This paper is a critique of the concept and practice of stabilization as practiced by leading states from the global north in peace support interventions.
It begins by noting how the concept of peace has been side-lined in recent years and has been supplanted by ‘stabilization’, ‘security’ and other concepts that are based on ideas of control. It then charts how the term stabilization has entered the peace-making and peacebuilding lexicon, stating that it lacks definitional clarity and is often found alongside a broad range of security and peace-related terms. The article explains the ascendancy of the term, and the practice of stabilization locating much of the explanation in the fallout of the War on Terror.
Key findings:
- An argument made in defence of stabilization is that it is an emergency interim measure required when the security situation does not allow a more expansive, civilian focused international mission. This ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ argument has plausibility, but only in a limited sense. Stabilization, as a concept and practice lowers the horizons of peace and peace interventions. It moves us away from the realm of emancipation towards the realm of control. The term suggests a conservative exercise of maintaining a controlled environment rather than emancipation or liberation. Profound social change requires transformation across many levels of society. Such transformation is likely to have unforeseen consequences, many of which might challenge western norms and sensibilities. State-building is the central plank of most peace-support interventions. Statist and institutionalist methods and ends are preferred by the international guardians of peace. Such approaches risks excluding creativity, innovation, dissent, resistance and pluralism; all indicators of agency and of a vibrant polity.
- Many stabilization missions mention concepts such as local legitimacy, participation, empowerment and consent. Yet the use of a corporate and plastic language often does not equate to a fundamental re-ordering of power away from national and international elites. The primary aim of stabilization is usually ordered transition, with the transition bounded by structures set down by international financial institutions and diplomatic conventions. In cases where people power has challenged international order established actors from the global north have branded these activities as ‘irresponsible’.
- The mainstreaming of stabilization has resulted in a hollowing out of peace in international approaches to intervention. Peace still plays a role, rhetorically at least, in the statements of international organizations. Yet, with stabilization, it has to share a billing with securitized and institutionalized order. The use of peace with security, which is a recurrent theme in most definitions of stabilization, undercuts the distinctive value of peace. The danger is that peace is relegated to just another glib buzzword that is empty of meaning.
- The concept of stabilization further normalizes the role of the military and aligned security agencies into peacebuilding. As seen by both the US and UK, stabilization is about harnessing civilian and military know-how, and institutionalizing the working relationships between the two sectors. The principal role of militaries is to fight, they are trained, equipped and conditioned to operate through a security lens. The routine and institutionalized inclusion of the military in peace-support operations endangers expansive notions of peace that are based on the fulfilment of human potential, imaginative and creative expressions of political and cultural desires.
