How did Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) deal with security issues? What lessons are there for international mediators assisting other peace processes? This Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue report finds that in Sudan the parties’ lack of trust led to a deliberate avoidance of commitments related to security and weapons control. In this context, there were few opportunities for international mediators to broaden the scope of the negotiations.
The government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the CPA in 2005, formally ending over 20 years of war. However, the agreement is only binding until a planned referendum on self-determination for South Sudan in 2011. Both parties therefore acted on the assumption that armed conflict might be necessary again in the future. In the peace talks, they sought to avoid provisions that would constrain their ability to maintain, re-equip or augment their armed forces.
Unusually for a peace process, the CPA left both parties in control of very strong military institutions. However, international mediators had little incentive to push harder on security issues because their main objective was to stop the talks stalling or collapsing. As a result, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and weapons control measures in the CPA were aimed at other armed groups. In addition, there were three major failures regarding security issues:
- The parties did not set concrete targets and definitions for basic details relating to security issues, such as the status of popular defence forces.
- Neither the parties to the conflict, nor the CPA, identified civilian arms control or community security as important issues.
- The talks and the resulting CPA failed to prevent or reduce the Darfur conflict.
Four lessons for international mediators can be drawn from the negotiation of the CPA:
- Detail is vital if the parties are set against implementation. The CPA’s clauses relating to DDR, SSR and arms control lack detail. Because both parties were against disarmament, this led to inertia.
- Vagueness on the issue of civilian disarmament can lead to loss of life. The CPA referred only to the disarmament of “civilians who are illegally armed”. This vagueness gave the SPLA space to engage in a series of sometimes repressive civilian disarmament campaigns in the south which resulted in significant loss of life.
- The consequences of excluding other armed groups from negotiations can be high. A decision was made early to limit negotiations to the government and the SPLM/A. This decision shut out groups in Darfur and contributed to an upsurge in violence by these groups.
- Peace talks can be a useful forum for discussion of security issues and the development of common understanding. This can take the form of a declaration of principles or memorandum of understanding.
