This study examines the available evidence on the experience of international support to improving infrastructure in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It draws on a literature review and case studies (focusing on DFID supported infrastructure programmes in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal and South Sudan).
The study identifies the main causal relationships by which infrastructure programmes may contribute to economic growth, poverty reduction and improved access to services, as well as their relationship to processes of stabilisation, peacebuilding and state-building. Although the evidence base is in many areas weak, some clear conclusions emerge about the strengths and weaknesses of past engagement, and lessons for the design and implementation of more effective infrastructure programmes.
Key Findings:
The review of evidence has identified several common (indeed endemic) problems in the design and implementation of support to infrastructure in fragile and conflict affected situations:
- Infrastructure support programmes have (at least until very recently) lacked a clearly articulated intervention logic that specifies the key assumptions and risks underlying the programme and sets out the relationship between infrastructure and growth, service delivery, and state- and peace-building objectives.
- There has also been a tendency to neglect conflict analysis (again something that appears to be improving in the most recent practice). In the case study examples, systematic conflict analyses were not undertaken as part of the original project preparation in South Sudan which was emerging from twenty years of civil war, in Nepal where the Maoist insurgency was evidently growing in strength during project design (although conflict analysis was used during implementation), or in DRC where ongoing conflict was still a major factor affecting project implementation.
- Programmes have often not been effectively integrated into a satisfactory and effective wider stabilisation strategy, and there is little evidence to suggest that infrastructure investment can contribute to stabilisation rather than as part of a peace-building process once stabilisation has been achieved.
- The issue of “how” and “where” infrastructure development is supported and taken forward may be as important as “what” is done, if infrastructure does have a role in particular in strengthening confidence and local institutional arrangements.
Recommendations:
- The weakness of the evidence base on key causal relationships needs to be addressed. To some extent this could be done through a series of more intensive and narrowly focused systematic literature reviews on specific questions.
- A clear strategic framework for intervention is required which recognises that different forms of programme and engagement may be required at different stages particularly in the process of stabilisation and emergence from conflict, but that the long-term objectives of building capacity and ensuring sustainable and effective infrastructure provision are not compromised by short-term measures. An infrastructure strategy, agreed with the government, is needed at an early stage.
- Long-term commitment is needed. While the nature of involvement may change reflecting circumstances, any infrastructure programme and associated capacity-building, institutional strengthening and related activities will take time – most likely decades. Problems should be identified and resolved rather than programmes abandoned.
- One of the best empirically supported conclusions of the study is the central importance of community engagement in successful programmes, and this should be fully recognised in programme design and implementation. Working during conflict is only possible by and with the full collaboration of local communities – for instance by fostering local ownership and socially inclusive employment – which means priority should be given to local infrastructure but this is not easy and may not be possible in extreme situations.
