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Home»Document Library»Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform under Occupation

Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform under Occupation

Library
International Crisis Group
2010

Summary

What recent changes have taken place in the Palestinian security sector? Have these improved the long-term prospects for peace? This report examines the security situation in the Palestinian West Bank since the second intifada of 2000. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has improved the security environment through security sector reorganisation and by tackling militant groups, but this may not be sustainable. In the long term, the split with Hamas and disregard for democratic norms are deeply at odds with the emergence of a strong, representative, legitimate national movement. Further, without serious progress toward ending the occupation and intra-Palestinian divisions, support for the security measures may diminish, and PA legitimacy could shrivel.

In the past few years, the PA has restored order and a sense of personal safety in the West Bank. However, deepened cooperation between the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has been controversial. Repeated IDF incursions into Palestinian cities and limitations imposed on the PSF undermine real indigenous empowerment. The PA has also suppressed armed groups such as Hamas, but by also repressing its social and political manifestations has undermined democratic principles.

After the Islamists’ June 2007 takeover of Gaza, Ramallah, Israel and the donor community all saw great urgency in bolstering the Palestinian security forces (PSF). Prime Minister Salam Fayyad prioritised security reform. The first phase of reform focused mainly on checking Hamas, but also on restraining Fatah militants and restoring order. Additional structural reforms aimed at establishing clearer lines of authority and reducing redundancy were less visible but important. Some key elements of the security initiatives follow:

  • As of June 2010, some 469 Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters had been demobilised through a comprehensive amnesty programme and in effect the Brigades seem to have dissolved.
  • Efforts to strengthen the interior ministry have attempted to steer the autonomous security services towards civilian control. However, the result seems to have been retained financial autonomy and three masters (the interior minister, prime minister and president) for each security branch.
  • External support for reform from a senior US security coordinator and a UK-led coordination office for the Palestinian police: The US have so far trained and equipped five of ten planned gendarmerie-style National Security battalions, and the police coordination office have trained an estimated 3,000 police officers.
  • The General Intelligence agency has improved its collection and analysis capacities.

Despite being widely regarded as successful, it is unclear whether the security forces have improved enough either to withstand a genuine domestic challenge or to assuage Israeli concerns. Priority should be given to ending the occupation and intra-Palestinian divisions. The U.S. Government and the European Union need to insist on respect for human rights and increase support for the justice sector. Israel should allow the PSF to expand their area of operation and facilitate increased Palestinian crime-fighting efforts. It is also important to strictly limit incursions into the PSF’s operational area and to curb hostile acts against Palestinians by settlers. The PA should enhance respect for human rights by: adopting a code of conduct for security sector employees; prohibiting arrests and detentions without clear suspicion of criminal activity; releasing prisoners currently held without such suspicion; and subjecting the security services to oversight by judicial authorities. The PA should also:

  • Bring to civilian justice security officers involved in human rights violations and prohibit all forms of torture.
  • Cancel the requirement that civil sector public employees, journalists and NGO board members obtain ‘good conduct’ certification from the security services.
  • Respect freedom of association on the basis of political affiliation, allow Hamas to function as a political party and refrain from closing down civil organisations.
  • Establish an independent mechanism to oversee the PSF.

Source

International Crisis Group, 2010, 'Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform under Occupation', International Crisis Group, Ramallah / Jerusalem / Brussels

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