How has security sector reform (SSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) been undertaken since 2002? This International Peacekeeping article assesses the success and failure of SSR reforms as well as the contribution of external actors. International efforts have been the driving force. However, as the international community’s role decreases, the onus will increasingly be on local authorities to complete SSR reforms. This will be essential if BiH is to succeed in drawing closer to Europe.
Defence reform in BiH took place under rather specific circumstances arising from constitutional arrangements, which posed specific problems. A division of the country existed, not just along ethnic or political lines, but also along the lines of constitutionally established entities which had maintained practically all the prerogatives of sovereignty, including over armed forces and intelligence services. Another factor was the specific structure of the international presence. The High Representative, NATO and the OSCE mission all had specific mandates that gave them different roles within the various reform processes.
Efforts in defence, intelligence and police reform in BiH have been broadly successful:
- Defence reform in BiH represents a significant step, making plain that ‘defence’ is a state function. It has made clear that the conflict conditions in which the entities had defined themselves along ethnic lines, rather than territorially, could not be perpetuated indefinitely.
- Defence reform could be regarded as a relative success. It does, however, display shortcomings. The reform did not address the persistence of old, pre-democratic thinking in the entities’ defence laws, which were left substantially the same.
- In intelligence reform, the key issue was establishing state-level institutions. However, problems persist in the appointments of leading functionaries and establishing state structures.
- Police reform has to be assessed in terms of reducing forces and of structural reform. The number of personnel was reduced from 44,000 in December 1995 to 17,000 in 2004. However, police officers were still underpaid, and police work still suffered from fragmentation of jurisdictions.
It is obvious that without the involvement of the international community, the reform processes in BiH would not have taken place. The way it was undertaken leaves room, however, for some critical assessment.
- One precondition for success is a thorough understanding of the local situation, and this cannot be easily acquired with a short tour of duty. A strong grasp of the situation also helps to identify weak spots in the positions of those resisting reform, and to develop flexible approaches to match the evolving situation.
- Military expertise is a necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite for defence reform. The military way of thinking has to be balanced with a diplomatic approach, finding durable solutions by negotiation rather than by overrunning resistance, and by preventing resistance from building up in the first instance.
- If SSR is to endure, it is the citizens of BiH that will have to lead it. The role of international players has been decreasing, and it is only a matter of time before the High Representative will be phased out and replaced by an EU representative whose role will include assisting BiH in its application for EU membership.
