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Home»Document Library»Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Actors

Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Actors

Library
Sami Makki, Abdel-Fatau Musah, Sarah Meek
2001

Summary

How can the international community combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies? This briefing, by the British American Security Information Council and the Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d’Ètudes Stratégiques, shows how the activities of the private security sector can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse. The international community needs to implement existing legislation, uphold embargoes and introduce national laws to tackle the issue effectively.

During the 1990s, there was a change in the way wars were fought. The amount of available weaponry increased and new types of actors began to engage in warfare. The international arms trade expanded with new buyers and more channels of supply. This has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. There has been a growing number of mercenaries and private companies, contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice, procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention.

These companies sign contracts to procure large amounts of weaponry for their clients. Furthermore, the military and security services and training that they provide contribute to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: (1) arms brokering and transportation activities, (2) violations of UN arms embargoes, (3) impact on human rights and humanitarian law and (4) driving demand for small arms.

Various measures exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies, through national legislation or international agreements. However, these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to provide effective control. To date:

  • action to control mercenaries and private military and security companies has been unsystematic and sporadic;
  • few countries have developed relevant laws to support the international agreement that exists although most recognise the need to prohibit the activities of mercenaries; and
  • control of private military and security companies has been left to self-regulation and corporate responsibility, with only a few countries such as South Africa and the United States implementing specific laws on the issue.

There is an urgent need for states to take steps to control the role of these actors in the arms trade as well as their role in providing military and security services. An interlocking framework of national, regional and international regulatory mechanisms is required. Key priorities for states include: 

  • ratification of relevant international and regional legal instruments;
  • controls over arms brokering and shipping agents that recognise the role played by private military and security companies;
  • development of national legislation to control the activities of private companies;
  • better implementation of UN arms embargoes and sanctions, which should include military and security services and technical assistance that may accompany arms transfers;
  • support for broadening the Special Rapporteur’s mandate on mercenaries to include private military and security companies; and
  • promotion of security sector reform programmes that lead to the development of accountable security forces with proper civilian oversight and control.

Source

Makki, S., Meek, S. Musah, A.-F., Crowley, M. and Lilly, D. (2001). 'Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Actors', Biting the Bullet Briefing 10, BASIC, International Alert and Saferworld.

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