How does corruption affect post-conflict states? This article from the journal International Peacekeeping surveys cross-country evidence to consider how the weakness of institutions and leadership in post-conflict states make them a haven for both low-level and high-level corruption. It argues that although it is difficult and risky to include counter-corruption in post-conflict peacebuilding, if corruption is allowed to fester, it can undermine other efforts to create a stable, well-functioning state with popular legitimacy. International assistance can help, but it needs to be carefully tailored to avoid exacerbating the underlying problem created by the mixture of corruption and violence.
In a state with very weak institutions, corruption may be a short-term way to hold the system together and prevent violent disintegration. In countries emerging from civil war with weak governments, bribery demands will be used opportunistically by officials operating under unclear rules that allow them to invent offences or simply to extort funds from ordinary people. Furthermore, many people may engage in illegal activities, such as smuggling or illicit trade in arms, and may need the protection of public authorities to continue to operate. It is important, however, to distinguish between low-level bribery, where officials opportunistically extort funds from citizens for petty offences, and grand corruption, where malfeasance is entrenched in the workings of the government and threatens outright state failure.
The paper recommends three lines of policy response:
- The first line of policy response is the redesign of programmes to limit the underlying incentives for pay-offs. This includes eliminating highly corrupt programmes, and streamlining and simplifying regulations. But reformers should consider whether cleanups in one area would just shift corruption to another part of the government.
- The second collection of reform strategies focuses on the accountability and transparency of government actions, including freedom of information, independent oversight agencies, and a vigorous and free media.
- Third, some countries may need to consider more radical reforms in government structure. Democracy, taken in itself, is hardly a cure for corruption and elections are insufficient. Civil liberties, an independent judiciary and police with integrity are also necessary.
Peacebuilding strategies must avoid triggering vicious spirals. Reformers need to ask themselves what is likely to happen if they decide to upset established corrupt relationships. Beyond the conventional reform options above, international bodies and reformers should consider the following policy options:
- Seek peace agreements that incorporate measures to limit corruption.
- Anti-corruption and government reform efforts can either set the stage for more reforms or destabilize a fragile equilibrium. Peacekeepers can only create space for reform if they have the resources to operate effectively.
- Pick fights carefully to achieve some early and visible victories and to fit reform programmes to the capacities of the country—arrange exile for corrupt leaders rather than incorporating them into a new government.
- Involve ordinary people and local businesses in oversight and participation and provide safe havens for whistleblowers, while building the capacity of regular police and law officials to perform their duties effectively.
- Restrict the armed forces’ and other security services’ ability to participate in legal and illegal businesses.
- Create bodies both inside government agencies and independent of the executive to administer a freedom-of-information law to audit and monitor government spending.
