What is the role of mediation in contemporary conflict? This paper reflects on ten years of mediation by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. It argues that mediation is at a critical juncture. Drawing on experience in Africa, the Middle East and South and South East Asia, the authors discuss challenging patterns of armed conflict. They emphasise that mediation has transformed dramatically over the last decade. The United Nations is no longer the sole multilateral mediator: regional organisations are playing an important role, and individual states are increasingly active. Mini-coalitions of states have emerged to support peacemaking and there has been a rise in the number of independent mediators.
Despite this diversification there are still problems. These occur to different extents in different conflict environments but include: a superficial understanding of conflict dynamics; a lack of coordination among mediators; inconsistent standards and strategies; regional diplomacy confused by diverse interests; poor standards of implementation; and an overall disconnect between mediation and other methods of coping with armed conflict.
Mediation ten years on outlines the comparative advantages particular to official and independent mediators and cautions against what the authors call ‘mediator pile-on’. Official actors dominate interstate conflicts; they play a variety of roles in internal conflicts, but can face difficulties in engaging with non-state armed groups. Independent mediators tend to focus on internal conflicts. They also seem more likely to engage earlier and for a longer period of time than many official actors, especially in conflicts of low strategic importance, but can be easily dismissed by conflict parties and will need to link up to official actors as a peace process advances.
The war on terror has also caused significant problems for peacemaking. The perception of armed groups as potential or actual terrorist organisations has had several consequences for mediators. Even social and political organisations deeply entrenched in their respective societies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, have been isolated. The authors advocate engagement with armed groups, but on the basis of careful assessment of when and how that engagement should take place. This involves careful analysis of the armed group itself, with attention to its leadership, ideology, patrons and capacity, but also a clear-eyed assessment of the mediator’s own capacities and comparative advantage.
In Sri Lanka, the military defeat of the LTTE demonstrated both the power and the limitations of force. A sense of futility on the part of international peacemakers relegated to the sidelines by conflict parties’ choice of force is identified as an extreme manifestation of a perennial challenge: external mediators cannot get parties to act against what they perceive as their core interests. Reaching a peace agreement is a considerable but not sufficient achievement. The real work begins as implementation is tested by hesitation on the part of the signatories, deficiencies in national capacities, failings on the part of international actors, and the frequent presence of a complex array of spoilers.
