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Home»Document Library»Beyond ‘Shadow-Boxing’ and ‘Lip Service’: The enforcement of arms embargoes in Africa

Beyond ‘Shadow-Boxing’ and ‘Lip Service’: The enforcement of arms embargoes in Africa

Library
Guy Lamb
2007

Summary

How effective have international arms embargoes been in reducing the supply of weapons into countries in Africa? What factors determine the success or failure of arms embargoes? This paper from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) analyses the monitoring and enforcement of United Nations arms embargoes in Africa. Examining international embargoes of nine African countries, it finds that the impact of arms embargoes depends on the commitment of all states to enforce them.

The UN has sought to improve the implementation of arms embargoes through enhancing organisational capacity and extending its monitoring capability. The effectiveness of arms embargoes, however, is primarily dependent on the member states monitoring and enforcing them. While arms embargoes often reduce the transfer of weapons into targeted countries, their impact is limited. Arms-producing states and states neighbouring target countries tend to prioritise economic and political interests over commitments to international peace and security. Many African states, sub-regional organisations and the African Union (AU) do not actively support or monitor the enforcement of arms embargoes on the continent.

While ascertaining the failure of an arms embargo is relatively simple, determining whether an embargo has been successful is more difficult. Factors important to an understanding of embargo enforcement include UN Security Council actions, member states’ activities and the integrity and policing of borders and airspace:

  • The UN Security Council has sought to reduce loopholes and problems in enforcing embargoes by expanding and standardising definitions of arms and clarifying embargo violations. 
  • The Security Council has regularised the establishment of independent panels of experts to more closely monitor arms embargoes, investigate violations and provide recommendations. 
  • In the cases of many African arms embargoes violations, are primarily due to lack of national legislation and appropriate policy and implementation. However, states often intentionally violate arms embargoes due to political and economic interests. 
  • In the majority of cases, states bordering the targeted countries, as well as arms-producing states, were largely responsible for embargo violations. 
  • Many of the states and regions targeted by embargoes had inadequately-policed borders and/or points of entry and unregulated and unmonitored airspace. These conditions are highly conducive to embargo-busting and concealment activities.

In order for arms embargoes in Africa and for a prospective arms treaty to be effective, the following are required:

  • the strengthening of the UN process and system of designing, monitoring and verifying arms embargoes;
  • the compilation and implementation of measures to regulate the arms trade at AU and sub-regional levels;
  • the establishment of arms trade monitoring agencies within the AU and sub-regional organisations which have appropriate human and financial resources and submit regular reports;
  • punitive action by the AU and sub-regional organisations against states and actors that violate UN arms embargoes;
  • the establishment of national-level policy and legislation on the regulation of the arms trade, where such policy and legislation is outdated or absent; and
  • establishment of appropriate government agencies to make and implement policy and legislation on the regulations of the arms trade.

Source

Lamb, G. 2007. 'Beyond 'Shadow-Boxing' and 'Lip Service': The enforcement of arms embargoes in Africa', Occasional Paper 135, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

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