What kinds of governance arrangements are most effective in Africa in providing the public goods essential to sustained and inclusive development? Drawing on empirical research by the Africa Power and Politics Programme in Malawi, Niger and Ghana, this article challenges conventional perceptions of ‘good governance’. It argues for ‘practical hybrid’ arrangements that combine authoritative coordination with an enabling environment for local problem-solving and a constructive use of culturally legitimate ways of working. A developmental form of neo-patrimonialism is more likely to provide the necessary institutional discipline than ‘good governance’ initiatives.
Comparative analysis of governance case studies at local, sectoral and national levels suggests that authoritative institutions that enable local solutions work best in providing public goods. Three key success factors are:
- Local collective action through which communities deal with their specific problems in their own ways. This works because it is anchored in established forms of social obligation.
- Administrative coordination and policy coherence among the agencies and actors involved.
- Authorities capable of imposing rule enforcement and discipline within public organisations and among service providers. To have a generalised effect, this must stem from the national political system.
The findings regarding local collective action need to be distinguished from the widely-held belief that better governance requires the funding and encouragement of ‘associational’ life. Co-production is not easily facilitated by donor-funded and inspired committees or associations conceived as formal advocacy groups in the ‘Northern’ mode, or as co-managers. Even democratic participation, seen as a way of arousing citizen demand for better public services, emerges from the research as a weak force at best.
The research suggests a theoretical distinction between developmental and predatory neo-patrimonialism that builds on and modifies previous ‘developmental state’ models. For example, the East Asian model of developmental technocracies – autonomous state bureaucracies embedded in business networks – does not fit the African environment. Successful African regimes have built their economies through state-driven demand for returns to patronage-based enterprises. Neo-patrimonial regimes can produce developmental outcomes instead of the corruption and economic collapse normally associated with patronage politics (‘predatory neo-patrimonialism’). ‘Developmental patrimonialism’ flourishes when there is centralised rent control under a unified elite and investment in long-term productive projects or enterprises. Such a regime demands and sustains a competent and disciplined civil service that has sufficient autonomy to implement development policies.
A regime that is a) characterised by developmental patrimonialism and b) expected to retain power in the long-term seems more likely to promote country-owned development than competitive democracies. (The latter can incentivise short-termism and the pillage of public resources.) At the local level, governance arrangements that best support development may be informal and complex, involving pay-offs and deals. Thus, ‘practical hybrid’ institutions are needed that combine authoritative coordination with an enabling environment for local, culturally legitimate problem-solving. International NGOs and donors need to:
- Work with the realities of country governance as they find them – experience does not suggest that developmental governance can be purchased with funding and conditionalities.
- Support authoritative coordination and policy coherence by African governments and avoid fragmented initiatives. Conflicts over jurisdiction and accountability together with multiple sources of funding hinder service delivery.
- Note that standard NGO or donor approaches seldom enhance local collective action to improve public goods provision. Blueprints for associations should be avoided.
