What is the impact of domestic politics on democratic decentralisation in ‘hybrid’ African states? This paper from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) argues that the unique political logic that governs policymaking in these states distorts the implementation of these reforms, resulting in outcomes detrimental to development and governance objectives. It concludes that donors must improve their tools for analysing and understanding the structural features of countries prior to intervening and, in some cases, must embrace reforms that are generally effective, if not universally equitable.
In ‘hybrid’ states, formal institutions and informal practices interact in constantly changing ways, creating multiple de facto rules and uncertainty for all. Due to underdeveloped productive capacity and private markets, controlling and milking the state is the principal means of accumulating wealth, creating a system of neo-patrimonial, zero-sum politics in which power is centred on a charismatic leader. Relatively unfettered by modern accountability institutions, this leader and his patronage network are able to use all available political tools to maintain power and legitimacy.
Donors and local reformers have promoted decentralisation as a means to improve public service delivery and promote participatory democracy and decision-making. The results, however, have generally been disappointing. Evidence from Africa illustrates how the political logic of ‘hybrid’ states has distorted decentralisation reforms, resulting in unexpected outcomes that are often to the detriment of development objectives:
- Rather than promoting the public interest, national and local leaders manipulate formal institutions and reforms to gain access to power and resources, culminating in a decline in democratic accountability and a partial reversal of the devolution of power and funds.
- Current reform trajectories are being instigated by domestic elites, often against the preferences of donors, in an attempt to mould the functioning of this macro-institutional context to their advantage.
- Democratisation is accentuating neo-patrimonial logic by rewarding political strategies that favour short-term political gain, populist policy, patronage and the recentralisation of power over coherent policymaking and long-term development planning.
- Exactly how competition for power plays out and how this influences reform processes depends on the configuration of actors and interests and the structural and institutional features within which they operate, leading to unpredictable reform outcomes.
New institutions, including democratic ones, cannot be simply or quickly introduced. Existing institutions are deeply entrenched and benefit particular groups in society. Indeed, it seems that informal practices, such as clientelism, are reinforced when the state fails to deliver rights, goods or services. In this context, incremental change is the best that can be hoped for, particularly in the absence of social upheavals that can bring about rapid institutional change. However, donors can facilitate positive progress following certain recommended courses of action:
- Analysis of the historical and structural features of a country and the informal norms that influence the behaviour of different actors in order to understand the likely trajectory of different reforms and their possible outcomes
- Identification of reforms that can forward the interests of both political elites and poor people – this may mean supporting changes that appear ‘second best’ or indirect and therefore not immediately pro-poor
- Supporting civil society and watchdog groups, which play an important role in curtailing the abuses of the elite in all societies
- Distinguishing between immediate and longer-term objectives, as these may not always be compatible and the actions necessary to achieve them may be different.
