This article examines the different forms of criminal violence that affect fragile states, with special reference to Yemen. The article is particularly interested in analysing the relationship between violent offending with no clear political motive, underdevelopment and conflict. It does so by conducting an in-depth evaluation of conflict and crime in Yemen, using publically accessible data to suggest new ways of understanding violent criminal behaviour in Yemen and elsewhere.
The article is written in response to a prioritisation of political violence, insurgency and terrorism in international development and stabilisation strategies, which has emerged alongside the broad securitisation of international aid. Common forms of criminal violence have been overlooked in a number of fragile contexts, as they have been in Yemen. In light of rising levels of insecurity, resulting from poor relationships between the state and its citizens, there is a need to re-evaluate this unstated omission if the new Yemeni Government is to gain increased legitimacy by being seen to prioritise the protection of its citizens. The article finds that:
- Yemen’s rates of crime and patterns of conflict are intrinsically connected to state fragility, as this is manifested by a lack of territorial control, poor legitimacy, authority-based weaknesses, and a lack of service delivery, particularly in relation to law enforcement and security delivery. A prioritisation of conflict over crime has emerged naturally from the militarisation of the Yemeni state and its policing structures. It has also been supported by international and regional donors, who prioritise counter-terrorism and stabilisation strategies that are intended to generate increased levels of public safety and security.
- However, such strategies do not acknowledge the complex tapestry of violence in Yemen, and therefore are not designed to provide protection to civilians from other forms of attack. This limitation not only allows offending to escalate unchecked in Yemen, particularly through the rise of retributive violence, but also enables crime to feed back into and regenerate conflict, most often through crime that can be linked to resource competition or tribalism.
- While these challenges imply that crime and conflict in Yemen should be dealt with according to an integrated strategy, there is also a clear need for targeted responses to both of these issues. This is particularly important because crime has not been effectively addressed by existing security strategies in Yemen, so that it is on the increase and cannot be resolved through negotiation or other peace-building strategies.
- Greater challenges stem from a lack of understanding, or perhaps a lack of interest, as to why people offend in Yemen and a failure to mitigate the causes of crime. This is not a problem that is limited to fragile states, but the overall sense of discouragement and apathy among policymakers towards non-political violence in conflict-affected fragile states is no longer excusable, particularly given its implications for public welfare. While ending violence in fragile states may ultimately require a holistic approach, the severe lack of research on criminal violence in Yemen likely necessitates that criminal violence and conflict be investigated separately and addressed in tandem.
