International state-building interventions frequently invite controversy and the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was no exception. Can international intervention succeed where local participation is excluded? Should a ‘peace-maintenance’ mandate involve bestowing sovereignty on the United Nations? This paper, compiled for Development and Change, reviews the governorship style of intervention exercised by the UN in East Timor, highlights the problems associated with such a total form of international administration and recommends a ‘participatory intervention’ doctrine for future enterprises.
78.5 per cent of East Timorese voted in favour of independence rather than an autonomy arrangement with Indonesia in 1999. Indonesian armed forces and militia launched a three-week offensive destroying buildings, infrastructure and, most importantly, a significant element of the human resources skills base. The perceived power vacuum created by this all-encompassing breakdown led to the UN assuming statehood and sovereignty during the ensuing transitional phase prior to national elections.
Only an absolute form of transitional authority was deemed commensurate in order to take control of the Timorese political process. Re-establishing an executive, legislature and judiciary with central administration over the entire country was regarded as the swiftest and most effective way to ‘rebuild’ East Timor. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was unique in a number of ways:
- Administrative functions were assumed by UNTAET more totally than in any other UN mission, with the body corporate inheriting the status of sovereignty and UNTAET’s Transitional Administrator acting as head of state rather than a UN representative.
- UNTAET hoped to tackle the underlying causes of conflict by assuming total control of the political sphere, transforming the political dynamics and then transferring control to a newly-implemented state machine.
- UN officials assumed unprecedented powers. This was felt necessary because the Timorese lacked the skills required for self-government.
- Decentralisation plans were thwarted on a number of levels resulting in re-centralisation measures that undermined relative organisational coherence and excluded Timorese participation.
- Local council election plans designed to introduce local democracy and encourage downward accountability were eventually rejected in favour of a provisional appointment approach.
The peaceful Constituent Assembly elections of 2001 indicated mission accomplished for UNTAET. For the Timorese people, however, claims of success based on a peaceful election were hollow because the left behind a nation in ruins. As such, the intensity of UN intervention in East Timor has raised a number of issues:
- In implementing such an absolutist form of authority, UNTAET became a master rather than a servant of the local population and assumed that East Timor was a political no-man’s-land without indigenous social structures.
- Authoritarian UN rule failed to separate powers and create space for peaceful opposition, thereby discouraging the culture of freedom of expression and disagreement necessary for the instillation of democratic values.
- In assuming full responsibility for the functions of government, UNTAET failed to delegate authority downwards to encourage effective territorial management and capacity for future self-sustaining governance.
- In favouring short-term UN personnel who remained largely removed from local politics and the social dynamics behind it, the Timorese people were overwhelmingly ignored or excluded during the transitional period.
- In future missions, the UN must engage in a more participatory intervention involving the local population to increase legitimacy and effectiveness.
