Do informal systems of power, such as patrimonialism and clientelism, necessarily hinder democratisation? Are they bad for poor people? This paper written for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) explores the negative aspects and hidden positive effects of clientelism and patrimonialism; it then looks at evidence on liberalization, democratization, decentralisation and civil service reform as ways to good governance.
While democratic institutions are supposed to be transparent and facilitate equal participation to political power, informal systems of power such as patrimonialism and clientelism are based on exclusive, unequal relations and unwritten social norms. These two systems are not isolated from each other or society at large. As the Russian case shows, informal systems are based on existing patterns of power, and they can adapt to the development of formal institutions and coexist with them.
Informal politics may have negative effects on democratic institutions. However, they retain positive potential, depending on the degree of reciprocity between citizens and patrons. Some degree of informal politics is necessary to any political system and is not good or bad in itself.
Citizens may perceive bureaucracies as impersonal and focussed on procedures, as opposed to the personalized services offered by patron-client arrangements. In Brazilian shantytowns, the poor look at clientelism, not ‘good governance’, as a source of security.
- Institutional change does not follow predictable courses, but unfolds according to its specific context.
- Patronage ensures loyalty to leaders and can play a role in party-building.
- Clientelism adds on existing divisions, as in Jamaica and Benin. However, it has desirable effects in Thailand, where patronage monopoly is absent.
- Patronage may have different outcomes: in East Asia, corporate elites re-invested state subsidies and produced growth. In Africa, rents were consumed by elites.
- The Indian case shows that it is possible to break the cycle of rent-seeking.
- In Africa, corruption put at risk productivity, led to the exploitation of public resources and contributed to collusions between states and criminality.
Economic liberalization, democratization, decentralisation and civil service reform are major strategies for the promotion of institutional change. They are not necessarily effective: in Taiwan, South Korea and Ghana democratic institutions create space for clientelism; in Russia, Malaysia and Kenya, liberalisation enhanced inequality, exclusion and political violence. In Latin America and Asia, decentralisation reduced the power of local elites, while in Brazil and former USSR, it created space for corruption.
- It is necessary to understand the socio-political context of informal politics, the choices available to citizens and what incentives may limit patronage.
- Clientelism may be mapped through the identification of actors, winners, losers, and potential actors of change.
- Policy-makers should only curb clientelistic practices which have socio-economic costs.
- Institutions should empower marginalized groups and promote civic education to change common acceptance of clientelism.
