Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a rise in the number of semi-authoritarian regimes: regimes that contain elements of both democratic and authoritarian systems. This paper, by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that although these regimes allow for a certain degree of political freedom and openness, they cannot be regarded as democratic. This is because they lack the essential characteristic of a democratic system, namely, the ability to transfer power to a new leadership.
The adoption of outwardly democratic reforms in many countries during the 1990s was motivated by several factors. These include the loss of appeal of socialism, the quest for internal and external legitimacy within newly independent states, pressure from donors and the influence of democratic transition in neighbouring countries. However, these reforms are incomplete and many regimes have retained authoritarian features.
The terms ‘transitional’ or ‘imperfectly democratic’ are often used to describe such regimes, but ‘semi-authoritarianism’ is more useful because it highlights a crucial aspect – the existence of mechanisms that prevent the transfer of political power from the incumbent government or political elite through free and fair elections. Other key characteristics of semi-authoritarian systems include:
- The absence of meaningful change in the distribution of power in society: resulting from efforts by the government to manipulate state institutions, the domestic opposition and public opinion.
- The source of power and legitimacy in semi-authoritarian regimes is difficult to locate due to lack of transparency during elections and the absence of clear power relationships between the government and citizens.
- Semi-authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian systems in that there is a greater level of openness within political institutions, the economy and civil society. However, openness is much higher in democracies.
- Semi-authoritarian regimes can be divided into three main types: Dynamic regimes that may allow for incremental democratic change over time; equilibrium regimes that require profound changes to become democratic; and regimes in decay that are unlikely to democratise.
Current donor initiatives to support democracy in semi-authoritarian regimes are inadequate and fail to address key challenges, particularly the locus of power in these regimes. To remedy this shortcoming, donors should:
- Recognise that certain donor-funded programmes, such as media training and assistance to NGOs, may be ineffective because they are easily absorbed and neutralised by the incumbent authorities.
- Review traditional assumptions on democratic change, which are often based on a simple three-stage linear path of liberalisation, transition and consolidation. Semi-authoritarian regimes are more complex and may consist of various elements of these stages.
- Understand the ineffectiveness of democracy programmes that fail to challenge the distribution and exercise of power in semi-authoritarian regimes. Donor assistance to government institutions and civil society may be redundant if power does not reside in these bodies.
- Recognise that impact may be limited due to conflicting economic and security interests. This is particularly the case for US foreign policy.
- Create appropriate policy instruments to encourage democratic reform in semi-authoritarian regimes, focusing on dealing with the mechanisms that prevent the transfer and distribution of political power.
- Develop a coherent donor strategy for semi-authoritarian countries covering key issues like the nature of domestic political dynamics, the presence of alternative political groups and the political space open to independent groups.
