated into existing host community structures, with services provided to both refugees and host communities, as important ways to promote social cohesion and inclusive attitudes to refugees, and to reduce tensions and strains on host communities (Chatelard, 2011; Betts, 2009; Herbert, 2013). For example, the FCDO-funded Community Level Conflict Resolution Programme aims to strengthen social capital and reduce tensions between Jordanian host communities and Syrian refugees, with livelihoods and social cohesion interventions targeted at both refugees and host communities. This approach is especially relevant when host communities have similar socio-economic characteristics and challenges to the refugees – such as Iraqi refugees in Jordan (Chatelard, 2011).

5.2. Pastoralist livelihood interventions

In recent years, there has been a renewed attention on pastoral, agro-pastoral and agricultural interventions (Stites & Bushby, 2017, p.vi), **which in the context of FCAS often include multiple objectives of supporting livelihoods, managing movement, peacebuilding,** and social cohesion, as a number of ongoing African conflicts (e.g. Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, north-eastern Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan) involve pastoralists (Avis, 2018). Peacebuilding goals in livelihood interventions often focus on raising the opportunity cost of going to war and minimising grievances (Mallet & Slater, 2015, p.227). Despite the cross-border nature of many pastoralists' lives, donors still tend to take a national rather than a regional approach (Pavanello, 2010).

However, “there has been very limited experience on how pastoral development initiatives can contribute to stability directly, and on how to better provide security to these populations and cooperate with them on security initiatives to combat terrorism, criminality, and other violent activities” (De Haan et al., 2014, p.9). And there is a general lack of documentation on cross-border initiatives with pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa (Pavanello, 2010)

Emerging trends in regional and multilateral pastoral development policies include a shift from conventional approaches such as livestock development to pastoral development, and shifts from national to regional pastoral resilience programmes, with the latter being more sensitive to the regional nature of pastoralists' transboundary migratory patterns (Avis, 2018). An example is the three-year (2018-2020) regional pastoral resilience project in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia – Building Opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa (BORESHA). It aims to improve the economic and employment opportunities of pastoralists, boost cross-border socio-economic integration, and strengthen the resilience of the communities through (BORESHA, 2018, p.3; 2020):

- Strengthening cross-border communities' capacities to identify their own priorities and plan and advocate for measures to help them withstand shocks
- Promoting the development of inclusive cross-border environment for livestock and non-livestock trade and business, and fostering private sector opportunities for women and young people

- Supporting the equitable and conflict sensitive management of natural resources in the cross-border area

A baseline survey of BORESHA found that pastoralist livelihood initiatives that have achieved the best results have tended to: take a cross-border and conflict-sensitive approach; involve and build-on traditional institutions and practices; balance commercial interests and community needs; integrate peacebuilding; take a market approach; and support already-existing mechanisms (BORESHA, 2018, p.3). Ultimately, it found that ex-post interventions – implemented after a crisis – are not sustainable, and it recommends shifting to ex-ante disaster risk management approaches (BORESHA, 2018, p.12).

Common criticisms of pastoralist livelihood interventions are that they are often poorly implemented, lack adequate funding, and are implemented by ill-equipped non-pastoral administrators, finds Avis (2018) in a rapid literature review. It is often difficult to disentangle targeted livelihood interventions from broader programmes to support pastoral development including conflict, resilience, and development programmes. Indeed, the overarching insecurity of pastoral groups and their historic marginalisation entails that support must inherently tackle a number of cross-cutting issues (Avis, 2018). For example, contextual factors often undermine livelihood interventions, such as the political marginalisation of pastoral ethnicities, which tend to be minorities in many African countries (De Haan et al., 2014). Related to cross-border challenges, these interventions are often undermined by an increasing lack of clarity in the geographical and administrative mandates of formal and traditional governance systems leading to overlapping and competing conflict-resolution outcomes and exacerbating the pastoralists' marginalisation (Avis, 2018).

To improve pastoralist livelihood interventions in the Sahel, interventions should be conflict-sensitive and accompanied by stabilisation measures, argue De Haan et al. (2014). However, they note there needs to be a clear distinction between development operators and security operators to ensure the population do not reject the former. State-supported projects that combine development and overcome security challenges for the population's benefit, if designed and implemented in a participatory fashion, can improve pastoralists' perception of the state (Avis, 2018). For example, collective action institutions (like pastoral associations) can amplify pastoralists' voices and increase their inclusion in national policy debates; and specifically designed services (e.g. education using mobile, radio, and a boarding school model) could improve education outcomes amid the constraints of mobility (Avis, 2018; De Haan et al., 2014).

5.2.1. Resilience, drought and climate change

There has also been an increased focus on the link between livelihoods and climate change adaption as climate change and environmental and demographic stresses have become more prominent. As vulnerabilities do not stop at national boundaries, this area has a logical cross-border application. However, despite this, development actors often still take a national rather than regional approach – e.g. in pastoralist programmes, and livelihood approaches to drought (Standley, 2012; Pavanello, 2010). Again, evidence gaps and context variability mean that there is limited evidence on how livelihoods and local governance systems “are responding (positively or negatively) to climate change, and on the emergence of new mechanisms to manage vulnerable systems such as shared natural resources” (Stites & Bushby, 2017, p.v).

A CARE programme – the Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (RREAD) – focused on cross-border collaboration with pastoralist communities in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia to improve the adaptive

capacity of pastoralist communities and local structures for drought preparedness and livelihood protection (Standley, 2012). Through the design process and learning through implementation, CARE took an increasingly cross-border approach that acknowledged the boundaries of the socio-ecological systems, as opposed to within national or ethnic borders (Standley, 2012; Pavanello, 2010). This was due to the recognition that cross-border conflicts and insecurity had undermined traditional, cooperative methods of managing livelihoods in the region (Standley, 2012). So, while the programme was premised on natural resource management, a major outcome was the transformation of conflict dynamics (Standley, 2010).

Features of the approach included strengthening and expanding the existing cross-border relations through organising meetings between the two communities on natural resource management, the sharing of early warning information, livestock marketing, and agreements on wet and dry season grazing patterns (Standley, 2012). This process was premised on the natural resource management regimes being devised and driven by the community users, in collaboration with the authorities (Standley, 2012). Indeed, the RREAD approach is considered successful in helping manage and transform conflict between the two communities, particularly through the establishment of cross-border committees (Pavanello & Levine, 2011; Standley, 2012).

The establishment of cross-border committees is a feature of cross-border interventions related to natural resource management and pastoralist vulnerability to drought and other shocks (Levine & Pavanello, 2012). They tend to be hybrid authorities, blending formal and informal rules and mechanisms, with members typically comprised of: pastoralists, mainly elders; representatives of local government; and a small representation of women and youth (Levine & Pavanello, 2012).

Other lessons from RREAD show that programmes should: link traditional and formal governance institutions; broker joint planning that is inclusive across social groups, gender, and different interest groups; and build the capacity of local institutions on issues such as risk assessment and adaptive planning (Standley, 2012). Yet the RREAD programme also faced challenges – e.g. due to the huge and remote border areas making it difficult to reach communities frequently, to develop deep links, and to monitor project activities (Pavanello, 2010; Levine & Pavanello, 2012). The programme was also based on insufficient analysis of the context and history, and of the risks and vulnerabilities affecting adjacent communities, which affected implementation (Levine & Pavanello, 2012; Pavanello, 2010).

5.3. Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) livelihood interventions

ICBT is crucial for reducing poverty, sustaining livelihoods and resilience, and strengthening human security for borderland communities, yet GBV, movement restrictions, and the general well-being of communities pose challenges to effective ICBT (BORESHA & DDG, 2020). An estimated 95% of regional trade in east Africa is carried out through unofficial channels (BORESHA & DDG, 2020).

5.3.1. ICBT and GBV

GBV at border crossings is a serious challenge to women informal cross-border traders (WICBTs). Women comprise about 70% of ICBTs in Africa, and around 60% of the non-agricultural self-employment of women in sub-Saharan Africa comes from cross-border trade (Parshotam & Balongo, 2020). Yet threats to WICBTs are a constant challenge, and they experience high levels of GBV – for example, in a survey of cross-border trade in the Great Lakes region, 50% of respondents reported experiencing physical harassment and abuse (including sexual harassment and rape) (World Bank, 2012 in Parshotam & Balongo, 2020; Jacobson & Joekes, 2019; UNCTAD, 2019a).

There is some evidence of gender-sensitive border infrastructure interventions successfully reducing violence and harassment towards WICBTs (Parshotam & Balongo, 2020). A literature review found that interventions that simplify customs procedures, taxes and charges for small traders made the context less conducive to harassment (Jacobson & Joekes, 2019). UNCTAD (2019b) highlights that improving sanitation and sleeping facilities at borders is crucial to reduce the risks for harassment. Examples of successful interventions targeting GBV include installing solar panel lighting at the border under the World Bank's Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project, which has led to "massive positive improvements" for WICBTs with increased security and longer trading hours, allowing cross-border journeys at night (Parshotam & Balongo, 2020). Another example is the introduction of a 24-hour security presence – under the One Stop Border Post intervention at Busia (between Uganda and Kenya) – which has contributed towards improving the personal safety of WICBTs (Parshotam & Balongo, 2020). Jacobson and Joekes (2019) identify promising approaches to addressing GBV as: gender-sensitive training of border officials; awareness raising and information sharing with WICBTs; supporting the collective voice, and capacity development, of WICBT labour organisations; and improving the design and maintenance of border infrastructure services. However, despite these examples, evidence on what approaches are most effective is still at an early stage, with few evaluations available, and ICBT interventions do not always factor gender into their approaches (Jacobson & Joekes, 2019; Parshotam & Balongo, 2020).⁷

5.3.2. ICBT and pastoralists

In the Horn of Africa, ICBT is particularly relevant for livestock producers, intermediaries, traders, and trekkers, as mobile pastoralist systems often cross international borders, and ICBT is a key source of earnings (Pavanello, 2010). Along the borderland areas of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia (known as the Mander Triangle), governments have increased border security, restricted movement of cross-border communities, and some borders have been closed, as a response to cross-border conflicts and attacks, and traffic in arms and human smuggling (BORESHA & DDG, 2020). ICBT interventions related to pastoralists include setting up cross-border committees, workshops, and meetings; developing drought disaster resilience plans; and training in natural resource management.

The regional pastoral resilience project BORESHA also includes ICBT initiatives to address these challenges; it develops its interventions through a participatory approach, and has set up trade committees, meetings, and a mobile-based platform to share market information across borders (BORESHA & DDG, 2020). For example, the Tri-border Trade and Business Committee facilitates regular meetings between the private sector, community representatives and local governments. Meanwhile, cross-border workshops on resource-based conflicts have included community representatives, local administration, security officials and political leaders, and have led to agreements on resolutions to regulate and negotiate access to resources (BORESHA & DDG, 2020). The active and meaningful participation of borderland communities in BORESHA's initiatives has led to the joint identification of participatory, community-managed drought disaster resilience plans, the creation of natural resource management committees, and training in natural resource management (BORESHA & DDG, 2020).

Yet BORESHA's participatory approach has also faced challenges, as border restrictions on movement have limited implementation, with programme staff and key beneficiaries unable to attend joint meetings, exchange visits, and joint training (BORESHA & DDG, 2020). This has damaged the collaborative approaches they set up and the harmonisation of priorities (BORESHA & DDG, 2020). For example, the tri-

⁷ For detailed policy recommendations on how to support women ICBTs in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, see UNCTAD (2019a, pp.4-11).

border business committees could not cross the border for meetings, and thus had to meet separately within their countries, defying the purpose of having a multi-country, cross-border committee (BORESHA & DDG, 2020).

In light of this, BORESHA and DDG (2020) make recommendations for future cross-border projects:

- **Contextualise and pursue cross-border access rights** – Formalise the committees and lobby local authorities to recognise the need for cross-border movement. Provide security clearance for key individuals to cross the border.
- **Strengthen integration for all stakeholders at the borderlands** – Focus on integration from the design and planning stages of the project, and establish a sustainable and inclusive mechanism for government, private sector, NGOs, local authorities, and communities to integrate their operations.
- **Facilitate gender-transformative enterprise development and training** – Focus on interventions that can shift household power dynamics, and help women find employment outside the home and beyond traditional, lower-income women-dominated fields.
- **Leverage technology by designing, developing and promoting information sharing platforms** for facilitating cross-border trade.

Pavanello (2010) draws attention to the pivotal roles that regional bodies can play in coordinating and enabling the policy and legal environment to regulate cross-border dynamics, highlighting the need for donors to support these processes – e.g. through the African Union’s Border Programme.

5.4. Microfinance⁸ livelihood interventions

While microfinance is one of the most widely discussed and used livelihood intervention in FCAS, the outcomes and impacts from these interventions are not well evidenced, and some interventions have been poorly regarded (Mallett & Slater, 2015; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). Common donor microfinance interventions include credit provision, savings facilities, and insurance (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). Jacobsen and Fratzke (2016, p.18) reiterate the importance of context awareness in programme design, explaining how refugee microcredit programmes in the 1990s failed to adequately integrate local practices, attitudes, knowledge, and customs regarding loans, debt, and repayment, causing them to fail and become unsustainable. “Agencies did not understand how loans would be used (e.g. for consumption instead of business investment), nor did they anticipate that refugee loan recipients would take out other loans to repay agency loans, thus falling into dangerous indebtedness, or that the lack of consequences for non-repayment would undermine the program” (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18).

As migration and refugee flows increase, the importance of cross-border microfinance service delivery is also growing and requires greater attention (The Asia-Pacific Forum on Financial Inclusion, 2012; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.8). The main constraints facing refugees in starting or grow their businesses are access to credit and capital, and government restrictions (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). The Asia-Pacific Forum on Financial Inclusion (2012) outlines plans for better facilitation of cross-border microfinance including: regulators moving migrant workers from cash-to-cash transfers, to account-to-account transfers; financial education to increase awareness of formal channels and strengthen financial literacy; and allowing recipients’ remittances to be considered income to help establish credit and credit history.

⁸ For lessons on microfinance interventions related to livelihoods, see Mallett and Slater (2015).

5.5. Alternative livelihood interventions targeted at ex-combatants

DDR programmes often include livelihood elements in their aim to ‘reintegrate’ ex-combatants back into society, following a peace agreement or a demobilisation process. These interventions often take the form of public works schemes, training, or other employment interventions, and tend to be targeted at men (Blattman & Annan, 2016). Blattman and Annan (2016) explain how these programmes are rooted in three assumptions:

1. “That states can stimulate lawful employment by supplying training or capital”
2. “That lawful employment will decrease incentives for illegal work and rebellion”
3. “That jobs and higher incomes will socially and politically integrate men into society”

DDR programming has evolved significantly over the past few decades, with traditional DDR focused on ex-combatants, second generation DDR including communities and a wider approach to peacebuilding, and the “next generation” of DDR including ties to national development goals (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, in Idris, 2016b). Reintegration is often the “weakest link” in DDR, receiving the least funding and suffering from a public relations challenge where it is hard to enthuse governments and donors to fund it (Idris, 2016b).

Overall, reintegration programmes face “daunting challenges” due to the limited economic opportunities available for ex-combatants and to the limited information on the local political economies. This means that programmes often lack context-specific design and that training is often not matched well to employment and credit opportunities (TDRP, 2012). “The result is that ex-combatants can have their ability to diversify livelihood strategies restricted and so must endure enforced dependency upon subsistence agriculture and activities in the coping economy” (TDRP, 2012). DDR programmes also tend to favour men over women, and do not cater for specific needs women may face – for example, reintegration in Sierra Leone and Eritrea largely overlooked women (Bouta et al. 2005 in Anderlini, 2006). In a rapid literature review, Idris (2016b) summarises that while some DDR programmes have had positive effects – e.g. through engaging ex-combatants in productive activities, and building social cohesion – common problems include insufficient resources, lack of coordination among donor agencies, weaknesses in reintegration, and lack of transparency.

5.6. Migration livelihood interventions

While migration and remittances have been key livelihood strategies throughout history, they have become an increased focus of international development and foreign policy discussions and interventions over the past decade (Stites & Busby, 2017). This may be due to a range of factors, including, for example: increases in the number of people forcibly displaced (from 41 million in 2010 to 80 million in 2019) (UNHCR, 2020); and increases in the number of people seeking asylum in Europe (from 235,000 people in 2010, to a high of 1.28 million in 2015, to 676,000 in 2019) (EUROSTAT, 2020). Yet the vast majority of refugees are hosted by neighbouring developing countries.

One example of an intervention that combined livelihoods and migration is the ‘EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’ (EUTF). Castillejo (2017) argues that the EUTF is at the centre of a shift “towards a politically prioritised, security-focused response to migration”. Established in 2015, part of its work fosters

collaboration in cross-border areas of the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa, with core objectives that cover a wide range of conceptual lenses:⁹

- Greater economic and employment opportunities
- Strengthening the resilience of communities
- Improved migration management
- Improved governance and conflict prevention

Examples of the range of cross-border projects under the EUTF include:

- EUTF – Cross-border collaboration programme in Western Ethiopia and Eastern Sudan¹⁰
- EUTF – Omo Delta Project: Expanding the Rangeland to achieve Growth & Transformation in Turkana (Kenya) and South Omo (Ethiopia)¹¹
- EUTF – Cross-border cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Marsabit-Moyale cluster¹²
- EUTF – Regional Approaches for Sustainable Conflict Management and Integration (RASMI)¹³

Migration interventions combined with livelihood interventions are often critiqued for having unrealistic goals. For example, the push factors of displacement and irregular migration encompass a wide range of development challenges that are extremely difficult to address (Castillejo, 2017; Kipp, 2018). Research to date suggests that refugee-related programmes have little effect on emigration rates, as, while development cooperation can promote economic development, in poor countries economic development tends to actually cause emigration rates to rise (Kipp, 2018). Similarly, in some places, migration increases after conflict has ended (Maxwell et al., 2017). As Kipp (2018) emphasises, “economic motives cannot be viewed in isolation from other motives for emigration.” However, the European Court of Auditors (2018), in its analysis of the EUTF for Africa, finds that the EUTF “has contributed to the effort of decreasing the number of irregular migrants passing from Africa to Europe, but this contribution cannot be measured precisely.”

The goals of these interventions may be contradictory and lead to negative side effects, including increasing violence (Mallett & Slater, 2012). For example, EUTF interventions that have tightened laws and enforcement of people smuggling routes in Niger’s Agadez Region on the route to Libya have meant that people smugglers have moved to use more dangerous routes, and these interventions have effectively favoured transnational organised crime networks over individual people smugglers (Kipp, 2018; McAllister, 2020)). And EUTF interventions in Niger related to border protection have restricted regular migration in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – movement that has historically been an important livelihood resource (Kipp, 2018). However, Eaton et al. (2019) make an important point, that in conflict sub-economies, carrying out interventions with the aim of doing ‘less harm’ is the best option as any intervention is likely to have unforeseen and/or negative consequences. This highlights the need for developing a deep understanding of the operating environment combined with an honest assessment of

⁹ See EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa webpage – https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en.

¹⁰ See EU webpage – <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/8800/#summary>.

¹¹ See EU webpage – <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/6770/>.

¹² See EU webpage – <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/7093/#summary>.

¹³ See EU webpage – <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/6570/#summary>.

the risks and the actual opportunities for change. Castillejo (2017) argues that “the most controversial aspect of the EUTF” is that it diverts development aid from its supposed aim of poverty reduction.

Combining livelihood interventions with migration objectives is also widely criticised for its lack of alignment with partner countries’ agendas, undermining the aid effectiveness principle of partnership (Monteiro, 2019; Castillejo, 2017; Kipp, 2018). For example, while the EUTF prioritises a focus on irregular migration flows, reducing arrivals, and ensuring African compliance on returns and readmissions, African countries tend to prioritise “facilitating legal migration into Europe, building resilience and employment, and harnessing remittances for development” (Castillejo, 2017). Kipp (2018) stresses that, according to core aid effectiveness principles, “only a partnership-led approach based on a balance of interests has any prospect of success. Financial incentives alone cannot create functioning migration partnerships”.

Further, migration programming that is not aligned with partners’ interests risks alienating African partners, and overlooking local knowledge, priorities, and capacities (Castillejo, 2017). Castillejo (2017) emphasises that “African diplomats express frustration that the EU has offered little space to incorporate African interests”. This risk of damaging relations is heightened by the rise in power and interest of non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors – such as China – that offer development cooperation and financial aid with fewer political demands (Kipp, 2018). Illustrative examples highlight this risk of alienation and the importance of understanding how interventions are shaped differently by the local socio-political contexts. For example, in the case of the EU Migration Partnership with Ethiopia, Kipp (2018) critiques it as tending to worsen rather than improve relations between Ethiopia and the EU, as the EU’s focus on repatriating Ethiopian citizens dominated the process and threatened to undermine other aspects of the agreement. Further, remittances from Ethiopians living abroad provide three times as much revenue to Ethiopia as total development aid, therefore it is not in Ethiopia’s interest to focus entirely on repatriation (Kipp, 2018). Alternatively, the EU Migration Partnership with Niger did not face this problem as Niger is not a big country of origin for irregular migration to Europe, instead being an important transit country for illegal migration (Kipp, 2018).

5.7. Serious and organised crime (SOC) livelihood interventions

In tackling the effects of serious and organised crime (SOC) on development, programming falls into four principal areas: (a) alternative development and/or rural livelihoods/development promotion for drug crop-producing communities (e.g. poppy farmers and coca farmers); (b) alternative livelihoods promotion for rural populations engaged in wildlife crime, (e.g. illegal hunting and poaching); (c) alternative livelihoods promotion for populations at risk of engaging in piracy; and (d) gang violence reduction and citizen security enhancement (Schultze-Kraft, 2018). However, in general, there have been limited livelihood interventions in the area of SOC, as SOC tends to have been understood and framed as a security problem for states, not a development issue; thus policy responses focus on responsive/law enforcement approaches rather than preventative/developmental approaches (Schultze-Kraft, 2018).

There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of SOC livelihood interventions, finds Schultze-Kraft (2018) in a literature review. For example, even in the so-called success stories (e.g. suppressing opium poppy farming and heroin production in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam), there is no evidence that alternative development and the promotion of alternative livelihoods has been the main factor contributing to the reduction of the illicit opium economy. A study on men at high risk¹⁴ of being re-recruited into violence in

¹⁴ This study does not limit itself only to ex-combatants, but by looking at “high-risk” men in post-war Liberia it includes many ex-combatants.

post-war Liberia highlights that although states and aid agencies use employment programmes to rehabilitate high-risk men in the belief that peaceful work opportunities will deter them from crime and violence, rigorous evidence is rare (Blattman & Annan, 2016)

There are examples where alternative development programming has led to negative impacts – e.g. in Afghanistan “the increased production of staples or high value horticulture, have marginalised the land-poor, leading to changes in land tenure arrangements, the migration of vulnerable groups and the concentration of drug production in more remote and insecure regions” (Schultze-Kraft, 2018). Ultimately, the literature on alternative livelihoods focuses primarily on the outcomes in terms of the effect on levels of illicit drug crop cultivation, without discussing additional effects on stability and security (Haider, 2012).

5.8. Vocational training and skills development livelihood interventions

There is little evidence – and no definitive causal link – on the relationship between livelihoods and skills programming and conflict prevention (Altai Consulting, 2019, p.6). For example, an impact evaluation conducted in Afghanistan found that “while vocational training increased employment, improved employment did not have any impact on the willingness to use violence for political or other reasons” (Mercy Corps, 2015, in Altai Consulting, 2019, p.13). Further, most studies looking at whether participation in skills or livelihoods development projects could directly contribute to conflict prevention find no significant effect (Altai Consulting, 2019). In fact, some studies find it may be counterproductive to provide education or training if it does not directly lead to effective employment (Altai Consulting, 2019).

6. Cross-cutting lessons

6.1. Border-sensitive interventions

Interventions should be ‘border-sensitive’, as border areas can be conflict and insecurity hot spots where political and geopolitical interests may be heightened. This can exacerbate the risk that interventions are designed with multiple, conflicting goals, or that they include goals that contradict the interests of local, regional, or host country actors. These factors all complicate the successful impacts of the interventions, and increase the possibility of negative side-effects. It also brings into question the appropriate roles and responsibilities of external actors vis-à-vis issues such as local ownership, sovereignty, etc.

As conflict and insecurity hot spots, “the impact of development efforts on state-society relations, political settlements and conflict dynamics in borderland zones are likely to be magnified” (Goodhand, 2018, p.36; Lambroschini & Hulofo, 2011). Thus, it is important to consider how the costs and benefits of interventions are shared, and how that affects political and social stability (Goodhand, 2018, p.36). Yet, as is reiterated throughout this paper, too often context analysis is insufficient, especially on cross-border elements, or the analysis is not adequately followed during programme implementation (e.g. UNHCR, 2018; Levine & Pavanello, 2012; Pavanello, 2010). Also, too often, the views and interests of local communities on all sides of a border are not adequately included in programme analysis and design limiting the programmes’ understanding of local realities, and the legitimacy and effectiveness of interventions. Conversely, cross-border or cross-group processes can help develop shared understandings of challenges and strategies (Wasafiri, 2020; BORESHA & DDG, 2020).

Cross-border livelihood interventions should be more honestly assessed according to the local, domestic, and regional political and policy contexts, and according to the motivations, capacities, and

practicalities/realities of the funders (Holzaepfel & Jacobsen, 2015; Paris & Sisk, 2007). For example, illustrative questions include: are the stated goals of programmes the actual goals? Is there an honest assessment of the risks and the actual opportunities for change? (Castillejo, 2017). Are project cycles and budgets adequate enough to achieve impacts? (UNHCR, 2018). Are domestic limitations adequately considered, such as access to credit and capital, government restrictions, and social norms of exclusion towards foreigners? (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016; De Haan et al., 2014).

Analytical tools need to include analysis of: cross-border war economy networks (TDRP, 2012); **cross-border commodity chain analysis** (e.g. from the local to the international level) (Collinson, 2003); conflict sensitivity (e.g. refugee and host community relations) (USAID, 2005; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016); and national and regional legal and policy frameworks (Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011). On national and regional legal and policy frameworks, analysis that can clarify mandates across borders is particularly useful to avoid geographic, legal, and administrative confusion and competition (Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011), suggesting the need to develop more integrated approaches to livelihoods interventions across borders.

6.2. Context-specific interventions

Conflict economies are highly complex and dynamic, and as local contexts vary, the extrapolation of lessons from one context to another is problematic (TDRP, 2012; Mallett & Slater, 2015; Maxwell et al., 2017; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). FCAS are often characterised by change and uncertainty; therefore, an intervention that might make sense or work at one point in time may not at another (Mallett & Slater, 2015). Indeed, the literature widely acknowledges that externally driven livelihood interventions “need[s] to be much more concerned with understanding this context and less concerned with implementing grand programme designs, or replicating successful programmes from outside the context” (Maxwell et al., 2017, p.31).

Ultimately, the effectiveness of livelihood programming is shaped by the context, and interventions that are not underpinned by good context analysis are negatively affected (e.g. Maxwell et al., 2017; Schultze-Kraft, 2018; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016; International Alert, 2016). For example, many rehabilitation projects in Angola in the 1990s did not understand that displaced people had developed new livelihood strategies tying them to urban areas, thus when some projects encouraged moving back to rural areas, they threatened the resilience that people had developed in response to the conflict (USAID, 2005, p.11). And ultimately, interventions in FCAS are at risk of legitimising and strengthening conflict actors – thus analysis of the context is essential to mitigate this risk (Eaton et al., 2019, p.viii).

Yet too often, sufficient analysis is not carried out especially on cross-border elements, or analysis is not followed during programme implementation. Thus, many livelihood recovery programmes neglect the context, needs and priorities of the population, fail to understand the structure of the informal economy, structures, and institutions, and struggle to be informed about who can access and succeed in various livelihoods (Maxwell et al., 2017). For example, skills development courses for refugees are often focused on formal sector employment yet host country limits on legal status or work rights often prevent refugees from participating in the formal economy (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.2). Inappropriately designed interventions can cause harm to local populations, can damage local economic activity, and can increase profit margins for those controlling violence and violent economies (Pugh & Cooper, 2004, in Rohwerder, 2013). Concurrently, “a recent project with Iraqi women in Jordan has been viewed as a success in part because the programme focuses on helping participants develop home-based businesses, rather than entering wage employment, due to legal limitations on participants’ right to work as well as cultural considerations” (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18).

A range of factors constrain the extent and quality of analysis, including lack of time, funding and staff capacity and knowledge to design and implement initiatives; the complexity of FCAS environments; limited evidence and data; biases; and access (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18). Overall, SLRC research finds there have been insufficient evaluations of livelihood programmes, creating a knowledge gap that hinders the development of evidence-based programming (Maxwell et al., 2017; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). This is exacerbated by the complicated research environment of many FCAS – e.g. lessons from DDR livelihood programming reveal that local political economy information is often limited (TDRP, 2012). Similarly, a key challenge identified by a study on the Syria refugee response in five neighbouring countries highlights significant information gaps on livelihoods and economic opportunities (UNHCR-UNDP, 2018). Further, the study identifies that “outdated assumptions, that women do not want to work, or that it is culturally inappropriate for them to do so” mean that programming is not tailored to the needs and wishes of working poor women (UNHCR-UNDP, 2018, p.11).

6.3. Analytical tools for better context analysis

To address the knowledge deficit and the need for context-specific interventions, the literature recommends: more and better analysis (with specific forms recommended); programming based on the analysis; and the integration of local actors into analysis processes and programme implementation.

The literature is replete with recommendations to improve context awareness through better analysis, ranging from recommended analytical models (e.g. conflict analysis) to analytical elements to include e.g. cross-border dynamics or networks, with variation according to the type of intervention and the context. Examples include:

- **Livelihoods analysis** – “A livelihoods approach starts by investigating how individuals, households, and communities seek to achieve and sustain their livelihoods. Livelihood analysis is cross-sectoral, and seeks to take into account all economic, political, social, and cultural factors affecting people’s lives and livelihoods from the local up to the national and international levels. In analysing individual, household, and community livelihood strategies, their different assets (land, social networks, education, etc.), and ways to cope with conflict situations, several questions suggest themselves: what does the livelihood ‘portfolio’ of a given social group look like? How and why is this changing over time, i.e. is it a long-term response to environmental change, a response to changing market conditions, or a short-term response to a direct threat? How long-term is people’s outlook, and how is this reflected in the way they use and manage their assets? Are they saving or depleting their assets for the sake of immediate survival?” (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005, p.19; Collinson, 2003; USAID, 2005). Gender sensitive livelihoods analysis focuses on how gender roles and responsibilities have changed due to conflict, resulting in new livelihood strategies, and the opportunities and challenges this brings.
- **Conflict analysis** – Ongoing and regular conflict analysis focuses on the profile, actors, causes, and dynamics of conflicts (Herbert, 2017). In a cross-border context, this will include analysis of cross-border and regional actors, networks and systems (Wasafiri, 2020). In a refugee/host community context, this will include analysis of ethnic or religious differences, armed group presence, and land contestation (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18). This is the basis of conflict-sensitive programming (see below).
- **Political economy analysis** – Focusing on the interaction of political and economic processes: “the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the

processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time” (Collinson, 2003). This could be supported by commodity chain analysis and livelihoods analysis.

- **Commodity chain analysis** – Focusing on power relationships, governance structures, and exchange relationships within commercial networks related to key conflict-related resources (e.g. opium, timber, diamonds). This includes analysis of: the network from production to consumption and from the local level to the international; who controls the commodities and exchanges; and who controls the means of violence and distribution of profits (Collinson, 2003).
- **Economic market assessment tools** – E.g. the Emergency Market Mapping Assessment analyses livelihood interventions against market realities, value chains, market niches, service sectors, and employment opportunities (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18).
- **Analysis of national legal and policy frameworks** – This is particularly important in cross-border contexts, where laws and frameworks can vary widely and can pose operational challenges – e.g. regarding labour laws, import/export of goods, vehicle movements, livestock movement, etc. (Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011, p.2-3).
- **Analysis of networks** – “The dynamic nature of war economies, the interrelation of geographies and actors, and the mobility of war economies whereby economic activity can shift from country to country, region to region or indeed from market (sub-national and international) to market, can be captured through using the concept of ‘networks’” (TDRP, 2012).

6.4. Conflict-sensitive approaches

The literature widely acknowledges the need for livelihood interventions to be conflict-sensitive, recognising that they can cause harm (Maxwell et al., 2017; Lambroschini & Hulufu, 2011). Conflict sensitivity in programming is the ability to: 1) understand the context; 2) understand the interaction between the intervention and that context; and 3) act on this understanding to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on conflict (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.2). This is particularly relevant for FCAS; indeed Duffield (2001) argues that the merging of agendas has led to more accommodation and complicity of international actors in complex conflict dynamics (Duffield, 2001). In SLRC’s analysis of livelihood interventions, they identify that some programme posed “considerable risk to the participants” (Mallett & Slater, 2015).

There are anecdotal examples in the literature of how conflict sensitivity thinking has been used in livelihood programming. For example, regarding the importance of timing interventions alongside analysis of conflict dynamics, USAID (2005) finds that livelihoods support in FCAS can help strengthen trust between communities when people are ready to communicate and collaborate; conversely it can inflame tensions if enough trust is not present. It advises watching for patterns of pragmatic cooperation and building on them. For example, in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, some of the first people to foster reconciliation were traders on opposing sides of the conflict (USAID, 2005). In relation to tensions around refugee livelihood interventions in Lebanon, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) aims for half of its beneficiaries to be host community Lebanese nationals, and half to be refugees (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p.18). In relation to pastoralist interventions and cross-border tensions, Lambroschini and Hulufu (2011, p.2-3) recommend that development partners start projects by focusing on non-contentious issues to build trust between communities.

6.5. Participatory and locally relevant programme design and implementation

A core theme across the literature is the need for programming to integrate participatory processes with local communities to ensure programmes are locally relevant and appropriate according to the needs, knowledge, aspirations, assets, and skills of the beneficiaries (the idea of ‘capitals’ – see section 2) (e.g. TDRP, 2012; Eulenberger et. al., n.d.; UNDP, 2017b; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). Local communities can help develop an understanding of what has succeeded or failed in the past, of current and past responses to livelihood threats, and of current needs (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016; USAID, 2005). This is especially relevant as livelihood interventions are “most effective” when building on existing capacities and efforts at the local level (USAID, 2005). Cross-group, or cross-border, processes can also help develop shared understandings of challenges and strategies (Wasafiri, 2020; BORESHA & DDG, 2020). In fact, cross-border committees and meetings are key programme outputs in some of the interventions reviewed in this paper such as the BORESHA and RREAD pastoralist programmes (see sections 5.2 and 5.3; BORESHA & DDG, 2020; Levine & Pavanello, 2012). In relation to DDR, TDRP (2012) suggest building “good enough coalitions”, including civil society. In relation to pastoralist programming, De Haan et al. (2014) highlight the need for true participation and inclusion of pastoralists in deciding what kind of development interventions are needed and in governance mechanisms (De Haan et al., 2014). Such processes require conflict-sensitive organisation and facilitation – e.g. it is essential to devise a strategy in advance for how to reach a compromise among the participants when positions are likely to be entrenched (UNDP, 2017b).

Yet despite their unique knowledge and capacities, borderlanders are “largely ignored and unused in formal governance and development practice” (Eulenberger et. al., n.d.). SLRC research warns that livelihood programmes “often appear to be supply-side driven, to prioritise donors’ objectives rather than beneficiaries’ specific needs, and to evaluate output over actual impact on the ground” (Maxwell et al., 2017). This risk increases in line with the level of political interest a region or an intervention evokes for external actors.

6.6. Role and capacity of external actors

The wider donor context and political shifts in donor countries are also important contextual aspects to understand and integrate into planning – e.g. how new and intensified challenges like migration and terrorism affect aid flows, aid priorities, safety concerns for aid workers, etc. (Holzaepfel & Jacobsen, 2015). This is especially important for longer-term livelihood programmes (Holzaepfel & Jacobsen, 2015; Wasafiri, 2020), although donors often struggle to reconcile short aid timelines with long-term developmental needs (Paris & Sisk, 2007). For example, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan for the five countries affected by the Syrian crisis¹⁵ reveals a predominance of emergency/short-term initiatives and significant gaps in long-term sustainable livelihoods, employment and inclusive economic growth interventions (also echoed in section 5.1) (UNHCR-UNDP, 2018; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016).

Ultimately, the legitimacy and effectiveness of external actor engagement in state- and peacebuilding processes is characterised by tensions, contradictions and dilemmas (Paris & Sisk, 2007). Lambroschini and Hulufo (2011, p.2-3) highlight how certain cross-border issues can be extremely contentious to local communities, bordering governments, and also international relations. Examples of cross-border issues include disarmament, security, infrastructure development, and natural resource management (e.g. building a dam on one side of a border). Cross-border contexts herald more administrative and legal

¹⁵ Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

hurdles to ensure a project is not just implemented as two or three projects in different countries (Lambroschini & Hulofo, 2011). Meanwhile, coordination issues across the plethora of external actors continue to affect aid effectiveness (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016).

7. References

- Altai Consulting (2019). *Conflict prevention, peace, and economic opportunities for the youth: Lessons learned from a consortium approach to stability and conflict prevention in Kenya*. Report. European Union.
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/mls_kenya_youth_case_study_021219.pdf
- Altai Consulting (2020). *EUTF Monitoring and Learning System. HoA yearly 2019 report covering until 31 December 2019. 8th quarterly monitoring report for the EUTF Horn of Africa region*. Report. European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eutf_hoa_2019_-_q4_annual_report.pdf
- Anderlini, S. N. (2006). *Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations*. Social Development Papers, No. 33, World Bank.
<https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/449571468144266512/pdf/351500MainstreamingGender0WP3301Public1.pdf>
- Asia-Pacific Forum on Financial Inclusion (2012). *Asia-Pacific Forum on Financial Inclusion: Approaches, Regulations and Cross-Border Issues*. Conference report. The Banking with the Poor Network Ltd & The Foundation for Development Cooperation.
<https://www.findevgateway.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/mfg-en-paper-asia-pacific-forum-on-financial-inclusion-approaches-regulations-and-cross-border-issues-jun-2012.pdf>
- Avis, W. (2018). *Rebuilding pastoralist livelihoods during and after conflict*. K4D Helpdesk Report 421. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c6c047ce5274a72be398f02/rebuilding.pdf>
- Ballentine, K. & Nitzschke, H. (2005). *The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation*. Handbook. Berghof Foundation. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71733125.pdf>
- Barakat, S. & Waldman, T. (2013). Conflict analysis for the twenty-first century. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 13(3), 259–83. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2013.811048>
- Betts, A. (2009). *Development assistance and refugees. Towards a North-South grand bargain?* Policy Briefing. Refugee Studies Centre. <https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/pb2-development-assistance-refugees-2009.pdf>
- Blanton, R. G., Early, B., & Peksen, D. (2018). Out of the shadows or into the dark? Economic openness, IMF programs, and the growth of shadow economies. *The Review of International Organizations*, 13(2), 309-333. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-018-9298-3>
- Blattman, C., & Annan, J. (2016). Can employment reduce lawlessness and rebellion? A field experiment with high-risk men in a fragile state. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1), 1-17.
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/can-employment-reduce-lawlessness-and-rebellion-a-field-experiment-with-highrisk-men-in-a-fragile-state/BAD0B309BD8AB92BBCEB7CAD6E999213>
- Building Opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa (BORESHA) & Danish Demining Group (DDG) (2020). *Freedom from fear and freedom from want. Towards Safe and Sustainable Cross-Border Trade*.

- Position paper. BORESHA Consortium. <https://boreshahoa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/BORESHA-Position-Paper.pdf>
- BORESHA (2018). *Baseline survey-building opportunities for resilience in the Horn of Africa (BORESHA) program*. Report. BORESHA. <https://boreshahoa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/baseline-survey-final-report.pdf>
- Browne, E. (2013). *Livelihoods in fragile contexts* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 942). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. <https://gsdrc.org/publications/livelihoods-in-fragile-contexts/>
- Castillejo, C. (2017). *The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: what implications for future EU development policy?* Briefing paper. German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/briefing-paper/article/the-european-union-trust-fund-for-africa-what-implications-for-future-eu-development-policy/>
- Chambers, R., & Conway, G. (1992). *Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century*. Discussion Paper. Institute of Development Studies. <https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/sustainable-rural-livelihoods-practical-concepts-for-the-21st-century/>
- Chatelard, G. (2011). *Iraqi refugees: making the urban refugee approach context-specific*. ODI. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_report_109.pdf
- Cockburn, C. (2004). "The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace." In *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones*, edited by Giles, W. & Hyndman, J. pp. 24-44. University of California Press.
- Collinson, S. (2003). *Power, livelihoods and conflict: case studies in political economy analysis for humanitarian action*. ODI. <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/289.pdf>
- Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. (2012). *How to guide to conflict sensitivity*. Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. http://local.conflictsensitivity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/6602_HowToGuide_CSF_WEB_3.pdf
- Cramer, C. (2015). *Jobs, Unemployment and Violence* (GSDRC Professional Development Reading Pack No. 10.). University of Birmingham, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. <http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/reading-packs/jobsunemploymentviolencecp.pdf>
- De Guerry, Stocchiero & CONCORD EUTF (2018). *Monitoring the Migration Compacts and EU Trust Fund for Africa: partnership or conditionality?* CONCORD & CINI. https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CONCORD_EUTrustFundReport_2018_online.pdf
- De Haan, C., Dubern, E., Garancher, B., & Quintero, C. (2014). *Pastoralism Development in the Sahel A Road to Stability?* World Bank. http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/18-ABCA_Pastoralism_and_stability_in_the_Sahel_master_-_Final_for_translation-June_9_2014.pdf
- Duffield, M. (2001). *Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security*. (1st ed.). Zed Books.
- Duffield, M. (2014). *Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security*. (2nd ed.). Zed Books Ltd.
- Easton-Calabria, E., & Omata, N. (2016). *Micro-finance in refugee contexts: current scholarship and research gaps*. Working Paper Series No, 116. Refugee Studies Centre. <https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/micro-finance-in-refugee-contexts-current-scholarship-and-research-gaps>

- Eaton, T., Mansour, R., Khatib, L., Cheng, C., Yazigi, J., Salisbury, P. (2019). *Conflict Economies in the Middle East and North Africa*. Chatham House. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/conflict-economies-middle-east-and-north-africa>
- Eulenberger, I., Feyissa, D., Iyer, P., Gebresenbet, F., Adugna, F. Tefera, S., Hoehne, M., Lokwang, A., Eaton, D. (n.d.) *Agenda-setting report for the Borderlands Working Group*. DANIDA. <http://www.bkhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Agenda-setting-report-for-the-Borderlands-Working-Group-FINAL.pdf>
- European Court of Auditors (2018). *European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Flexible but lacking focus*. European Court of Auditors. <https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/eutf-for-africa-32-2018/en/>
- EUROSTAT. (2020). *Asylum statistics*. Webpage. EUROSTAT. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics
- Fishstein, P. (2014). *Despair or hope: rural livelihoods and opium poppy dynamics in Afghanistan*. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5428fc074.html>
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167–91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690>
- Goodhand, J. (2004). From war economy to peace economy? Reconstruction and state building in Afghanistan. *Journal of International Affairs*, 155-174. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357940>
- Goodhand, J. (2018). *The Centrality of the Margins: The political economy of conflict and development in borderlands*. Working Paper. Borderlands Asia. http://www.borderlandsasia.org/uploads/1579261490_The%20Centrality%20of%20the%20Margins.pdf
- Haider, H. (2012). *Alternative Livelihoods*. Helpdesk report. GSDRC. <https://gsdrc.org/publications/alternative-livelihoods/>
- Herbert, S. (2013). *Responding to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon: lessons learned*. Helpdesk Research Report 987. GSDRC, University of Birmingham. <https://www.alnap.org/help-library/responding-to-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-in-lebanon-lessons-learned>
- Herbert, S. (2017). *Conflict analysis: Topic guide*. GSDRC, University of Birmingham. <https://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/conflict-analysis/>
- Herbert, S. Haider, H., Lenhardt A. & Maguire, M. (2021, forthcoming). *How to analyse resilience in fragile and conflict affected contexts: case studies in Ethiopia and Myanmar*. Working paper. GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Holzaepfel, E. A. & Jacobsen, K. (2015). *Synthesis report: Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOS/PRM Livelihoods Programs in Ethiopia and Burundi*. US Department of State. <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/evaluating-the-effectiveness-of-dos-prm-livelihoods.pdf>
- Idris, I. (2016a). *Youth unemployment and violence: Rapid literature review*. GSDRC, University of Birmingham. <https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/youth-unemployment-and-violence-rapid-literature-review>
- Idris, I. (2016b). *Lessons from DDR programmes* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1368). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

- Idris, I. (2017a). *Cash transfer platforms in humanitarian contexts*. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1416). University of Birmingham, GSDRC. <https://gsdrc.org/publications/cash-transfer-platforms-in-humanitarian-contexts/>
- Idris, I. (2017b). *Conflict-sensitive cash transfers: unintended negative consequences*. (K4D Helpdesk Report 200). Institute of Development Studies. <https://gsdrc.org/publications/conflict-sensitive-cash-transfers-unintended-negative-consequences/>
- International Alert (2016). *Rethinking drug policy from a peacebuilding perspective. Studies from Afghanistan, Colombia–Peru and Nigeria*. International Alert. https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Crime_RethinkingDrugPolicy_EN_2016.pdf
- Jacobsen, K., & Fratzke, S. (2016). *Building livelihood opportunities for refugee populations: lessons from past practice*. Migration Policy Institute. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/building-livelihood-opportunities-refugee-populations-lessons-past-practice>
- Jacobson, J. & Joekes, S. (2019). *Violence against Women Traders at Border Crossings, Work and Opportunities for Women (WOW) Helpdesk Query No. 31*. WOW Helpdesk. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/876256/Query-31-VAW-Traders.pdf
- Kipp, D. (2018). *From Exception to Rule – the EU Trust Fund for Africa*. Research Paper. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/eu-trust-fund-for-africa/>
- Lambroschini, S. & Hulufu, H. (2011). *Draft good practice principles for cross border programming in the drylands of the Horn of Africa*. ACTED, CARE & The Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/draft-good-practice-principles-cross-border-programming-drylands-horn-africa>
- Levine, S. & Pavanello, S. (2012). *Rules of the Range: Natural resources management in Kenya-Ethiopia border areas*. Working Paper. ODI. <https://www.odi.org/publications/6401-rules-range-natural-resources-management-kenya-ethiopia-border-areas>
- Mallet & Slater (2012). *Growth and Livelihoods in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC). <https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/Growth-and-livelihoods-in-conflict-affected-situations.pdf>
- Mallett, R. & Slater, R. (2015). Livelihoods, conflict and aid programming: is the evidence base good enough? *Disasters*, 40, 226-245. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/disa.12142>
- Maxwell, D., Mazurana, D., Wagner, M. & Slater, R. (2017). *Livelihoods, conflict and recovery: findings from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium*. SLRC. <https://www.odi.org/publications/10837-livelihoods-conflict-and-recovery-findings-secure-livelihoods-research-consortium>
- McAllister, E. (2020, 5 August). EU effort to stem African migration leaves some ex-smugglers empty handed. News article. *Reuters*. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-niger-migrants-europe-insight/eu-effort-to-stem-african-migration-leaves-some-ex-smugglers-empty-handed-idUKKCN2510TB>
- Monteiro, J. (2019). *The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: a literature review*. Working paper. Observatório Político. http://www.observatoriopolitico.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/WP_88_JM.pdf
- Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) (2018). *Mapping Study of the Conflict Prevention Capabilities of African Regional Economic Communities*. OSAA. <https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/events/2018/20181107/mappingReport.pdf>

- Paris, R. & Sisk, T. (2007). *Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding*. Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding, International Peace Academy.
<https://www.ipinst.org/2007/11/managing-contradictions-the-inherent-dilemmas-of-postwar-statebuilding>
- Parshotam, A. & Balongo, S. (2020). *Women traders in East Africa: The case study of the Busia One Stop Border Post*. Paper. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).
<https://www.africaportal.org/publications/women-traders-east-africa-case-study-busia-one-stop-border-post/>
- Pavanello, S. (2010). *Working across borders. Harnessing the potential of cross-border activities to improve livelihood security in the Horn of Africa drylands*. ODI.
<https://www.odi.org/publications/4997-working-across-borders-harnessing-potential-cross-border-activities-improve-livelihood-security-horn>
- Ramsbotham, A., & Zartman, I. W. (Eds.). (2011). *Paix sans frontières: Building peace across borders*. Conciliation Resources. http://www.rcsglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/rcs/pdfs/RCS-Global-Trade_development_peace_in_Great_Lakes_Garrett_Seay-2011.pdf
- Rohwerder, B. (2013). *The shadow economy in conflict-affected contexts* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1046). GSDRC, University of Birmingham. <https://gsdrc.org/docs/open/HDQ1046.pdf>
- Saferworld (2011). *The securitisation of aid?* Briefing. Saferworld.
<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/505>
- Schafer, J. (2002). *Supporting Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict and Political Instability: Overview of Conceptual Issues*. ODI. <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2686.pdf>
- Schultze-Kraft, M. (2018). *Serious and organised crime and livelihoods programmes*. K4D Helpdesk Report. Institute of Development Studies. <https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/serious-and-organised-crime-and-livelihoods-programmes>
- Scoones, I. (1998). *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis*. Working Paper 72. Institute of Development Studies. <https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/sustainable-rural-livelihoods-a-framework-for-analysis/>
- Scoones, I. (2009). Livelihoods perspectives and rural development. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36:1, 171-196. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150902820503>
- Standley, S. (2012). *Building resilience in a complex environment*. Briefing Paper Issue 04. CARE.
<https://www.care.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Building-resilience.pdf>
- Stites, E. & Bushby, K. (2017). *Livelihood strategies and interventions in fragile and conflict-affected areas: Assessing trends and changes from 2012 to 2016*. SLRC. https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/7.-Livelihood-strategies-and-interventions-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-areas_-2012-to-2016.pdf
- Tanner, T., Bahadur, A., & Moench, M. (2017). *Challenges for resilience policy and practice*. ODI.
<https://www.odi.org/publications/10903-challenges-resilience-policy-and-practice>
- Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) (2012). *Sustainable Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Shadow Economies and Cross-Border Trade*. Discussion Note. TDRP.
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39113-doc-79._sustainable_reintegration_of_ex-co_mbatants_shadow_economies_and_cross_border_trade.pdf

- UNDP (2013). *Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations*. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group, UNDP.
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/20130215_UNDP%20LER_guide_summary.pdf
- UNDP (2017a). *Conflict Sensitivity: Experiences from UNDP's Local & Community Development Practice*. UNDP.
https://www.mm.undp.org/content/myanmar/en/home/library/poverty/Conflict_Sensitivity_Expereinces_from_UNDP_Local_and_Community_Practise.html
- UNDP (2017b). *Application of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework in Development Projects*. Guidance Note. UNDP.
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rblac/docs/Research%20and%20Publications/Poverty%20Reduction/UNDP_RBLAC_Livelihoods%20Guidance%20Note_EN-210July2017.pdf
- UNHCR (2018). *Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches*. UNHCR.
<https://www.unhcr.org/5c51a0774.pdf>
- UNHCR (2020). *Global trends: forced displacement in 2019*. UNHCR.
<https://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-trends-2019.html>
- UNHCR & UNDP (2018). *Improving Livelihoods and Economic Opportunities for Syrian Refugees and Host Communities: Countries Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey*. Report. UNHCR & UNDP.
<https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/SyriaResponse/Livelihoods%20Sector%20Brochure%20Ono%20crop%20marks.pdf>
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2019a). *Gender-sensitive policy recommendations to support women cross-border traders in Malawi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia*. UNCTAD. <https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2589>
- UNCTAD (2019b). *Borderline: Women in informal cross-border trade in Malawi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia*. UNCTAD. <https://unctad.org/node/5526>
- USAID (2005). *Livelihoods & conflict*. USAID. <http://www.hiproweb.org/fileadmin/cdroms/biblio-reference-0912/documents/RRD-187-USAID%20Livelihoods%20and%20Conflict.pdf>
- Vaughn, J. (2009). The unlikely securitizer: Humanitarian organizations and the securitization of indistinctiveness. *Security Dialogue*, 40(3), 263-285.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26299791?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
- Wasafiri (2020). *Strengthening responses to cross-border conflict and complexity*. Webpage. Wasafiri.
<https://www.wasafirihub.com/impact-areas/strengthening-responses-to-cross-border-conflict-and-complexity/#toggle-id-3>
- Wils, O., Hopp, U., Ropers, N., Vimalarajah, L. & Zunzer, W. (2006). *The Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation*. Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/SCT_Systemic_Conflict_Transformation_Complete.pdf