How has ethnic mobilisation and confrontation manifested itself in multi-ethnic Nigeria? What efforts have been made to address it? This paper from the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity explores Nigeria’s contradictory processes of ethno-regional fragmentation and a centralising nation-building agenda. Ethnic mobilisation remains resilient in the face of repeated efforts at political engineering and nation-building.
Nigeria has creatively, if not always successfully, grappled with its heritage of ethnic diversity, polarisation and conflict. It has over 250 ethnic groups, with three major groups: the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast. Many minority groups cluster politically, linguistically and culturally around these major groups. This has created a tripolar ethnic structure which forms the main context for ethnic mobilisation and contestation.
Inequalities persist between different regions and ethnicities. The south has higher levels of educational attainment and professional development than the north. There are also economic and social inequalities, with northern states having higher levels of poverty. These ethno-regional inequalities have an impact on electoral politics and on the composition of the Government, Parliament, and public sector. With uneven access to economic and political resources, ethnicity is a convenient platform for political mobilisation.
Since the 1960s several government reform agendas and policy instruments have attempted to achieve ethno-regional balance. A centralising, nation-building drive started in 1966, leading to the 1979 Constitution which introduced innovations in the management of inter-ethnic relations. The 1979 Federal Character Principle aimed to ensure representation and power sharing. However, efforts at reforming inter-ethnic relations and creating inclusive institutions have had limited success.
Ensuring ethnic representation within bureaucracies has not meant that individual bureaucrats are guided by ethnic or national considerations. Bureaucratic and political power are frequently used for personal, not collective, advancement.
- Reforms have transformed the Nigerian state but have not solved the problem of ethnic mobilisation and conflict. Many ethnic groups still have grievances, contributing to much of Nigeria’s violent politics since 1999.
- The real problem may lie not in groups’ marginalisation, but in the inadequate formulation and implementation of previous reforms, their politicisation, and increasing poverty.
It has been easier to broaden ethnic representation in the executives and legislatures than to create genuine structures of social inclusion. While representativeness has increased, particular ethnic groups’ impulses to dominate are not totally suppressed.
- Efforts at wider representation in the organisation of political parties are often manipulated by powerful ethnic groups. Despite reforms, parties retained their ethnic character until the regimes of Babangida and Abacha destroyed old regional political networks.
- Political parties are increasingly replacing ethnic organisation with personal networks of wealthy and powerful individuals. The regional ethos supporting party formation has been replaced by personal ambition. The increasing personalisation of power under the military since 1985 has been matched by the increasing personalisation of the political party system.
- Reforms of other institutions have been unsuccessful. In the judiciary and civil service, professionalism is threatened by political interference, ethnic gate-keeping and internal factionalisation. Private sector bureaucracies – media, banks, the formal sector economy – remain ethnically biased, making little effort to correct imbalances.
