How do states collapse? What separates state collapse from conflicts and changes that occur without the state being destroyed? How can state collapse be forseen and prevented? This chapter from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University analyses examples of state collapse in African countries and summarises the lessons which can be learned from these experiences.
Nowhere are there more examples of state collapse than in contemporary Africa. It is not a postcolonial phenomenon, but a condition of nationalist, second- or later-generation regimes ruling over established states. It has occurred in two phases. One came toward the end of the second decade of independence, when regimes that had replaced the original nationalist generation were overthrown, carrying the whole state structure with them into a vacuum. The second came around a decade later and extends through the 1990s to new cases. The authoritarian successors of the nationalist generation were overthrown by a new regime that can destroy but not replace, and government functioning and legitimacy recede.
Collapse is an extreme case of governance problems, or excessive burdens on governing capacity. It is a matter of degree but not a difference in nature from the normal difficulties of meeting demands and exercising authority.
- The common feature of state collapse is the effectiveness of the state in question, whether hard or soft, evil or merely incapable, in destroying the regulative and regenerative capacities of society through repression and neglect.
- State collapse is marked by the loss of control over political and economic space; the former expands beyond its boundaries, and the latter retracts.
- State collapse is not a short-term phenomenon but rather a long-term degenerative process. However, it is not inevitable, and many states recover their balance and return to more or less normal functions.
- There are an absence of clear turning points, warning signals, thresholds or pressure points in state collapse. There are few opportunities for clear, appropriate responses.
- It is difficult to focus the attention of governments on the gravity of the problem until it is too late and difficult to prescribe preventive measures.
Five ultimate signposts of proximity to state collapse can be identified. Reversal is extremely difficult and it may well be that the process needs to run its course before a new structure of law and order or legitimate authority can be constructed. The signposts are:
- Power devolves to the peripheries when (because) the centre fights among itself. Local authority is up for grabs by local forces (future warlords).
- Central government loses its power base. It no longer pays attention to the needs of its social bases, who withdraw their support; it relies instead on its inner circle, whose demands divert allocations from the broader social sources of support.
- Government malfunctions by avoiding necessary but difficult choices. As a result, such measures mount in urgency and difficulty, facing the state with a governing crisis.
- Governments practice only defensive politics, fending off challenges and reducing threats, concentrating on procedural rather than substantive measures. A political agenda for participation and programmes is absent.
- Probably the ultimate danger sign is when the centre loses control over its own state agents, who begin to operate on their own account.
