What lessons can be learned from the Angolan peace process? This report, published by Conciliation Resources, argues that the military peace brokered by the Angolan government may have consolidated their power as the victorious party, but that the ‘peace through war approach’ has hindered the process of democratisation, which relies on dialogue and negotiation. The secessionist war in the enclave of Cabinda further demonstrates that peace cannot be achieved through military force. A shift from military peace to social justice is needed to fully resolve conflict in Angola.
The end of war has failed to bring peace to Angola. The government continues to employ the ‘peace through war’ tactics of scorched earth and starvation in the secessionist war in Cabinda and is unwilling to find a negotiated solution to the crisis. Furthermore, Angola has witnessed growing social unrest, the ostracisation of political opponents, a lack of economic opportunities and a sense of disillusionment among the population.
The creation of a truly participative democratic system is essential, but this faces some challenges:
- Serious restrictions to participation, open debate and freedom of expression, which have led to the marginalisation of opposition parties and the absence of an active civil society.
- Democratisation has been slow and cumbersome, including delays in drafting a new constitution and the decision of the government to extend its mandate and postpone elections until a series of conditions are fulfilled.
- Autocratic structures still exist, witnessed by the increased militarisation of society and restrictions on unions and associations.
- The prevailing party-state relationship and the concentrated wealth of the minority has contributed to the failure to share resources and political power. The state can be described as an appendix to the ruling party, which in turn absorbs it through oligarchy or kleptocracy.
- A ‘democratic deficit’ in the paralysis of the National Assembly, which is incapable of taking legislative initiative or monitoring the executive.
The reduction of peace to ‘military logic’ is inadequate. Donors should promote a peaceful negotiated solution to the war in Cabinda, involving granting a form of autonomy or special status to Cabinda during a transitional period, followed by negotiations between democratically elected leaders. The following steps should be also taken to move from military peace to social justice:
- Support the process of democratisation, including the drafting of a new constitution and holding elections. However, the ‘winner takes all’ model should be avoided and arbitrary deadlines not imposed.
- Promote the transparent and accountable management of natural resources. Strong institutions are required to withstand the destructive forces of corruption and conflict.
- Encourage the participation of opposition parties, including UNITA, and civil society in decision-making and political life.
- Implement the terms of the Luena Memorandum, including the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Reintegration should be viewed as a means of developing the community as a whole, rather than individuals or target groups.
- Support the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees.
- Pursue national reconciliation efforts by supporting the social processes that address and overcome the distrust, polarisation and pain caused by conflict.
- Support the role of an independent media and strengthen professional organisations such as the Union of Angolan Journalists (SJA) and the Luanda-based press centre.
- Recognise the short-comings of the various UN missions in Angola (UNAVEM I, II and III; MONUA, UNMA and UNMA) – which were in the end reduced to humanitarian operations and a small human rights division – in particular, the inability of peacekeeping forces to disarm and demobilise a guerrilla army.
