Why do some peace processes create conditions for effective protection of civilians while others don’t? This paper, authored by Jeremy Brickhill, uses lessons learned from the Darfur Peace Agreement to argue that inadequate attention to security aspects of peace processes leads to failure of peace agreements and civilians left at risk. Security arrangement negotiations and transitional strategies which link short-term stabilisation with long-term security sector transformation are essential requirements for peacebuilding in Africa.
There has been a recent escalation in the number of third-party interventions supporting negotiation processes, peace support operations and conflict/post-conflict recovery assistance in Africa. This development reflects increasing intra-state conflict on the continent and increased attention by Africa and the international community to protecting civilians during conflict.
While practitioners and organisations working on security issues of peacebuilding have improved their approaches to ceasefire agreements and subsequent peacebuilding processes, key weaknesses remain. They are:
- Lack of coherent, focused and effective provisions related to security aspects of peace processes;
- Lack of analysis of the nature, character and specifics of a particular conflict prior to engagement in a peace process; and
- Lack of recognition of the “ripe moment” when the parties in conflict conclude that the costs of further conflict are unbearable and they are ready to conduct negotiations.
The following brief summary of the Darfur Peace Agreement process identifies key peace agreement issues related to security:
- Initially, none of the parties were seriously committed to a negotiation process; they were generally not representative of Darfur communities and did not demonstrate capability or capacity to implement a peace agreement.
- Repression, conflict and resulting population displacement in Darfur closed off political space and debate, and prevented representative voices from emerging.
- Military advisors concluded when ceasefire was appropriate and politically viable. They attempted to develop a ceasefire concept which incorporated issues agreed to by the parties.
- Security advisors compiled a ceasefire negotiation plan and trained negotiating parties for ceasefire negotiations.
- The Darfur Peace Agreement process was then hijacked by “deadline diplomacy”. The African Union (AU) and the international community demanded immediate completion of an agreement, which led to a farcical series of unrealistic deadlines that replaced a step-by-step negotiation process.
The resulting peace agreement may have met AU and international community deadlines, but it did more harm than good in securing peace.
The following are recommendations to help create successful security arrangement negotiations:
- Develop a clear and coherent strategy for both peacemaking and peace negotiations;
- Maintain a professional negotiation process by ensuring that mediators mediate, facilitators facilitate, advisors advise and observers observe;
- Support the development of the capacity of negotiating teams by providing training workshops and resource personnel;
- Provide sufficient time to allow negotiating parties to express themselves and thrash out the issues;
- Facilitate a step-by-step development of the contents of an agreement;
- Place security issues at the centre of negotiations; and
- Insist that parties negotiate specific implementation modalities, avoid short-cuts and ensure that they understand precisely what they have agreed to do.
