How can liberal representative democracy work in plural or segmented societies? Why have former dominant or single party regimes, especially those in Africa, generally survived and even emerged strengthened after multi-party competitive elections? How can the case of Côte D’Ivoire illustrate the problems faced by emerging political oppositions in these circumstances? What is the logic of forming improbable coalitions under these conditions?
This African Affairs article looks at how the ruling party in Côte D’Ivoire has been able to win elections since 1990 by using incumbency to present itself as an organisation capable of forming a working coalition. Over this period opposition parties have been unable to escape their extremely localised strongholds. Multi-party elections have therefore had a limited impact on the dominance of the former single party, and have been unable to generate the popular pressure required to lead to the ousting of entrenched political elites.
This article contends that the Ivorian case is significant because the logic of its political life is largely determined by certain key social and political characteristics which it shares with most other African states and countries world-wide. It is found that to be successful in elections, oppositions have to demonstrate that they have the potential to be on the ‘winning’ side, or at the very least have the ability to win concessions from the ruling power. Other key findings include:
- The introduction of multi-party elections has both positive and negative effects, in that it will inevitably politicise new areas in society, but it may also have the effect of reinforcing the prevailing control structures.
- When political parties emerge from the ‘underground’ shortly before the first multi-party elections, they have little time to mobilise support within the administration and the media.
- There are two apparently contradictory qualities that a political party needs to succeed in these circumstances. It requires a power base derived from one of the social segments – although appearing to support a particular societal group is damaging to electoral chances.
Opposition parties must therefore play a positive version of segmental politics, demonstrating that it can form part of a coalition of ethnic and communal interests capable of winning government as a coalition. The ruling party already enjoys the advantage that it is perceived as a ‘winner’, and is therefore more likely to attract coalition partners. From this, key policy implications can be drawn:
- Opposition parties must seek their social bases, but be wary of getting trapped in them. The Ivorian case demonstrates that accentuating the exclusionary and hostile character of their local appeal limits a party’s election chances.
- Coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties with personally opposed leaders may be seen as foolish, but there is logic in creating this sort of alliance in a socially segmented, patronage-based political system as it dramatically broadens a coalition’s appeal, and subsequently their chance of ‘winning’.
