Most citizens in developing countries experience the state through local government. Yet local government has been largely neglected in the literature on state-building. This paper from the Crisis States Research Centre examines the relationship between local government and state-building in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. It argues that a neglect of certain types of interventions contributed to the failure of local government reform and the state-building agenda.
Whilst policymakers may see state-building as creating a rule-based system, it may be more helpful to think of it as substituting one set of rules for another. Therefore, formal bureaucratic rules would take precedence over informal rules rooted in patronage and clientelism. In this way political power can be exercised in a progressively depersonalised, formalised and rationalised way, as considered appropriate for a ‘modern state’. Such a process takes time and is resisted by existing power holders. It can create a hybrid system with new forms of authority layering over existing ones.
Two examples of initiatives to reform local government in Afghanistan – Public Administration Reform (PAR) and Provincial Development Committees (PDC) – have failed to introduce depersonalised bureaucratic rules. Power continues to be exercised in a personal and patronage-based manner but within the overall framework of bureaucratic rules:
- In theory, employees of ministerial departments report to their ministries in Kabul. In practice, however, the provincial governor is usually an extremely powerful individual locally, with the opportunity to influence appointments, as well as direct activities at provincial level.
- Existing government-initiated co-ordination is also highly dependent on the wishes and interests of individual governors. In Nuristan, for example, the governor is resisting the introduction of a PDC, as he believes he can better deal with the Coalition and NATO as an individual.
- In provincial or district governors’ offices, there are streams of supplicants seeking the personal attention of the governor to address their problems.
International and Afghan actors have tended to see state building as creating organisations and structures. They have ignored the interventions that would have contributed to supporting the introduction and establishment of a different set of rules constraining powerful interests. State building policies thus needs to pay more attention to local government:
- There was a near exclusive focus on strengthening central government organisations in Kabul during 2002-2005. The importance of sub-national administration was only subsequently viewed as an urgent priority.
- There was a lack of attention paid by the international community to those aspects that perpetuated the exercise of power through the state by means of patronage and corruption. There was a failure to disarm effectively, inattention to reform the judiciary, and a failure to support the reform of the police.
- Insufficient attention was paid to the quality of senior appointments to sub-national posts. Many unqualified and unpopular individuals were appointed to fill key provincial positions.
- There was a failure to make substantive progress in rule of law reform. This has meant that there is an inadequate legal framework, the judicial system is weak and corrupt, and there is continued widespread impunity.
