The phenomenon of state failure and its remedies constitute a growth area of international politics, partly because of the recognition that state failure generates security threats and partly because it is so difficult. This document, by the Lowy Institute, identifies critical elements of the case of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003. RAMSI had eight defining characteristics. It was preventive, permissive, regional in nature, nationally led, supported by the United Nations (UN), non-sovereign, police led, and light in touch.
The background to RAMSI was the longstanding tension between the peoples of the two main islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita. During the period from 1998 to 2002, this developed into militant violence that then mutated into widespread criminality and thuggery. Acting on request from Honiara, the Australian government and its regional partners elected to lead a new kind of state-building intervention.
RAMSI had eight defining characteristics:
- RAMSI was preventive in that the Solomon Islands state was weak and heading for failure, but no humanitarian disaster had yet occurred.
- RAMSI was permissive in that it was supported by the Solomon Islands government, the public of both the Islands and Australia, regional states, and the international community.
- RAMSI was regional in nature in that it was initiated under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum.
- RAMSI was led by Australia. Most of the planning was done in Canberra, most principle actors and personnel have been Australians, and most of the financial burden has been borne by Australia.
- RAMSI was backed by the United Nations, despite no Security Council resolution being brought due to fears of complications as a result of China’s veto.
- RAMSI is non-sovereign, insofar as although it works with and inside the Solomon Islands government, the latter remains the repository of executive, legislative and judicial authority.
- RAMSI was police orientated on the basis that the absence of internal security would have undermined any future state-building.
- RAMSI exhibits a ‘light touch’ compared to other international interventions in that it adopts a low profile, arrived under cover of darkness, and is based in a secluded location.
So far, RAMSI has made significant progress, securing law and order, arresting the country’s perilous political decline and placing it on a new trajectory. The mission will need to navigate three main challenges:
- Whereas the restoration of law and order served the interests of the political elite, the current focus on economic reform and clean government threatens those same interests. Although it is unlikely any future government will ask RAMSI to leave, the mission will have to be skilful in the way it works with any new government after the elections on 5 April 2006.
- Many of the underlying causes of tensions, including land ownership and inter-community problems, remain unresolved. RAMSI initially felt that this should be left to Islanders themselves, yet this view has recently changed.
- Although welcome, the Australian government’s stressing that RAMSI is a long-term commitment may simply prevent the Solomons from reverting to a self-sustaining state and prolong the financial and human resource burden of Australia. RAMSI therefore needs to focus on building indigenous capacity so that responsibility can be handed back, and on setting public goals by which its own performance can be measured.
