How do political geography and politician identity at grass roots level affect public goods provision? Does reserving posts for disadvantaged groups better target the poor with respect to goods provision? This paper uses survey data on village governments in South India to assess these questions and provide evidence on the issue of whether decentralised government represents the needs of poor people.
The focus of this paper is on the lowest tier of Indian Government – the Gram Panchayat (GP) – a popularly elected village council that may cover one to five revenue villages. Elected representatives on the GP have decision-making power over an array of public goods, and there is mandated special representation for scheduled castes/scheduled tribes (SC/ST). Final decision-making power rests with the GP head; the Pradhan.
There is little consensus on how to develop governance structures that are responsive to the interests of the poor. Decentralising political power is one approach, but the verdict is still out as to whether it empowers the poor through their elected representatives, or enhances local elite influence. The impact of decentralising public goods provision is also affected by the extent of spill-overs associated with such goods. The study finds that:
- The Pradhan has the power to shape resource allocation and often does so to benefit his own village.
- With high spill-over public goods, such as access roads, the whole village benefits.
- With low spill-over goods, such as programmes targeted to specific groups, villagers who share the Pradhan’s group identity benefit.
- The overall incidence of targeted public goods is unrelated to the Pradhan’s residence regardless of whether the Pradhan is SC/ST or not.
- An agenda-setting model of resource allocation, rather than ‘universal norm’ or ‘minimum winning coalition’ model, is the best tool for analysing public goods allocation in the South Indian context.
Political reservation is relevant for within-village allocation of low spill-over goods but not for overall village allocation. Further policy implications are implied:
- State/donor funding of local infrastructure development and other high spill-over public goods projects will be largely pro-poor.
- The Pradhan has the potential to be a key catalyst for interventions targeted at village level. Conversely, he could also be a significant obstacle.
- Projects and programmes targeted at specific groups within the GP must factor the Pradhan’s allegiances and preferences into their design, especially if aimed at groups different to the Pradhan’s.
