How do police training programmes support or undermine post-conflict reconstruction? This article analyses the importance of democratic policing to rebuilding the state after conflict. International policing and police training missions in post-conflict and fragile states have been fragmented, ad hoc, and rarely focused on the principles of democratic policing. When a new regime emerges after war or replaces authoritarianism it is essential that the training, mindset and methods of the police undergo fundamental change. Instilling an ethos of democratic policing requires training programmes and reform that builds professional competence, accountability, and a public service ethic.
The most visible arm of government for ordinary citizens is the police. In authoritarian regimes, the police mission is to intimidate and suppress opposition and to protect the regime. In democratic societies, the police mission is to protect and serve citizens, building safe communities by responding to both crime and official corruption and abuse. Efforts to build stable democratic regimes in post-conflict and fragile states require a radical reformation of police forces and their actions.
However, the democratic model that underpins such reform rarely receives the attention it deserves from international actors assisting reconstruction. Instead, police training programmes are usually swamped by short-term concerns. There are five main obstacles to implementing democratic policing in post-conflict countries:
- A focus on quickly raising the numbers of police officers. Levels of crime or rebel activity mean pressure to put police on the streets quickly. Typical numerical targets are 2000 to 3000 police per million inhabitants.
- The lack of an institutionalised international police force that is able to follow and teach the principles of democratic policing. It is easier to train locals than to mobilise international forces, but the professionalism and experience of the latter is what is needed immediately after conflict.
- Efforts to harness the police to assist the military as part of an overall security plan that ignores the key division of labour among security forces in democratic countries. Public confidence is undermined when police are paramilitary.
- Bulk deployment of individuals from the prior regime’s security forces in the new regime’s police. Incorporation is often a key factor in making transition peaceful, but it also makes changing institutional culture difficult.
- Widespread police corruption, which can undermine the entire project of post-conflict statebuilding.
To address the five obstacles to post-conflict democratic policing, international assistance programmes should:
- Focus on developing a smaller, well-trained, professional force rather than on numerical targets. Such a force will prove more effective than a large, unruly, and poorly trained one.
- Implement training programmes that institutionalise democratic policing. This requires keeping international police mentors in theatre for long periods. It cannot be done through Training of Trainer programmes.
- Collaborate to form an international professional standby police force that can be deployed over extended periods and in diverse countries.
- Ensure that the police are used to protect citizens and build community relations, not as second-tier soldiers. The army should be employed to attack terrorists, drug lords and rebels.
- Confront police corruption through establishing accountability mechanisms and embedding international democratic policing mentors in local units for several years.
