Why are Lebanese and international efforts failing to stem the flow of weapons into Lebanon? Does the Lebanese government lack the capacity, or the will, to control its borders? This article, by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, argues that Hizbullah’s political ascendancy and its re-emergence as the party of resistance will ensure Hizbullah retains an armed capacity. Furthermore, the Lebanese government, regional governments and the UN are reluctant to disarm the resistance. This will hamper efforts to increase Lebanon’s border monitoring capacity.
The challenges of securing Lebanon’s 320km border with Syria are huge. Despite denials by the Syrian government, significant amounts of weapons and munitions have been smuggled into Lebanon from Syria. A recent border assessment by the UN’s Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) stated that the level of cooperation and coordination was low, particularly in terms of inter-agency information sharing and joint planning. Furthermore, Lebanese border management was focused more on territorial defence than the establishment of border surveillance to prevent smuggling.
An ineffective border regime increases the likelihood of an inflow of weapons, explosives and operational know-how to all groups in Lebanon. This has significant implications:
- A re-armed Hizbullah increases the likelihood of rocket attacks against Israel.
- Israel may see the issue of arms smuggling and the capability enhancement of Hizbullah as provocation and attack Lebanon.
- Attempts by international advisors to encourage the seizure of Hizbullah weapons could increase tensions with the international presence in Lebanon. This could lead to further attacks on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and prominent Lebanese figures.
- Porous borders also bring insurgents who attack the Lebanese Army and population, increasing the threat from within. The Lebanese Army is likely to have to repeat its struggle at Nahr Al-Bared with another Al-Qa’ida affiliated Islamist group.
- The rearming of all parties in Lebanon further threatens internal stability.
The international community would be naïve to think that Lebanon’s security forces are going to risk confrontation with Hizbullah by actively seek to enforce the arms embargo on the Lebanon-Syria border. Furthermore, the reasons for the armed resistance by Hizbullah will endure and this will undercut any attempt to promote a more holistic integrated border management system.
- Many Lebanese consider that the resistance is part of Lebanon’s national defence strategy (given the weak state security structures) to be used in further confrontations with Israel.
- Hizbullah will not be pressured to disarm by Syria as long as Syrian aspirations for the return of the Golan Heights are unfulfilled.
- Hizbullah will form part of a newly constituted national unity government, hold ministerial posts and enjoy increased influence. It has capitalised on its gains in demanding a guaranteeing third in a reconstituted Lebanese Cabinet. This will ensure that no initiative to disarm the resistance will be seriously considered.
- The Lebanese army will not be used to disarm the resistance. Such a move would likely result in the disintegration of the army, a significant percentage of whose soldiers are Hizbullah’s co-religionists.
