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Home»Document Library»Designing for Equality: Best-fit, Medium-fit and Non-favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas

Designing for Equality: Best-fit, Medium-fit and Non-favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas

Library
S Larservd, R Taphorn
2007

Summary

What combinations of electoral systems and quotas best promote women’s representation in elections? This paper from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) shows how the interaction of electoral systems and quotas impacts upon the nomination and election of women. These two factors must be considered in concert. While certain systems are often associated with better representation, the particular country circumstances must be closely analysed in designing a ’best-fit’ solution.

An electoral system can be described as ‘the way in which votes are translated into seats’. Three elements govern this process. The ‘district magnitude’ determines the number of representatives per district; the ‘formula’ determines how the winner of each seat is chosen; and the ‘ballot structure’ determines the structure of choices open to each voter.

Quotas are a form of affirmative action designed to counteract the obstacles preventing women from entering politics. There are several types of quotas. Legal quotas enshrined in constitutions or legislation differ from voluntary quotas adopted by political parties. Quotas may be applied during the nomination phase or on a results basis during elections to achieve a certain proportion of female representatives.

Several general observations can be made about the fit of electoral systems with quotas on women’s representation:

  • The ‘list PR’ system, in which parties receive seats in direct proportion to their share of the vote, tends to promote female representation most effectively, if combined with quotas targeting the nomination process and applying ‘rank-order rules’. Large districts are more favorable than small districts.
  • The ‘district magnitude’ has a direct impact on women’s chances of election: often voters vote more willingly for a man when only one candidate can be elected in a district.
  • A large ‘party magnitude’, which determines the number of candidates elected from one party in one electoral district, tends to favour women, especially if they are nominated in favorable positions on the candidate lists.
  • Women are also more likely to be elected where a party’s chances of losing seats is greater. Therefore, in systems containing many parties which yield fewer wasted votes, parties seek to attract to a wider range of voters by fielding a variety of candidates, including women in favorable positions.
  • It is easier to apply quotas in systems that are party-centred rather than candidate-centred. However, where voters favour women candidates more than parties do, candidate-centred systems are more accessible to women.

It is possible to rank the different combinations of electoral systems and quotas for their amenability to female representation:

  • ‘Best-fit’: list PR systems often best achieve female representation as they use multi-member districts and usually achieve large party magnitudes. Other electoral systems combined with best loser systems or women only tiers are also likely to work well.
  • ‘Medium-fit’: these combinations work to promote female representation provided certain variables, such as the use of open versus closed lists or the concentration of female candidates across geographic areas, are borne in mind.
  • ‘Non-favourable’: a number of combinations are unlikely to promote representation for women due to the technical aspects of specific electoral systems which can neutralize specific quota types.
  • More generally, electoral systems with small districts, candidate-centred voting and many independent candidates tend to make quotas more difficult to implement. Reforms to such electoral systems should be undertaken with inclusion of all stakeholders to ensure wide endorsement and consideration of wider implications of electoral system change.
  • Other variables also impact the representation of women. Factors tending to promote such representation include well-enforced quotas, knowledgeable electoral management bodies, sympathetic voters and a broad pool of female aspirants.

Source

Larserud, S. and Taphorn, R., 2007, 'Designing for Equality: Best-fit, Medium-fit and Non-favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas', International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm

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