History offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behaviour significantly over time (like Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe), while there are also cases of dictators who have displayed remarkable improvements (like Jerry Rawlings of Ghana). This study shows that such mutations can result from rational behaviour when the dictator’s flow use of repression is complementary to his accumulated stock of wrongdoings. This complementarity gives rise to two steady states (one where repression is low and one where repression is high) and implies that any individual rising to power in this setup has the potential to end up as either a moderate leader, or as a dreaded tyrant.
The paper presents a new theory (focused on explaining the use of repression) which is able to rationalise these remarkable mutations – both for the better, as well as for the worse. It shows that such transformations can arise without having to allude to a sudden exogenous change in the dictator’s preferences through a mysterious mental illness. In this model, citizens are able to oust a dictator via a revolution, but the dictator can reduce the probability of being overthrown by exercising repression.
Key findings:
- The model suggests that dictators are more likely to derail with higher levels of divertible funds available, for example stemming from fungible aid inflows or from the exploitation of natural resources. It implies that the mobilisation of anti-government opposition has the potential to bring about a significant change to a dictator’s behaviour – either for the better, or for the worse.
- This seems to be in line with reality. It has been described how Mugabe’s regime became more repressive after he started to feel the opposition by the Zimbabwean Movement for Democratic Change. The Movement’s leader at the time, Morgan Tsvangirai, seems to agree with this assessment. He has stated that ‘the turning point of Mugabe was when he lost an election for the first time, when he lost the support of the people, when it dawned on him the people no longer supported him. Then he became reactionary. He reacted to the people’s will by enforcing his will on the people.’
- This also has the provocative implication that any dictator operating in our environment has the potential to end up as either a moderate leader, or as a vicious tyrant. Interestingly, even non-sadistic individuals who have absolutely no preference for exercising repression per se can already end up as repressive leaders (provided that their actions are not fully congruent with the preferences of society, which seems to be the case in reality – especially for non-accountable regimes.
- The model finally shows that something which at first sight appears to be a rather minor non-congruence in preferences between the dictator and (a subset of) the public, has the potential to escalate and lead to serious conflict. Depending on the nature of the opposition, even a difference in religion could already be enough to form the necessary friction.
- Leaders who fear consequences can become more desperate in clinging on to power (even if they have delivered high-quality work, as a result of which they should have nothing to fear on objective legal grounds). When such leaders have the opportunity to do so, it may even induce them to use repression in order to avoid an unfair trial.