Despite nearly $10 billion in international police assistance, the Afghan police are riddled with corruption and incompetence. This report reviews past failures and current challenges facing the international police assistance programme in Afghanistan. The US strategy for the Afghan police is to increase numbers, enlarge the ‘train and equip’ programme, and engage the police against the Taliban. This approach has not worked in the past, however. The role of the police is in controlling crime, protecting Afghan citizens, and increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government. International police assistance should expand as part of a comprehensive programme for security sector reform and the rule of law.
The Afghan National Police includes the uniformed police force, plus specialised police forces dealing with public order, counternarcotics, terrorism, and border control. While growth in numbers has been significant, the ANP is unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency.
International donors initially set aside a comprehensive security sector reform programme in favour of a ‘lead nation’ framework, with one lead nation assigned to each of four security sector pillars. Assignments were made with little attention to expertise, experience, or resources, and there was no mechanism to ensure a coordinated approach. Once engaged, international donors regressed into train-and-equip programmes that focused on rapidly improving operational effectiveness but that largely ignored management and governance structures.
The European Union has replaced Germany as the lead partner for police reform, but the United States has the largest police programme, which is directed by the U.S. military. Putting soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarisation of the ANP and its use as a counterinsurgency force.
- Using improperly trained, equipped, and supported ANP patrol men as ‘little soldiers’ has resulted in the police suffering three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army. Police are assigned in small numbers to isolated posts without backup and are targeted by the insurgents.
- Beyond funding the Taliban, the explosion in Afghan narcotics production fuelled widespread corruption in the Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers became increasingly common as did other forms of criminality.
- The many bilateral police assistance programmes reflected the practices of the donor countries, and often were not coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programmes.
A broader international community approach to police assistance should recognise that the role of police in successful counterinsurgency efforts is to establish relations with the public, protect citizens against violence, and work as a component of the criminal justice system along with effective courts and prisons. To create an effective and professional police force in Afghanistan, the United States should:
- Use the military to fight the Taliban and to provide force protection for the police.
- Emphasise civilian police skills and the relationship between civilian police and their communities in training programmes. Donors and the Afghan government need to agree a common training curriculum.
- Expand the Afghan Constabulary. Prior to the Soviet intervention, the Afghan police were divided between a civil police that performed law enforcement functions and a constabulary (gendarmerie) that was responsible for maintaining public order, operating in rural areas, combating banditry, and patrolling the border. The Afghan National Civil Order Police reflect this tradition and have served effectively. Efforts should be made to retain members of this force, which suffers from high levels of attrition, and expand it to take on operations in contested areas.
- Reform the Interior Ministry. Afghanistan’s police cannot operate effectively without the supervision and support of the Interior Ministry, which has been neglected by donors.
- Improve the criminal justice system. Efforts to improve courts and prisons have lagged behind the massive expenditures on improving the police. A comprehensive, holistic approach to reforming the criminal justice sector is needed. This may involve imaginative programmes to combine elements of the traditional and formal legal process.
