What hinders effective policing and the pursuit of terrorist and militant organisations in Pakistan? What lessons can be learned from successful Pakistani police operations? This policy paper from the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding looks at the need for police reform in Pakistan. It calls for greater international support for police reform in order to enhance Pakistan’s law enforcement and counterinsurgency capacities and improve the security environment.
Pakistan’s police force is poorly managed, ill-equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicised and chronically corrupt. Perhaps the primary reason for this is the government’s persistent failure to invest in law enforcement reform and modernisation. Half-hearted implementation of reforms, political manipulation, structural problems, disregard for human rights, inadequate training and investigation facilities and corruption hinder effective policing in Pakistan. Better policing will add to the government’s credibility and help to establish its writ in areas where militant groups are increasing their influence.
Reasons for the Pakistani police’s failure in pursuing terrorist and militant organisations include:
- lack of coordination and trust between police, the civilian-run Intelligence Bureau and the military-run intelligence agencies;
- poor data collection capability as regards crime and criminals – many criminals who join militant groups are not tracked efficiently and banned militant organisations are not well profiled;
- the insufficient strength of the Special Investigations Group (SIG) – the SIG has only 37 investigators, while expected cooperation with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation has been limited;
- the absence of special security measures or rewards for police officials, investigators and lower court judges involved in counterterrorism – officials who have pursued terrorists have been assassinated, discouraging anti-terrorism efforts;
- non-provision of adequate resources to police in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), despite the expansion of Taliban influence there; and
- higher incentives offered by militant groups to potential recruits – while the government pays $6,000 to families of police officers killed in terrorist attacks, militant groups offer $20,000 to the families of suicide bombers.
- implement in letter and spirit the Police Order of 2002 and discard the controversial amendments made in 2004;
- increase salaries and improve service conditions in order to improve overall policing standards;
- use a separate force for VIP security, on the pattern of the US Secret Service, to lessen the burden on regular police work;
- follow the model of the Citizens-Police Liaison Committee in Karachi, a non-political statutory institution, throughout Pakistan;
- upgrade Islamabad’s National Police Bureau to a resourceful think-tank for ideas and research for improving counterterrorism and the police’s counterinsurgency capacity; and
- use the ‘intelligence-led policing’ model, in which police interface with the civilian population to gain intelligence to prevent crime, for counterinsurgency efforts in the NWFP.
