Since the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal of Vietnamese forces ten years later, Cambodia has focused on stabilisation and the consolidation of political power. Is the government now ready to pursue active decentralisation? Will decentralisation become a reality or remain an impotent legislative measure to satisfy donors? This paper, compiled for Public Administration and Development, reviews the context of decentralisation in Cambodia, the reasons why decentralisation has faltered and the importance of decentralisation for donors.
Decentralisation is just one of the options open to post-conflict states as they embark on reconstruction and many variables influence the choices that are made. Cambodia was an extremely weak state, severely lacking in political, administrative and technical capacity. As a result, establishing central control with a view to transferring limited power to sub-national governments later was the preferred route. Twenty years later, however, central control remains the political reality.
Post-conflict dynamics continued to dominate the political agenda in Cambodia long after the defeat of the Khmer Rouge as a result of prolonged Vietnamese influence, the end of Soviet aid and the ineffective contribution of the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC). During the 1990s, donor-funded programmes attempted to build capacity, increase popular participation and promote public administration reform. In 2002, decentralised commune councils were elected to fulfil the requirements of this initiative, but with limited success:
- Decentralisation does not fit well with the reality that hierarchy and centralisation are prevailing principles in Cambodia.
- The major government institutions in Cambodia are still recovering from the aftermath of decades of war and civil disturbance that inhibits progress towards decentralisation.
- Whilst the number of active NGOs in Cambodia has increased dramatically in recent years, civil society remains weak in terms of voluntary participation by citizens.
- An expensive national decentralisation programme is unwise in Cambodia as foreign investment remains low and the private sector is relatively undeveloped.
- Central government agencies retain control over the communes in a complex, congested and overlapping system, ensuring that political interests are safeguarded and that communes remain ineffective.
The centre continues to determine policy and expenditure and current legislation concerning the structure, roles and functions at lower levels is not well developed. The Cambodian government has managed to ensure donor endorsement and continued financial and technical assistance for its own political agenda. A number of areas are highlighted:
- For the ideologically-driven donor community, good governance stems from the delegation of authority to the lowest levels of government to encourage high levels of community participation.
- There is probably a low level of knowledge among donors concerning comparative and Cambodian evidence of the realities of decentralisation and their effects on poverty reduction.
- By focusing on outputs rather than outcomes, something of a bandwagon effect has been created in terms of donor funding of a single approach to decentralisation.
- By limiting decentralisation to the weak commune councils, the government has consolidated the peace and stability valued by Cambodians after decades of upheaval, whilst simultaneously consolidating the political continuity of the ruling party.
- In order to realise the full potential of decentralisation, the donor community must reassure the Cambodian government of the negligible risks and the likelihood of favourable benefits.
