What progress has been made in reforming Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and what remains to be achieved? This report finds that progress has been made within the MOI, but it remains susceptible to changes of leadership and budgetary crises, and to broader administrative weakness within the public sector. Progress should be consolidated and transparency and oversight mechanisms strengthened to help to deflect inappropriate political influence. The effectiveness and professionalism of the Iraqi police depends on the MOI’s performance and operation.
Iraq’s MOI is responsible for supervising, training and administratively supporting Iraq’s non-military security forces. These include: the Police Service, the National Police, the Border Enforcement Service and the Facilities Protection Service. In total, MOI is responsible for nearly 600,000 armed personnel – a force that is three times the size of the new Iraqi Army, Navy and Air Force combined.
During 2006, the coalition’s police assistance programme had included a major push to build institutional capacity. For the MOI, this focused on improving the ability to plan, programme, budget, and implement. However, in September 2007, the MOI was reported as being crippled by corruption and sectarianism, and a U.S.-led MOI Transition Team of American and British advisers was assigned the task of ministry reform. An expert panel discussed progress in June 2009, and this report summarises that meeting’s findings.
Each new national government has brought changes in ministerial leadership, personnel, direction, and priorities. This is a primary reason why the MOI had difficulty implementing reforms from 2003 to 2006. However, Interior Minister Jawad al-Bulani, appointed in 2006, oversaw the removal of corrupt and sectarian officials and members of the police and has effectively promoted comprehensive MOI reform. His leadership has enabled the MOI to achieve more efficient operation and greater insulation from politics.
- A ministry court system was developed, which removed 10 percent of ministry employees from their roles for misconduct. The Iraqi National Police leadership that was involved in sectarian violence was replaced and approximately 1,500 policemen were fired and 2,000 disciplined in 2008.
- A Director of Human Rights was appointed to improve the deplorable conditions of MOI holding facilities. In June 2009, the MOI opened an inquiry into complaints of prisoners being tortured and the slow processing of cases in two jails in southern Iraq.
- The Ministry is also creating an independent advisory, inspection, and accountability mechanism tied to ‘IG-5000 Plan’. The goal of the plan is to increase the Inspectors General workforce to 5,000 people.
- Between 2006 and 2007, more than 100 senior MOI and provincial officials participated in institutional development through the MOI’s strategic planning process. These leaders set objectives across a range of areas, including building tailored security plans for different parts of the country, creating requirements-based training curricula, and developing anti-drug offices in the provinces. In 2007, the ministry executed nearly 90 percent of its budget.
- Critical legislation has been enacted and other measures are working their way through the government and parliament and are expect to become law. For example, the Internal Security Forces Penal Code, which came into effect in April 2008, rewrote police regulations concerning violations and punishments.
- However, other elements of the criminal justice system are weak, and the broader public administrative systems on which the ministry relies are equally weak.
The MOI still faces many challenges in building an institution that focuses on law enforcement and providing protection to citizens. Past reforms must be consolidated in order to withstand future changes in leadership or government. Lessons and implications include the following:
- Ministry reform is a highly political process, particularly in a contentious post-conflict environment, and consistent local leadership matters.
- Ministry reform requires integration of the strategic planning and budget execution process to ensure that operational objectives are achieved.
- There are broader, structural problems in providing effective security that need to be addressed.
