This report examines the effectiveness of official UK development assistance delivered to Afghanistan since 2001. Over 100 people were either interviewed or invited to participate in small workshops during August-September 2011 to gauge the way Afghans perceive the past, present and future prospects in their country, as well as the specific contribution of UK aid to Afghanistan.
In order to provide a snapshot of UK aid effectiveness, and the challenges surrounding it, this paper combines a review of available statistics with informed observations from Afghans, aid workers, and serving military personnel. Collectively, they paint a picture of a country where UK aid has on the one hand helped to make a positive difference, and where the UK approach is often welcomed as better than others. Yet there are also numerous perceived challenges and weaknesses that have limited the impact of that aid, and contributed to much disillusionment and frustration among Afghans.
Key Findings:
- The most consistent point made by all workshop participants in relation to the mismatch between assistance and realities on the ground is that the UK and other donors do not appear to strive to respond to the real needs of its people. National NGOs, on whom the international community in large part relies for the implementation of its programmes, underscored that responding to needs is not simply a matter of ethics – their safety also depends on whether they can deliver appropriately.
- The international community has been over-ambitious about its expectations for progress given the constraints and time required to effect systemic change. Pressure for fast and visible improvements in governance, development and security has led to unrealistic national-level goals, without adequate means of implementing them.
- The international community appears not to listen to the people properly, or take on board what they say. It does not learn (e.g. due to rotations and short deployments, we have not been in Afghanistan for 10 years – we have been there 1 year, 10 times).
- Too much aid has been provided in ways that are ineffective or inefficient, such as for ‘quick wins’. An emphasis on quantity over quality has expanded numbers (of schools, police, clinics) but undercut operational effectiveness, professionalism, institutional loyalty and public confidence. Donor support for services delivered by NGOs has diminished, with negative consequences. Aid is politicised due to it being an instrument of ‘westernisation’, ‘stabilisation’ and military objectives, while space for humanitarians to operate has diminished. Existing informal systems have been ignored or maligned to the detriment of social capital.
- PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) have undermined Afghan Government legitimacy, rather than strengthened it, over ten years. Political negotiations are questioned because of who is included at the table.
- Many challenges still remain for women, despite some improvements in their legal, political and cultural position since 2001.
