This Crisis States Research Centre paper examines the strategic and institutional dimensions of mediation. It argues that international mediation should involve confidence-building rather than coercive diplomacy and should be pursued (by highly proficient and experienced mediators) as a specialised activity. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), should establish the Panel of the Wise, a sub-structure of the Council, as an expert mediation unit that is independent of states.
Poorly conducted mediation can exacerbate conflict. International mediators diminish the prospect of ending conflict when they deviate from the principles of confidence-building mediation. The key to effective mediation lies in understanding, managing and transforming the political and psychological dynamics of serious conflict that make parties fiercely resistant to negotiations. Three strategic implications result from this emphasis on trust:
- Mediators should not be partisan – Through the presence and support of a trusted third party, mediation can provide a relatively calm and safe space for the adversaries to articulate and explore ways of meeting their respective concerns. A mediator’s acceptability and effectiveness may be greatly diminished by partisanship.
- Mediators should not engage in punitive action – A mediating body will almost certainly lose the confidence and cooperation of a party against whom it threatens or applies sanctions or military force. Punitive action destroys the mediator’s credibility as an honest broker, makes the mediator a party to the conflict and undermines the peace process in numerous ways.
- The parties must own the settlement – if a mediator attempts to thrust on the parties a solution that is inimical to their interests, they are likely to conclude that the mediator has sided with their opponent. Agreements that are reached under duress will have scant value in the absence of a genuine commitment to peace and reconciliation.
Peacemaking by multinational organisations is often prejudiced by the partisan interests of member states. In the case of the African Union, a structural solution to this problem would lie in establishing an expert mediation unit that functions independently of states. Independence would allow the mediators to engage in low-profile preventive diplomacy long before a conflict reached crisis proportions and attracted the attention of plenary organs. Their flexibility would not be constrained by vested interests and they could more easily make contact with parties that had acquired pariah status. Most importantly, their impartiality and lack of coercive power would make their efforts less threatening to the parties.
- It would be a mistake to appoint retired heads of state and other national leaders to the Panel of the Wise. The Panel’s credibility should derive from the mediation expertise of its members. The Panel should thus comprise people with a proven track record as mediators.
- Without sufficient resources, the Panel of Wise will not be able to perform its functions properly, but human resources are a key consideration.
- Panel activities could include: preventive diplomacy; facilitating dialogue through shuttle diplomacy; preparing for, mediating in and managing formal negotiations; and assisting in dispute-resolution during the implementation of settlements.
NB: At the beginning of 2009 the African Union embarked on a serious discussion on mediation.
