Can democratisation contribute to the reproduction of neo-patrimonialism, rather than counteract it? Do elections, however free and fair, feed neo-patrimonialism? This article, from the journal Democratization, reports the results of a survey of MPs in Ghana regarding their election campaigns. It finds that the prevalence of patronage politics among MPs in Ghana has increased throughout the period of democratic rule. This threatens the very heart of democratic consolidation and adversely affects both vertical and horizontal accountability.
Neo-patrimonialism is an informal political system based on personalised rule and organised through clientilist networks of patronage, personal loyalty and coercion. In such a system, vertical accountability becomes a matter of ensuring public favours at the expense of public concerns and resources. Horizontal accountability is weakened because elected officials become preoccupied with the time-consuming task of attending on their clientelist network, and with systems of mutual favours.
Ghana became a full (if imperfect) liberal democracy in 2000, but the consolidation of democracy is undermined by behavioural patterns. Evidence shows that MPs in Ghana are involved to a significant degree in patron-client relationships to reproduce their political power. All but one of the 34 MPs interviewed admitted to having spent substantial amounts on personal. MPs’ spending on election campaigns has sharply increased from 1996 to 2000, at the same time as political competition has increased and democracy had reportedly ‘matured’. The tradition of gift giving has grown out of proportion. This persistence of neo-patrimonial structures around elections erodes the principles of liberal democracy:
- In a patron-client environment, election campaigns are turned into ‘harvesting season’ for the electorate, whereby they can rewards/personal favours in return for their vote.
- The involvement of more players gives clients greater room for manoeuvre for electoral blackmail and the political contest may turn into an economic competition between candidates. Loyalty is formed around material resources rather than political agendas.
- Accountability becomes a matter of distributing patronage, and MPs may become free to act at will on policy issues. Citizens have to rely on personal ties to be heard.
- MPs will spend much time and energy finding personal or state resources to meet constituents’ demands and may turn to corruption to meet resources demanded.
- Sincere but less wealthy individuals are deterred from seeking office, reducing the quality of elected leaders.
It is possible that elites have forged a consensus on formal democratic procedures whilst at the same time promoting patron-client relations to manage politics. These practices may exist elsewhere in mature democracies, but their consequences are more damaging in Africa.
- Institutions such as the media, courts and parliamentary ethics committees are weak in Africa, so the damaging effects of personalised clientilism are even greater.
- Patronage systems may stretch to ministerial and other government staff positions, media campaigns, contract and licenses, interference with the police and the juridical system and other illicit administrative practices.
- Future research could examine Ghanaian understanding of democracy. Specifically, whether the instrumental value that Ghanaians ascribe to democracy has to do with increasing returns from elections.
- Gender biases may need to be addressed: of those surveyed female MPs spend significantly more than men on campaigning.
- Prompt attendance at committee and good attendance in parliament is affected by patronage and also needs to be addressed.
