Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils (PIAC) were created by the presidents of Ghana, Tanzania and Senegal in 2002, and in Mali and Uganda in 2004. Subsequently, councils were set up in Mauritania and Benin. Ethiopia launched a Public-Private Consultative Forum – loosely modelled on the PIAC – in 2010. The PIACs were supported by the World Bank and IMF, and were linked to the World Bank’s private sector development and investment-climate reform programmes. The main purpose behind the establishment of the councils was to enable presidents and governments to talk with experienced business leaders to identify obstacles to investment, generate recommendations for concrete action, and accelerate continuing policy reforms to improve the overall investment climate (World Bank 2005b).
A World Bank (2005b) impact assessment found that PIACs have had a positive impact on private sector development by reforming many investment-climate issues. However, there was less evidence of progress on more complex strategic priorities, such as identifying and promoting sources of growth. In a study of PIACs in Ethiopia, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda, the African Development Bank (2012) found significant variation in effectiveness. Uganda was a clear success due largely to the care taken to design its structure and processes, and to a firm commitment from the President to act on its recommendations. The PIAC secretariat was located in the Ugandan Investment Agency, which enjoyed a solid reputation for competence with the private sector. Representation of the private sector was extended beyond a small number of big businesses to small and medium enterprises and business associations (World Bank 2005b).
Page (2014) identified four reasons for the lack of effectiveness of PIACs as a mechanism to implement industrial policy in Africa, compared with their more successful counterparts in East Asia:
- a marked lack of enthusiasm for the councils from top political leadership, except in the case of Uganda;
- a lack of focus on identifying industry, sector and firm specific constraints to growth, and a preoccupation with an economy-wide agenda for investment climate reforms, influenced by the World Bank’s own agenda around private sector development;
- a lack of a systematic means of assessing the impact of the council’s decisions on firm performance, investment, and growth; and
- a limited track record in experimentation and innovation, which were essential to the success of the public-private forums in East Asia. This was partly due to the fact that the councils’ agendas were mostly set by multilateral donors which were pursuing their own policy reform agendas, and partly due to the bias in the membership of the councils to large investors.
- African Development Bank. (2012). Assessing the impact of Presidents Investors’ Advisory Council: Country case studies. Tunis: African Development Bank.
- Page, J. (2014). Industrial policy in practice: Africa’s Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils (UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2014/117). Helsinki: UNU. See document online
- World Bank. (2005b). Presidential investors’ advisory council in Africa: Impact assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank. See document online