What lessons can be learned for future peace and stability operations from the upheaval that occurred in Iraq following international intervention? This special report for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) experience in Iraq. It argues that intervening countries should anticipate and plan for large-scale breakdowns in public order, particularly in societies emerging from brutal oppression. Creating a safe and secure environment for law enforcement and police operations are paramount.
In planning for post-conflict operations, senior US officials presumed that Iraqi police and the regular army would assume responsibility for public order. Instead, the Iraqi police and government authority vanished when the US army reached Baghdad in 9 April 2003. A large-scale breakdown in public order followed. Several public security problems emerged:
- Public order: The small cadre of US police advisers could not compensate for the loss of management skills resulting from de-Baathification. Although the US earmarked millions of dollars for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), budget processes were extremely slow in responding to immediate needs.
- Street crime: US soldiers complained that they were not trained to fight crime and should not be asked to make arrests. Also, insurgency numbers were bolstered by violations of local codes of honour by US forces in Sunni areas.
- Border control: The US response to border control was delayed by the lack of prior planning. Therefore, criminals, foreign agents and terrorists were able to enter the country freely.
- Local police: The rush to create the IPS undermined public confidence in the CPA and failed to reduce public anxiety about the country’s lack of security.
- Local police training: Rebuilding the IPS was never given the priority it required. US police advisers also believed the military did not understand the requirements for training police officers.
- Police in combat: Iraqi police were untrained for combat, operated from unprotected facilities, were inadequately equipped and were subject to repeated attacks from terrorists
The lessons identified from these experiences are that:
- Public order: Large-scale breakdowns in public order should be anticipated in the aftermath of interventions. Without adequate planning and resources, critical security needs will not be met.
- Street crime: Failure to control civil disorder creates a climate of impunity. Ordinary citizens have no effective defence against crime. Consequently, support for intervention authorities is undermined.
- Border control: Border control is essential in restoring security in post-conflict environments. Its absence may place the intervention force in jeopardy from external elements.
- Local police: Police institutions need to be reformed and new police officers need to be recruited. Even so, newly reformed security personnel have difficulty adapting to new circumstances.
- Local police training: Attempts to rush training fail to meet either the short-term need for immediate security or the long-term requirement for professional law enforcement personnel.
- Police in combat: International and indigenous police cannot operate effectively unless the intervention force is able to create a secure environment.
