What was the political impact of the government’s Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme in the 2006 Brazilian elections? This study estimates the extent to which the programme increased the probability of voting for President Lula. It concludes that Bolsa Família undoubtedly helped to re-elect Lula. While there is still considerable debate over the long-term implications of CCTs, the significant pro-incumbent electoral effects identified suggest that CCTs could be both ‘good policy’ and ‘good politics’. Knowledge among politicians of these electoral effects could increase political will for the implementation of CCTs and reduce reliance on clientelism.
The 2006 presidential elections in Brazil marked a dramatic shift in Lula’s traditional voting base away from the more developed regions of the country and into its poorest areas. Incumbent president Lula obtained a sweeping majority of the votes in the less developed areas of the country, reversing a two-decade personal and party history of performing significantly better in more developed regions; these elections represented a significant change in Lula’s electorate. An important development of the previous few years was the creation of Bolsa Família (BF), a massive cash transfer programme implemented and maintained by the federal government. Did BF influence the change in Lula’s voting base?
The study used a combination of different types of data and analysis (a simultaneous equations model, ecological inference analysis and analysis of individual level survey data) and found that BF had a considerable impact on individuals’ voting decisions. The different methods produced results in the same order of magnitude.
- Regardless of the controls used, the scope of BF had a positive, significant and substantially relevant effect on Lula’s vote share.
- BF increased the probability that the poorest voters would vote for Lula by approximately 0.3, which is enough to produce significant aggregate changes. Estimates suggest that close to five million votes might have swung Lula’s way due to BF alone.
- Support for Lula among non-beneficiaries of the programme was also very high in the less developed regions of the country where BF provided economic stimulus. In these regions the municipalities rely heavily on BF; there is little private investment or local tax revenue and the public sector dominates the economy.
- The programme’s indirect electoral effect through the economic stimulus it provided ranged from approximately one-fifth to two-fifths of the direct effect of the programme, depending on the level of development of the municipality.
- There is still little insight into whether the electoral effects of the conditional cash transfers will fade away as time progresses. Two decades ago, economic stabilisation contributed to the immediate re-election of governments across the region, but did not translate into sustained electoral support over longer periods.
The question of BF’s electoral effects is particularly relevant if the economic outlook becomes gloomier, budget cuts are considered, and priorities need to be reset. Development agencies should note that:
- While conditional cash transfer programmes may be considered ‘good policy’ by development agencies, politicians are more likely to implement them if they know that these programmes will deliver short-term election results as well as longer-term development outcomes.
- Retrospective electoral support for the proponents of policies such as the BF programme makes CCTs a low-risk, cost-efficient option that can benefit both politicians and voters.
- Demonstrating the political potential of conditional cash transfer programmes may also serve to reduce reliance on clientelism in many developing countries, with politicians being able to reap similar benefits by providing public goods as opposed to private ones.
NB: This paper is no longer available online. The link is to a revised, broader paper:
Zucco, C., 2011, ‘Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior: Redistribution and Clientelism in Developing Democracies’, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.
