The high insecurity that characterises post-conflict and transitional societies often calls for a prominent role for the military in maintaining law and order and a ‘security first’ approach to police reform. However, is there a risk associated with the potential overlap between police and military functions? This concept paper, presented at the Whitehall Policy Seminar, highlights the dangers of blurring the boundaries between police and military functions in post-conflict situations. The key challenge for police reform is to re-establish the clear boundaries between police and military roles, whilst simultaneously meeting the pressing need to restore security in the aftermath of violent conflict.
External actors put a high premium on police reform as an ostensible function of the restoration of law and order in the aftermath of violent conflict. Police reform goes beyond the discreet function of restoring law and order, contributing to the demilitarisation of society and the restoration of security, as well as playing a central role in upholding the rule of law.
In many transitional societies, there is a blurring of the distinction between police and military functions, which poses considerable risks to police reform. The long-term goal of police reform is to demilitarise and recivilianise the police service as an essential organ of the rule of law. Police reform should therefore focus on redrawing the boundaries between the police and military by:
- Demarcating the respective roles of the military and the police. The task of the military is to provide defence against external threats to national integrity, whilst the role of the police is to maintain law internally.
- Separating the functions between the police and military. In times of peace, the police should not have a defence or security function and conversely, the military should not have a mandate to enforce the law internally.
- Recognising that the military may create difficulties for the demilitarisation and recivilianisation of the police due to the entrenched nature of the military in many transitional societies and its potential loss of influence over civilian affairs by relinquishing its control of the police.
- Understanding that military resistance to police reform may be motivated by a loss of prestige due to cutbacks in military budgets, which often occur as a result of donor pressure during the transition to peace or democracy.
- Undertaking careful military reform to ensure that any move to reduce military expenditure is balanced against the potential consequences of military opposition to police reform. The military may not oppose attempts to civilianise the police force if its leadership does not fear sharp cutbacks in its budget and prestige.
In societies emerging from violent conflict, external intervention should be sequenced in the following manner to meet the most immediate security challenges, whilst at the same time, facilitating police reform:
- International peacekeeping: intervention is needed in the form of peacekeeping forces with a clear mandate and adequate resources to stabilise the situation, protect the civilian population and facilitate a climate of security.
- Demobilisation: adequate demobilisation and disarmament is crucial to raise the general level of security. Partial demobilisation can lead to a proliferation of weapons and a rise in violent crime.
- Interim security and CIVPOL: provide interim security measures whilst a new army and police force is being trained. This should ideally take the form of a UN-led force or another kind of international civilian police force (CIVPOL).
- Rule of law: undertake broad rule of law reforms at an early stage in the transition process. Police reform should be undertaken in parallel and as an intrinsic part of these broader rule of law reforms to aid the civilianising process.
- Special security to tackle criminal violence: special security measures may be needed if criminalised war economies and violent crime are deeply entrenched. A small corps of experts, such as international security forces and INTERPOL officers, should remain in place to work alongside and train local counterparts.
- Military reform: undertake vital military reform to ensure that the military does not obstruct police reform, whilst ensuring that the military has sufficient capability to meet real defence and external security challenges.
- Development interventions: post-conflict reconstruction should begin at an early stage in post-conflict situations and should adopt a comprehensive approach aimed at stabilising peace and reverting a relapse into conflict.
