International remittances have grown dramatically over the past few decades. Existing scholarship on the impact of remittances has focused on their socioeconomic effects. This article focuses instead on the political impact of remittances, and in particular, its effect on political participation.
Recent work on Mexico suggests that remittances may be a resource curse. They insulate recipients from local economic conditions, weaken the link between government performance and individual well-being, and reduce incentives to participate in politics. The resource model of participation, however, suggests that since remittances increase incomes, they should increase political engagement.
This is the first cross-country, individual-level analysis on remittances’ effect on political participation. It employs data from 27,713 individuals across 20 sub-Saharan African countries. It finds that remittance recipients are less likely to vote but more likely to participate in politics by contacting government officials directly as well as joining demonstrations and protest marches. The study thus shows that remittances may not necessarily demobilize citizens, as previous work on Mexico suggests.
Key findings:
- The study finds that remittance recipients are less likely to vote than those who do not receive remittances. This is consistent with Bravo’s findings among Mexican citizens. Interpreting the coefficients in terms of log odds, receiving remittances decreases the odds of voting by 17%. It also find that those who receive remittances are more likely to contact government officials about important problems or to share their views. Whereas remittances have a significant negative effect on voting, they have a significant positive effect on contacting government officials. Receiving remittances increases the odds of political contact by 15%.
- Finally, we find that remittance recipients are more likely to protest than those who do not receive remittances. Receiving remittances increases the odds of protesting by 16%. Note that the positive effect of remittances on protest is similar to that of remittances on contacting government officials, but contrary to that of remittances on voting. The impact of control variables across these regressions is consistent with findings elsewhere on the determinants of political behaviour in African countries.
- The analyses show that remittances have a significant effect on political participation in migrants’ home countries, although this effect differs across types of participation. Specifically, remittance recipients are less likely to vote but more likely to contact government officials directly as well as engage in protest marches. The results on voting behaviour are consistent with previous work on Mexico (Bravo 2007; Goodman and Hiskey 2008), while our results on the latter forms of participation (government contact and protest) are more in line with the resource model of participation. This suggests that the insulating effect of remittances dominates when considering voting, while the income effect prevails when considering the decision to contact government officials directly or to engage in protests.
- Why might this be the case? We offer an explanation based on the calculus that remittance receivers might engage in when deciding to participate in politics. While voting may be the least costly political activity in terms of time and effort, in the context of African politics, it is also the least likely to incur a payoff. The chances of effecting change through voting are slim to none.
- In his work on Mexico, Pfutze (2013) argues and shows that the impact of remittances on voting is conditional on clientelistic structures. Where clientelism prevails, remittances are likely to reduce the need to turnout for incumbents that provide little benefit. This could explain our results as clientelism is seen as pervasive in African countries (Wantchekon 2003; van de Walle 2007).
- Remittances provide recipients with the ability to provide for themselves the meagre welfare goods that politicians in Africa provide in exchange for votes. Remittance recipients thus have little incentive to vote. The insulating effect of remittances dominates the decision to turnout.
- On the other hand, direct contact with government officials, while more costly in terms of time and effort, is a more effective way of securing benefits in states like those of sub-Saharan Africa where clientelistic politics dominates. The return to one’s investment of time and effort is much more likely to pay off.
